



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 July, 1982

Dear John.

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King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

I enclose a briefing for King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister at 4 pm on 22 July. We are sending you separately a brief on the Lebanon/Palestine crisis.

The Jordanian Ambassador and the C in C Jordanian Armed Forces Lt General Sharif Zeid bin Shaker will accompany the King.

Sir J Leahy and Mr Urwick will, as agreed, also attend.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER 4 PM ON 22 JULY

Essential Facts

1. King Hussein arrives in on 21 July and leaves about 30 July. The visit is as usual a private one.

2. The King and Queen Noor will be guests of HM The Queen at lunch on 22 July. The King will visit the 22 SAS regiment Headquarters (23 July); take the salute at the trooping of the guidon of the 13/18th Hussars at Wimbish (24 July) where Prince Abdullah is serving; attend "'Army Air 82'" at Middle Wallop (25 July).

3. Mr Pym accompanied by Mr Hurd will call on the King on 23 July. Mr Nott and the Chief of the Defence of Staff will call on 26 July.

4. Records of the King's call on the Prime Minister and his discussion with the Secretary of State in November 1981 are attached.

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KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER 4 PM ON 22 JULY

DEFENCE SALES

Points to Make

P110/Tornado

Very encouraged at your interest in P110/Tornado family of aircraft. Keen to see dialogue continue on possibility for joint development of a high-performance combat aircraft to meet both our future requirements. What timetable are you, and the other Arab countries working towards?

Hawk

Best advanced jet trainer in the world and now chosen by US Navy. Ideally suited to meet Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) requirement for advanced jet trainer aircraft. It also has ground attack and air-to-air missile capability. Understand that British Aerospace will be having further discussions with RJAF in August.

Khalid Tank

Regret difficulties. Hope these are now largely behind us. UK always prepared to go to great length to ensure customer satisfaction.

Rapier

Performed excellently in the Falkland Islands. Understand RJAF are considering some enhancements to your airfield defence systems. Hope you will again consider the proven Rapier missile (towed). BAe pleased to discuss this with you.

DEFENCE SALES:

General Background

Until the Baghdad Summit meeting after the Camp David peace settlement, Jordan was largely dependent on the US for defence procurement. In 1979, however, following the Summit and Jordan's rejection of the Camp David agreement, Arab funds were made available. This led to the ordering of 274 Khalid tanks (improved Chieftains originally destined for Iran) and supporting equipment, worth nearly £400M; the biggest defence deal ever made by Jordan. They also bought 36 Mirage F1 aircraft from France and have recently ordered £100M worth of Soviet SAM 8s and ZSU 23-4s (multi-barrelled guns). The Soviet order is disappointing as we had hoped to sell Rapier, but neither UK nor US could match Soviet prices and delivery. The presence of Soviet technicians could affect our readiness to release classified information and equipment to Jordan, but King Hussein has said that this presence will be kept to the bare minimum.

Further major purchases of defence equipment will depend on Arab funding being made available.

P110/Tornado (£200m ?)

The Prime Minister wrote to King Hussein in January 1981 offering Tornado for consideration by a consortium of Arab countries as an advanced fighter in competition with Mirage 4000. This was subsequently elaborated to include the P110, a derivative of Tornado, and it was hoped that some Arab states would participate in a joint development programme. Iraq seemed the best prospect for early funding but Iraq has now said that she has no requirement for a P110 type aircraft till the late 1980s; and the prospect for other early Arab funding is slight. The consortium has not met recently and we have opened up discussions on P110/Tornado with individual countries. Although the Jordanians do not have the capacity to fund joint development of P110, we are anxious to maintain a close dialogue with them as they remain very interested in the concept and have been a strong lobbyist for the British aircraft with other Arab countries.

The Jordanians have asked the USA for supply of F16 fighters (which would effectively shut out the Tornado/P110) but USA has only been prepared to offer the less sophisticated F5G.

King Hussein flew Tornado in April 1981.

Hawk (£100M)

The Jordanians need to replace their current advanced jet trainer aircraft (F5A) from 1985 onwards the British Aerospace are offering Hawk in competition with the Franco-German Alpha Jet. BAe have also advised the Jordanians on flying training cycles and are considered to be well placed to secure the contract. A BAe team will be visiting Jordan in August, when they will re-emphasise Hawk's versatility, including its ground attack capability and its ability to mount air-to-air missiles as done by RAF.

