

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE PORT LOUIS
	10	1. Please transmit following message from the Prime Minister to
	11	the Prime Minister of Mauritius, Mr Jugnauth, as soon as possible,
	12	and in any case before he addresses the Assembly on 15 October.
	13	BEGINS: 'I much appreciated the opportunity of meeting you again and
	14	hearing from you of your government's desire to strengthen the
	15	already cordial relations between our two countries. We warmly
	16	reciprocate that wish and are looking into the various points
	17	which you raised.
	18	Immediately, I undertook to let you know what we could do to
	19	bring our agreement concerning the Ilois into effect without
	20	further delay. I am glad to say that we can do this as soon
	21	as we have informed Parliament here, a step which we <sup>would</sup> will take
///	22	on 19 October, immediately after its reassembly. In the meanwhile
//	23	we have instructed Mr Allan, our High Commissioner in Port Louis,
/	24	to propose to Mr de L'Estrac an exchange of notes which would
	25	amend the agreement by removing the twenty-eight day provision.

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword This
File number	Dept PRIVATE OFFICE	Distribution EAD FINANCE DEPT LEGAL ADVISERS EWAD/ODA	
Drafted by (Block capitals) R B BONE		CC: PS PS/MR ONSLOW SIR J LEAHY MR SQUIRE MR BEASTEL, TREASURY PS/MR MARTEN	
Telephone number			
Authorised for despatch			
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	<b>IMMEDIATE</b>	Page <b>2.</b>
	CONFIDENTIAL		

<<<<

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25
- 26
- 27
- 28
- 29
- 30
- 31
- 32
- 33
- 34

<<<< *would*  
 This ~~will~~ clear the way for a further exchange, *possibly* on 20 October,  
 bringing the agreement into effect at once, including the  
 payment of £4 million to your government for the Ilois  
 Trust Fund.

With best wishes' ENDS

PYM  
 NNNN

*Over  
 mr*

///


//

/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
--------------------	-------	-----------



14 OCT 1951







FILE

Mauritius

RWJ

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 October, 1982

VISIT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF

MAURITIUS

Thank you for your letter of 14 October. As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister agrees that the proposed message to Mr Jugnauth should be despatched, subject to the following amendments:-

- (a) line 21 - substitute "could" for "will".
- (b) line 2 on the second page - substitute "would" for "will". and insert "possibly" before "on 20 October".

The Prime Minister has made these changes because in her view our willingness to help Mr Jugnauth must depend to some extent on the nature of his speech to the United Nations General Assembly tomorrow.

A. L. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

SW



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister  
You may like to make your message more conditional in case he makes an unhelpful speech in the U.S. tomorrow. → Yes

14 October 1982

*John Stan* Agree to despatch as amended?  
A.F.C. <sup>44</sup>/<sub>10</sub>. Yes

Visit by the Prime Minister of Mauritius

In your letter of 11 October enclosing the record of the Prime Minister's discussion with Mr Jugnauth you reported the Prime Minister's undertaking to attempt to resolve the delay in paying the sum due under the Ilois Agreement.

The Agreement with Mauritius stipulated that an interval of 28 days should elapse between the time each government has informed the other that its internal procedures (to make good its commitments) have been completed and entry into force of the agreement. It would obviously be imprudent to pay over the £4m before the agreement comes into force. We are therefore proposing an amendment to the relevant Article of the agreement, eliminating the 28 day delay. The only remaining constraint will then be the need to inform Parliament first that we are implementing the agreement and drawing on the Contingencies Fund for the £4 million payment. This will be done by means of an arranged Written Question, which will be answered on 19 October. The way will then be clear to bring the agreement into force by an exchange of letters on 20 October.

