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DESKBY 051600Z

FM BUENOS AIRES 05/1330Z MAR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 63 OF 05 MARCH 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE PORT STANLEY (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR)

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 62 : FALKLANDS TALKS

1. MY INTERVIEW WITH ENRIQUE ROS YESTERDAY EVENING TURNED INTO AN EXCHANGE OF COMMISERATIONS. HE WAS AT PAINS TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO US THAT HE HAD FIRST LEARNT OF CONTENTS OF MY TELEGRAMS 57 AND 58 FROM THE PRESS, THAT HE ACCEPTED THAT THE FALSE IMPRESSION OF MENACE IN THE MFA STATEMENT'S LAST PARAGRAPH WAS QUOTE UNHAPPY UNQUOTE AND THAT THE MINISTRY ACCEPTED NO (REPEAT NO) RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REMARKS ASCRIBED TO IT UNATTRIBUTABLY (IE PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 57). HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD WHAT MR LUCE HAD FELT OBLIGED TO SAY IN THE HOUSE AND WAS NOT INCLINED TO COMPLAIN IF COUNCILLORS SHOULD LET SLIP DETAILS OF THE WORKING PAPER OR EVEN OF THE BOUT DE PAPIER PROPOSALS (THOUGH HERE HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE HOPED A DISTINCTION WOULD BE DRAWN, AS IN THE BOUT DE PAPIER, BETWEEN WHAT WAS PROPOSAL AND THE EARLIER PART WHICH WAS SIMPLY A RESTATEMENT FOR THE RECORD).

2. I, WHILE COMMISERATING WITH HIS DIFFICULTIES, DROVE HOME THE POINT THAT THE PRICE OF THESE MISHAPS WAS LIKELY TO BE EVEN LESS CAPACITY FOR SPEEDY RESPONSE BY OUR SIDE. COUNCILLORS MIGHT WELL FIND PAUSE FOR EMOTIONS TO COOL BETTER THAN THE RISK OF A REJECTION IF DECISIONS WERE TAKEN NOW (I HAD STANLEY TELEGRAM NO 29 IN MIND). IF MR LUCE COULD HAVE PERHAPS BEEN IN A POSITION TO CLEAR WHAT WAS AGREED IN NEW YORK WITH HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE FCO IT WAS NOW MORE LIKELY THAT OTHER CABINET MEMBERS WOULD EXPECT TO BE CONSULTED AND THAT TOOK TIME, ETC. THERE WAS NO WAY IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS WITH A PISTOL AT THE HEAD COULD BE AUTHORISED AND SOMEHOW THE PISTOL WOULD HAVE TO BE REMOVED. I SUGGESTED SOME DISCLAMATORY AND EMOLLIENT STATEMENT BY COSTA MENDEZ OR THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE THE BEST WAY OF LAYING THE SPECTRES RAISED.

3. WE NEED EVERY WEAPON TO HAND IN RESISTING ARGENTINE PRESSURES FOR UNDUE HASTE. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT THE MFA'S OBVIOUS EMBARRASSMENT OVER THE RECENT OUTBURSTS SHOULD BE USED IN THIS WAY AND THAT I SHOULD KEEP UP THE PRESSURE WITH COSTA MENDEZ WHOM I EXPECT TO SEE THIS EVENING OR TOMORROW MORNING.

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4. AS AGREED WITH HME WASHINGTON BY TELEPHONE, I SHALL ALSO ACT TODAY WITH US AMBASSADOR HERE ON YOUR TELNO 415 TO WASHINGTON.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

WILLIAMS

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 66 OF 05 MARCH 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE PORT STANLEY (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR)
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 63: FALKLANDS DISPUTE

1. IN MY INTERVIEW WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS EVENING I, AT HIS INVITATION, REHEARSED AGAIN THE REASONS WHY THE RECENT PRESS OUTBURSTS WERE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND COULD LEAD TO DELAY IN OUR RESPONSE. COSTA MENDEZ FELT IT NECESSARY TO REPEAT FORMALLY AND AT SOME LENGTH THE EXPLANATIONS OF ARGENTINE DISSATISFACTION WITH PROGRESS THAT WE HAD HEARD FROM ROS IN NEW YORK (TO WHICH I REPLIED FIRMLY ON SIMILARLY WELL WORN LINES) BUT ENDED BY DENYING THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WISHED IN ANY WAY TO THREATEN AND BY ADMITTING WITH REGRET THAT THEY COULD NOT ALWAYS PREVENT UNHELPFUL PRESS TREATMENT.
2. HE THEN ASKED WHAT COULD BE DONE NOW AND I SUGGESTED ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS SPECIFICALLY DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM PRESS REPORTS THAT THREATS WERE BEING HELD IN RESERVE. IN REPLY HE DREW ATTENTION TO STATEMENTS HE HAD MADE EARLIER TODAY IN BRAZIL, MAKING CLEAR THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT IMPOSING DEADLINES BUT SETTING OUT A PROPOSED PROGRAMME WHICH INCLUDED ONLY RECOURSES CONTEMPLATED IN THE UN CHARTER.
3. WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT SOMETHING MORE SPECIFIC WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE HE ENTERED INTO A LONG DISCOURSE ON THE NEED FOR MORE SERIOUS AND CONTINUOUS DISCUSSIONS FOR WHICH, AS LATINS, THE ARGENTINES SAW THE DISCIPLINE OF A MONTHLY CALENDAR AS NECESSARY. I EXPLAINED THAT OUR ANGLO-SAXON RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT UNREALISTIC RHYTHMS WAS PRACTICAL AND CONCEALED NO DESIRE TO PROCRASTINATE. I COULD ONLY SAY THAT WE STILL HOPED TO GIVE HIM AN ANSWER AND TO PROCEED THEREAFTER AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. I ASKED HIM TO CONFIRM THAT WHAT HE STILL WANTED WAS APPROVAL OF THE NEW YORK DRAFT WORKING PAPER AND THIS HE DID. WE LEFT IT THAT I WOULD SEE HIM AS SOON AS I HAD ANYTHING TO COMMUNICATE.
4. THOUGH WE ARE PERSONAL FRIENDS AND COSTA MENDEZ SPEAKS EXCELLENT ENGLISH THE INTERVIEW WAS FORMAL AND MAINLY IN SPANISH. BOTH ROS AND FIGUEROA (THE MINISTER'S CHEF DE CABINET) WERE PRESENT BUT LARGELY SILENT. WE BOTH TALKED QUITE TOUGHLY, BUT ENDED IN FRIENDLY PERSONAL CHAT.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK

WILLIAMS

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