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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
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MO 19/1

16th July 1984

Dear Andrew

SERVICE ASSISTANCE IN DOCK STRIKE

At the meeting of MISC 101 this morning, Mr Stanley agreed that we would provide a short note for the Prime Minister on the current plan for Service assistance in a national dock strike.

The existing plan, Op HALBERD, was prepared in February 1981 and circulated to the Cabinet Office and the Departments directly concerned under the title "Ministry of Defence (Army Department) Standing Instruction for Military Aid to Civil Ministries (MACM) in National Emergencies in Peace (Index 15) (Feb 81) - Assistance in the Event of a National Dock Strike" (copy attached for ease of reference). The Plan is directly geared to the operation of modern ports, which rely heavily on specialised mechanical equipment. Service resources in this area are very limited, essentially those of the RCT Port Regiment who operate the military port at Marchwood.

The plan provides for some 2,800 Servicemen to operate as small teams for:

Roll-on/Roll-off operations	- 13 teams
Container operations	- 3 teams
Break bulk cargo operations	- 13 teams
Tug operations	- 13 teams
Lockgate/water impounding machinery operations	- 9 teams

Under the plan these teams would be available for deployment (normally at 7 days notice to move) at up to 3 ports, where they would be used to handle the highest priority items required as essential for the life, health or safety of the nation. The plans do not assume a complete substitution for the dock labour force. The plan assumes that:

- a. Servicemen will have unrestricted access to the ports and to specialist equipment;

A Turnbull Esq



- b. Sufficient port managers and supervisory staff will be available to give general direction (ie, identification of the contents of a ship and its containers and production of unloading programmes in consultation with military commanders);
- c. Port staff will be available to explain the working of the more intricate pieces of equipment (eg Bulk grain cargo unloading systems, lock gate machinery etc);
- d. Cargo unloading by soldiers will not be "blacked": if it was necessary to move cargo from ports, the general instructions on road haulage contained in Index 5 would apply (see paragraph 4 below);
- e. Local pilots will co-operate with RN tug boat crews.

If these conditions are met, we judge that the Service teams could, in the best circumstances, handle up to 1,000 tonnes a day; the precise quantities cannot be determined without further planning since they depend heavily on the nature and location of the goods to be unloaded and the equipment available.

The operational consequences for the Services of implementing Op HALBERD are not insignificant. Two major exercises BOLD GANNET - UKMF deployment to Denmark - and LIONHEART - major Regular and TA reinforcement of BAOR - are scheduled for September; both make heavy demands on the port facilities at Marchwood from mid-August onwards. In the event of a widespread dock strike, these exercises could be mounted on a slightly smaller scale using Marchwood alone. However, the deployment of specialist troops under Op HALBERD would severely reduce the effectiveness of Marchwood and lead to the possible cancellation of both exercises.

Service deployment in the docks would bring with it a major risk of escalation of the dispute by the lorry drivers (TGWU). Under another Service plan (Op BEANSTALK) up to 10,000 drivers could be made available, half of which would be HGV qualified. This would require withdrawal of Service drivers from British Forces Germany and would therefore have an immediate effect on our operational readiness in NATO. Any movement of Servicemen in or out of the docks would require substantial police protection.

No study has been made to date of the possibility of using unskilled Service labour in this dispute on a large scale in the ports. After a period of time this would undoubtedly increase the flow of goods onto the dockside particularly in Ro-Ro docks, but its impact would depend upon the availability of transportation to and from the docks. The last time troops were committed was in 1950 when some 6,000 troops were used in London without significant operational or training penalties, but this was for a period of 5 days only. Any large scale committal of troops for an extended period of time would soon bring operational penalties and affect the training of recruits, both Regular and TA, as was evident in the use of 15,000 troops deployed during the firemans strike in 1977/78/

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Your reference

Distribution as per Annex A
to Index 1 of Subject Document

Our reference

D/DASD/58/3/3
(ASD 2d)

Date

5 March 1981

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (ARMY DEPARTMENT) STANDING INSTRUCTIONS FOR
MILITARY AID TO CIVIL MINISTRIES IN NATIONAL EMERGENCES IN PEACE (MACE)

A new Index 15 (Assistance in the Event of a National Dock Strike) is attached and is effective on receipt. It will form the basis of any Service response to requests from the Department of Transport for assistance in the Docks. The detail in column (d) of Index 1 opposite Index 15 should be amended to read "Feb 81".

