



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 February 1984

Dear John,

King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister

I wrote to you on 15 February with briefing for the call at 4.45 pm this afternoon.

/// We have received overnight from Washington, Washington tels nos 530, 531 and 532 reporting on King Hussein's visit there (copies of these are enclosed for ease of reference).

/ These telegrams make it clear that King Hussein may raise with the Prime Minister a draft Security Council Resolution on Israeli settlements, of which he left a copy with the Americans. The Americans have passed this on to us in strict confidence. I enclose a supplementary brief on this subject. The Prime Minister will wish to bear in mind that King Hussein will not expect us to have seen a copy of his text in advance.

The US Ambassador in Amman, Dick Viets, called on Sir John Leahy this morning and amplified the account of King Hussein's visit to Washington contained in Washington telno 532. He confirmed that King Hussein was now in good health and in extremely confident mood: the Americans did not encourage King Hussein to make a move, rather he was keen to press forward on his own initiative. This is in many ways admirable; but there are dangers for King Hussein in pressing forward too fast and in ways which are bound to heighten Syrian suspicion and hostility. The Prime Minister may wish to sound a note of caution.

/ News was also received this morning of an Iranian offensive in the Iran/Iraq war. I enclose supplementary briefing on this also.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

John Coker Esq

oro



1 copy for  
back-up

*With the compliments of*

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Further to the Hussein brief.

$\frac{16}{2}$  Peter Ricketts  
h-a -

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
SW1A 2AH

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER : 16 FEBRUARY

IRAN/IRAQ : UP-DATE

Iranian Offensive

1. There are reports this morning of what the Iranians claim is the first phase of the expected major new offensive: Val Fajr V. Tehran Radio claims a major attack between Mehran and Dehloran, in the central area north Al Amarah. The Iranian objective is probably one of the main Bahgdad-Basra roads. There are strong Iraqi forces in the area. The attack may be a forerunner of a second thrust further south.

Mediation

2. The Iraqi Permanent Representative at the United Nations informed the UK Deputy Permanent Representative on 15 February that the Iraqi reaction to the UN Secretary-General's proposed two-pronged mission did not amount to rejection of the proposal. The Iraqis are probably urgently reconsidering their response, in the light of the damage that rejection of the mission would do to their position at the UN. We are urging them to accept the mission. The Iranians have already responded positively.

Middle East Department  
16 February 1984



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 February 1984

Dear John,

King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

I enclose briefing for King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister on 16 February at 4.45 pm. He proposes to be accompanied by Mr Taher Masri, his new Foreign Minister now in London making his farewells as the outgoing Jordanian Ambassador.

King Hussein arrived in London on 15 February from the US where he had been undergoing medical tests since 3 February. While there he had talks with President Reagan, and also with President Mubarak. He will be staying privately in London until 17 February.

When he last called on the Prime Minister on 16 December, King Hussein was deeply worried about the situation in the Middle East and US policy in the region. He had been particularly upset by the US/Israeli understanding on strategic cooperation. Developments since then have shifted the focus of attention but have not altered the general picture. Arafat called on President Mubarak in Cairo on 22 December. King Hussein recalled the Jordanian Parliament on 16 January after a long gap, but the consequences of the step for the Arab/Israel dispute have not yet materialised. Arafat and Hussein are expected to resume the dialogue broken off last April, but no date for this is yet known to us.

The King will no doubt want to discuss Arab/Israel and Lebanon. The Jordanian Foreign Minister told Sir Geoffrey Howe today that he also intends to raise Iran/Iraq. King Hussein enjoys the confidence of President Saddam Hussein. The Prime Minister might ask him for his latest assessment of the situation and his views on the chances of persuading the Iraqis to be more flexible towards the UN Secretary-General's latest initiative for a two-pronged mission. With an Iranian offensive imminent they would be wise to do so, and we shall be saying as much in Baghdad.

/Bilateral

CONFIDENTIAL  
COVERING SECRET UK EYES A



/  
Bilateral relations are excellent and will reach a new peak with the State Visit (26 - 29 March). Agrément has been given for Mr Hani Tabbara, as the new Jordanian Ambassador to London. He is expected here well before the end of March. I enclose a note on security aspects of The Queen's Visit.