We believe that this procedure will meet Mr Jugnauth's political requirement. In doing so we risk giving some offence to Parliament here. First, because in not laying this Agreement before the House prior to implementation we shall be conforming to the letter rather than the spirit of the Ponsonby rule. Second, because Mr Jugnauth may, despite his assurance to our High Commissioner that his General Assembly speech would not be 'fiery', refer to Diego Garcia and the Ilois in terms that give comfort to Argentina. Mr Pym believes that these risks should be accepted, but considers that the second of them would be reduced if the Prime Minister were to send a personal message to Mr Jugnauth on the lines of the attached draft. This needs to be despatched before close of play on 14 October if we are to be certain of it reaching Mr Jugnauth before he addresses the General Assembly on 15 October.

*Yours ever,*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL





Prime Minister

Pl. see also the attached  
telegram.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 October 1982

Do you agree, especially in view of  
(c) below that we should now  
include the agreement on the Ilois?

Yes

A.J.C. 18/10

Yes

Mauritius: Diego Garcia and the Ilois

The Prime Minister's message of 14 October to Mr Jugnauth allowed for the possibility of holding up implementation of the Ilois Agreement, should Mr Jugnauth have spoken in unacceptable terms about Diego Garcia when he addressed the UN General Assembly on 15 October.

UKMis telegram 1662, which you have seen, contained the relevant passage from Jugnauth's speech. In our view these remarks, though colourful, do not justify holding matters up:

- a. Jugnauth said nothing at all about the Ilois; and it is the invidious comparisons between them and the Falkland Islanders which have attracted interest at the Assembly. It would have been perfectly possible for Jugnauth to have sought Latin American support for his views on the Indian Ocean by drawing attention to the plight of the Ilois. It is helpful that he remained silent;
- b. his claim to Diego Garcia is not new, and it was to be expected that Jugnauth should state it in his speech. But he said nothing about the timing of its return. The most critical element in his remarks - the allegation that Diego Garcia has become a 'horrendous nuclear base' - is by implication directed at the United States rather than ourselves;
- c. most important, our main objective in hastening implementation of the Ilois Agreement is not to help Jugnauth, but to get the issue out of the way without further incidents in Mauritius which would attract fresh attention to the plight of these people, with consequent repercussions both here and, perhaps, in New York.

I should be grateful for your confirmation that we may now go ahead with the Agreement, which we would hope to conclude within the next few days.

Yes

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary



CONFIDENTIAL

*Mauritius* *DSG*

*File*

*Mauritius*

19 October 1982

MAURITIUS: DIEGO GARCIA AND THE ILOIS

Thank you for your letter of 18 October.

The Prime Minister agrees that we should now proceed to conclude the Agreement relating to the Ilois.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

*U*



UNCLASSIFIED  
DESKBY 160800Z  
FM U K MISSION NEW YORK 152245Z OCT'82  
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NO. 1662 OF 15 OCTOBER 1982  
INFO IMMEDIATE PORT LOUIS  
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON

MIPT : UNGA 37 : GENERAL DEBATE : STATEMENT BY THE PRIME  
MINISTER OF MAURITIUS.

1. FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT ON DIEGO GARCIA FROM JUGNAUTH'S STATEMENT:

BEGINS.

THE GOVERNMENT OF MAURITIUS, IN ITS PURSUIT OF ITS POLICY OF STRICT NON-ALIGNMENT AND IN CONFORMITY WITH THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION DECLARING THE INDIAN OCEAN A ZONE OF PEACE, WILL WORK ALONG WITH OTHER PEACE-LOVING MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR THE DEMILITARISATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN. DURING THE YEARS WHICH HAVE ELAPSED SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION, WE HAVE WITNESSED THE EXPANSION OF THE OCEAN'S GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSIONS AND THE CONVERSION OF THIS INTENDED ZONE OF PEACE INTO A ZONE OF WAR AND MOBILISATION FOR WAR, WITH ALL THE ATTENDANT DANGERS FOR THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION. THE OCEAN HAS GRADUALLY EXPANDED BEYOND ITS OWN WATERS. IT IS NOW LINKED TO THE STATES OF SOUTH EAST ASIA, TO DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SO-CALLED MODEST COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY IN DIEGO GARCIA HAS BEEN CONVERTED INTO THE FORMIDABLE AND HORRENDOUS NUCLEAR BASE WHICH THREATENS THE SECURITY OF ALL INDIAN OCEAN STATES, AND THERE HAS BEEN A SCRAMBLE FOR THE SECURING OF PORT FACILITIES ALONG THE SO-CALLED 'ARC OF CRISIS', THAT IS THE HORN OF AFRICA, AND THE SAUDI ARABIAN PENINSULAR AND THE VITAL AREA OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