Salmon

W N B JACKSON

Major

for Director of Army Staff Duties

CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (ARMY DEPARTMENT)
STANDING INSTRUCTIONS FOR
MILITARY AID TO CIVIL MINISTRIES (MACM)
IN NATIONAL EMERGENCIES IN PEACE
(INDEX 15) (FEB 81)

ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF A NATIONAL DOCK STRIKE

SITUATION

1. In the event of a national dock strike, the Government may require servicemen to unload certain cargoes without which the life of the community would be placed seriously at risk. This plan provides for a relatively ~~small~~ number of flying squads for deployment to ports where cargo designated essential was to be unloaded and where, in the light of circumstances at the time, it was assessed that there would be a reasonable chance of success in operating sophisticated modern equipment.
2. Lessons from previous dock strikes have shown that serious shortages do not tend to manifest themselves until at least three weeks into the strike and that the first major supply problems occur with bulk grain and animal foodstuffs. If historical patterns are followed it is not expected that military involvement would be required until at least the fourth week of a strike and then only on the basis of a slow build-up of manpower. This plan is based on the need to provide a flexible response.

ASSUMPTIONS

3. It is assumed that:
 - a. Servicemen will have unrestricted access to the ports and to specialist equipment.
 - b. Sufficient port managers and supervisory staff will be available to give general direction (ie. identification of contents of a ship and its containers, production of unloading programmes in consultation with military commanders).
 - c. Port staff will be available to explain the working of the more intricate pieces of equipment (eg. Bulk grain cargo unloading systems, lock gate machinery etc).
 - d. Cargo unloaded by soldiers will not be "blackened". If it is necessary to move cargo from ports, the general instructions on road haulage contained in Index 5 would apply.
 - e. Local pilots will cooperate with RN tug boat crews.

MISSION

4. To assist the Department of Transport in the event of a national dock strike by providing Servicemen to unload essential cargo.

EXECUTION

5. General Outline. "Flying Squads" will be formed to perform the following tasks:

- a. Roll-on-Roll-off Operations (Ro-Ro). 13 teams
- b. Container Operations. 3 teams
- c. Break Bulk Cargo Operations. 13 teams
- d. Bulk Cargo Operations. 13 teams in support of Break Bulk teams.
- e. Tug Operations. 13 teams
- f. Lock Gate and Water Impounding Machinery Operations. 9 teams

Annex A gives the detailed composition of each team annotated with the level of skill assessed as being required for each job. The allocation of RCT operators is based on the 1980 manpower availability. It is assumed that the Port School will close and that unskilled manpower will be drafted into Marchwood to keep the operation going, on a one for one basis.

6. Locations. Teams may either be concentrated at one or two ports, or dispersed, depending on the specific requirement. Form up points will also depend on circumstances and will be subject to the direction of MOD (ASD 2) in consultation with HQ UKLF.
7. Liaison. Districts will not liaise with ports without the specific authority of MOD (ASD 2). The addresses and telephone numbers of the major port operators are given at Annex B.
8. District Responsibilities. Districts will:
 - a. Initially, supply men to form port operating teams, as directed by HQ UKLF.
 - b. Take under command, control and administer such teams as are allocated to them by MOD (ASD 2) and HQ UKLF.
 - c. Liaise with port managers and direct military port operations within District boundaries.
 - d. Conform with the general instructions given in Index 2.

SERVICE SUPPORT

9. General administrative instructions are given at Index 2.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

10. Entry to the Docks.
 - a. Servicemen will not enter dock estates until invited so to do by the port managers listed at Annex B.
 - b. Servicemen will only enter and leave docks in formed bodies escorted by the police.
11. Communications. Arrangements should be made to ensure rapid passage of information on local situations to MOD (ASD 2).

ANNEX A TO INDEX 15
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (ARMY DEPARTMENT)
STANDING INSTRUCTION FOR
MILITARY AID TO CIVIL MINISTRIES (MACM)
IN NATIONAL EMERGENCIES IN PEACE

