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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 December 1983

Please type letter

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A.S.C. 20/12

Dear John,

Call by King Hussein of Jordan

Thank you for your letter of 16 December enclosing a record of King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister and a copy of President Reagan's letter of 11 December to King Hussein, as well as for your letter of today with copies of President Reagan's letters of 26 and 27 November to the King. We are keeping these letters very close.

As requested, I now enclose a draft letter from the Prime Minister to Mr Reagan. This refers to the existence of the Reagan/Hussein exchanges, but does not reveal that we have seen copies of any of them.

We have assumed that the Prime Minister will wish, for tactical reasons, to concentrate in her letter to President Reagan on the Arab/Israel question and Jordan's role in it, and not to go over the question of Lebanon - on which we are already putting our views to the Americans on other channels.

The draft, as you will see, does rather more than report what King Hussein had to say. I shall be showing it to Sir Geoffrey Howe overnight and we agreed to get in touch again tomorrow.

Yours ever,
[Signature]

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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Jordan visits by king

Pt 2



DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~XXXX~~ minute/letter/teletype/dispatch/word

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

President Reagan

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I had a long talk with King Hussein on 16 December. He told me that he had recently been in touch with you. Leaving aside what he had to say about the Lebanon, the main burden of his remarks concerned the current Palestinian situation and your recent agreement with Prime Minister Shamir on United States/Israeli strategic co-operation.

On the first of these questions, which he fears is being lost sight of because of the Lebanese crisis, the King spoke forcefully about Syrian attempts to control the PLO. Because of the PLO requirement for consensus, the radical minority were always able to prevent positive moves. He wished that moderate Palestinian leaders would remember that their strength lay in their constituents. If moderate leaders would identify with their people, Jordan would see what could be achieved - and was already in touch with Egypt about this. But as things were,

/the Palestinian

Enclosures—flag(s).....

the Palestinian people, especially those in the Occupied Territories, were in despair. His priority now was to put the Palestine/Jordan relationship in order and then make "a final effort" to get a dialogue going. He told me that he would have to recall the Jordanian Parliament in the next month or so, and that he would be explaining his proposals to the moderate Arab world and to the moderate PLO.

Secondly, King Hussein was still extremely upset by the developments announced during Prime Minister Shamir's visit. He clearly felt that this latest development identified you in Arab eyes with Israel, thus reducing your chances of acting as an honest broker. In his view this sharply increased the dangers of polarisation in the Middle East, with the US and Israel on one side and the Soviet Union and many of the Arab countries on the other. The King also repeated his idea of the early convening of an international conference on the Middle East. I warned him off this. I know he has had it in mind before, but I find it disturbing that he feels constrained to come out with it again now.

You and I, Mr President, were in firm agreement when we met in September on the crucial role of Jordan in the Arab/Israeli dispute, and on the vital need to preserve that country's stability and integrity. We both of us appreciate the value of King Hussein himself as a moderate and pro-Western force for stability in the volatile Middle East. I am worried that despite what you have been able to tell him he should still appear to feel so unsure of his relationship with the United States. It is nonetheless encouraging that he is still clearly seeking to play an active part in the

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search for peace. If the peace process is to remain alive, we need such leaders on the Arab side, and with Egypt still on the sidelines, Hussein is ^{one of the few who can help us.} ~~the only one there is.~~ ^{You will be well aware of} ~~I do not need to explain to you~~ the implications of his decision to recall Parliament and the risks that this, and any attempts at a dialogue with the PLO, will carry for him. The Syrians will be implacably opposed, as will radical elements of the PLO: and Jordan is already facing a terrorist campaign.

This vulnerability demands that we, the West, should consider urgently what kind of support we can best give to Hussein at this difficult time. We should do this, I believe, in two main ways. First, we should give what help we can to the Palestinians (whether on the West Bank or in the diaspora) to encourage them to take the moderate road to negotiation. Second, we should make it plain to the moderate Arab states that the West remains actively committed to the search for a comprehensive solution of the Arab/Israel conflict, of which the Palestinian problem is the core.

To do this it is essential that we avoid the polarisation that King Hussein fears so much. ^{It does seem that} ~~Whatever~~ ^{new agreement} ~~the substance of your co-operation with Israel,~~ ^{has been} ~~it has been~~ ^{misunderstood} ~~by many of our friends in the area.~~ ^{It is} ~~It is~~ ^{remain as} ~~vital~~ ^{and} ~~that the US should be seen as the impartial mediator of goodwill.~~ ~~This makes it essential that the United States should stand (and stand publicly) firm on the principles and the text of Security Council Resolution 242, calling for Israeli withdrawal from the territories~~

the new U.S. / Israel cooperation agreement has aroused great concern among

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occupied since 1967, and that the US should press Israel harder to show her desire for peace by freezing the expansion of settlements on the West Bank. I know the difficulties you face in moving the Israelis on this, but it ~~does~~ ^{is an} ~~after all form~~ ^{irreparable} part of your proposals of 1 September 1982, and unless it is actually achieved (and soon) we ^{may} face an irreparable setback to peace. ^{I believe that} ~~the~~ people of the West Bank ^{would welcome a} ~~must be given some~~ sign that you do not wish to see them absorbed by Israel. This cannot be done simply by aid programmes (though we are looking at what more we can do here). It needs unmistakable political signals. ^{otherwise I fear}
~~If not,~~ ^{but} Palestinian despair will end up by offering golden opportunities to the Russians.

I have expressed my views frankly. ~~You would not expect anything else, especially on a question of such importance~~, as you and I always do to each other, because the question is of such great importance to both of us.

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

King Hussein.

I have revised the message
to President Leagan.

If you agree it I will send
it on the hot-line on
Thursday.

A.J.C. ²³/₁₂.

SECRET



to VC

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 December 1983

Message from the Prime Minister to
President Reagan about her meeting
with King Hussein

Thank you for the draft message to
President Reagan enclosed with your letter of
19 December.

The Prime Minister has now signed a revised
version of the message and I enclose it. I
should be grateful if you could arrange for
the text of the message to be delivered before
the holidays and for the signed version to
follow thereafter.

AJC

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET

Sir A. Parsons

I don't much like the style
and tone of this - and will
adjust them in redrafting.

but do you think the
substance is all right?

A. J. Coler ²⁰/₁₂.