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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 February 1983

Dear John,

Prime Minister's Lunch for King Hussein

/ I enclose a brief note summarising weekend developments on the Arab League Delegation and the PNC meeting in Algiers.

Yours ever

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'John Holmes'.

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. The Moroccans have said publicly that King Hassan and his delegation will be coming to London on 18 March. The Moroccan Foreign Minister has assured our Ambassador privately that, unless our position changes, Milhem will be the Palestinian representative. The Moroccans have also announced that the Fez Follow-Up Committee will meet in Morocco on 24/25 March to discuss all the visits to capitals.

2. Comment. It is encouraging that the King has committed himself to a new date before the end of the Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers. It indicates that King Hassan is determined to go through with the visit, and is counting on PLO approval for Milhem in due course. As before, it remains uncertain whether this will be forthcoming; but the situation is more satisfactory for us than if the King gave up altogether.

Palestine National Council (PNC)

3. The meeting in Algiers is likely to last another two or three days. The moderates have not had it all their own way; but Arafat is likely to be left with just enough flexibility to continue exploring the Reagan initiative with King Hussein, provided that:

- (i) the Jordanians alone do not represent the Palestinians;
- (ii) an independent Palestinian state is on the agenda.

4. King Hussein will expect Arafat to visit a number of Arab countries following the PNC, before returning to Amman with his final position. He has given the PLO until 1 March to make a decision.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear John,

King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

I enclose a brief for King Hussein's working lunch with the Prime Minister at 1 pm on 21 February. You will have received a separate note from Mr Hurd about how the Prime Minister might raise the subject of the Arab League visit to London, on which King Hussein has offered to try to help.

The King will be accompanied by his Commander in Chief, General Shaker and the Jordanian Ambassador. Sir Antony Acland will attend from here.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO BRITAIN 19-26 FEBRUARY

Arab/IsraelPoints to Make

1. Admire King's skill in difficult discussions and determination to see peace process through.
2. Discussions with Arafat on basis of Reagan proposals only realistic way forward. Next steps after PNC meeting? If Arafat falters?
3. Working hard to encourage maximum support for Jordanian/PLO efforts to make progress towards negotiations on West Bank. Have made our view quite clear to US on Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and settlements. Anything more that Europeans can usefully do?
4. Hope to re-arrange Arab League Visit after PNC. In full agreement with King Hassan, but he does not seem able to convince the PLO.

Lebanon and SyriaIsrael/Lebanon negotiations

5. Share Jordanian concern at slow progress. Hope Habib can produce some movement. No evidence yet of greater Israeli flexibility needed for agreement. Does King think Syria/PLO are sincere in their promises to withdraw from Lebanon in parallel with Israeli forces?

British participation in Multinational Force

6. British contingent has settled in well. Three months deployment only, but welcomed by Lebanese Government as visible sign of our support.



SAM-5's in Syria

7. Syria's SAM-5 missiles a threat to Jordan?

Jordanians on trial for attempted assassination of Mr Argov,
Israeli Ambassador (if raised)

8. We have no power to transfer a person convicted of an offence in a UK court to serve his sentence in another country.

KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO BRITAIN: 19-26 FEBRUARY 1983

IRAN/IRAQ

POINTS TO MAKE

Military Situation

1. Now a hiatus in the military position. Major Iranian attack may still come. But this no longer seems inevitable.

Arab Military Support for Iraq

2. Some Sudanese and North Yemeni troops already in Iraq. Some Jordanian volunteers also in Iraq but we would counsel caution on question of sending regular Jordanian troops.

European Support for Iraq

3. We do not share French views on European role. No leverage in Tehran. Strategic interest in not isolating Iran.

Syria

4. We see no chance of Syrians re-opening pipeline. This would be the most effective way of bringing Iran to negotiating table.

Mediation

5. Iraq sounded us out about Security Council Meeting. We are not convinced that at this stage this is best way to end the fighting.



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VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN 19-26 FEBRUARY

FALKLAND ISLANDS: NAM SUMMIT

POINTS TO MAKE

1. After the events of 1982 we would regret it if the NAM were to continue to support Argentina on sovereignty.
2. Grateful that Jordan abstained on General Assembly Resolution 37/9. Hope for continued support. We cannot negotiate with Argentina as if nothing had happened, particularly as she still refuses to agree a definitive cessation of hostilities or renounce the use of force.
3. Pleased to learn that draft of Summit declaration refers to non-use of force and the right of people to self-determination. Hope that more extreme language will not be added to present text and if it is, friendly governments will enter reservations. Support from NAM risks encouraging Argentina to further military action.

