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NARA DATE 7/3/16

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

November 10, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From


Alexander M. Haig, Jr.



1. The Europeans and the MFO. The representatives of the UK, France, the Netherlands and Italy came to see me again this evening. They presented a revised "Statement of the Four" (before going to the EC Ten for clearance) which followed my suggestions to them in every regard, even to the point of avoiding mention of the Venice Declaration. I told them their new version was excellent, and they will now proceed to seek approval by the Ten. We still face a major problem: the Four believe they may not be able to get the Ten to either (a) issue no statement at all, (b) delay its statement for ten days or so, or (c) modify the offensive language of its statement. I told the Four that unless they could accomplish something along these lines, the Statement of the Ten would simply cancel out the excellent work they have done in revising the Statement of the Four. They agreed to report our views back to Europe and see what can be done. In the meantime we will hope to cool Israeli rhetoric while we pursue this effort. (S)

- 2. Meeting with Saudi Ambassador. At Crown Prince Fahd's request, Saudi Ambassador Alhegelan told me today that the Crown Prince continues to view his Eight Points as essentially a "safety net" for the future and that, while they expect an Arab League endorsement, the Crown Prince had made no decisions about moving to the UN. He also expressed nervousness at the possibility that we would move to a more negative public posture on the Eight Points under Israeli pressure. Finally, he suggested some sort of "contingency plan" between us "on the future"--presumably to determine the time when the Eight Points or some modification thereof might be an appropriate framework for peace discussions. I emphasized that, while we would not be pressured away from our public posture on the Eight Points (your statement today was reconfirmation) we were committed to pursuing the autonomy talks under Camp David and it was very premature to even be thinking about other alternatives. Alhegelan seemed to take our point that all should refrain from public rhetoric in this uncertain and dangerous period. (S)
- 3. Israeli Overflights of Saudi Arabia: A Deliberate Signal. In a conversation with Ambassador Lewis, Israeli Defense Minister Sharon confirmed Israeli incursions into Saudi airspace yesterday, saying that they were carrying out photo reconnaissance. It is clear the overflights are a deliberate Israeli signal to us that they now regard Saudi Arabia as posing a threat requiring the kind of periodic airspace violations for reconnaissance purposes that Israel conducts over Jordan and Lebanon. The Israelis told us, however, that we should not interpret such flights as "a warlike act" against the Saudis. The overflights are also a signal that Begin no longer feels bound to the 1977 commitment he made to President Carter not to overfly the Saudi's Tabuk Airfield. We intend to make it clear both to the Israeli Government and in our public statements that we do not condone any such violations of Saudi airspace. (S) RDS 2/3 11/10/01 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ATTACHMENT

November 11, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT:

Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Attached is Secretary Haig's Evening Report for Tuesday, November 10, 1981.

The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

SECRET ATTACHMENT

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