Khalid Tank

Deliveries of the 274 Khalid tanks ordered in 1979 are currently under way. There have been problems with the transmission/steer unit assemblies on the tanks (a new assembly developed for Khalid replacing the proven Chieftain fit), which forced UK to revise the delivery programme. It has now been agreed that the improved transmission unit developed for Challenger will be retrofitted to the Jordanian Khalids already delivered and be incorporated in the Khalid production line at the earliest opportunity. Twenty-one tanks were modified at Jordanian request in a crash programme to enable the vehicles to take part in the Army Day parade on 25 May (which the Jordanians subsequently cancelled): the detailed arrangements to retrofit the remaining tanks have now been agreed with Jordan.

There were also problems with the delivery state of the tanks arriving in Jordan. A senior MOD team visited Jordan in March and made a report with recommendations which have now been implemented.

Despite the difficulties experienced, the Jordanians have purchased a tank of advanced design and which represents excellent value for money. On 7 April 1982 King Hussein saw 3 tanks (manned

by Jordanian crews) give a mobility and firepower demonstration including 4 hits out of 4 on a long range moving target.

Rapier

The Jordanian Army were very interested in Rapier until an unsuccessful in-country demonstration in mid-1981. They have now instead purchased Soviet equipment (SAM 8 and ZSU 23/4 multi-barrelled guns) and are no longer interested in Rapier. Royal Jordanian Air Force are, however, reportedly interested in Rapier to supplement their airfield point defence and we are arranging for an RJAF officer to be briefed next month on its performance in the Falklands.

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER 4 PM ON 22 JULY

Points to Make

West Bank and Gaza

Concerned at disturbances and increasing Israeli pressure on inhabitants. Regret dismissal of Mayor of Gaza. Israelis believe they can now do what they want on the West Bank - how do you see events developing?

'Jordan is Palestine'

As you will know from Jordanian Ambassador, campaign continues here on the theme Jordan is Palestine. We receive regular correspondence. Also letters in the press etc.

We do our best to rebut both the historical and political arguments. But much effort is put into picking holes in our case. It would be most useful to have further authoritative statement making clear that in Jordan's view a Palestinian homeland must find its natural place on the West Bank. This would help us counter the campaign. The Crown Prince did refer to the problem briefly in his article in the Times (20 July).

King Hussein's visit Moscow

How did your visit to Moscow go?

Secretary of State's visit to Jordan

Mr Pym hopes to visit later this year, possibly early November.

Background Note

West Bank and Gaza

1. There was no demonstration in the West Bank against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon until 4 July when a two day strike took place. Israeli forces forced shopkeepers to open in all towns except East Jerusalem. In the disturbances that accompanied the strike two Arabs were killed and ten injured. Two Arab collaborators were shot (one later died) in Nablus in late June and a Jewish settler was found stabbed to death. The Israelis have arrested a number of people.

2. On 10 July the Mayor of Gaza (Rashad ash-Shawwa), a leading moderate, was dismissed for rejecting an order from the Head of the Civil Administration. More Village Leagues have been established. The Jordanians see these developments and events in Lebanon as the blue print for a plan to establish their autonomy plan on the West Bank Arabs. They fear that increasing Israeli pressure will lead to an exodus of West Bankers which could lead to an Israeli majority when there would be an Israeli call for self-determination.

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Secretary of States Visit to Jordan

4. The dates for the Secretary of State's visit to Jordan have not yet been finalised. The dates 8/9 November will shortly be put to the Jordanians.

JORDAN IS PALESTINE

Essential Facts

1. "'Jordan is Palestine'" is shorthand for a solution to the Palestinian problem favoured by a number of Israeli cabinet ministers including Mr Sharon, and also much publicised in this country. It rests on two propositions, one historical and one political. The historical argument is that Britain was given a mandate over the whole of Palestine (ie. including modern Jordan) and chose to subdivide this into (a) a territory upto the River Jordan which continued to be known as Palestine (now roughly the modern state of Israel, with the West Bank and Gaza) and (b) Transjordan, which evolved into the modern State of Jordan. Transjordan was kept exclusively for the Arabs. The argument runs that since the original Palestine has already been divided into two states, of which the larger is the 'Palestinian' Arab state of Jordan, there is no need for a second Palestinian state on the West Bank.
2. The political argument is that a large proportion of Jordan's population are Palestinian Arabs and that Jordan has only foresworn its Palestinian identity under pressure from the PLO, who have since 1974 had their sights on a Palestinian state in the West Bank. The Jordan is Palestine campaign argue that Palestinian refugees should therefore be returned to Jordan, and that any act of Palestinian self-determination should take place there. The Jordanians suspect that Sharon would like to drive as many West Bank Palestinians as possible across into Jordan and put an end to the Hashemite dynasty.
3. The historical arguments are not clear-cut. But the political realities of 1982 are clear. Neither the Palestinians living outside Jordan nor the Jordanians themselves accept that Jordan is the natural homeland of the Palestinians. The problem is that prominent Jordanians from the King downwards have often spoken in public (particularly prior to 1974) about the close links between the Palestinians and Jordan. In a similar vein, the King said in his interview with the Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram on

6 May he said ''We and the Palestinians have been one people in the past and are so at present''. Remarks like this make it more difficult to shoot down the Jordan is Palestine thesis. It would be useful to have a firm Jordanian statement on the record making clear that in their view Jordan was not Palestine.

