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155835  
SENSITIVE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *Q*

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1. U.S. Reply to Israel on Golan Issue. I called in the Israeli Deputy Chief of Mission Nehushtan tonight (Evron was out of the city) to deliver to him our written reply to the Israeli Foreign Minister's letter of December 15, informing Israel of our vote at the Security Council and our decision to not proceed at this time with the MOU on strategic cooperation. I elaborated on this letter to make certain the Israelis understand that we are deeply disturbed at their failure to take our interests into consideration and that while our commitment to their fundamental security has not changed, we are unable to proceed at present with "business as usual". Nehushtan replied, speaking personally, that he felt we were reacting too harshly considering the enormity of other events around the world. I stressed to him the importance that we never face such a situation again and that our decisions were a consequence of the position in which Israel had placed us. (C)

2. Security Council Agrees to Adopt Resolution on Israeli Annexation of Golan Heights. Syria has agreed to changes in its draft resolution on the Golan Heights, making it acceptable to us. A reference to "relevant UN resolutions" that we interpret to mean Resolutions 242 and 338, has been added. The Syrians also agreed to water down language in the resolution which could have been taken as a reference to future sanctions. Voting on the resolution is expected to take place late this evening. (S)

3. Poland -- Quadripartite Consultations. Walt Stoessel met this afternoon with the British, French, and West German Ambassadors to share assessments of the situation in Poland. He gave them the text of your statement, which they welcomed. There was discussion of the likelihood that at some point the West will have to consider providing additional humanitarian assistance to Poland. All thought that any humanitarian assistance should be kept outside Polish government channels, especially given evidence that previous aid had been channeled to the military. A difference of view emerged, among the Allies over how we can most effectively warn the Soviets of the consequences of direct involvement. The British and French support our calling attention to the fact that the repression in Poland could not have occurred without the full knowledge and support of the Soviet Union. The German Ambassador, however, expressed concern that portraying Polish Prime Minister Jaruzelski as a Soviet stooge could restrict Western leverage in eventually winning a rollback of the repressive measures. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

RDS 2/3 12/17/01 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)

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BY *RW* NARA DATE 9/2/11



The President has seen 12/18/81

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT

December 18, 1981

DR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES W. NANCE

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Attached is Al Haig's Evening Report for Thursday,  
December 17, 1981.

CC: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT

RW  
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