



CONFIDENTIAL

1 Grosvenor Square
London W1X 0AB

October 26, 1983

Dear Prime Minister,

I have been asked by Prime Minister Trudeau to pass the following message to you:

"Dear Margaret,

During your most welcome official visit to Canada last month we devoted a considerable amount of our time to the theme of East/West relations and international security. You will be aware of my concern about the current unsatisfactory state of affairs and I am writing today to inform you of my intention to try to ameliorate this situation in the days and weeks ahead.

In doing so, I want to emphasize to you that my point of departure is one based on Canada's long standing and continuing firm commitment to the principles and purposes of both NATO and NORAD, which I view as the very bedrock of Canada's foreign and defence policies. Renewed evidence of this is reflected in our decision to permit the testing of air-launched cruise missiles in Canadian airspace, despite considerable domestic public opposition, and our four-square support behind NATO's "two-track" decision in INF; a decision which Canada supported completely at the outset in December 1979 and will continue to abide by fully. The collective security provided by NATO has proven invaluable to us all before during unsettled times as I am sure it will again.

What is required at this stage, however, is something that goes beyond our enduring commitment to NATO and firmness of resolve. As I see the situation at the present time, the political climate between East and West is not good and indeed

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The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

is rather troubling. This is particularly the case following the Korean airliner tragedy and against the background of NATO's likely imminent deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. While there have been several troughs, including some rather deep ones, in our relationship with the East in the past, I believe there are vital new elements in this equation going beyond the lack of progress in arms control negotiations that bear consideration at this time for the potential threat they contain to our mutual security. The first relates to the situation in Moscow where General Secretary Andropov appears ill and seems to be encountering considerable difficulty in establishing his political control. Added to the possibility that there may be increasing militarization of the Soviet system underway is the relatively recent Soviet position of having achieved rough parity of nuclear forces which may lead Moscow not to back away, as it has in the past, from any real or perceived crisis.

The third, and perhaps most important element, is that at this critical juncture of heightened tension and uncertainty in Moscow we are attempting to manage this relationship largely in a political vacuum, devoid of any real high level political dialogue of the type that is essential to understanding and dealing with the concerns and intentions of the other side. At this time there is an evident mutual loss of confidence in one another. While we may be sure of what we are saying and what we intend our words to mean, there is a real possibility, precisely because of this mistrust and absence of dialogue, that the East at a distance may misread, misinterpret or miscalculate our true intentions.

The conclusion I draw from this appreciation of the above confluence of circumstances is that there is an urgent requirement for those Western leaders in a position to do so to apply themselves: to the task of arresting the downward trendline in relations; to the reinstatement of high level East/West dialogue; to the need to inject real political impetus into stalled arms control negotiations, such as MBFR; and to the necessity of taking a more global approach to nuclear arms control with regard to both horizontal and vertical proliferation.

At Williamsburg we agreed to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war. This is the necessary moment, I believe, when these resources should be put into play. Our publics, who are obviously disturbed by the current situation, expect as a minimum that their political leaders will make such an effort. I, for my part, intend to do so.

I will make public some of my concerns during an address to an international conference entitled "Strategies for Peace and Security in the Nuclear Age" being held at the University of Guelph in Ontario on October 27. My speech will

also allude in the most general of ways to some of the preliminary thoughts I have been considering for possible remedial action. These will include the need to stabilize East/West relations as a first step by reinstating high level political dialogue; ways of ensuring that all five nuclear weapon states engage in negotiations aimed at establishing global limits on their strategic nuclear arsenals; possible endeavours to encourage non-nuclear states in the direction of containing horizontal proliferation; as well as the need for the West to get off the defensive on the MBFR negotiations and to put forward substantive and constructive proposals aimed at breaking this longstanding deadlock, an objective for which I would seek your support.

I wish to emphasize that it is not my intention to insert myself into the important bilateral arms control negotiations now taking place between the USA and the USSR. As I also said in the House of Commons October 24, I do not think it would be right to include UK and French nuclear forces in the current INF negotiations.


I would like to stay in close touch with you on this matter and would be most pleased to receive your comments on what I have had to say above. I plan on taking this subject up personally with a number of allied leaders in November including Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand. As we will be meeting again at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in New Delhi for a number of days later in November I believe this will provide us with an opportune occasion for an in-depth discussion of our own on this vital subject.

Yours sincerely,

Pierre Elliott Trudeau"

I will ensure a copy of Prime Minister Trudeau's University of Guelph address to the International Conference on Strategies for Peace and Security is forwarded to you immediately it is received here.

Yours sincerely,



Donald C. Jamieson
High Commissioner

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NOTES FOR REMARKS BY

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU
PRIME MINISTER

TO THE CONFERENCE ON STRATEGIES FOR PEACE
AND SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH, ONTARIO

27 OCTOBER 1983

Let me, first, congratulate the organisers of this Conference. The theme is compelling; your membership is eminent; and your location is appropriate. It is appropriate because the name of Guelph reminds us of another age which was torn by hostile systems, competing alliances and profound ideological division.

The depth and violence of the dispute between Guelphs and Ghibellines tore Europe apart for much of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The argument was fundamental for the time. Who supreme, Pope or emperor? It spread from Germany to Italy, France and Sicily, drawing other powers and interests in its wake. No country, church, class or family in Europe was immune from the destructive force of that question.

Popes excommunicated emperors. Emperors took up arms against successive Popes. The battle between Guelphs and Ghibellines was remarkable for its ferocity, for the loss of life and the wreck of cities, for its pervasive and lasting influence throughout European politics and culture. It was an early version of total war - on a continental scale. And, because both history and geography are written by the victorious, the name of Guelph lives on, given to this place as the proud heritage of a ruling dynasty.

That this city of Guelph is to be found in Canada encourages me to underline a further proposition, familiar but profound, that we Canadians have a framework of long-standing and deep-rooted ties with Europe and with European conflicts. There is a European-ness, well beyond place-names, in our

history, in our culture and in the predisposition of many of our government policies. I do no disservice to our north American nature nor to our place on the Pacific Rim. But our engagement with Europe comes home with particular force in questions of peace and security.

Canada's participation, from the beginning, in both World Wars of this century, our founding and loyal membership in NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), our decision to test the Cruise missile in Canadian territory, all demonstrate the recognition that our own security is tightly bound with the security of our European allies.

A nation of our size and geographic location could, in the past or in the present, have considered other options, those options, whether of isolationism, or of being a nuclear-arms state ourselves, have in Canada been invariably set aside in favour of a commitment to collective security. Our dedication to the Western Alliance, and to our partnership with the United States in the defence of this continent, is part of the bedrock of our foreign policy.

But the political, economic and military obligations we have undertaken for our common defence offer commensurate rights and duties. Among them is the right to speak about the full range of Western policies, and the duty to reflect about where we are and where we should be going.

We are not silent partners in any of the councils we have joined - because silence would mean the abdication of

responsibility in the face of crisis. We are not ambiguous about our international commitments - because we recognize our deep engagement with an interdependent world. We are not afraid to negotiate with those who may threaten us - because that fear would betray lack of confidence in the vital strength of our own values.