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VISIT BY KING HUSSEIN OF JORDANUK/JORDAN DEFENCE RELATIONSPOINTS TO MAKE

1. Welcome our very friendly defence relations with Jordan. Hope relations will continue to develop.

2. Hope Prince Abdullah enjoyed his time with the 13/18 Hussars, where I understand that he enjoyed the considerable respect of his brother officers. Very pleased that he has decided to join the Territorial Army; hope that he will enjoy his attachment to his old regiment in Germany at Easter. Pleased that Prince Talal may be following his cousin's example.

3. (Defensive) Hope that problems over training charges are being resolved. Jordan has a high priority for UK defence assistance. We would like to have many more Jordanians on courses here, and are always willing to assist in new areas - eg at present we are hosting a team from the RJAF studying photo-reconnaissance training methods, and we are helping to set up gunnery staff courses in Jordan.

4. Pleased to help in training the Jordanian Coastguard.

DEFENCE SALES BRIEFPoints to Make

- 1 General. We welcome the close collaboration between our countries on defence equipment and we would like to extend its scope. UK remains ready to supply a wide range of items which have been fully combat proven. UK companies always prepared to quote for your requirements. The Floating Sales Exhibition which visits Aqaba next month will demonstrate the wide range of the UK's defence industries.
- 2 Agile Combat Aircraft (ACA)/Tornado. Very encouraged at your interest in ACA/Tornado family of aircraft. Keen to see dialogue continue. What timetable are you and the other Arab countries working towards?
- 3 Hawk. Best advanced jet trainer in the world and now chosen by US Navy. Ideally suited to meet Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) requirement for advanced jet trainer aircraft. It also has ground attack and air-to-air missile capability.
- 4 Khalid (defensive only). Regret past technical difficulties. Hope these are now behind us. UK always prepared to go to great length to ensure customer satisfaction.



KING HUSSEIN'S LUNCH WITH THE PRIME MINISTER 1245 PM
21 FEBRUARY

Essential Facts

1. King Hussein arrives in London on 19 February and is due to leave on 26 February. The visit is as usual a private one. The King has just completed one day visits to Romania and Yugoslavia.
2. Queen Noor is not accompanying the King as she is expecting her third child in March. The King's party includes his Commander in Chief (and Chief Adviser) General Shaker.
3. Mr Pym will call on the King on 23 February.
4. Records of the King's call on the Prime Minister and his
A discussion with the Secretary of State in July 1982 are attached.

Near East and North Africa Department
18 February 1983



KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO BRITAIN 19-26 FEBRUARY

ARAB/ISRAEL

Background

1. King Hussein will be waiting for the outcome of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) meeting to see how further progress can best be made with Arafat towards negotiations with Israel under the US auspices. He has a difficult balancing act to perform. He must bring the PLO to aim at a realistic target somewhere close to the Reagan proposals (and compromise on PLO representation in negotiations) whilst avoiding Arab criticism for appearing to push the PLO too far towards the American position and usurp their role. At the moment King Hussein seems to have the backing of the moderate Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia.
2. The PNC meeting, which opened in Algiers on 14 February and could last for ten days or more, is vitally important for the continuation of the Hussein/Arafat discussions. The indications are that Arafat will receive a qualified mandate to proceed with King Hussein. The King seems determined to see the peace process through (see Amman telno 58 of 14 February).
3. Even so the path forward is full of obstacles, eg Palestinian representation in the negotiations, US credibility, the Israeli response. Scepticism in the Arab world is growing and King Hussein is not immune.
4. King Hussein will wish to help us if he can with the Arab League Delegation Visit to London; but he undoubtedly still strongly believes we should accept a PLO representative. He is worried that this episode may divert attention from the main issue and weaken the position of the PLO moderates.

Lebanon and SyriaIsrael/Lebanon negotiations

5. Habib has been back in the Middle East since early February but no evidence yet of Israeli willingness to give up demands such as early warning stations in Southern Lebanon manned by IDF personnel, a security role for Major Haddad and his forces (recently expanded with Israeli help) and a substantial degree of normalisation of bilateral relations. All these demands are unacceptable to the Lebanese who are under pressure from Saudi Arabia and Syria (which has threatened to close her border with Lebanon) not to make substantial concessions.

6. Both Syria and PLO have given undertakings to the Lebanese and Americans that they will withdraw in parallel with Israeli forces. But Syria will want assurances that her own security will not be threatened by whatever arrangements are made between Lebanon and Israel and the PLO will seek guarantees for the security of the Palestinian population. The German Presidency has recently made representations on behalf of the Ten to both the Israeli and the Lebanese Government about killings and harrassment of Palestinians in Southern Lebanon.

