

Classification and Caveats

Precedence/Deskby

SECRET

FLASH

CZC  
RS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
ESKBY  
MFCO  
RE/ADD  
TELNO

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 SECRET  
4  
5  
6 FM FCO  
7 FLASH BUENOS AIRES  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 INFO IMMEDIATE PORT STANLEY, WASHINGTON  
10 INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO, BRAZILIA  
11 FALKLANDS CRISIS: YOUR TELNO 126

*Revs for Gov*

12 1. We are grateful to you and to the Americans for this report  
13 of US/Argentine exchanges on our behalf. While we shall continue  
14 to be grateful for American efforts to persuade the Argentine  
15 Government away from hasty or violent reactions, we do not see  
16 that we can usefully ask them to undertake negotiating a  
17 solution of the South Georgia problem on our behalf. For your  
18 own information we fear that we would end up with the Americans  
19 also exerting pressure on us to reach a solution which was  
20 politically unacceptable to us.

21 2. Your TUR was despatched before the prominent UK media stories  
22 about nuclear powered submarines and other ships being despatched  
23 to the Falklands. We must assume that these speculative reports

24 *Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).*  
25 *Weyland, 22/5/2012*

will give an impression

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword in
File number	Dept		Distribution  Standard SAmD Cabinet Office  Additional Falkland Islands
Drafted by (Block capitals)			
Telephone number			
Authorised for despatch			
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		

OUT TELELETTER (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

Page

SECRET

FLASH

2

1 <<<<  
 2 in Buenos Aires that we are seeking a naval rather than a  
 3 diplomatic way ~~out~~<sup>OUT</sup> of our difficulties. This could be a very  
 4 dangerous impression to leave - even for a few days.  
 5 3. We therefore think it important that we launch our diplomatic  
 6 initiative without further delay, even if the Argentine response  
 7 to this and the despatch of our Emissary is likely to be less  
 8 speedy (indeed there would be some advantage in not hastening  
 9 unduly). We therefore wish you to deliver the message in  
 10 my telno 116.  
 11 4. However we are very conscious of the skill and firmness with  
 12 which you have been handling these exchanges so far and we have  
 13 of course no wish to risk undermining your position as an  
 14 interlocutor. If you feel it would be helpful you may therefore  
 15 insert into the message a sentence to the effect that 'The  
 16 Emissary would be coming to support our Ambassador'. We would  
 17 rather not drop the references to 'constructive proposals'  
 18 because we think it important that the Argentines should not  
 19 think we have run out of any ideas except military ones.  
 20 5. As regards your further suggestion (your telno 128) that the  
 21 Emissary should be someone like Lord Carver or Lord Hill-Norton,  
 22 we think that negotiations would more effectively be carried out  
 23 at working level and that in any case some of the presentational  
 24 objections which would apply to sending a Minister to BA would  
 25 also apply to sending a prominent public figure.  
 26 6. I have been consulted in Jerusalem and agree.

27  
 28 CARRINGTON

29 NNNN  
 30  
 31  
 32  
 33  
 34

NNNN ends  
 teleletter

BLANK

Catchword