*Yours ever,  
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL  
COVERING SECRET UK EYES A

## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1 During his meeting with the Prime Minister on 16 December, King Hussein expressed deep disquiet at the announcement of closer Israel/US Strategic Co-operation following Mr Shamir's visit to Washington on 27-30 November last year. King Hussein's past identification with US policies in the region (particularly the Reagan Plan) has worsened his relations with radical Arab States, particularly Syria, and US/Israel rapprochement compounds the problem. Jordan faces serious terrorist threats. King Hussein has said that he has irrefutable evidence that the Abu Nidhal Group, with Syrian backing, were responsible for the attacks on the Jordanian Ambassadors in Rome and Delhi last November.

2 Many Jordanians fear that after Lebanon they will be next on Israel's agenda. They are concerned at the promotion of the 'Jordan-US-Palestine' line among senior Ministers in the Likud Government and their supporters, with its implications that the continuation of a moderate Hashemite regime in Jordan is not necessarily in Israel's interest.

3 After the meeting with King Hussein the Prime Minister wrote to the President Reagan reporting the King's concern at these developments. To date we have



not received a reply. She urged the President to recognise that Jordan deserved strong Western support, as a force for moderation in the Arab world, and as a key mover in the Arab/Israeli dispute. We should reassure moderate Arabs of the West's commitment to the peace process, by standing firm on Security Council Resolution 242's call for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967. Political help to the Palestinians could start with US action to follow up the Reagan plan's call for a freeze on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. Increasing aid programmes should also be considered. If this support was not forthcoming, the Prime Minister said countries in the Middle East might seek to involve the Soviet Union more deeply in its problems. Even King Hussein has spoken publicly about an International Conference.

4 There is however evidence of a strengthening of one aspect of US/Jordanian relations. A secret contingency planning agreement was signed on 15 December in Washington by the two countries. The plan, designed mainly to guard against a Syrian attack on Jordan, provides, on implementation, for the drawing down of US war stocks worth \$8-10 billion, and the use of American servicemen on a graduated basis to man air defences in Jordan. It will be useful to hear from King Hussein

whether his meeting with President Reagan on 14 February did anything to reassure him about American policy on Arab/Israel. Reagan is reported to have told him and Mubarak, who was also in Washington at the time, that he would not 'shy away' from the peace process.

5 Despite some positive developments - Arafat's meeting with Mubarak in December, Egyptian readmission to the Islamic Conference Organisation in January and Arafat's intention to visit Amman later this month - fundamental problems remain. Arafat's own position is still uncertain and important differences exist between these elements of the PLO not dominated by Syria. The Palestine National Council ('parliament') which Arafat had hoped to convene in February to confirm his leadership, has been postponed for two or three months, probably to give Arafat time to win over important minority PLO groupings. If Arafat resumes his dialogue with Hussein - he said he will go to Amman when Hussein returns there after his present stopover in London - he may find that he has too restricted a mandate for the talks to succeed. Hussein himself is likely to be cautious and his first concern must be the security of Jordan and his regime. Syria is totally opposed to a Hussein/Arafat initiative and Israel will have nothing to do with Arafat. The Arab Summit, originally scheduled



for 31 March, has been postponed indefinitely, apparently at Saudi prompting, because of present Arab disunity. It may also have been delayed to give Arafat and Hussein the chance of coming to the Summit meeting with a joint plan for negotiations with Israel.

6 Assistance to the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Both the moderate Arabs and the US have been keen that in the absence of moves towards a political settlement, they should explore the question of improving the flow of assistance to Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The main problem in this area has been Israel's determination to control entry of all foreign funds and to channel them into approved projects. The Arabs have repeatedly stressed that assistance to the Palestinians must not be allowed to replace need for a political solution. Both UK and the Ten are at present reviewing their own modest aid programme in the Occupied Territories. The UK's present programme stands at £75,000 pa. We also contribute £5m pa to the UNRWA core budget, from which funds are channelled to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The EC also contributes £15m pa to UNRWA, of which the UK share is one fifth.

## LEBANON

7 A SITREP on recent political and military developments is attached.

8 King Hussein will understand the reasons for the redeployment of the British MNF contingent, but will be looking for reassurance that we do not intend to abandon President Gemayel altogether. He shares our concerns about US policy. During his talks with the Prime Minister on 16 December, the King described the 17 May Agreement as having been imposed on the Lebanese President and people, representing another stage in the 'fundamentally flawed' US step-by-step approach. He criticised the Americans for not having given President Gemayel anything to offer the Lebanese opposition after the November meeting of the Geneva Reconciliation Conference which gave the President a mandate to seek alternative means of ensuring Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. But he may not have made much impact in Washington: latest reports suggest that Mr Runsfeld is going to Israel on 15 February to reassure the Israeli Government that the US will not support

abrogation of the agreement. Our latest draft of a further message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan, requested by No 10, stressed the need to find a formula to give the Syrians confidence that the agreement would not in fact be implemented, as an incentive to the Syrians to play a more constructive role.

IRAN/IRAQ

(Not for Use)

The War

9 After a lull in fighting Iraq has in the past fortnight launched missile attacks against a number of Iranian towns. Iran has in turn shelled Basra, and other Iraqi towns and has mounted a land attack in Kurdistan. Iran is likely to mount a major offensive further south in the near future. Reports reached us on 15 February that Iranian jets have bombed an Iraqi military installation only 22 miles Northeast of Baghdad. This is the first serious attack near Baghdad since mid-1982. A dangerous period ahead, particularly if Iraqi reaction to a successful Iranian push involves attacks on Iranian oil installations and shipping. Iran's moves unpredictable but threat to close Straits of Horuz remains (recently

reiterated by Iranian President). We remain in close touch with Americans and contingency preparations continue (Omani request for increased readiness of UK mine counter measures forces and general message of support to Shaikh Zaid (UAE)).

#### Mediation

10 The most hopeful prospect continues to be mediation by the UN Secretary General. He has proposed a two-pronged mission, to update the report of an earlier Mission of Enquiry into civilian casualties and to explore the positions of both Governments. This has been accepted by Iran; we hope that the Iraqis will reconsider their initial refusal, and HM Ambassador Baghdad and UKMIS New York both are following this up.

#### ANGLO/JORDANIAN RELATIONS

11 Bilateral Relations. Our relations with Jordan are excellent and free of problems. King Hussein, a regular visitor to the UK, as are other members of the Royal Household, is a useful sounding board for Arab thinking. The Duke of Gloucester as Grand Prior of the Order of St John, and the Duke of Edinburgh as President of the World Wildlife Fund, both paid visits to Jordan in October last year. Mr Luce was there from 3-6 November as part of a



wider tour of the Middle East including Israel and Egypt, and the Chief of Defence Staff visited this year from 14-18 January. The Queen, the Duke of Edinburgh will make a State Visit at the end of next month. Arrangements for this are proceeding smoothly and the Jordanians have co-operated fully to ensure that every aspect of it is covered. King Hussein has let it be known how much importance he attaches to this.

12 A separate note (Annex B) gives additional background on security aspects to the State Visit and some of the recent coverage in the British Press.

13 Mr Taher Masri, the outgoing Ambassador, leaves his post here after only seven months on appointment (on 10 January) as Jordanian Foreign Minister. He has done well during his short stay in London and is well-disposed. We look forward to the arrival of the new Jordanian Ambassador, Mr Hani Tabbara, who served in the Jordanian Embassy here as Assistant Military Attache (1973) and subsequently as Minister. He comes from 2 years as Jordanian Ambassador in Saudi Arabia where our own Ambassador has found him a pleasant and helpful colleague.

14 The Jordanian parliament, recalled in extraordinary session on 9 January, was formally opened on 16 January. It was prorogued in 1974 following the Rabat Summit which



declared the PLO to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. King Hussein has emphasised that it was reconvened primarily for domestic reasons. Seven new West Bank members have been co-opted; bye-elections for East Bank vacant seats are due to take place within the next six weeks.

LEBANON: SITREP 15 FEBRUARY

Military developments

1. Beirut. Following the major fighting of 3-7 February both East and West Beirut are much calmer, with occasional minor clashes along the 'Green Line' dividing East (Christian) and West (Muslim) Beirut. The Lebanese Army (LAF) have been expelled from almost all parts of West Beirut, where the leader of the Shia Militia Amal, Mr Berri, has emerged as de facto civilian and military commander. The Christian Phalange have claimed that Palestinian fighters have reinfiltrated Beirut and helped the Druze and Amal in the recent fighting.
2. Outside Beirut, there has been some fierce fighting since 13 February between the Druze and LAF. Despite artillery support and raids by Lebanese Airforce Hunters (in action for the first time since September 1983), the LAF have lost control of some positions on the Shouf mountain ridge south-east of Beirut and of the area round Khalde to the south of the airport. The Druze have therefore tightened their hold on Beirut and further demoralized the LAF.
3. On 15 February the Israelis deployed elements of two armoured brigades north of the Awali river as far as Damour where there are reports of fighting with Amal/Druze forces. The Israeli aim is presumably to relieve pressure on the LAF in Khalde. Three Katyusha rockets were fired from Southern Lebanon into the Israeli border town of Metullah on 9 February, provoking an Israeli air strike on alleged Palestinian positions in Bhamdoun (east of Beirut) on 10 February. The Israeli Cabinet is considering a plan for a further partial Israeli withdrawal, possibly to the Zahrani River south of Sidon.
4. MNF The Americans have decided that redeployment of US Marines off shore will be completed within 30 days and that US naval firepower will continue to be used as necessary in retaliation for any shelling of Beirut by Syrians/Druze. A US destroyer responded to and succeeded in stopping Druze shelling of US positions on 14 February. The French and Italians have said that they will maintain a presence in Beirut until the UN can take over, /though the

though the Italians intend to reduce their contingent (1400 men), leaving only enough men to guard the Palestinian refugee camps.

#### Political Developments

5. President Gemayel announced on 13 February a new 28 point plan outlining detailed administrative and political changes which he hopes to present officially at a resumed national reconciliation conference in Geneva. This is unlikely to be accepted by his opponents: Walid Jumblatt (Druze) has pressed for President Gemayel's resignation, and Berri (Amal), has suggested that the Lebanese Parliament should pass a constitutional amendment shortening President Gemayel's term of office and calling new Presidential elections in summer 1984. Both are concentrating for the time being on consolidating their hold on West Beirut. They may be prepared to allow Gemayel to stay on if he is prepared to make genuine concessions. The Syrians have not so far endorsed calls for Gemayel's resignation, but are still insisting on abrogation of the 17 May Agreement as a pre-condition of any resumption of the reconciliation process. Two former Lebanese Prime Ministers (Takieddin Solh and Selim Al-Hoss) who might be asked to lead a new government were in Damascus on 9/10 February, together with ex-President Franjeh and another ex-Prime Minister Rashid Karame (both members of the National Salvation Front). Gemayel met Franjeh on 14 February and is reportedly engaged in "'secret diplomacy'" with the Syrians and Saudis. The Saudi mediator Hariri is in Beirut and there are reports, so far unconfirmed, of an 8-point Saudi peace plan which includes renunciation by Gemayel of the 17 May Agreement and a new power-sharing arrangement. Rumsfeld has returned to Washington and is due to go to Israel on 15 February.

6. The 17 May Agreement is still a major sticking point: the US remain unwilling to abandon it (although they have told us that they would continue to support Gemayel if he felt obliged to do so), and appear convinced that heavy shelling of Syrian positions has been helpful in persuading Syria to be flexible. The Israelis have warned against abrogation of the 17 May Agreement, hinting that this would mean some Israeli forces remaining in South Lebanon indefinitely.



UN Forces

7. The French are pursuing their initiative to replace the MNF by a UN force. Their draft resolution will be discussed by the Security Council on 16 February but is likely to founder on Soviet/Syrian demands that the MNF, including naval forces, should withdraw entirely and refrain from further 'interference' in Lebanon. The US, while not opposed in principle to wider UN involvement, do not want this confined to replacing the MNF in Beirut. The Italians would like a UN presence to take over guarding of Palestinian refugee camps in their sector. President Gemayel is only likely to accept a UN force if there is no prospect of maintaining an MNF presence. We have suggested more modest steps: better use of the 50 UN observers in Beirut to guard crossing points between East and West Beirut or other important installations, despatch of a Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the area, and expanded use of UNIFIL to cover a further Israeli withdrawal in Southern Lebanon. The Soviet Union have not so far objected to these proposals, though President Gemayel and other Lebanese dislike the idea of UN-manned crossing points which might consecrate the redivision of the city.

## STATE VISIT TO JORDAN: SECURITY ASPECTS

Assessment of the Threat

1.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Policy

2. In the FCO Sir John Leahy has been holding fortnightly inter-departmental meetings of senior officials to draw together the threads of the intelligence studies, to consider political points, including liaison with HM Embassy, Amman, and the Jordanians, and to prepare advice to Ministers.

Reconnaissance visits

3. Security for the visit has been taken fully into account by the reconnaissance missions carried out so far. The first of these (3-7 January) considered the threat on the ground in all its aspects. A member of the Security Service went to Amman on 5 February to liaise directly with the Jordanian Intelligence Services and to review any further requirements for closer cooperation - specific or general - between our Services. A third visit, led by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Smith, with police and military support, will take place from 19-24 February to take a further detailed look at the threat on the ground.

Ministerial advice

4. The Smith report will then form the basis of the JIC's final assessment on 2 March before Ministers meet, as planned, on 7 March to consider their advice to The Queen.

/The Press

The Press

5. There have been a number of alarmist reports in the British press about The Queen's safety in Jordan. The Daily Express of 13 February carried an article and editorial about SAS bodyguards for The Queen during her visit. Like similar stories run by the Express on earlier occasions, this one is invention. The fact that a member of Deputy Assistant Commissioner Smith's team is an SAS officer is co-incidental. The press emphasis on this aspect came too early to be politically embarrassing and may have burned itself out.

HUSSEIN BIN TALAL, HIM KING (9000)

King of Jordan.

Born Amman 1935.

Educated Bishops School, Amman; Victoria College, Alexandria; Harrow; shortened course at Sandhurst 1952/53. He was present when his grandfather, the Amir Abdullah, was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1952 and acceded to the throne in the following year on the deposition of his father, Talal, a schizophrenic. He has been in power longer than any other Arab leader and has survived numerous assassination attempts and threats to his throne including the overthrow of the Hashemites in Iraq in 1958, the loss of the West Bank to Israel in 1967, the civil war against the Palestinian groups in 1970-71 and periods of bad relations with Iraq and, most recently, Syria.

In relation to Israel, King Hussein recognises the futility of extreme policies. He has, however, maintained both in public and private strong opposition to the Camp David agreements and to the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations despite US attempts - some heavy-handed - to persuade him to participate. His willingness to contemplate full peace with Israel is genuine, but his freedom of manoeuvre has always been limited by the need to keep in step with his Arab neighbours and with the oil-rich Arab states which contribute substantial sums to Jordan in budgetary support; he also has to take account of the views of the Palestinian half of Jordan's population. In the light of the re-armament of Israel since 1973 he recognises how far the Arabs have to go before they will have a credible military option; he will therefore do everything possible to avoid Jordanian involvement in a further Arab/Israel war.

At the Rabat Conference in October 1974 King Hussein recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, thereby implicitly renouncing his claim to the West Bank. Nevertheless, King Hussein has not abandoned his belief that his family will have an important role to play with regard to the West Bank in any Arab/Israel settlement. He recognises, however, that the initiative for such a development must come from the West Bankers themselves.

Despite the playboy image of his youth King Hussein is now wholly serious and dedicated in his efforts to preserve the Hashemite Kingdom and to protect the interests of his people, both East Bank Jordanians and Palestinians. Allied to a measure of luck he has shown the ability and experience to take sensible and sometimes courageous decisions in times of crisis.

Both by inclination and because of his assessment of the best interests of his country, King Hussein has always been strongly pro-Western. He has, however, taken care to maintain relations with the Soviet Union and has argued that the Russians must be associated with a future UN conference to settle the Middle East dispute.

King Hussein takes all major foreign and defence policy decisions himself. He is less interested in economic questions and has devolved responsibility for planning in this field to Crown Prince Hassan. Perhaps King Hussein's greatest single asset is his very warm, friendly and outgoing personality. He has used this to good effect in keeping in close touch with and maintaining the loyalty of the Armed Forces, whose importance to his throne he has always recognised.

In his personal life, the tragic death in a helicopter crash in 1977 of his Palestinian-born third wife, Queen Alia, affected him deeply. His marriage in June 1978 to his fourth wife, Noor (née Elizabeth or Lisa Halaby, an American of Lebanese origin) appeared at the outset to be one of genuine affection but is now showing some signs of strain. Despite complaints at the King's choice of another non-Arab, non-Muslim girl to marry, the marriage did not attract the public criticism aroused by the King's wedding to Princess Muna. Shortly before the marriage the King announced that Prince Ali, his infant son by Queen Alia, would be next in the line of succession after Prince Hassan, thus displacing the son subsequently born to Queen Noor in 1980, the two sons of Princess Muna and the son of Crown Prince Hassan and Princess Sarvath. By this means King Hussein sought to avoid later argument and to strengthen the Hashemite throne for the future by giving precedence to a son of entirely Arab descent.

King Hussein has recently suffered on more than one occasion from slight heart trouble. Provided, however, that he continues to be able to avoid assassination attempts and accidents and that his health remains good, there seems no reason short of an all-out Arab/Israel war, with all the uncertainties it would bring, why he should not remain King of Jordan for the foreseeable future. For the time being, his neighbours and his financial backers seem likely to continue to believe that their interests will be best served by the maintenance in Jordan of the Hashemite regime headed by King Hussein.

CURRICULUM VITAE OF MR TAHER AL-MASRI

Mr Al-Masri was born in 1942 in Nablus (West Bank). He later studied at the North Texas State University where he received a BA in Commerce.

He joined the Jordanian Central Bank in 1965 and worked there, including a period attached to the Bank of England, until his appointment in 1973 to represent Nablus in the Lower House of the Jordanian Parliament. In May 1973 he was made Minister of State for the Affairs of the Occupied Territories, a post which he held until November 1974.

Mr Al-Masri has previously served as Jordanian Ambassador in Madrid (1975-78), Paris (1978-83) and London (1983). He was appointed Foreign Minister in January 1984 in a major cabinet reshuffle.

He speaks excellent English, and is married with two children.



KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 16 FEBRUARY

BRIEF: ARAB/ISRAEL

POINTS TO MAKE

- 1 UK commitment to Jordan's stability. Progress on Arab/Israel best way of ensuring this. Some positive developments - Arafat's meeting with Mubarak, Egyptian readmission to Islamic Conference Organisation, prospect of resumed King Hussein/Arafat talks. Momentum must be maintained. Hope postponements of Palestine National Council (PNC) and Arab Summit do not reflect a slowing down of progress. Egypt's role in peace process? Likelihood of Egyptian readmission to Arab League?
- 2 Arafat/Hussein talks. When will they begin and what will be discussed? How far can Arafat go without a new PNC mandate?
- 3 King Hussein's meeting with President Reagan. Was the King encouraged by his talks with President Reagan? Would US put pressure on Israel if Arafat/Hussein came up with an agreement to negotiate with Israel on lines of Reagan plan? Hussein's own view of prospects for Reagan plan? Ten and US differ on certain points and we regularly let Americans know our views.

4 (If raised) International Conference on the Middle East. Americans have rejected this idea so there seems little chance of progress. In any case, Conference unlikely to be productive while gap between parties so wide. Realistic prospects for progress now lie with Hussein/Arafat dialogue.

5 (If raised) Aid to the Occupied Territories. Reviewing our possibilities. In absence of a settlement, assistance could help sustain Palestinian sense of identity and self-sufficiency in Occupied Territories. Need to outflank possible Israeli obstruction, and identify worthwhile projects.

## LEBANON

6 Redeployment of our MNF contingent unavoidable in view of deterioration in Beirut and (separate) US decisions. It remains close at hand for sake of MNF solidarity. We are working hard to help restore stability in Beirut and persuade all concerned to resume reconciliation process.

7 Have stressed to the Americans the dangers of their increased use of naval shelling in support of President Gemayel: adds to climate of violence and makes it more difficult for Gemayel to win back the moderate





opposition. Have also pressed them strongly to exploit the fact that 17 May Agreement is a dead letter and to find a formula which gives the Syrians an incentive to co-operate. No doubt King Hussein made the same points in Washington: US reaction?