British participation in Multinational Force

7. The British MNF contingent (97 men from the Queen's Dragoon Guards equipped with 16 Ferret Scout cars) has been operational since 8 February. The Commander has established good liaison with local Lebanese forces and there have been no incidents. With other MNF contingents we have agreed to provide patrols in support of the recent Lebanese Army deployment into East Beirut.

SAM-5's in Syria

8. Two SAM-5 complexes are nearing operational readiness in Syria. Their high altitude and long-range capability could cover all Jordan's airspace. The Soviets have assured the King that the missiles will remain under Soviet control.

/Jordanians



Jordanians on trial for attempted assassination of Mr Argov

9. The three men currently on trial for the attempted assassination in London last June of Mr Shlomo Argov, the Israeli Ambassador, have Jordanian nationality. King Hussein may ask that if convicted they are allowed to serve their sentences in Jordan.

10. There is no legislation which allows a person convicted in a British court to serve their sentence in another country. A Council of Europe convention to allow prisoners to be transferred to serve their sentences in their European countries of origin is now under study by Ministers. Other countries may be allowed to join subject to the agreement of all participating states.

Near East and North Africa Department
18 February 1983

IRAN/IRAQ

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Military Situation

1. Iran launched a new offensive in Amara sector on 6/7 February and recaptured approximately 250 sq km of Iranian territory previously held by Iraq. Further fighting in same sector on 9/10 February when Iraq launched successful counter-attack and halted Iranian advance. Bulk of Iranian forces yet to be committed and major Iranian attack could still come. Signs that Iranians may be having second thoughts on this.

Arab Military Support for Iraq

2. Jordan so far sent only volunteers to Iraq (the Yarmouk brigade), but majority now returned to Jordan. Some Sudanese and North Yemeni forces also in Iraq and Jordan now apparently considering committing regular troops.

European Support for Iraq

3. France is heavily committed to Iraq and is now seeking support from EC partners for this policy. We do not share French views on spread of Khomeinism : the threat of external attack or subversion can be met; the threat to the area posed by the example of successful revolution in Iran cannot be exorcised by aligning with Iraq. Whilst we lack leverage with Tehran, there is little the Ten can do to bring the conflict to an end.

Syria

4. Iraqi economy in serious short term difficulties. Re-opening of Syrian pipeline would bring financial relief and would have profound psychological effect on Iran. Recent Saudi attempts to achieve Iraqi/Syrian rapprochement ended in failure.

/Mediation

Mediation

5. Iraq has approached us about Security Council meeting and is engaged in intense diplomatic activity to bring the Iranians to the negotiating table. We would support even-handed resolutions calling for an end to conflict but further UN action ignored by Iran is worthless and may even be counter-productive.

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VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN 19-26 FEBRUARY

FALKLAND ISLANDS: NAM SUMMIT

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Jordan voted in favour of Security Council Resolution 502 and abstained on the Argentine Resolution at the UN General Assembly in November despite considerable pressure to vote in favour along with the majority of members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

2. We have seen the Indian first draft of the NAM Summit Declaration (the text of the relevant extracts from the Latin America section is attached). Our Mission in Amman has on instructions made representations locally with the Secretary General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Falkland Islands Department
18 February 1983

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TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 14 FEBRUARY

AND TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE, BELMOPAN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, AMMAN, NAIROBI, MUSCAT, CASTRIES, SINGAPORE, COLOMBO, PORT OF SPAIN, BAHRAIN, DHAKA, BRIDGETOWN, GABORONE, YAOUNDE, CAIRO, LIBREVILLE, BANJUL, ACCRA, ABIDJAN, KUWAIT, BEIRUT, MASERU, MONROVIA, LILONGWE, KUALA LUMPUR, KATHMANDU, ISLAMABAD, DOHA, JEDDA, DAKAR, FREETOWN, KHARTOUM, MBABANE, KINSHASA, NEW DELHI
INFO PRIORITY LAGOS, KAMPALA, DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, HARARE, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

MIPT: NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT

1. FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM THE LATIN AMERICA SECTION OF THE INDIAN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE.

86. THE HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT NOTED WITH GRAVE CONCERN THE CONTINUED TENSIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THE CARIBBEAN AND SOUTH ATLANTIC WHICH WERE THE RESULT IN PARTICULAR OF POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY OUTSIDE POWERS IN VIOLATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE REGION AND THE EXPRESS WILL OF THEIR PEOPLES. THEY PROTESTED AGAINST THESE ACTIVITIES AIMED AT EXERTING PRESSURE ON AND DESTABILISING ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA.