MANPOWER REQUIREMENT

Serial	Team	No of Teams	Job	Number per Team	Total Number	Post filled by:
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(h)
1	Ro-Ro operation	13	a. Supervisor b. GD men c. Drivers	1+1 7 7	13(+13) 91 91	Unskilled plus 1 x RCT movement adviser per team. HGV Driver.
2	Container operation	3	a. Supervisor b. Chargehand c. Gantry Crane op d. GD men e. Clerk f. Electrician g. Mech Fitter h. Straddle Carrier operator	1(+1) 2 6 6 2 3 2 10	3(+3) 6 18 18 6 9 6 30	Officer I/C plus adviser RCT operator A1. RCT Port operators A2. RCT Port operators A3. Unskilled. Clerk. REME. REME. RCT Port operators A3.
3	Break Bulk Cargo operation	13	a. Supervisor b. Hatch Chargehand c. Crane drivers d. Hatch Signalman e. Inboard Labour f. Lashing chargehand	1(+1) 5 5 5 40 5	13(+13) 65 65 65 520 65	Officers I/C plus advisers. a. 6 Port operators A1. b. 7 Port operators A2. Unskilled 1 x JNCO per team. RE 13 Port operators A2. 8 Port operators A3. Remainder unskilled 1 x JNCO per team. Unskilled. Team based on inf pl org JNCO unskilled.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
3 (Cont'd)			g. Landing Labourer	15	195	Unskilled.	2 x JNCO per team
			h. Tally clerk	10	130	Clerk	
			i. Fork lift driver	20	260	RAOC/unskilled driver	
			j. Transit Shed (TS) Foreman	1	13	SNCO unskilled	
			k. TS Labourer	5	65	Unskilled.	
			l. TS clerk	6	78	Clerk	
			m. Mobile Crane Op	2	26	RE/RAOC	
			n. Electrician	1	13	REME	
			o. Veh Mech	3	39	REME	
4	Bulk Cargo Support team	13	a. Mech fitter	2	26	REME	
			b. Engineer	2	26	RE	
			c. Electrician	2	26	REME	
5	Lock Gate and Water impounding operation	9	a. Lockmaster	1	9)	
			b. Seaman	9	81)	
			c. Engineer	1	9) RE.	
			d. Electrician	3	27)	
			e. Engine hands	3	27)	
6	Tug operation	13	a. Tug Masters	4	52	Royal Navy - Junior officer	
			b. Mate	4	52	Junior officer or CPO	
			c. Boatswain	4	52	CPO or PO	
			d. Deck hand	12	156	AB	
			e. Chief Engineer	4	52	CPO (Eng) or PO (Eng)	
			f. Engine room hand	3	104	MEM	

Total Skilled 1531
Total Unskilled 1100
Overall Total 2631

ANNEX B TO INDEX 15
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (ARMY DEPARTMENT)
STANDING INSTRUCTIONS FOR
MILITARY AID TO CIVIL MINISTRIES (MACM)
IN NATIONAL EMERGENCIES IN PEACE

CONTACTS FOR PORTS WITHIN PORT EMERGENCY COMMITTEE AREAS
(AS AT 1 JAN 81)

<u>PEC AREA AND CHAIRMAN</u>	<u>PORT</u>	<u>CONTACT</u>	<u>TELEPHONE NO.</u>
<u>BRISTOL</u> Mr S Turner Port of Bristol Authority 0272823681	BRISTOL	Mr G Pike Deputy General Manager	0272 823681
<u>CLYDE PORTS</u> Mr J P Davidson Clyde Port Authority 041 221 8733	CLYDE	Mr McCreath Marketing Manager	041 221 8733
<u>GRIMSBY</u> Mr J H Hughes British Transport Docks Board	GRIMSBY AND LIMINGHAM	Mr J M Hughes Docks Manager	0472 59181
<u>HULL</u> Mr K E Bantock British Transport Docks Board, Hull 0472 27171	HULL	Mr G A Cullington Docks Manager	0472 27171
<u>FORTH PORTS</u> Mr W J Leaman Forth Ports Authority	FORTH	Mr W J Leaman Director Operations	031 554 4343 Ext 200
<u>LIVERPOOL</u> Mr J P Fitzpatrick Mersey Docks and Harbour Co 051 200 2020	LIVERPOOL	Mr P J Furlong Cargo Operations Director	051 200 2020
<u>LONDON</u> Mr J D Presland Port of London Authority 01 476 6900	LONDON	Mr Kibblewhite Secretary's Office Mr B Aldous Secretary's Office	01 476 6900 Ext 3-211 01 467 6900 Ext 3-105

PEC AREA AND CHAIRMAN	PORT	CONTACT	TELEPHONE NO.
<u>MANCHESTER</u> Mr D K Redford Manchester Ship Canal Co 061 872 2411	MANCHESTER	Mr R J F Taylor Manager	061 872 2411
<u>TEES PORTS</u> Mr J Tholen Tees & Hartlepoons Port Authority 0642 241121	TEES	Mr M J Hyslop Secretary	0642 241121
<u>NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE</u> Mr J H H Gillespie Port of Tyne Authority 0632 25541	TYNE	Mr J Hayes Director Operations	0632 25541
<u>SOUTHAMPTON</u> Mr J B Williams British Transport Docks Board 0703 23844	SOUTHAMPTON	Mr W D Hoddings Deputy Port Director	0703 23844
<u>SOUTH WALES PORTS</u> Mr R Bury British Transport Docks Board 0222 42544	CARDIFF NEWPORT SWANSEA	Mr B Pearson Docks Manager Mr A Pidduck Docks Manager Mr W G King Docks Manager	0222 42544 0633 65411 0792 50655
<u>EAST ANGLIAN PORTS</u> Mr G Blackhall Felixstowe Docks and Railway Co 039 42 1433	FELIXSTOWE IPSWICH HARWICH	Mr P D Peters Sales Manager (Temporary Contact) Mr J Evelyn Chief Executive Mr C Crawford Asst Shipping and Port Manager	039 42 4433 0473 56011 025 55 8949

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