That is the mood I want to bring to you this evening, and the spirit in which I want to share with you some of my own reflections on your theme 'Strategies for Peace and Security in the Nuclear Age'.

I will tell you right away that I am deeply troubled: by an intellectual climate of acrimony and uncertainty; by the parlous state of East-West relations; by a superpower relationship which is dangerously confrontational; and by a widening gap between military strategy and political purpose. All these reveal most profoundly the urgent need to assert the pre-eminence of the mind of man over machines of war.

There is today an ominous rhythm of crisis. Not just an arms crisis. It is a crisis of confidence in ourselves, a crisis of faith in others. How can we change that ominous rhythm? That is the question which brings me here tonight.

I start from what I suppose is a problem in epistemology - the difficulty all of us experience in trying to know what is going on in the world - to know it and to understand it in a manner that is accurate, that provides the ground for useful action.

Too often our knowledge and our judgments are true and false at the same time. This is often the distinctive sign of rapidly changing realities which tend to elude our understanding. For example we know that there are, in the eighties, many new kinds of power and many new centres of power. There is the power of oil, or of cheap labour, or of regional hegemony. We call it a multipolar world - which suggests that no nation can act in isolation, that no power is truly dominant. But surely it is also true, and perhaps now with a special force, that the superpower relationship is at this time as dominant and as crucial as it ever was in the fifties - when we had a more simplistic bipolar model with which to understand the world. Another example: military strategy is the subject of much debate these days. This is a positive sign. Many strategists, in rightly trying to increase the odds against the nuclear gamble, advocate increased strength in conventional weapons, and new doctrines for conventional deterrence. Some of these doctrines have the sound purpose of delaying, or even preventing, the terrible resort to nuclear weapons in any European conflict.

I believe that such a raising of the nuclear threshold in Europe is a concept of the first importance. It would not be an easy, or an inexpensive task. But even as I am attracted to this concept in its application to Europe, I am troubled by a broader implication. Non-nuclear weapons are in an advanced state of technology, and are widely marketed. Sea-skimming missiles, laser-guided bombs and fragmentation weapons are

available for distribution. Is it the purpose of nuclear arms control to make the world safe for conventional warfare? Surely a basic term is missing in this equation: it is the encouragement of an equilibrium of conventional arms and forces, balanced at lower rather than higher levels. An agreed framework of conventional deterrence against armed aggression - but significantly reducing any dangerous concentration of forces. This is to some extent the task of the mutual and balanced force reduction talks (MBFR) in Vienna. But those talks will not succeed unless their importance in terms of military strategy is developed within a wider framework of East-West confidence and political will. Let me suggest a further example of our difficulty in understanding a time which appears to be out of joint. A moment ago I used the word interdependence. It is the accepted description of the world as we know it. We think it describes a rational and positive condition, an ethic to be encouraged. But we are also learning that the consequences of interdependence are frequently unforeseen, often irrational, negative, and out of control - rogue trends which promote inequality among states, and deep strains between them.

If we have difficulty understanding the intricacies of interdependence, we are not yet even close to managing the economic linkages with peace and security.

Consider Poland. Its economic collapse strongly suggested action to assist. Western banks were deeply exposed.

There seemed to be a common interest in the renewed viability of the Polish economy. But the overriding political considerations, in light of the brutal declaration of martial law, pointed in quite the opposite direction. Thus, the debate over East-West economic relations - which haunts every Western council - reveals the fundamental and unresolved question of how much economic interdependence is desirable between the two systems. Some say less. Some say more. Those who argue for less are often, paradoxically, the first to advocate the punitive merit of economic sanctions - which are only effective if interdependence exists, and if Soviet behaviour is modified by the expectation of economic benefit. Moreover, some who argue for economic sanctions in the civilian sector apparently believe that this will influence Soviet military spending. Yet they may add that there is little if any relationship between civilian and military economies in the Soviet Union.

This particular debate tends also to lay open one of the most gaping self-inflicted wounds of the current period. That is the unfortunate tendency for a discussion which starts off about East-West relations to wind up in the fratricide of West-West relations. There have been days when I, or Ronald Reagan, or Margaret Thatcher may seem to have been accused, for whatever reason or passion of the moment, of posing a greater threat to the security of the West than do the Russians and their associates.

It is almost as though the diversity, pluralism, and freedom of expression which we are determined to preserve through

the alliance, are not seen as appropriate within the alliance.

The alliance in arms against itself is a paradox rich with historical allusion. NATO will avoid that fate if we are wise. But institutions cannot grow to meet new challenges if their level of debate - their intellectual universe of discourse - does not expand to meet the changing realities of our environment.

Therefore, I am uneasy with these paradoxes. I am not satisfied with our ability to analyze and understand the complexities of an entirely new phase in East-West relations. I am not reassured by the posture and rhetoric of an earlier wartime age - an age, by the way, in which Canadian nerves were not found to falter.

For it is not our nerves which are being tested now, and these are not playing fields on which we stand and cheer. It is the killing-ground of life itself - and what is being tested is whether the force and will of our statecraft can reverse the momentum of the nuclear arms race.

When I spoke in June of last year at the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, I said:

'... I understand full well the people's anguish and confusion. The nuclear debate is difficult and seems to pursue an inverse logic. It deals with power that, by common consent, is unusable. It argues for more nuclear weapons in order that, in the end, there may be fewer. It perceives the vulnerability of cities and of human beings as an element of stability in the nuclear balance. And worst of all, the debate goes on without

much evidence of any light at the end of the tunnel.'

More than a year later, I still see little light ahead. How did we arrive at such an impasse? Some of the answers lie in the ragged course of East-West relations over the past fifteen years. Those relations have an innate tendency to defy management and control. They are animated by competing philosophies and civilizations, and armed with weaponry that is global in scope. Like Guelphs and Ghibellines, the two sides advocate radically different visions of political order, human values and social behaviour.

As Canadians, we know where we stand. We have a distinguished record of accomplishment in working for international peace and security. NATO has without doubt been one of the instruments preventing nuclear war for the past thirty-five years. Canada has done pioneering work in the United Nations and elsewhere on arms control and disarmament. Our nuclear power industry has perforce made us experts on safeguards agreements and has given us a special commitment to the cause of non-proliferation. We have continuously pressed for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, for a convention to prohibit chemical weapons, and for the prohibition of all weapons for use in outer space.

We have played our part in periods of cooperation, and pulled our weight in periods of confrontation. We have identified a distinctive Canadian space in East-West relations, determined by our history and geography, by our membership in NATO, by successive waves of immigration, by such priorities as

trade and human rights, and by that sense of realism which is, to paraphrase John Holmes, both the achievement and the comfort of the middle-powers' middle age. I do not believe we have any illusions about the short-lived and much-maligned period of detente. I certainly have no embarrassment about my own part in that process, bred in a conjuncture of geopolitics, economic aspirations, and collective leadership on both sides.