89. THE HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT URGED ALL STATES TO SCRUPULOUSLY REFRAIN FROM ALL ACTS OF AGGRESSION: RESORT TO USE OR THREAT OF FORCE: INTERVENTION AND INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES AS WELL AS OTHER FORMS OF PRESSURE, INCLUDING ECONOMIC OR MILITARY BLOCKADES. THEY REAFFIRMED THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES OF THE REGION TO NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION, INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY AND THEIR RIGHT TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS FREE FROM ANY TYPE OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCE, INTERFERENCE OR PRESSURE.

94. THE CONFERENCE REITERATED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA TO SECURE THE RESTITUTION OF THE

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MALVINAS ISLANDS TO ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND URGED THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THIS REGARD BE REINSTATED WITH THE PARTICIPATION AND GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THIS WOULD ENSURE A SPEEDY, PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE NON-ALIGNED DECLARATIONS AS WELL AS UNGA RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) AS WELL AS OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE SUBJECT.

PYM

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VISIT BY KING HUSSEIN OF JORDANUK/JORDAN DEFENCE RELATIONSBACKGROUND

1. The UK and Jordan have well established defence relations, partly as a result of the personal links between King Hussein and the British Armed Forces. These links are being continued by the King's eldest son (by his English-born wife Princess Muna) Prince Abdullah, who recently served with the 13/18 Hussars and is now attending Oxford University, and Prince Talal, the King's nephew, who has been provisionally accepted for the Standard Military Course at Sandhurst. Prince Abdullah has recently applied for a commission in the Territorial Army to enable him to return to his old regiment during vacations; this request is receiving favourable consideration.

2. Substantive defence relations have increased since 1979, when we received a number of Jordanian requests for help in training and organising their Armed Forces. A substantial proportion of the training assistance was associated with Jordan's purchase of 274 Khalid tanks. This training programme is now running down, and the number of Jordanian students undergoing training in the UK has fallen accordingly (although this may also reflect Jordanian dissatisfaction with the level of our training charges - see para 4). During 1981, 126 Jordanian students attended military courses in this country. This fell to 60 students during the 1981/82 financial year, but the figure for the 1982/83 financial year will probably be higher, reflecting an increase in the number of Jordanian Coastguard personnel attending UK courses following a DNAO study on the Coastguard conducted in 1980. At present 10 Jordanian Army students, 4 Royal Jordanian Air Force students (one officer on the RAF's Advanced Staff Course and three pilots) and one Coastguard officer are training in the UK.

3. Two Loan Service personnel are serving in Jordan; both are FAR flying instructors conducting basic flying training. Small numbers of Army personnel are attached to IMS in Jordan in support of the Khalid contract. There are also occasional short-term visits to train or advise on specific skills. Among recent visits

was one by an SAS training team in 1982 (cost subsidised by the UK Military Training Assistance Scheme (UKMTAS)). There have been no recent RN ship visits to Jordan and none are planned.

Training Charges

4. The Jordanians have regularly complained about the high cost of UK training courses. The Jordanian Commander-in-Chief, General bin Shaker, twice raised the question with Sir John Nott in 1981, and again with the Foreign Secretary in November 1982, when he made an unfavourable comparison between our charges and those of the Americans. General bin Shaker's specific complaint, about the cost of the Long Gunnery Staff Course, prompted Prime Ministerial interest and an exchange of letters explaining the background.
5. Comparisons in price between our training courses and those of our competitors are very difficult to make because of differences in course content and length. A recent MOD study showed no clear pattern as between UK and US courses; some of our courses were more expensive, others cheaper than their US equivalents. We have no independent information about the cost of the gunnery staff course mentioned to Mr Pym, which was alleged to cost \$4000 compared to \$370,000 for the UK course. But we do charge full costs for ammunition used on such courses, which in this case accounts for about $\frac{2}{3}$ of the total (we recover about 60% of the full cost of tuition), and we know that the Americans heavily subsidize countries in which they have an interest. Together these factors may account for the large discrepancy.
6. Jordan has for some time been a recipient of UKMTAS funding; the current UKMTAS allocation is £325K, which has been used during this financial year to pay for 67 Jordanian students on UK courses (including RCDS, Army and RAF staff courses) and 4 Loan Service personnel in Jordan. In 1980/81 UKMTAS funded a Jordanian student attending the Long Gunnery Staff Course.
7. Partly as a result of General bin Shaker's approaches to Sir John Nott, Jordan was earmarked as one of the three Category / A countries



A countries for assistance from the Defence Policy Fund (DPF) this financial year. Since the General's remark to Mr Pym, we have asked HMA Amman to informally advise the Jordanians that subsidies are available for training assistance, and DA Amman has prepared a detailed list of other training projects suitable for DPF funding. Among the projects already approved are partial funding of a visit to RAF Coltishall by a RAF team studying photo-reconnaissance training techniques and an advisory visit to Jordan to help set up a gunnery staff course for the Jordanian Army. We hope that these steps will ensure that the Jordanians will not have cause for further complaints.



DEFENCE SALES BRIEF

General Background

Until the Baghdad Summit meeting after the Camp David peace settlement, Jordan had little to spend on defence procurement. In 1979, however, following the Summit and Jordan's rejection of the Camp David agreement, Arab funds were made available. This led to the ordering of 274 Khalid tanks (improved Chieftains originally destined for Iran) and supporting equipment, worth nearly £400M; the biggest defence deal ever made by Jordan. They also bought 36 Mirage F1 aircraft from France and £100M worth of Soviet SAM8s and ZSU 23-4s (multy-barrelled guns). The Soviet order is disappointing as we had hoped to sell Rapier, but neither UK nor US could match Soviet prices and delivery. The presence of Soviet technicians could affect our readiness to release classified information and equipment to Jordan but King Hussein has said that this presence will be kept to the bare minimum.

Various recent Arab summits have promised Jordan more defence (and general) aid but most of the pledged money has never materialised. This has meant Jordan is cutting back on her current spending although medium term prospects for more aid - and thus more orders - look fair.

Recent Visits

The Head of Defence Sales visited Jordan in September to discuss a range of future Air Force projects - mainly the ACA, Hawk and F5E refurbishment but also looking ahead to possible future interest in UK electronic warfare equipment, airborne early warning aircraft and improvements to Jordanian Air Defence Command and Control facilities.

The Defence Sales Exhibition ship (currently on a Gulf promotional tour) visits Aqaba, Jordan on 7-9 March. The Jordanian C in C and top military staff are expected to visit the boat.

DEFENCE SALES BRIEFPoint-by-Point BackgroundAgile Combat (ACA)/Tornado (£200M?)

The Prime Minister wrote to King Hussein in January 1981 offering Tornado for consideration by a consortium of Arab countries as an advanced fighter in competition with Mirage 4000. This was subsequently elaborated to include the ACA, a derivative of Tornado, and it was hoped that some Arab states would participate in a joint development programme. Iraq seemed the best prospect for early funding but Iraq has now said that she has no requirement for an ACA-type aircraft till the late 1980s, and the prospect for other early Arab funding is slight. The consortium has not met recently and we have opened up discussions on ACA/Tornado with individual countries. Although the Jordanians do not have the capacity to fund joint development of ACA we are anxious to maintain a close dialogue with them as they remain very interested in the concept and have been a strong lobbyist for the British aircraft with other Arab countries. King Hussein flew Tornado in April 1981.

The Jordanians have asked the USA for supply of F16 fighters (which would shut out the Tornado/ACA) but USA has only been prepared to offer the less sophisticated and as yet unsold F5G (now relabelled F20): This is not acceptable to the Jordanians. A possible compromise however may be the sale of smaller quantities of both types of aircraft.

As an alternative to an early buy of new aircraft Jordan is considering refurbishing a number of her early marks of F5 fighters (F5E). UK companies are working up proposals. An extension of the F5Es life would shut out other front line fighter sales until the late 80s/early 90s when ACA would be a strong competitor.

Hawk (£100M)

The Jordanians need to replace their current advanced jet trainer aircraft (F5A) from 1985 onwards and British Aerospace are offering

/Hawk



Hawk in competition with the Franco-German Alpha Jet and the Italian MB339. BAe have also advised the Jordanians on flying training cycles and are considered to be well placed to secure the contract. A decision on Hawk may be delayed while there is uncertainty over the future front-line aircraft - in particular whether the F5Es will be run on. A BAe team visited Jordan in August 1982 which emphasised Hawk's versatility including its ground attack capability and its ability to mount air-to-air missiles as done by RAF.

Khalid

Deliveries of the 274 Khalid tanks ordered in 1979 are well under way. Earlier difficulties associated with the transmission/steer unit assemblies on the tanks forced UK to revise the original delivery programme. These problems have now been overcome and a refit programme covering delivered Khalids is progressing. Completion of the delivery programme is planned for April 1984.