

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MFL)

ADVANCE COPY

27

SECRET NO 10 DOWNS ST

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR LOCH  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR WRIGHT  
MR CARTLEDGE  
MR KACIHERIS  
MR ADAMS  
MR JENKINS  
MR HORTON

SECRET  
MR GOODALL  
MR R. ARBUTHNOTH CABINET OFFICE

HD/HEAD  
HD/SEC  
HD/DEFENCE DEPT  
HD/FOOD  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/UND  
HD/MAD  
HD/NEO  
HD/NEO  
HD/BCD (E)  
HD/FINANCE DEPT  
HD/PROTOCOL DEPT

R.C.

*me*

CONFIDENTIAL

REF BY 181000Z

IMMEDIATE

FM UNIS NEW YORK 172215Z FEB 84  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 177 OF 17 FEBRUARY 1984  
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, PARIS  
PRIORITY TEL AVIV, ROME, CAIRO, AMMAN, JEDDA, MOSCOW

NY TELNO 1704 LEBANON UN OPTIONS

1. THE FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAS TOLD ME THAT HE IS GOING TO TABLE THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION "IN BLUE" FORTHWITH. SINCE I WAS AWARE (NANTEUIL EXCUSED HIMSELF FROM A MEETING OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TEN THIS MORNING) THAT HE HAD HAD A MEETING WITH THE SOVIET PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE I ASKED HIM WHAT WAS THE RUSSIAN REACTION. NANTEUIL SAID ONLY THAT THEY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE FRENCH NOT TO GO AHEAD.
2. THE CHANCES ARE, THEREFORE, THAT THERE WILL BE A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON 21 FEBRUARY TO CONSIDER THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION AT WHICH THE RUSSIANS WILL HAVE TO REACT. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS TOLD ME THAT HE IS GOING AHEAD WITH HIS VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE (FOR WHICH HE LEAVES LATER TODAY) BUT THAT HE WILL FLY BACK AT ANY TIME, EVEN AS EARLY AS 21 FEBRUARY, IF THE LEBANESE SITUATION DEMANDS.
3. I HAVE HAD AN ACCOUNT FROM BOTH THE MALTESE AND ZIMBABWEAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS REFERRED TO IN PARA 3 OF YOUR. THE CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE NON-ALIGNED SHOULD WAIT AND SEE. THE GENERAL VIEW SEEMED TO BE THAT IT SHOULD BECAUSE TO PROMOTE AN INTERVIEW WITH UNDERSECRETARY THE NON-ALIGNED

~~RESOLVED TO TAKE 3 DE THE~~ WE CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE NON-VICTORIOUS SHOULD WAIT AND SEE. THE GENERAL VIEW SEEMED TO BE THAT IF SAUDI EFFORTS TO PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT WERE SUCCESSFUL THE NON-ALIGNED MIGHT BE ABLE TO COME UP WITH SOMETHING THAT WOULD HELP CONCILIATE OPPOSING VIEWS. ON A PERSONAL BASIS SAUDI AGREED THAT, IF THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION FAILED, THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT WHICH MIGHT SERVE AS AN END TO THE PRESENT STAGE OF COUNCIL DISCUSSION AND A SPRINGBOARD FOR THE NEXT STAGE.

4. SINCE DICTATING THE ABOVE I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR TELNO 74. FRANKLY I AM AMAZED. THERE REALLY OUGHT TO BE NO DOUBT AT ALL IN FRENCH MINDS THAT WE SUPPORT THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A UN FORCE. I HAVE KEPT IN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE TOUCH WITH BOTH NANTERUIL AND HIS DEPUTY AND HAVE GONE OVER THE GROUND WITH THEM ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, EVEN GIVING THEM THE TEXT OF MY STATEMENT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ADVANCE AND DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE PARTICULAR PARAGRAPHS ABOUT OUR INITIATIVE. AT NO POINT HAVE EITHER OF THEM MADE ANY CRITICISM OF OUR INITIATIVE LET ALONE THE POINTS IN PARAS 1 AND 3 OF YOUR TELNO 79, WHICH ARE NONSENSE. ONLY THIS MORNING I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE MEETING OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TEN TO CONFIRM EXPLICITLY THAT THE UK SUPPORTED THE FRENCH INITIATIVE AND THAT OUR OWN PROPOSALS SHOULD BE SEEN AS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN BEIRUT AND IN NO WAY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF REPLACING THE NMF WITH A UN FORCE.

MARGETSON

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NYWD 35/17

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