But the process too soon became part of the problem. The main achievements of the late sixties and early seventies were carried forward with difficulty, perhaps with an overload of linkage. Historians may reflect on the reasons why 1975 was the year which saw both the high point of the formal structure of detente in the conclusion of the Helsinki final act - and the imminent erosion of its broader purpose as a result of Soviet-Cuban adventurism in Angola. Detente rapidly showed signs of a process being drained of its substance. Core issues were held hostage by one side or the other - human rights, economic cooperation, hegemony in key spheres of influence. Detente became both divisible, and reversible.

And yet, I am not ready to call detente a failure. There were clear benefits of stability and cooperation. Its long-term impact, for example on Soviet elites, cannot yet be judged. Moreover it did coincide with, or provoke, an important impulse in the early seventies, which seems to have been lost without trace. It is the impulse toward political dialogue, toward regular consultation at the most senior levels of the East-West system.

This was not talk for the sake of talk. It led to a set of interlocking bargains or understandings on strategic arms, on Vietnam, on the place of China in the world, on cooperation in outer space. Techniques of crisis management were put tenuously in place. It was an impulse in which elements of mutual respect contended with the search for advantage - which is to say it was high politics in action. With the loss of that impulse, and in the absence of high politics in the East-West relationship, it is not surprising that any shred of trust or confidence in the intentions of the other side appears to have vanished as well. Also missing, and this troubles me deeply, is much trace of political craft and creativity directed at ameliorating the intentions of the other side. There is a disturbing complacency, a readiness to adapt to the worse rather than to exert our influence for the better. We are, in short, de-politicizing the most important political relationship we have.

The responsibility for this lies partly, but by no means exclusively, with both superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union outstrip the rest of us in their global reach, their armaments, and their leadership responsibilities. Naturally, they differ greatly - and I am not committing the fallacy of describing them as equals in any moral sense at all. Nevertheless, they breathe an atmosphere common to themselves, and share a global perception according to which even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates.

And there are some other features which both powers have in common: continental land-mass and considerable economic self-sufficiency; ambivalent relationships with Europe and with Asia; complexities of demography; a central focus on each other in their policies; spasms of unilateralism and isolationism.

It is therefore facile to deny the grave responsibilities which are shared in Washington DC and Moscow, or to deny that what both seem to lack at the present time is a political vision of a world wherein their nations can live in peace. What is essential to assert is that, just as war is too important to leave to the generals, so the relationship between the superpowers may have become too charged with animosity for East-West relations to be entrusted to them alone. Military scientists make a routine distinction between capabilities - what weaponry the enemy has; and intentions - when, how and why he intends to use it. I am profoundly concerned that we are devoting far too great a proportion of our time to the enumeration of capabilities, and far too little to the assessment of intentions which govern the use of arms. We may at some point be able to freeze the nuclear capability in the world at greatly reduced levels. But how do we freeze the menacing intentions which might control those weapons which remain? Therein lies the inadequacy of the nuclear freeze argument.

Although known as the architect of total war, Von Clausewitz himself insisted on a political framework for military capabilities.

He said:

'War cannot be separated from political life; whenever this occurs in our thinking ... we have before us a senseless thing without an object.'

On that point, I agree with him. I am convinced that casting a fresh linkage - of military strategy with, and subordinate to, strong political purpose - must become the highest priority of East and West alike.

This is a period of deep questioning of many of the strategic concepts which have dominated the post-war world. New-school strategists, and critics from left and from right, are probing the fundamentals of strategic thought in the nuclear age from many points of view. They are in agreement, however, when they point to changing realities, to evolution in the psychology of those who live constantly with the spectre of nuclear war, and to the importance of weeding out obsolete ideas.

But much of this questioning, provocative as it is, strikes me as missing an important point. And that is the place of military strategy in the nuclear age. I believe that military strategy must, above all, serve a comprehensive set of political objectives and controls, which dominate and give purpose to modern weapons and to military doctrine. Our central purpose must be to create a stable environment of increased security for both East and West. We must aim at suppressing those nearly instinctive fears, frustrations, or ambitions which have so often been the reason for resorting to the use of force.

Therefore it is essential to Western purposes, in my judgement, to maintain in our policies elements of communication, negotiation, and transparency about our own intentions - plus a measure of incentive for the Soviet Union first to clarify, and then to modify, its own objectives towards the West.

This was, in a limited sense, the philosophy which underpinned the NATO response to the Soviet build-up of SS-20 missiles in Europe. We had to ask ourselves what purpose of political intimidation could be served by that build-up. That is why we decided to respond with a two-track approach - deployment and negotiations. This approach has given the Soviet Union both the clear incentive to reach agreement, and the table at which to do so. I and my fellow NATO heads of government remain firmly committed to that two-track decision.

The tragic shooting down of the Korean airliner raises further questions about military dominance on the Soviet side. It is the Soviet military system edging beyond the reach of the political authorities? Are we contributing to such a trend by the absence of regular contact with the Soviet leadership?

These considerations suggest that our two-track decision may also require, as the time for deployment comes closer, a 'third rail' of high-level political energy to speed the course of agreement - a third rail through which might run the current of our broader political purposes, including our determination not to be intimidated.

The risk of accident or miscalculation is too great for us not to begin to repair the lines of communication with our adversaries. The level of tension is too high for us not to

revive a more constructive approach to the containment of crises. The degree of mutual mistrust is too intense for us not to try to rebuild confidence through active political contact and consultation. Only in this way can the quality and credibility of efforts towards peace and security, from whatever quarter, be animated and reinforced. But it is a precondition of that goal that Western councils, particularly at the head of government level, benefit from the free flow of ideas which we maintain in our own societies, and which we advocate for others. That, too, forms part of our armament and we should not hesitate to deploy it.

Because the trend is for arms negotiations, like military strategy itself, to become ever more distanced from the political energy of the participants, I have mentioned the MBFR talks in Vienna. That forum has laboured for over ten years and produced very little by way of results. Those talks require urgent political attention if they are to move off dead centre. Over the years, other leaders and I have made several proposals in that direction - proposals which now merit wider support.

We have high hopes for the conference on disarmament in Europe, established by the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), and due to open in Stockholm next January. Canada will do its utmost to make that conference productive. We recognize the importance of agreement on confidence-building measures of a military nature. But these

negotiations, important as they are, will not advance our larger hopes if they proceed in a political vacuum. The delegate framework of security in Europe cannot be balanced on the fate of one or two sets of negotiations alone. These negotiations must be grounded in a structure of stable East-West understanding: reciprocal acknowledgement of legitimate security needs, regular high-level dialogue, and a determined approach to crisis management.

Here again, we require that jolt of political energy which I have described as the third rail.

What is missing is a strategy of confidence-building measures of a political nature:

- steps that reduce tensions caused by uncertainty about objectives, or caused by fear of the consequences of failure;
- steps that mitigate hostility and promote a modicum of mutual respect;
- steps that build an authentic confidence in man's ability to survive on this planet.

