

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

MINUTES of a Meeting held in Room 5301, Ministry
of Defence, Main Building, Whitehall,
on WEDNESDAY 9 JUNE 1982 at 4.00 pm

PRESENT

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin,
Chief of the Defence Staff

Admiral Sir Henry Leach,
Chief of the Naval Staff

General Sir Edwin Bramall,
Chief of the General Staff

Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beetham,
Chief of the Air Staff

ALSO PRESENT

Air Chief Marshal Sir David Evans,
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
(Personnel & Logistics)

Lieutenant General Sir James Glover,
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
(Intelligence)

Lieutenant General Sir Maurice Johnston,
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
(Operational Requirements)

Commodore R G Heaslip,
Representing the Assistant Chief
of the Defence Staff (Policy)

Rear-Admiral D W Brown,
Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff
(Operations)

Air Vice-Marshal T B Stephenson,
Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff
(Signals)

Rear-Admiral J W T Walters,
Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff
(Personnel & Logistics)

Mr J M Stewart,
Representing the Permanent
Under Secretary

Mr D H Gillmore,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier J A C G Eyre
Captain J E S Raymond RN
Lieutenant Colonel J B R Peacock
Commander M Bickley RN

C O N T E N T S

PART I - ITEMS DISCUSSED AT THE MEETING

1-2. (1) OPERATION CORPORATE

PART II - ITEMS DEALT WITH PRIOR TO THE MEETING

NIL

Note:

1. Recorded as a Confidential Annex.

COS 71ST MEETING/82

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

COS 71ST MEETING/82 HELD ON
WEDNESDAY 9 JUNE 1982 AT 4.00 pmOPERATION CORPORATEITEM 1. SHORE-BASED AIR OPERATIONS AFTER THE REPOSSESSION
OF PORT STANLEY

1. SIR MICHAEL BEETHAM said that, regardless of the precise force level which might be required in the Falkland Islands in the future, there was an inescapable requirement for various equipment and support facilities to be provided at Port Stanley airfield as soon as possible after its repossession, to enable shore-based air operations to be conducted. The requirement would include navigational aids, control and warning radars, and ground handling and support equipment.

2. Summing up a short discussion, SIR TERENCE LEWIN said they would wish to agree that the Air Force Department, in conjunction with logistic staffs, should set in hand arrangements to provide and move to the Falkland Islands the equipment which would be necessary to make Port Stanley airfield operational as soon as possible after repossession.

ITEM 2. FUTURE FORCE LEVELS

3. The Committee had before them a paper (1) prepared by the Defence Policy Staff, identifying a range of options for future garrison force levels in the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.

4. SIR HENRY LEACH said that there was a need to identify the issues which would have to be faced once the immediate aim of repossessing the Falkland Islands had been achieved. However, the probable threat was now becoming clearer and the paper should therefore address the broader issue of the force levels which would be required in the South Atlantic to meet that threat. It would be important to make more precise assumptions to provide a reasonable basis for planning, and to specify the planning parameters. Furthermore, politico-economic aspects should be examined as well as military requirements. The forces deployed in the South Atlantic

Note:

1. Attachment to COS(Misc) 259/742/1 dated 4 June 1982.

would have 2 main tasks; to deter aggression, and to defeat any attack which might be mounted. This would require a combination of in-station forces and reinforcements at normal notice in the UK, possibly with a stockpile of equipment in the Falkland Islands. The paper should examine the effect that such a requirement would have on our ability to fulfil our other defence commitments, particularly to NATO, and should identify the need for shipping and aircraft to maintain lines of communication. It might also be necessary to provide supplies for the civilian population of the Falkland Islands.

5. Continuing, SIR HENRY LEACH proposed some planning parameters. He suggested that 1 September 1982 should be used as the starting date for planning purposes; the actual date would not be too critical. The force level should be based on that identified in Annex B to the paper, although it should be set out by Service rather than by environment. The task should be costed over a five year period, and planned in detail a year ahead; the former would meet the requirements of the NATO Defence Planning Questionnaire, ship refits and manpower planning, while the latter would allow for economic logistic and roulement planning.

6. MR STEWART (Representing the Permanent Under Secretary) agreed it would be helpful to clarify the military requirements in the way suggested by the Chief of the Naval Staff. He said the Falkland Islands garrison might only be part of the force levels required in the South Atlantic. It would be for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to identify the politico-economic issues, but he considered the paper should identify for Ministers the effect that continuing operations would have on defence costs and on our overall defence capability. It should highlight the need either to provide additional funds to meet these costs, or to accept a degradation in our ability to meet our existing commitments.

7. MR GILLMORE (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) said he believed there was little likelihood of the repossession of the Falkland Islands ending hostilities; the Argentines were likely to continue to fight at whatever level they could manage for as long as possible. In that event the onus for continuing hostilities should be clearly placed on Argentina. It might then be possible diplomatically to isolate Argentina, to persuade our partners to continue economic sanctions, and to dissuade other countries from assisting Argentina to rebuild and re-equip her armed forces. Hopefully this would destroy the Argentine will to continue fighting.

8. In discussion the following points were made:

a. If Argentina continued to attack the Falkland Islands, or our lines of communication, from mainland bases after we had repossessed the islands, it would be necessary to reconsider our policy concerning attacks within Argentine coastal waters and on her mainland.

b. Ascension Island would be important to any continuing operations in the South Atlantic, particularly air operations and the movement of reinforcements. This requirement should be included in the paper.

c. It would be premature to take account of possible international involvement in security arrangements for the Falkland Islands, although such a development would probably reduce the UK commitment.

d. The force mix should be examined to avoid duplication and overlap between the Services.

e. The paper should take account of the need for logistic support units.

9. Summing up, SIR TERENCE LEWIN said he would instruct the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Policy) to revise the paper (1) with the aim of defining the future force level in the South Atlantic as a basis for planning, taking account of the points they had made in discussion. The force level should be based on that given in Annex B to the paper; set out by Service; come into effect for planning purposes on 1 September 1982, for an initial period of one year to be reviewed quarterly; and costed over a five year period. They would wish to instruct their staffs to forward detailed comments to the Defence Policy Staff as soon as possible, and their Secretary to bring the paper forward for their consideration on 16 June 1982.

Note:

1. Attachment to COS(Misc) 259/742/1 dated 4 June 1982.

10. SIR TERENCE LEWIN went on to refer to their discussion (2) at their meeting that morning, and said he would also instruct the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Policy) to prepare a military appreciation on contingencies 6 and 7 set out in the Military Contingencies paper (3), in the light of the assessment being prepared (4) by the JIC. This appreciation could be the basis for a future planning directive to the Task Force Commander. They would agree that it would be premature to discuss the Command and Control paper (5) in isolation from these further studies, and they would therefore wish to instruct their Secretary to bring that paper forward for their consideration at a suitable time in the light of the work they had now set in hand.

Annex:

- A. Operation CORPORATE - Actions in Hand (1 page).

Notes:

2. COS 70th Meeting/82, Item 5.
3. Attachment to COS(Misc) 255/742/1 dated 3 June 1982.
4. JIC(82) 32nd Meeting, Item 1e.
5. COS 68th Meeting/82, Item 7.

OPERATION CORPORATE - ACTIONS IN HAND

ITEM	ARISING FROM COS MEETING	DECISION OR ACTION REQUIRED	SPONSOR	ACTION/ DECISION BY	CONTINUED	CURRENT STATE
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
0023	6/82 Item 1 (re-titled 40/82)	Military Options for Repossession of the Falkland Islands	ACDS(Pol)	DPS/DS 11	7/82 Item 4 12/82 Item 6 35/82 Item 4 40/82 Item 7 43/82 Item 5 50/82 Item 5 54/82 Item 5 62/82 Item 5	COS(Misc) 256/ 742/1 dated 3 Jun
0091	54/82 Item 5	Contingency Studies	ACDS(Pol)	ACDS(Pol)	62/82 Item 5	COS(Misc) 255/ 742/1 dated 3 Jun
0092	59/82 Item 6	Future Force Levels (Formerly Future Garrison Studies)	CDS	ACDS(Pol)	71/82 Item 2	For COS 16 Jun
0093	61/82 Item 6	Rules of Engagement	ACDS(Ops)	OD(SA)	OD(SA) 28 May	Periodic review by OD(SA)
0095	67/82 Item 1	Replacement of Stores and Equipment	DCDS(OR)/ DUS(P)	OD Jul 82		
0096	68/82 Item 7	Garrison Command and Control Arrangements	CDS	ACDS(Pol)	71/82 Item 2	Dependent on 0092 and 0099
0097	69/82 Item 5	Provision of Press facilities	PUS	CPR/AUS (D Staff)		
0098	69/82 Item 6	South Sandwich Islands	CDS	CINCFLEET		
0099	71/82 Item 2	Military Appreciation - Operations after Repossession	CDS	ACDS(Pol)		