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PS
PS/WR LUCE
PS/FUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR SPERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NEWS
ED/ED
ED/USD

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE D10

ED/NAS
ED/CONSULAR DEPT

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NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 242342Z JANUARY, 1984

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 274 OF 24 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, MODUK, BRITFORLEB,
DANASCUS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, MOSCOW
AND CBFC.

YOUR TELNO 25 TO BEIRUT: LAF ACTION IN THE SHUWEIFAT GAP

1. WE TOLD MACK (STATE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR FOR LEBANON) TODAY OF
THE LINE WE ARE TAKING WITH THE LEBANESE. MACK HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY
HEARD IT SUGGESTED THAT THE LAF SHOULD INTERVENE IN SUPPORT OF THE
ISF TO HELP CLOSE THE GAP AND DOUBTED THAT BERRI AND JUMBLATT WOULD
HAVE ACCEPTED THIS. LAF IDEAS FOR CLOSING THE GAP REPRESENTED
CONTINGENCY PLANNING TO BE PUT INTO ACTION ONLY IF THERE WERE NO
HOPE OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY PLAN. MILITARY ACTION
WAS NOT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S PREFERRED OPTION. THEY WERE WELL
AWARE THAT THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS, INCLUDING THE AMERICANS, WOULD

~~WAS NOT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S PREFERRED OPTION. THEY WERE WELL
AWARE THAT THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS, INCLUDING THE AMERICANS, WOULD
OPPOSE SUCH A COURSE IF THEY HAD NOT TRIED IN GOOD FAITH TO REACH
AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY PLAN.~~

2. IF, HOWEVER, SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED, MACK
THOUGHT THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD LITTLE ALTERNATIVE BUT
TO ATTEMPT TO CLOSE THE GAP. THEY COULD NOT BE EXPECTED SIMPLY TO
SIT TIGHT IN BEIRUT UNTIL THE TERRORISTS AND MILITIAS GREW STRONG
ENOUGH TO OVERTHROW THEM.

3. WE SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS TO KEMP (NSC STAFF).

WRIGHT

NNNN