In short, we must take positive political steps in order to reverse the dangerously downward trend-line in East-West relations. I shall be exploring such steps with our allies, with other leaders, and with groups such as yours. We must work in a balanced and rational fashion, with a degree of trust, a degree of belief in the good sense of mankind, and with a strong recognition that the task is urgent. The negotiations

on theatre nuclear forces in Europe, and on strategic forces, are taking place between the superpowers. Canada is not at the table, and we have no wish to insert ourselves into this vital and delicate process. It is my hope, however, that we might help to influence the atmosphere in which these negotiations are being conducted, and thereby enhance the prospects of early agreement. We need to be realistic about the hard factors in play. We must appreciate the primordial drive for security and for sovereignty which is never very far below the surface of the arms control debate.

Let us begin the search for what Franklyn Griffiths has termed a strategic Keynesianism - counter-cyclical measures which work to moderate the terrible lurch from hope to crises. We shall have to go against the flow.

I intend to speak further, in other speeches in the weeks ahead, about these issues of confidence stability, arms control and political will, which dominate not only our times, but our lives as well. I have this week begun a process of close discussion with President Reagan. My consultations with other leaders have already commenced. I plan to take to them in person my own recommendations for a strategy of political confidence-building.

We will want to look at several elements:

- ways of designing a consistent structure of political and economic confidence with which to stabilize East-West relations;
- ways to draw the superpowers away from their

concentration on military strength, toward regular and productive dialogue, toward a sense of responsibility commensurate with their power;

- ways to persuade all five nuclear-weapons states to engage in negotiations aimed at establishing global limits on their strategic nuclear arsenals;
- ways of improving European security through the raising of the nuclear threshold, including the imposition of a political dynamic upon the static MBFR talks in Vienna; and
- ways to arrest the proliferation of nuclear weapons among other states.

It is my personal purpose to live up to the undertaking, made by leaders at the Williamsburg Summit last May, 'to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war.' The questions to be raised, as I believe I have shown to you tonight, are not easy. There are priorities which inevitably conflict. A new climate of East-West confidence cannot be instilled in a day, nor can the arms race be stopped overnight. But in so far as I, and other leaders who share this purpose, can work together to build authentic confidence, I pledge to that we shall.

Not to do so at this time would, I believe, amount to a form of escapism - an escapism well defined by the Harvard Nuclear Study Group in their thoughtful book, *Living with Nuclear Weapons*. The book cautions against two forms of escapism: the first form is to believe that nuclear weapons will go away. The authors rightly and regretfully say that they will not. But the second

form of escapism, they point out, is to think that nuclear weapons can be treated like other military weapons in history. Surely it is clear that they cannot.

And therefore I would add a third form of escapism, which we indulge in at our peril. That is the escapism of allowing shrill rhetoric to become a substitute for foreign policy, of letting inertia become a substitute for will, of making a desert and calling it peace. Thank you.



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CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY MR TRUDEAU, 11 NOVEMBER 1983

BRIEF NO 2: ARMS CONTROL

POINTS TO MAKE

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

1. The British interest in nuclear arms control is genuine and serious. We have made this clear to the Russians at every high level contact (my own response to Andropov's message on INF, Sir Geoffrey Howe's discussions with Gromyko and Kostandov.) But across the field of arms control we remain determined not to allow short-term presentational requirements to override genuine security concerns.
2. There is no doubt that under pressure from allies there has been a wholesale change for the better in the US Administration's attitudes to arms control. In addition the President now seems to see progress in arms control as a potential plus in electoral terms.
3. Given the state of East/West relations, extent of US flexibility in current negotiations has been creditable. In START they have made two recent proposals tailored to meet Soviet concerns and underline Western flexibility: in June they set aside previous demands for stringent limits on Soviet ICBMs, in October they expressed willingness to trade between US advantages in bombs and Soviet advantages in missiles (as well as introducing the 'build-down' concept.)

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4. INF problems still intractable. We cannot concede to the Russians the right to maintain a monopoly of INF missiles while excluding the Americans. Our own deployments will clearly have to go ahead but we are genuinely determined to continue the search for an arms control agreement. The Russians may well carry out threats to walkout of INF talks but there is a strong chance that they will be prepared to restart negotiations in the near future.

5. NATO's proposals for an interim agreement on INF provide a very flexible framework for progress. The Russians may well agree to negotiate on this basis once they have failed in their objective to prevent initial deployments in Europe.

6. No objection in principle to eventual merger of INF and START negotiations. Criterion must be whether a merger would facilitate agreements. At the moment it would probably serve only to aggregate current problems.

7. Nor is it helpful to us to speak of a merger of the INF/START talks as a solution to the problem of how to include British and French weapons in the arms control process.

8. This question of British and French systems is a highly sensitive one for us. We have given it a great deal of thought and produced a new public formula designed to help our allies in public debate on the issue. I inserted in my reply to Andropov this formula as announced by Sir G Howe at the UNGA in September.

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We must naturally take into account that our force is a strategic one. It represents less than 3 per cent of the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. It would be absurd as things stand for us to seek to trade reductions with a super power. But we have never said 'never'. If Soviet and US strategic arsenals were to be very substantially reduced, and if no significant changes had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would want to review her position and to consider how best she could contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat. Do not, for very real security reasons, wish to go further than this position for the present. Could not at this stage give any possible support to the idea of a five-power nuclear conference (and would much doubt that, despite his statement to the UN, President Mitterand thinks there is any realistic possibility of it happening in the foreseeable future).

9. Seeking to restrict mobility of ICBMs would also run counter to current thinking in Washington. Bi-partisan recommendations of Scowcroft Commission report encourage, [redacted] on grounds of enhancing stability, deployment of mobile non-MIRVed missiles ('Midgetman'). Verification of new nuclear systems important if they are to be limited in arms control; but verification of mobile land-based systems not impossible.

/ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE

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ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE

10. Understand desire for early action. Unlimited development in space-based military activities may be not in Western strategic interests. Presentationally a negative attitude will put us at a disadvantage with public opinion.
 11. But caution necessary. Should not stir up confrontation with the US whose assets are most at stake. Some in Washington sceptical about any arms control measures for space. Russians keen for propaganda reasons to promote their own draft Treaty as sole basis for any agreement. Timing of Soviet proposals, before US test of anti-satellite system (ASAT) begins, an attempt to hinder Western development of a weapon they already possess. And obvious verification and definition problems. Must not allow USSR to drive a wedge between us and the Americans.
 12. Committee on Disarmament (CD) logical place to pursue subject on basis accepted last session by West and non-aligned but blocked by Soviet Union.
- MBFR
13. Committed to negotiations. Keep under regular review. Minister of State responsible for arms control in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr Luce, will visit shortly.
 14. Always ready to consider new ideas but must be thoroughly



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evaluated against basic security requirements. Unsound agreements entered into for purely political reasons likely to lead to mutual recrimination and distrust not better relations.

15. Aware of German ideas and that President Reagan has recently decided against any change in US position for time being pending further study. Share US reservations.

