

cc fe ①

Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Agree attached

London SW1A 2AH

telegram of instruction?

2 March 1984

Dear John,

A.S.C. 2/3

Yes

mt

Jordanian Draft Security Council Resolution

During his call on the Prime Minister on 16 February, <sup>attached</sup> King Hussein handed over a copy of a draft Security Council Resolution on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. He had given this to the Americans but Mr Shultz had expressed scepticism. He hoped that if the Americans could not propose such a Resolution, other friends such as the United Kingdom could 'help.' The Prime Minister promised to study the text.

The substance of the text presents us with no major difficulties. It has long been the Government's view that the settlements are both illegal and an obstacle to peace. Previous US Administrations have accepted the illegality of the Israeli settlements, but the present Administration has been stuck with President Reagan's remark while still a candidate that they are 'not illegal'. In August 1983, the US vetoed a Jordanian draft Security Council Resolution on this point.

The new Jordanian draft has been cleverly drafted, using material from President Reagan's own speeches, and stops short of describing the settlements as illegal. It seems to be intended to put the US on the spot. They would find it difficult to reject the draft publicly. But there is strong opposition to it within the State Department, who have prepared a draft Presidential letter to King Hussein explaining that his proposal is not helpful at this juncture, and offering to discuss further how to deal with the settlements problem.

It is not clear whether King Hussein is determined to press ahead with the draft, whatever the US reaction may be. We could hardly refuse to support the draft in its present form if it came to a vote. However, Sir Geoffrey Howe does not think it would be helpful to force the issue now when the Americans are likely to oppose the draft, albeit mainly for domestic political reasons. Sir Geoffrey therefore recommends that our Ambassador at Amman should be instructed to speak to the King in an effort to dissuade him on tactical grounds from pressing ahead with his resolution now. The Americans have expressed interest in keeping in touch with us on this: the telegram authorises the Embassy in Washington to brief them after Mr Urwick has acted in Amman.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private SecretaryA J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street





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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

5 March, 1984

JORDANIAN DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

Thank you for your letter of 2 March to John Coles. The Prime Minister agrees that instructions should be sent to our Ambassador in Amman along the lines set out in the draft telegram attached to your letter.

(David Barclay)

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

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OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>PRIORITY</b>
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ZCZC 1 ZCZC  
 GRS 2 GRS  
 CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL  
 CAVEATS 4  
 DESKBY 5  
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO 271700Z FEB 84  
 PRE/ADD 7 TO PRIORITY AMMAN  
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
 9 INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON  
 10 ROUTINE TEL AVIV, CAIRO, MOSCOW, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAMASCUS,  
 11 BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, JEDDA, ROME, JERUSALEM  
 E D 12 MY TEL NO 130 AND WASHINGTON TEL NO 627: JORDANIAN DRAFT SECURITY  
 13 COUNCIL RESOLUTION  
 14 1. The text of the draft Resolution which King Hussein gave the  
 15 Prime Minister <sup>has been sent to you by separate telegram.</sup> ~~is in MIFT~~ As reported in my TUR, the Prime  
 16 Minister undertook to study the text. Although the King did not  
 17 specifically ask for UK sponsorship, we should clearly give him  
 18 our reactions to the draft. Please therefore seek an early  
 19 opportunity to speak to the King. You should thank him for  
 20 showing us the text and say that you have been instructed to give  
 21 him the Prime Minister's response. You should make the following  
 /// 22 points:  
 // 23 (a) The UK position, stated many times (including in statements by  
 / 24 the Ten) is that Israeli settlements are contrary to international  
 25 law and a major and growing obstacle to peace efforts. We have