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 4PM ON 22 JULY

IRAN/IRAQ WAR

POINTS TO MAKE

Progress of the War

1 The Iraqis seem to be doing well; Iranian advance blunted. Probably a lull in the battle before the Iranians try again. How do you assess the situation? Will the Iraqis hold?

Gulf States

2 We hope war will not spread. Gulf States alert to danger of provoking the Iranians. We have asked them how we might best help.

Mediation

3 Iranian rejection of Security Council Resolution 514 (of 12 July) and apparent refusal to accept mediation shows that 'hawks' are in ascendant in Tehran. But if Iraqis can continue to block Iranian advance, Iranians may eventually accept mediation. Islamic or NAM mediators could perhaps refine reconstruction/compensation proposals, thus helping Tehran 'doves'. Main objective must be to engage Iranians in a dialogue.

UN

4 Iraqis are considering a special session of UNGA. Value must depend on pressure likely to develop on Iran, eg through NAM activity during session. A further visit to the region by Palme could be helpful; but Palme reluctant to travel at this juncture.

Soviet Position

5 Soviet Union in quandary over which side to back. Russians would obviously like to extend influence in Iran. Iranians

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suspicious of USSR and now clamping down on Tudeh. No proof of reports that Russians have seriously penetrated elements of Revolutionary movement or captured allegiance of leading figures. But there is a danger here for the future and we must be vigilant. West must avoid driving Iran into arms of Russians.

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IRAN/IRAQ WAR

BACKGROUND

1 Since launching a major offensive several kilometres into Iraqi territory on 13 July, Iran has been unable to break Iraq's main defensive line. Two subsequent attacks on 17 and 18 July appear to have been repulsed. The present battlefront is just inside the international border. Iraq has launched attacks against Iran's main oil exporting terminal at Kharg Island and several provincial capitals in the west of Iran. Iranian aircraft bombed Baghdad on 21 July. Heavy fighting is likely to continue on the ground, with Iranian forces ready to exploit rapidly any sign of Iraqi weakness.

West's Role

2 No direct role for the West or the Ten to play. Those with influence in Tehran - principally Algeria and perhaps Pakistan and Turkey - are best placed to persuade the Iranians to come to the negotiating table.

Action at the UN

3 We voted for UN Security Council Resolution 514 calling for a ceasefire and a just settlement and suggested an early visit to the area by a representative of the Secretary General. In rejecting the Resolution Iran has ruled out a role for the United Nations for the time being. Iraq has now suggested a UN Special Session on the war. We believe this will be dismissed by Iran as manipulation of the UN by the US, though the Iranians may in due course respond to international pressure if their military offensive fails. We remain in the dilemma of being obliged to back our Arab friends despite our disapproval of Iraq's miscalculated war: while being also conscious of the danger of pushing Iran into Russian arms.

Reaction of other governments

4 We have asked our Arab friends whether they would welcome any gestures of UK solidarity (FCO tel no 199 to Jeddah). Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE are grateful for offers of help but see no need for detailed action at this stage. All are reluctant to involve the American Rapid Deployment Force. None plans to send military assistance to Iraq. Qatar and Bahrain want an immediate condemnation of the Iranian invasion. Before the recent offensive Gulf states appear to have agreed that US\$ 50 billion might be made available as 'reparations' to buy off Iran.

Jordan's Position

5 King Hussein is Iraq's staunchest ally. He sent a volunteer force to Iraq in April as a token of support for Saddam Hussein with whom he is in regular contact

Soviet Union

6 The Egyptians and Jordanians (the latter partly as a result of King Hussein's visit to the USSR) seem to have an exaggerated view of the extent of Russian influence over Iran. (Iran 'already in grasp of Soviet Union' according to King Hussein). We believe the Russians naturally wish to increase their influence, but are not

making as much headway at present as King Hussein may believe. Our policy is to resist Russian encroachment by (a) working for a more normal relationship with Iran; (b) refraining from hostile gestures that could drive Iran towards the Soviet Union, and (c) relying on historic Iranian suspicion and the present strength of revolutionary fervour to keep the Russians out.

US Position

7 The Americans are considering various contingency options aimed at reassuring Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. These could include a joint air exercise with the Saudis and joint naval exercises with the Omanis, but the Americans are conscious of the need to be guided by the wishes of their Gulf friends.