16. Should never forget that key to an agreement is Eastern willingness to reduce its superiority. No such evidence at the moment. New Eastern initiatives this year have some positive aspects but faulty and inadequate. Should continue to press them on verification without conceding sound Western positions.

CDE

17. Attach importance to CDE as serious negotiation on security. Concrete confidence and security building measures of NATO Allies could make a genuine contribution to European security; but do not delude ourselves it will be easy to achieve.

18. Overall state of East/West relations will be a factor. CDE could contribute to improvement but should not be overloaded politically. Too high public expectations risk disproportionate disappointment if no early progress. Also important to preserve balance of CSCE process.



19. Ministerial level opening appropriate: have not yet decided who will go.



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CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY MR TRUDEAU, 11 NOVEMBER 1983

BRIEF NO 2: ARMS CONTROL

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Mr Marchand, Canadian Deputy Secretary for External Affairs gave us on 7 November a list of topics which Mr Trudeau would probably raise with the Prime Minister.

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

2. He will probably ask about the British Government's 'bottom line' over the inclusion of British missiles in nuclear arms control. His own preference appears to be for a five nuclear power conference and he would also like to see Britain and France accepting, to provide a ceiling on their forces, a ratio between their independent forces and those of the two super powers. The Prime Minister may wish to firmly discourage him from pursuing this line at the present time.

3. He wishes the West to obtain maximum advantage from an INF/START merger. Our public position has been to recognise the very close link between the two negotiations. Merger would not however overcome practical difficulties at present and it is far from clear that it would be acceptable to the Russians let alone the Americans; it would complicate our arguments for excluding one nuclear deterrent from present negotiations.

4. Mr Trudeau's proposals to limit the mobility of strategic systems (to aid verification) and to prohibit new nuclear systems which could not be verified are unlikely to get far. They will probably be rejected outright in Washington.

CONFIDENTIAL



ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE

5. Some similarities between Mr Trudeau's latest ideas and Soviet proposals for a Treaty banning anti-satellite systems and other weapons for use in space. Need for any Western approach to take account of US attitude. Least divisive approach would be for the CD to agree to examine effectiveness of existing arms control measures before considering new measures.

6. UK officials to undertake further work on arms control possibilities. Verifiability an important criterion. Distinguish between limits on ASATs, where there may be room for manoeuvre, and ballistic missile defence (BMD) which is more difficult area in political and strategic terms.

MBFR

7. Mr Trudeau will argue that MBFR needs a political impetus and that German ideas would be a suitable basis for a new Western move.

8. MBFR deadlocked for 10 years over Eastern refusal to acknowledge existing superiority and hence indicate genuine readiness to reach agreed negotiating goal of 900,000 ground and air forces on each side. Current force levels in very round figures West one million: East 1.2 million (they claim just under 1 million). This year East has tried to persuade West to forego requirement for agreement on initial force levels and quantified reductions, instead holding out promise of verification of residual ceilings although measures they have suggested so far quite inadequate. These initiatives not guaranteed by any indication that the East is ready to



reduce its superiority, rather the contrary. In the circumstances it appears that their aim is, as ever, to contractualise the existing situation at lower levels.

9. Nevertheless both the US and FRG have been toying with possibility of new Western moves partly because of frustration through lack of progress and partly to satisfy alleged public concern. An outline of their thinking was leaked widely to West and East. However President Reagan recently decided against a change in the US position casting FRG and other advocates of new move into some confusion. NATO is likely to begin an evaluation of the Western negotiating position next week: it is not yet clear whether FRG will go ahead with its proposal in the light of the US decision.

10. In outline FRG proposes that after initial small US/Soviet reductions there should be a freeze based on tabled figures, verification of which would produce an agreed data base for reductions to 900,000. Verification measures would be agreed before the freeze. In theory this would require Eastern reductions and well over 200,000 in return for Western reduction of some 13,000. It is more likely the negotiations would flounder on verification because without data agreement the West would have to insist on a much stricter regime. In the meantime we would have the disadvantage of having abandoned a soundly based position with implications for other arms control negotiations.

CDE

11. Mr Trudeau will suggest that CDE should be opened /by



by Foreign Ministers if not heads of Government in keeping with the importance he attaches to its role in East/West relations. Most Western Foreign Ministers are likely to attend but Shultz has indicated that he does not wish to be put in a position of having to refuse an invitation. Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has instructed that we should discreetly encourage Shultz to attend but in the meantime not commit himself. Pressure by Genscher on Shultz has been counter productive. CDE begins in Stockholm on 17 January. Preparatory meeting in Helsinki 25 October - 14 November. First stage of CDE confined to confidence and security building measures. Further stages subject to decision to be taken by future CSCE follow up meetings and which next is Vienna in 1986. Attach importance to maintaining balance of CSCE process of which CDE is only a part.



MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER
ON 11 NOVEMBER 1983

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

Points to Make

1. Do not consider that there is any direct linkage between horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Incipient nuclear weapon states will decide whether or not to go nuclear on the basis of their own assessment of national interest. These interests are dictated overwhelmingly by regional security considerations and are not influenced by arms control negotiations between the Super Powers.
2. Major nuclear supplier countries should, we agree, be doing more under Article IV of NPT to help the G77 NPT Parties develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Officials are exploring possible ways of improving the benefits for G77 countries of being parties to the NPT.
3. Careful planning will be required to ensure the success of the 1985 NPT Review Conference. UK also intends to play its full part.

Nuclear Energy Department
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

9 November 1983



MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER
ON 11 NOVEMBER 1983

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

Essential Facts

1. Mr Trudeau is likely to press the case for injecting new political impetus into the Non-Proliferation Treaty, before the Review Conference in 1985. In his view the nuclear weapon states have not fulfilled their commitments to allow non-nuclear weapon signatories of the Treaty access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (Article IV), nor have they checked vertical proliferation (Article VI). Canada is prepared to play a major role in revitalising the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
2. At the 1980 NPT Review Conference the advanced nuclear countries were strongly attacked by G77 for their failure to make progress under Article VI of the NPT (which calls for nuclear disarmament). Some critics maintain there is a linkage between horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that limited progress on disarmament has encouraged the former. This is not so. Incipient nuclear weapon states will decide whether or not to go nuclear on the basis of their own assessment of national interest. These interests are dictated overwhelmingly by regional security considerations and are not influenced by arms control negotiations between the Super Powers.
3. Some G77 parties to the NPT claim that there are few real benefits to be gained under Article IV of the Treaty and that non-NPT parties have frequently obtained nuclear supplies on conditions less strict than those which NPT parties have to accept.

/4. (NOT ...



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MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER,
11 NOVEMBER 1983

GRENADA

POINTS TO MAKE

UK/US

1. Discussion with Mr Dam on 7 November.

US Troops

2. Some now withdrawn. Important they get out as soon as security situation permits.

The Governor General and Interim Administration

3. Vital that nothing is done to undermine authority of Governor General. Must be seen to be independent. (Interim Administration due to be set up 9 November.) Administration in Grenada demoralised; will need help.