WITH THE ALARMING INCREASE OF FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN HAS RECEDED THE FERVENT HOPE OF THE STATES OF THE REGION TO SEE THE HOLDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN. MAURITIUS AND THE OTHER STATES OF THE REGION ARE NOT HOODWINKED BY THE TACTICS AND PLOYS ADOPTED BY SOME STATES AND DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO CAUSE CONFUSION AND TO POSTPONE INDEFINITELY THE HOLDING OF SUCH CONFERENCE, THUS CREATING A PROPITIOUS SMOKESCREEN TO HIDE THEIR WARLIKE DESIGNS. WE SOLEMNLY APPEAL TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO GIVE THEIR FULL SUPPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SO THAT THE CONFERENCE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN COULD TAKE PLACE IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, AND WE ALSO CALL UPON THE FOREIGN MILITARY POWERS PRESENT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN TO EXERCISE MUTUAL RESTRAINT AND TO INITIATE A GRADUAL AND BALANCED WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES FROM THE REGION WHICH WOULD THEN BE OPEN EXCLUSIVELY TO COMMERCIAL NAVIGATION. IT IS OUR CONVICTION THAT THE SECURITY OF THE SEA LANES IN THE OCEAN WILL BEST BE PROTECTED BY THE STATES OF THE REGION.

/AT



AT THIS JUNCTION I WOULD LIKE, MR PRESIDENT, TO DWELL ON AN ISSUE WHICH AFFECTS THE VITAL INTERESTS OF MAURITIUS, I MEAN THE MAURITIAN CLAIM OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO, WHICH WAS EXCISED BY THE THEN COLONIAL POWER FROM THE TERRITORY OF MAURITIUS IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 1514 AND 2066. THIS DISMEMBERMENT OF THE MAURITIUS TERRITORY, THE VIOLATION OF OUR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, HAS BEEN MADE ALL THE MORE UNACCEPTABLE BY THE FACT THAT ONE OF THE ISLANDS OF THIS VERY ARCHIPELAGO, DIEGO GARCIA, IS NOW A FULL-FLEDGED NUCLEAR BASE WHICH POSES A CONSTANT THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF MAURITIUS AND OF ALL THE LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES OF THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE VERY OCEAN DECLARED TO A ZONE OF PEACE BY THIS ASSEMBLY IN 1971.

I SOLEMNLY APPEAL TO THE PEACE-LOVING MEMBERS OF THIS ORGANISATION TO EXTEND ALL THEIR SUPPORT TO THE LEGITIMATE MAURITIAN CLAIM OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO. IN HELPING MAURITIUS TO COME INTO ITS NATIONAL HERITAGE, THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE LIVING UP TO ITS OWN PRINCIPLES AND PROCLAIMING LOUD AND CLEAR THAT IT EXPECTS ITS RESOLUTIONS TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY ITS MEMBERS. AS THE DIEGO ISSUE INVOLVED TWO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NAMELY RESPECT BY THE ADMINISTERING POWER OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ITS COLONY AND THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY. I VENTURE TO SAY THAT THE RETURN OF THE ARCHIPELAGO TO MAURITIUS WILL BRING TO THE ORGANISATION THE RESPECT SO INDISPENSABLE TO ITS CONTINUED EXISTENCE.

ENDS.

THOMSON  
MINIMAL  
EAD  
UND  
DEF D

- 2 -

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET