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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 July 1983

Dear Sir,

Call on the Prime Minister by Mr. L.K. Jha

I enclose a record of the conversation which took place here this morning between the Prime Minister and Mr. L.K. Jha.

*Your ever
Fol Wla.*

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. L.K. JHA
AT 1100 ON MONDAY 11 JULY 1983 AT 10 DOWNING STREET

Present:

Prime Minister

Mr. L.K. Jha

Mr. Coles

Dr. V.A. Seyid Muhammad

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Mr. Jha said that he had been asked by Mrs. Gandhi to convey to the Prime Minister her thoughts about the proposal for a Summit in New York at the time of the UN General Assembly. He wanted to emphasise, in particular, that the proposal had nothing to do with the United Nations as such. The UN General Assembly simply provided a convenient occasion for Heads of Government to come together without the necessity of there being a host. Mrs. Gandhi hoped that few rather than many Heads of Government would attend. But she attached particular importance to certain leaders coming and these included Mrs. Thatcher.

The Prime Minister said that she was interested to have this clarification. She believed that the value of the proposed Summit would depend on persuading a few leaders of importance to attend. It was vital that Mr. Andropov should be there - otherwise the gathering would lose much of its point. Mr. Jha commented that the Indians were concerned that Andropov's health would prevent him going. Mrs. Gandhi's judgement was that Mr. Tikhanov might be the right person to represent the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister said that it would be much more valuable if Andropov went. She had the impression that he was very much in command in Moscow. No-one else would have the same authority. If Andropov went, there would be an opportunity to put to him views which he never heard in the closed society of the Soviet Union. Mr. Jha said that he accepted that point but he hoped that, if Andropov could not attend, that would not deter the Prime Minister from attending. Apart from East/West tensions there were North/South issues to discuss.

/ The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister had played a magnificent role at Cancun. That meeting would have produced results if Venezuela had not intervened with its global approach to North/South questions. The Prime Minister agreed that Cancun was a good conference. This had been helped by the fact that only 22 Heads of Government attended.

Mr. Jha said that Mrs. Gandhi was hoping that not more than 50 Heads of Government would go to New York. It would not be necessary for them all to meet at the same time. But the occasion would be provided for communication between those who lacked an adequate means of communication at present. The Americans were showing some reluctance because of the lack of time for adequate preparation.

The Prime Minister asked who would chair the Summit. Mr. Jha said that it would not necessarily have to be the Chairman of the UN General Assembly. One possibility would be the Indian Prime Minister, as current Chairman of the Non-Aligned. India envisaged a series of informal meetings. Special care would have to be taken about who met whom. The Prime Minister commented that it was essential to be clear about who would attend and who would not, who would be Chairman, what would be discussed and what would be achieved. East/West relations would clearly dominate. But it was necessary to bear in mind that, for example, President Reagan and Castro could not possibly be in New York together. Mr. Jha said that Mrs. Gandhi had already stated that that must be avoided.

The Prime Minister said that if the proposal were to go ahead, a lot of careful thought would be needed. But the key was Andropov. It would also be important to know whether Deng Xiaoping would attend.

Mr. Jha said that there should be preparatory consultations between a few like-minded countries. The Prime Minister said that there might be a need for a preparatory meeting but it was important first to establish whether Andropov and Deng Xiaoping would attend. If they agreed to come then a great deal of preparation would be necessary.

Mr. Jha said that Mrs. Gandhi was concerned that if the proposal went ahead virtually all the non-aligned would wish to attend. From

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South Asia, if India attended, Pakistan would wish to do so also - and Nepal and Sri Lanka would probably not agree to be left out. The Prime Minister pointed out that previous gatherings of Heads of Government in New York, for example in 1960 when Kruschev had attended and last year at the Special Session on Disarmament, had not been very successful. She thought that any gathering would have to be very carefully restricted. Was a meeting in September perhaps too soon?

Mr. Jha said that he had had negative signals from the United States. They were wary of an "accidental Summit". There had been hints that the Americans might be more positive towards the idea if Andropov did not attend. They had not adopted a definite position and President Reagan was said still to be open minded.

In discussion of other possible participants, Mr. Jha said that he had reason to believe that Egypt would attend. The Prime Minister thought that it would probably be necessary to invite Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and a Francophone African state such as the Ivory Coast. Mr. Jha asked who should come from Europe. The Prime Minister said that she assumed that the five permanent members of the Security Council, including France, would have to attend. It would also be important for Germany to be present. Japan would doubtless have to be there as well.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr. Jha said that the Russian attitude was not negative but it contained a note of caution which the Indians attributed to the state of Andropov's health. In the next ten days the Indians would send a special emissary (not Mr. Jha) to Moscow.

The Prime Minister reiterated that the key to the whole proposal was Andropov. She wondered whether we were not now a little short of time. Perhaps we should consider a later date for the proposed Summit. Mr. Jha suggested that we should reflect on whether the presence of Andropov might not be a negative factor for President Reagan. The Prime Minister said that perhaps it would be wise to

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wait until both President Reagan and Andropov were ready. But the first step was to find out who was willing to go. If the key Heads of Government were not ready to make up their minds, perhaps the whole idea should be delayed. She thought that we would now make further contacts with the US Administration to establish their latest attitude.

The discussion ended at 1140.

A. J. C.

11 July 1983

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