The Commonwealth

4. Commonwealth may have role. But role depends on wishes of Governor General and of Interim Administration. Ramphal wants to establish Commonwealth presence but thinking more in terms of policing than military role. Options should be left open. Much depends on mopping up operations over coming weeks. If little or no guerilla activity by time US troops leave it might be possible for strengthened OECS police contingent to cope. Commonwealth will probably be able to help in other ways: administration, training, supervision/observation of elections.

The UK Position

5. We have announced resumption of UK aid programme to Grenada. Our experts are at present there assessing position.

/Americans



Americans seem ready to put in substantial sums. May be less need for help from others. We would consider participating in Commonwealth security presence on certain conditions. We would respond sympathetically to requests for help with police and security training. Not trying to elbow our way in. We shall be guided in these and other areas by requests of Governor General and interim administration. No-one should prejudge/interferewith these. Vital not to compromsie credibility of Grenadian authorities.



GRENADA

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Interim Administration

1 McIntyre will be Chairman. He sees main task to revive economic activity, find jobs for demobilized PRA, get schools functioning properly.

Role of Commonwealth Interim Security Arrangements

2 Difference of view about what is needed. Governor-General and OECS think OECS police contingent can take over when US forces leave perhaps by the end of November. Therefore no need for wider Commonwealth involvement. US in Washington and our High Commissioner do not agree and think others in the region should be invited to participate (including Canada).

Canadian Views

3 Mr Trudeau's initial reaction to the US invasion was cautious. Although his disapproval of US action was made increasingly clear, he still stopped short of outright condemnation.

4 The lack of any prior consultation with Canada is seen in Ottawa as a rebuff for Mr Trudeau at the hands of both the US and of Canada's Commonwealth friends in the Caribbean. Canada regards herself as having a special role to play in the area. There was a Canada/Caricom summit in St Lucia in February 1983.

5 Mr Trudeau stated on 27 October that Canada was ready to offer troops for a peacekeeping force to either monitor a truce or supervise elections and that he would be contacting other

/Commonwealth



Commonwealth Heads of Government about this. He telephoned Mrs Thatcher the same day proposing that a group of Commonwealth countries (other than those who were participating in the military action) might call for a truce and offer to supervise the departure of all forces, including Cuban forces, from Grenada. The Prime Minister replied that such an initiative was rather premature, and that she would be very hesitant about considering it until the United States had completed its operations. It was vital that they should be successful. She would be reluctant for Britain to be involved in the kind of force described and did not think a Commonwealth group should become engaged in dealing with Cuban resistance.

6 Mr Shenstone, Assistant Deputy Minister in Department of External Affairs, met Mr Ramphal in New York on 4 November. The Canadians think the Commonwealth could play a useful role, and they had indicated their desire to be helpful. They are determined that any operation should open the way free and fair elections open to all, ie including the New Jewel Movement. The main problems are:

A Membership. The Canadian pre-disposition was not to include those who had taken part in the invasion. The presence should be broadly based.

B The presence should not be a direct substitute for the US presence, and should have a different role. (The Canadians liked Ramphal's general approach that the role should be security rather than peace keeping).



C The Canadians were concerned about cost: Such ventures tended to be extremely expensive.

D Control and command. They considered that the presence should not be under the command of the Governor-General. It should probably be under the Secretary-General, via a civilian head. (As for control of the Secretary-General himself, this should perhaps be exercised by or through High Commissions in London plus an FCO Representative: There were some precedents).

E Duration. The elections should not be too long delayed. (Canadians note that today's press reports McIntyre as hoping that his interim Government would last six months or less).

7 The Canadians do not take it for granted that it will be possible to work out something that will be useful and that they can live with. They are however giving very serious consideration to taking part in a Commonwealth presence since they currently see no alternative for Grenada.

8 In our view the Canadians are still looking for over-ambitious Commonwealth arrangements. Their latest thoughts, particularly para 6D above, fail to recognise the independence and supremacy of the Governor-General and the Interim Administration.



MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND CANADIAN PRIME
MINISTER ON 11 NOVEMBER 1983

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING,
23 - 29 NOVEMBER

POINTS TO MAKE

Agenda

1. Looking forward to usual constructive exchange of views on wide range of international political and economic developments.
2. Sonny Ramphal has now circulated his considered proposals for agenda. These seem comprehensive. There will be general agreement on some topics. Others will provoke considerable discussion, and sometimes disagreement (e.g. Namibia, and proposals for arms control and disarmament). It may be better in some cases for heads of government to note areas of disagreement and then move on to other matters.
3. On Namibia, look forward to cooperating with Canadians, as fellow members of Contact Group. Grenada and more broadly, small island security now likely to prove another dominant theme.
4. We doubt whether Commonwealth initiatives on subjects like Cyprus and disarmament would be helpful in
/present



present circumstances. These are delicate issues which are already being handled in other fora.

"Towards a New Bretton Woods"

5. Welcome experts' report as serious contribution to current discussion on ways of improving international trade and payments system.

6. Grateful for Canadian support at Commonwealth Finance Meeting. Britain will play its part in further discussion of the issues raised by the report at the Heads of Government Meeting. Share common ground with Canadians in favouring evolution rather than revolution for international financial institutions.

Commonwealth Secretariat Finance

7. Could not welcome any proposals that implied increase in Commonwealth Secretariat expenditure without compensating savings elsewhere. Favour only gradual increase in Commonwealth Foundation's budgetary targets. Share Ramphal's view that this is time for consolidation.

Diego Garcia/IOPZ

8. If others wished to discuss Indian Ocean Peace Zone would not object. But discussion should not drift into consideration of the bilateral issue of sovereignty over Diego Garcia.

/Style

Style and Format

9. Aim that discussion should be as frank and business-like as possible. Welcomed Mr Trudeau's initiative. Proposals in Sonny Ramphal's recent paper should help; we hope they will be generally observed.

Communiqué

10. We have noted Sonny Ramphal's proposal that the communiqué should be shortened by hiving off decisions on Commonwealth functional cooperation to a separate document. This should help but care and discipline will still be needed in drafting communiqué.

11. We hope that communiqué will as usual cover major world problems which impinge on Commonwealth countries. Would welcome more detailed discussions nearer the time.

Pakistan (for use only if raised)

12. We would welcome Pakistan's re-admission. But this is a matter for the Commonwealth as a whole.

Commonwealth Coordination Department

9 November 1983.

MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND CANADIAN PRIME
MINISTER ON 11 NOVEMBER 1983.

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHOGM)
23 - 29 NOVEMBER

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. CHOGM will take place in New Delhi 23-29 November, with week-end retreat in Goa 25-27 November. The Indians know that the Secretary of State will have to leave early for a Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels. After Her State Visit to India, The Queen will remain in New Delhi, as Head of the Commonwealth, from 23 to 26 November for the opening stages of CHOGM.