8 Have also pressed for a more useful role for UN in Lebanon. French are pursuing ambitious goal of putting a UN force into Beirut. Soviet Union and Syria will only approve this on unacceptable conditions. We have been working for smaller steps, as described in Security Council Debate 16 February to make better use of UN observers in Beirut.

#### IRAN/IRAQ

##### The War

9 UK remains impartial and keen to see early end to the conflict. Concerned at recent attacks on civilian targets by both sides.

10 Can King Hussein persuade Iraq to accept Secretary-General's proposal for 2-pronged UN Mission? (On 13 February rejected by Iraq, but wisely accepted by Iran). With a new Iranian offensive expected in the Spring (late March, depending on weather) they would be wise to do. The Iraqis should not become overconfident

just because of a little US encouragement.

ANGLO/JORDANIAN RELATIONS

11 Our relations continue to be excellent. Reaffirm our commitment to Jordan. Sad to say farewell to Taher Masri as Jordanian Ambassador, congratulate him on his new appointment. Look forward to arrival of new Ambassador, Mr Hani Tabbara (for whom agreement given), who is highly spoken of.

Jordanian Parliament.

12 Congratulations on recall of Jordanian parliament. It will contribute to constitutional democracy in Jordan.

State visit

13 Plans are going ahead smoothly. Most grateful for all the co-operation received from Jordanians. The Queen and Prince Philip much look forward to the visit.

(Only if raised:) Daily Express article of 13 February on SAS bodyguards for The Queen in Jordan is without foundation.

(If pressed) We will be advising The Queen at the appropriate moment, but the probability of postponing the visit looks very slight. Co-operation very close between Jordanian and British services concerned.



CALL BY KING HUSSEIN ON THE PRIME MINISTER, 16 FEBRUARY

SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF (DEFENSIVE): JORDANIAN DRAFT SECURITY  
COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

Points to Make

1. Our position, stated many times (including Ten statements), is that Israeli settlements are contrary to international law and a major and growing obstacle to peace efforts. Have called on Israel radically to change these policies (Sir G Howe in Riyadh, 11 January).

2. (If asked for British sponsorship). Stand ready to do what we can to promote negotiations. Crucial test of any initiative is whether it will help bring progress towards comprehensive solution. Important not to provoke US hostility or veto. Will give the King's request close and urgent attention and let him have views.

## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1 During his recent visit to the US, King Hussein gave the Americans a draft Security Council Resolution on Israeli settlements (text in Washington telno 531). The Americans have given us a copy in strict confidence; we should not (not) reveal to the Jordanians that we have seen it. The Americans have minor problems with some of the wording but since most of it comes from resolutions which the US has supported or from President Reagan's speeches, and since it stops short of describing the settlements as illegal, they would have difficulty in rejecting it publicly. The initial US response to Hussein was cautious. They have told us at official level that since the King appeared to be using the draft to test President Reagan's good faith the State Department might recommend support for the text (with some amendments, if possible) if the King was determined to go ahead. But Mr Shultz was opposed to the text and might hope to dissuade the King. Others in the administration would also oppose it.

2 King Hussein told the Americans that he envisaged asking a friendly third country to sponsor the draft. They speculate that he might raise this with the Prime Minister on 16 February. The Americans have asked us, if possible, to discuss the matter further with them before going too far down this road.

3 In August 1983 the US vetoed a Jordanian draft Security Council resolution (text at Annex) on the situation in the Occupied Territories. This draft was prompted by a shooting /incident

incident at Hebron on the West Bank. The US objected to the draft's reaffirmation that the policies and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied in 1967 have no legal validity. HMG have long held the view that Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories are illegal, because they contravene the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits inter alia the transfer by the occupying power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. This view is very widely shared in the international community. It forms part of the Venice Declaration. The previous US Administration accepted it, and therefore supported Security Resolution 465 of 1980, from which the 1983 draft resolution was largely drawn. But President Reagan had while still a candidate proclaimed in public his view that settlements were 'not illegal', and his Administration have never been able to get off this hook.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION:

"THE SECURITY COUNCIL;

"HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JORDAN AND OTHER STATEMENTS MADE BEFORE THE COUNCIL;

"TAKING NOTE OF THE LETTER OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF DEMOCRATIC YEMEN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE ARAB GROUP FOR JULY 1983, TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/15890);