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword  called
File number	Dept NENAD	Distribution Arab/Israel Dispute
Drafted by (Block capitals) C W LONG		
Telephone number 233 6048		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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1 <<<<  
 2 called on Israel radically to change these policies (my remarks  
 3 in Riyadh on 11 January).  
 4 (b) It follows from this that we have no real difficulty with the  
 5 principle or the content of the Jordanian draft (subject perhaps  
 6 to minor amendments: eg we should prefer to replace the words  
 7 quote belligerent occupant unquote with quote Israel unquote).  
 8 If the text came to the vote in its present form it would  
 9 receive UK support.  
 10 (c) We do however have reservations on tactical grounds. The  
 11 crucial test of any initiative is whether it will help bring  
 12 progress towards a comprehensive solution. It is important not  
 13 to provoke US hostility or veto. Acceptable as the resolution  
 14 is to us as now drafted, it is likely that it would be so changed  
 15 in the course of negotiation in the Security Council that the  
 16 Americans would once again use their veto. It would be a  
 17 serious setback for the moderates if the Americans were  
 18 manoeuvred by extremists into aligning themselves with Israel  
 19 once again in this way on an issue so crucial to the Reagan plan.  
 20 Furthermore, it might direct attention unhelpfully from  
 21 current important and serious activity (ie the Arafat/Hussein  
 22 dialogue) towards renewed technical (and sterile) wrangles in  
 23 New York.  
 24 2. King Hussein is apparently using his draft resolution to test  
 25 the good faith of the US Administration over the Reagan plan.  
 26 He no doubt wishes to find out before deciding his own options  
 27 whether the Americans are willing to give him the support he  
 28 needs on a settlements freeze. Leahy's talks in Washington  
 29 (second TUR), and contacts with the US Embassy here suggest that  
 30 he is unlikely to get the answer he wants. You may judge it  
 31 appropriate to discuss this point with the King. You could say  
 32 that we <sup>fully</sup> understand his need to know where he stands with the  
 33 Americans. But this is not perhaps the best time to force the  
 34 Administration into a decision which could affect policy for

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1 <<<<  
 2 many months ahead. . A better opportunity may present itself  
 3 later for ~~padding~~ <sup>persuading</sup> the Americans ~~into meeting~~ <sup>to make</sup> making more  
 4 positive moves.  
 5 3. (For Washington) Leahy undertook to keep in touch with the  
 6 Americans. You may wish to inform them, when HMA Amman has  
 7 taken action, of the line in para 1 above. Para 2 should not  
 8 be revealed. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
 9 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

10 HOWE  
 11 NNNN

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MAY 1984

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U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL DRAFT RESOLUTION  
ON THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES

*Given to the Prime Minister  
by King Hussein on 16 Feb. 1971.*

*p.a.*

*A.S.C. 12/2*

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the Permanent Representative of \_\_\_\_\_ and other statements made before the Council,

Stressing the urgent need to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

Taking note of the policies and practices of the Government of Israel, and its instrumentalities, in unilaterally authorizing, establishing, subsidizing, promoting and enlarging settlements of Israeli civilians in the Arab territories under Israeli military occupation,

Recalling Security Council Resolutions 242, 267, 338 and 497,

Affirming that the situation in the Middle East and in the Arab territories under Israeli military occupation remains grave and volatile and that Israeli settlement policies and practices, among other factors, adversely affect the prospect for peace,

1. Reaffirms that peace in the Middle East is to be achieved by the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and negotiations between the parties aimed at establishing a just and durable peace, as called for by Security Council Resolution 338.

2. Recognizes that Israeli settlement activity is not essential for the security of Israel and diminishes confidence that a final peace can be freely and fairly achieved.

3. Determines that Israel's settlement activities in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, are an obstacle to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and contrary to the purpose and intent of those Resolutions.

4. Determines that Israel's settlement activities in the occupied Arab territories are without permanent effect or validity and cannot prejudice the status of the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem.

5. Affirms that the regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, are applicable to the Arab territories occupied



by Israel, including Jerusalem, and calls upon the belligerent occupant to abide scrupulously by the provisions thereof.

6. Calls upon the belligerent occupant to take no action which could result in a change in the legal status, geographical identity or demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories.

7. Calls for a halt to the acquisition and allocation of land for settlements, the construction and establishment of new settlements, the enlargement of existing settlements and the settling of Israel's own civilian population in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem.

8. Calls upon all States to provide no assistance to Israel for use in connection with settlements in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem.

9. Decides to keep the situation in the occupied Arab territories under close and constant scrutiny.

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within three months on the implementation of this resolution.