Agenda

2. The Secretary-General, following consultations with Heads of Government, has recently circulated his proposals for the agenda for CHOGM. The agenda will fall into three broad headings, in each of which particular subjects will be dominant:

Political: Namibia: Disarmament: and now, Grenada and small island security:

Economic: "Towards a New Bretton Woods":

Functional Cooperation: whether to increase funds for Commonwealth activities

/e.g.



e.g. Commonwealth Foundation,
establishment of an official
Commonwealth arts organisation.

On Namibia, we expect to be on common ground with the
Canadians as the two Commonwealth members of the Contact
Group. Ramphal had previously suggested the possibility
of Commonwealth initiatives on disarmament and Cyprus.
The Prime Minister told him that she did not think these
would be helpful. Mr Ramphal's latest proposals do not
specifically mention Commonwealth initiatives in these
subjects; but we know the Indians want to discuss
disarmament, and the Australians are likely to support
them.

3. The Canadians have passed us a copy of Mr Trudeau's
reply to Mr Ramphal's circular letters [attached]. In
it Mr Trudeau indicates his wish to lead the discussion
on political issues and also mentions East/West
relations, Namibia and economic issues as areas of
particular concern or interest. (Grenada and small
island security can now be added to this list). He
reiterates Canada's support for the CFTC and agrees with
the inclusion of Women and Development as a separate
agenda item. Generally, Canadian views on the agenda are
in line with our own.

/Commonwealth ...



Commonwealth Finance Minister's Meeting (CFMM) and

"Towards a New Bretton Woods"

4. Commonwealth Finance Ministers met in Port of Spain, Trinidad, 21-22 September. One of the main items was "Towards a New Bretton Woods". This was a report by a Commonwealth group of experts (chaired by Professor Helleiner of Toronto University) commissioned by the 1982 Finance Ministers' Meeting.
5. Discussion of the report at the CFMM turned on the extent to which the meeting could endorse it. Britain (and Canada) resisted the view of the overwhelming majority who wanted to endorse the report in full without any qualifications. The communiqué represents a compromise between these two positions.
6. The CFMM was more relaxed than might have been expected. This was in part due to the nature of the Commonwealth meetings and in part to the immediately following IMF/IBRD Annual Meetings at which the discussion of the main issues confronting the world economy took place.

Commonwealth Secretariat Finance

7. We know that the Canadians share our views on proposals involving increased expenditure. They would contribute 17.68% of any increase. Britain contributes 30%. We hope they will support us in resisting an

/immediate



immediate 50% increase in the Commonwealth Foundation's proposed budgetary target.

Diego Garcia/IOPZ

8. Any discussion of the sovereignty of Diego Garcia either in the context of a debate on the Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposal or separately would be incompatible with the convention that bilateral issues are not discussed at CHOGMs.

Style and Format

9. The Secretary-General has recently circulated a paper for early discussion at CHOGM about the style and format of these meetings. We know that Mr Trudeau shares our general aims in this respect. Mr Ramphal's proposals seem sensible and constructive and go some way towards meeting the Prime Minister's wishes for shorter communiqués, speeches and meetings themselves. They do not however go as far as we would wish on restricted sessions and reject our suggestion that some agenda items should be discussed by Foreign Ministers separately.

Communiqué

10. Mr Ramphal's suggestions on style and format of CHOGMs include a proposal that the communiqué should be shortened by issuing a separate document on Commonwealth functional cooperation and the Secretariat's work programme. This would achieve a shortening of the

/communiqué



communiqué but it is doubtful whether two documents would in practice mean less work than one. Mr Ramphal's professed objective of "highlighting (the) essentially political character" of the communiqué itself may need watching.

Pakistan

11. Britain's publicly expressed view is that we would welcome Pakistan's readmission, but that this is a question for all Commonwealth members to decide. The question is unlikely to be considered before or during CHOGM.

Commonwealth Co-ordination Department

9 November 1983.



MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER
ON 11 NOVEMBER 1983

BELIZE: CANADIAN ASSISTANCE

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Appreciate economic and military help you give Belize. International aid strengthens Belize's independent status. Small Caribbean/Central American countries badly need demonstrations of support.
2. Could you do more? Extend your training programme for the Belize Defence Force (BDF)? British garrison remains for an appropriate period. But BDF needs to be trained to take on more responsibility for external security. The more sources of training the better. Commonwealth members should stick together.

MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER ON
11 NOVEMBER 1983

BELIZE: CANADIAN ASSISTANCE

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The Canadians offer training facilities in Canada for BDF personnel. Courses this year have covered basic officer, pilot, and combat leaders training. They also provide coastguard training in Barbados.
2. The Canadians have contributed aid for infrastructural development. They are involved in a major and badly-needed sewage and water supply project in Belize City which has turned out to be much more difficult and expensive than expected.
3. The Commonwealth Secretary General has tried hard to persuade the Canadian and Commonwealth Caribbean governments to contribute to a Commonwealth Training Team in Belize. But Mr Ramphal's initiative foundered on Canadian unwillingness to commit troops on the ground in Belize, even in a training role. Although the Training Team was never intended to replace the British garrison, Mr Trudeau apparently concluded that we saw it as a way of easing withdrawal which might shift the burden for Belizean defence on to Canada. Extended commitment to the UN Force in Cyprus, and experience with the Uganda Commonwealth Training Team, has also coloured Canadian attitudes.



4. There seems to be little prospect of changing Mr Trudeau's mind at this stage, although he was informed during your visit to Canada at the end of September that the garrison will not be withdrawn by the end of 1983 as previously intended.

5. Other Commonwealth Caribbean countries, particularly Jamaica, were willing to contribute to a Training Team (if the garrison remained). In September 1983 Jamaica expressed interest in bilateral exchanges between the Jamaican Defence Force and the BDF. But after Mr Price's refusal to support the US invasion of Grenada, Prime Minister Seaga is less likely to look favourably on any assistance for Belize.

MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER

11 NOVEMBER 1983

UK/CANADA BILATERAL RELATIONS

POINTS TO MAKE

Bilateral Contacts

1. Very pleased with my visit to Canada. Glad you were able to come to London today. Important that we keep in touch. Mr MacEachen will be most welcome in London on 11-13 December.

EC/Canada [if raised]

(a) Link between Seals and Fisheries

2. Two-year EC ban on sealskins cannot now be reversed. Link with fisheries unjustifiable. Damages Canadian as well as EC interests.

(b) Fisheries

3. Hope negotiations between European Commission and Canadian officials will lead to satisfactory arrangements regarding future operation of the agreement.

(c) Newsprint

4. UK understands the importance that Canada attaches to a satisfactory permanent solution on newsprint quotas that balances Canadian interests with those of EC domestic producers. We share that concern. Hope that both the EC and Canada can be flexible in negotiations to ensure this.

British Pensioners in Canada [if raised]

5. We will keep this question under review but for the moment can see no prospect of an immediate change in our present policy.

CONFIDENTIAL

British Overseas Citizens Passports [if raised]

6. We hope that you will be able to find a procedure which will permit genuine visitors with British Overseas Citizens' passports to enter Canada.

