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DESKBY 100500Z CAIRO

FROM WASHINGTON 100100Z JAN 84.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 71 OF 9 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, RIYADH (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY),  
PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,  
DAMASCUS, MOSCOW, THE HAGUE,  
ROUTINE HELSINKI, SUVA, OSLO, DUBLIN, ACCRA, DUBAI, STOCKHOLM.

YOUR TELNO 11. TO UKMIS NEW YORK: UN FORCES IN LEBANON.

1. WE DISCUSSED THE IDEAS IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WITH PELLETREAU TODAY.

2. HE AGREED GENERALLY WITH YOUR COMMENTS ON THE VARIOUS OPTIONS. IN CONNECTION WITH OPTION (C) HE THOUGHT THAT THE LEBANESE NOW REGARDED POSSIBLE RE-DEPLOYMENT OF THE MNF AS SEPARATE FROM PHASE 2 OF THEIR SECURITY PLAN.

3. IN PELLETREAU'S VIEW, THE MOST PROMISING APPROACH WOULD BE FOR THE UN TO TAKE ON THE PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS. A MAJOR ADVANTAGE WOULD BE THAT THIS WOULD GIVE THEM A Foothold THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING TRIPOLI AND BALBECK. IT WOULD BE GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS THOUGH THE SYRIANS MIGHT OBJECT TO A UN PRESENCE IN THE BEKA'S. HE NOTED THAT THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT PROVIDED THAT THE UN SHOULD PATROL IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN TYRE AND SIDON BUT NOT HAVE A PERMANENT PRESENCE THERE. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE FLEXIBLE OVER THIS: THERE HAD BEEN SOME INDICATIONS THAT THEY NOW HAD A SLIGHTLY HIGHER OPINION OF UNIFIL.

4. PELLETREAU SAID THAT HE HAD PUT THIS POSSIBILITY TO URQUHART ON 6 JANUARY. URQUHART HAD THOUGHT PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN CAMPS A ROLE WHICH THE UN COULD PROPERLY PLAY. BUT UNIFIL WOULD NOT BE THE RIGHT FORCE SINCE TOO GREAT A CHANGE IN ITS MANDATE WOULD BE REQUIRED. A DIFFERENT UN FORCE WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO BE SET UP. URQUHART DID NOT THINK THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN TRYING TO FIND A WAY ROUND SOVIET OBJECTIONS. THE INITIATIVE WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE LEBANESE. PELLETREAU COMMENTED THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION AMONG THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS WOULD BE VALUABLE BUT THAT NOW WAS NOT THE TIME TO PUT NEW IDEAS TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THEY WERE PREOCCUPIED WITH EFFORTS TO SECURE AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY PLAN.

5. IT MAY BE WORTH ADDING THAT BURT (ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EUROPE) COMMENTED TO MINISTER TODAY THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR GETTING THE RUSSIANS TO AGREE TO ANY GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE LEBANON. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHY THEY WOULD WANT TO HELP THE US AND OTHER MNF GOVERNMENTS OFF THE HOOK. NOR COULD HE SEE ANY LIKELY VOLUNTEERS COMING FORWARD AS CONTRIBUTORS TO A UN FORCE OR UN OBSERVER TEAMS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

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6. BURT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING OFF HIS OWN SUBJECT BUT WHAT HE SAID WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE UNDERLYING US VIEW THAT IT IS LIKELY TO BE MORE FRUITFUL TO TRY TO WORK ON THE SYRIANS RATHER THAN THE RUSSIANS. FROM BURT'S STANDPOINT THERE WAS A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN TALKING TO THE RUSSIANS ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND CUTTING THEM INTO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THE OBJECT OF TALKING TO THEM WAS TO TRY TO ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO INADVERTENT MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT WHAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE. BUT BURT SAW NO ADVANTAGE FOR THE US IN BRINGING THEM ANY MORE DIRECTLY INTO THE PROCESS.

WRIGHT

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PROTOCOL DEPT

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PS/MR LUCE

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SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

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