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SENSITIVE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 22, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *AMH*

Lebanon: Meetings with Ambassadors Evron and Alhegelan.  
During my meeting with Ambassador Evron today I explained very forcefully the serious problems that recent Israeli activities in Lebanon were causing for both our bilateral relationship and for our mutual interests in the area. My remarks were put into the context of a series of Israeli actions, all taken without prior consultation with us, starting with the downing of the Syrian helicopters in April which triggered the Lebanese missile crisis, through the bombing of the Iraqi reactor, to today's problems in Lebanon. I pointed out that subsequent Israeli explanations were generally unconvincing about the relationship of such actions to longer term strategic objectives, including our cherished mutual goal: the search for peace. I concluded by pointing out that we had to have a better understanding of each other's motives, intentions and long-term strategic objectives if our relationships were not to suffer and most particularly if we were to become real strategic partners.

Evron promised to convey this strong message to Begin immediately by telephone. He also promised to provide us today with a copy of the transcript of his phone conversation with Begin in which Begin makes clear that Israel did not reject a ceasefire as alleged by the media. Phil Habib has already corrected this erroneous impression in Beirut. He will also be discussing the matter with Crown Prince Fahd in Saudi Arabia tonight or tomorrow.

In my subsequent conversation with Saudi Ambassador Alhegelan, he made a strong pitch, on behalf of Crown Prince Fahd, that Habib deal directly with the PLO in this crisis. This is a follow-up to the presentation he made to Bill Clark a couple of days ago. Bill and I both explained our policy on contacts with the PLO and urged that in recognition of this real constraint the Saudis continue to assist Habib by playing an active and helpful role with the PLO.

In this difficult and sensitive situation we should continue to let our actions, including most particularly our support for the Habib mission, speak for themselves. It is most important that all Administration spokesmen understand the need to avoid letting our public statements, rather than Begin's actions, become the focus of domestic and Congressional attention. Also we will be most effective in dealing with Begin by making our points in private and avoiding public controversy.

RDS 2/3 7/22/01 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)

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BY (N) NARA DATE 7/31/01



The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT

July 23, 1981

PR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Attached is Secretary Haig's Evening Report for July 22, 1981.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
James Baker  
Michael Deaver

RW  
3/12/83

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Received on July 23, 1981, 11:25 a.m.

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