CONFIDENTIAL

BACKGROUNDMinisterial Visits

7. The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr MacEachen is to visit London for two days on his way back from the North Atlantic Council in Brussels in December. Details of his programme are still being worked out.

EC/Canada(a) Link between Seals and Fisheries

8. The EC Directive providing for a 2 year ban on the import of baby seal products came into force on 1 October. The conservation grounds are debatable, but since the Community has some competence in the field of conservation, and none in that of public morals, this was judged to be the least undesirable basis for the action. The Canadians have generally given the UK credit for being helpful towards them during Community discussion leading up to the ban. However under pressure from fishing communities, which have until now supplemented their livelihood by sealing, there have been demands from Newfoundland politicians for retaliatory restrictions on EC (mainly German) vessels fishing in Canadian waters. The Minister for Fisheries and Oceans, M de Bané, has threatened to impose such restrictions. The Canadians cannot now hope to reverse the EC ban, but may find it tactically convenient to make a pretext of the issue as long as it suits them to maintain a hard line on fisheries.

Fisheries

9. There have been no developments since the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Trudeau on 26 September at which Mr Trudeau repeated the familiar Canadian complaint that their access to the Community market under the agreement had been below their

expectations, and the Prime Minister replied that by increasing our share of the Community's low-tariff quota from 7% in 1982 to 53% we had gone a considerable way towards meeting Canadian concerns.

Newsprint

10. The Canadians have pressed for a GATT-bound duty-free quota of sufficient magnitude to ensure that their anticipated export levels of newsprint continue to enter the EC on an unrestricted basis, following achievement of full EFTA duty-free trade in newsprint on 1 January 1984. They have asked the Commission for a quota of at least 700,000 tonnes to preserve existing levels of exports and provide for growth. In the face of divergent views from Member States, however, the Commission have so far only been able to put forward an interim proposal of 500,000 tonnes to be topped up (perhaps by supplementary autonomous quota next year). This proposal is without prejudice to a permanent GATT-bound solution. The UK is the largest consumer of Canadian newsprint in the EC and UK publishers have made it clear that they want to continue using Canadian newsprint after 1983 and that an adequate duty-free supply is needed. We have encouraged the Canadians to maintain a constructive and flexible dialogue with the Commission.

British Pensioners in Canada

11. As the Prime Minister indicated when she met Mr Trudeau in Canada recently, the British Government is well aware of the strong feeling on this matter in Canada. A petition calling for increases of British pensions to be payable in Canada and signed by nearly 400 British pensioners resident in Canada was accepted on the Prime Minister's behalf during her visit. [NOT FOR USE:

The question is being examined by the Public Expenditure Committee in the wider context of other demands on public expenditure, but it is not expected that the extra finance required will be approved.]

British Overseas Citizens Passports

12. On 15 April the Canadian Government passed an Order in Council which precludes the issue of a visitor's visa to any person whose passport or other travel document does not give the holder the right to enter the country on whose authority the document was issued. They now refuse to grant visit visas to British Overseas Citizens, British Protected Persons and to certain British subjects under Section 30 of the British Nationality Act 1981 because their passports do not indicate that they have the right of admission to the United Kingdom or any territory under British administration. In response to our representations, the Canadians are exploring the possibility of overcoming the problem by the issue of a Minister's permit - in cases where the visa officer is convinced that the purpose of the proposed visit is legitimate and that the visitor will be readmitted to his/her own country of habitual residence at the conclusion of the visit to Canada .

Foreign and Commonwealth Office



THE RT HON PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU PC MP
PRIME MINISTER

Mr Trudeau, at 63, has been Prime Minister of Canada for 14 of his 17 years in politics. He came from a wealthy Montreal family, with a French-Canadian father and a mother of Scottish lineage. He attended the Universities of Montreal, Harvard and Paris and the London School of Economics.

Mr Trudeau travelled widely as a young man but did little of consequence until his involvement with the asbestos' miners' strike in Quebec in 1949 which eventually led him to politics. He practised law (mainly labour law and civil liberties) in Quebec from 1951-1961 and subsequently taught law at the University of Montreal (1961-1965). During this period he wrote several books, and papers, and contributed to a new political magazine, 'Cité Libre' of which he was a co-founder.

Mr Trudeau joined the Federal Liberal Party and was elected to the Federal Parliament in 1965. A protégé of Lester Pearson, his star rose rapidly and he became leader of the Liberal Party and Prime Minister in 1968. His first four years as Prime Minister were probably his finest. Thereafter his popularity declined as he became more aloof, and less responsive to the electorate. The



Liberals scraped back into power with a minority government in 1972, did better in the 1974 election but lost the election in 1979. Mr Trudeau announced his resignation from politics but was persuaded to run again, and defeated Joe Clark's short-lived Progressive Conservative Government in 1980.

Mr Trudeau has long been a committed federalist maintaining that a separate Quebec could not be viable and that French-Canadians would be best served by a United Canada. After his 1980 re-election he concentrated anew on his aims of patriating the Canadian Constitution and establishing a bilingual Canada. He achieved patriation but without the support of Quebec, and in the process further alienated the Western provinces.

Mr Trudeau is a complex personality. He seems to combine great charm with brutal insensitivity; a firmly rooted belief in the principles of democracy with apparent contempt for the institutions and the men through whom they are secured; a wide-ranging and incisive intellect with sometimes poor judgement based on the advice of the political place-men around him.

Mr Trudeau's instincts are left of centre and he has a poor opinion of President Reagan and his policies. He has a tendency to flirt with the Kremlin and with Fidel Castro but this probably reflects a concern for a more open-minded Western approach to relations with the East rather than any real sympathy with Communism.



Over the last two years his personal popularity and that of his party has dropped dramatically. In part this is due to Canada's economic problems. But it is also a reflection of Trudeau's lack of interest in day-to-day politics, unwillingness to tackle economic problems and general abrasiveness. General Elections are due in February 1985 at the latest, but current speculation is that June 1984 is more probable. A number of leading Liberals have recently suggested in public that Trudeau should stand down now to give his successor a chance to establish himself and Trudeau himself has indicated an apparent intention to retire by the next election. However he is still relatively young and is combative by instinct: he could yet decide to stay and fight the next election.

Mr Trudeau married in 1971. After a long period of difficulties he and his wife were separated in the summer of 1977. He retains custody of the three children.



PROGRAMME FOR CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO LONDON:
11 NOVEMBER 1983

Friday, 11 November

10.45 am Arrive Heathrow Airport (South Side)

Met by Secretary of State's Special Representative (Sir Edwin Arrowsmith)

Proceed to No 10 Downing Street

12 noon Arrive No 10 Downing Street

Private talks with Mrs Thatcher

12.45 for 1 pm Working lunch

2.30 approx Depart for Heathrow

Depart Heathrow (South Side) by Canadian Armed Forces Aircraft

Seen off by Secretary of State's Special Representative (Sir John Stow).