"STRESSING THE URGENT NEED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST;

"AFFIRMING THAT THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES REMAINS GRAVE AND VOLATILE AND THAT THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES CONSTITUTE A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO ALL EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST;

"AFFIRMING ONCE MORE THAT THE REGULATIONS ANNEXED TO THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS OF 1907 AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ARE APPLICABLE TO THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM;

"1. REAFFIRMS ALL ITS RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS;

"2. DETERMINES THAT THE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF ISRAEL IN ESTABLISHING SETTLEMENTS IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, HAVE NOT LEGAL VALIDITY; CONSTITUTE A MAJOR AND SERIOUS OBSTRUCTION TO ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ARE IN CONTRAVENTION WITH ARTICLE 49 (6) OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, OF 12 AUGUST 1949;

"3. CALLS ONCE MORE UPON ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, TO ABIDE SCRUPULOUSLY BY THE PROVISION OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949, TO RESCIND ITS PREVIOUS MEASURES, TO DESIST FROM TAKING ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN CHANGING THE LEGAL STATUS AND GEOGRAPHICAL NATURE AND MATERIALLY AFFECTING THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967 AND, IN PARTICULAR, NOT TO TRANSFER PARTS OF ITS OWN CIVILIAN POPULATION INTO THE

OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES AND TO FORCE TRANSFERS OF ARAB POPULATIONS FROM THESE TERRITORIES;

"4. STRONGLY DEPLORES THE CONTINUATION AND PERSISTENCE OF ISRAEL IN PURSUING THOSE POLICIES AND PRACTICES AND CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF ISRAEL TO RESCIND THOSE MEASURES, TO DISMANTLE THE EXISTING SETTLEMENTS, TO DESIST FROM EXPANDING AND ENLARGING THE EXISTING ONES AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO CEASE ON AN URGENT BASIS FROM THE PLANNING, CONSTRUCTION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM;

"5. REJECTS ALL ISRAELI ARBITRARY AND ILLEGAL ACTIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH RESULT IN THE EXPULSION, DEPORTATION AND FORCIBLE TRANSFERS OF ARAB POPULATIONS FROM THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES;

"6. CONDEMNS THE RECENT ATTACKS PERPETRATED AGAINST ARAB CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, ESPECIALLY THE KILLING AND WOUNDING OF STUDENTS AT THE ISLAMIC COLLEGE OF THE ARAB CITY OF AL-KHALIL ON 26 JULY 1983;

"7. CALLS UPON ALL STATES NOT TO PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH ANY ASSISTANCE TO BE USED SPECIFICALLY IN CONNECTION WITH SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES;

"8. REAFFIRMS ITS DETERMINATION, IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL WITH THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TO EXAMINE PRACTICAL WAYS AND MEANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO SECURE THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION;

"9. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES UNDER CONSTANT AND CLOSE SCRUTINY;

"10. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN THREE MONTHS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION."

SPONSORS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ARE: ALGERIA, BAHRAIN, DEMOCRATIC YEMEN, DJIBOUTI, IRAQ, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON, LIBYA, MAURITANIA, MOROCCO, OMAN, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, SOMALIA, SUDAN, SYRIA, TUNISIA, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND YEMEN.

(END TEXT)

---

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER : 16 FEBRUARY

IRAN/IRAQ : UP-DATE

Iranian Offensive

1. There are reports this morning of what the Iranians claim is the first phase of the expected major new offensive: Val Fajr V. Tehran Radio claims a major attack between Mehran and Dehloran, in the central area north Al Amarah. The Iranian objective is probably one of the main Baghdad-Basra roads. There are strong Iraqi forces in the area. The attack may be a forerunner of a second thrust further south.

Mediation

2. The Iraqi Permanent Representative at the United Nations informed the UK Deputy Permanent Representative on 15 February that the Iraqi reaction to the UN Secretary-General's proposed two-pronged mission did not amount to rejection of the proposal. The Iraqis are probably urgently reconsidering their response, in the light of the damage that rejection of the mission would do to their position at the UN. We are urging them to accept the mission. The Iranians have already responded positively.

Middle East Department  
16 February 1984