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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR PRIVATE OFFICE

SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILATERAL WITH MR LANGE

SUMMARY

1. LANGE MADE NO COMMITMENT ON THE NEW ZEALAND VOTE ON THE FALKLANDS BUT TOOK OUR ARGUMENTS ON BOARD. ON NUCLEAR SHIPS VISITS, LANGE GAVE NOTHING AWAY BUT SEEMED OPEN TO THE IDEA OF AN ACCOMMODATION. LANGE CONGRATULATED THE UK ON THE HONG KONG AGREEMENT, AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF OUR HELP IN THE EC.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A BILATERAL MEETING WITH MR LANGE IN THE MARGINS OF UNGA TODAY.

HONG KONG

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HANDED OVER HIS PERSONAL MESSAGE TO MR LANGE ABOUT HONG KONG. MR LANGE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY IMPRESSED BY THE AGREEMENT WHICH WAS A REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT. HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CERTAINLY THINK OF MAKING A SUPPORTIVE STATEMENT.

EC

4. MR LANGE SAID THAT HE RECOGNISED THAT BRITAIN HAD BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN THE COMMUNITY ON NEW ZEALAND'S BEHALF. MR JOPLING HAD WORKED HARD. MR LANGE ADDED THAT NEW ZEALAND AGRICULTURE HAD RECEIVED ANOTHER BLOW RECENTLY WHEN THE UNITED STATES, WITH ITS GIFTS TO JAMAICA, HAD VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED AN IMPORTANT NEW ZEALAND MARKET.

FALKLANDS

5. MR LANGE TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO RAISE THE FALKLANDS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A DISCUSSION WITH OUR HIGH COMMISSIONER IN WELLINGTON BEFORE HE LEFT. HE WAS AWARE OF OUR CONCERN THAT IF HE CONVEYED TO PRESIDENT ALFONSIN AN INDICATION OF A POSSIBLE CHANGE OF STANCE (IN FAVOUR OF ABSTENTION) THIS WOULD ENCOURAGE HIM IN HIS CAUSE. MR LANGE HAD GIVEN THE HIGH COMMISSIONER HIS ASSURANCES THAT HE WOULD NOT GIVE ANY INDICATION TO ALFONSIN AND WANTED TO REPEAT THEM NOW TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

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6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID FIRMLY THAT HE WOULD BE VERY CONCERNED AT ANY CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND'S VOTE. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD WANT TO RAISE THIS WITH MR LANGE AT THE WEEKEND. A CHANGE OF VOTE BY ONE OF OUR CLOSEST ALLIES WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING. WE WERE KEEN TO HOLD THE PRESENT POSITION. THERE HAD BEEN SOME ENCOURAGING SIGNS OF PROGRESS WITH ONE OR TWO COUNTRIES THINKING OF MOVING IN OUR FAVOUR. THE PRESENT POSITION PROVIDED THE ONLY POSSIBLE FOUNDATION TO START A PROCESS OF GRADUAL NORMALISATION. WE COULD NOT NEGOTIATE ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY BUT WERE PREPARED TO MOVE TOWARDS NORMALISATION ACROSS A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES. IT WAS NOTEWORTHY THAT PRESIDENT ALFONSIN IN HIS SPEECH MENTIONED SELF-DETERMINATION IN OTHER SECTIONS BUT POINTEDLY FAILED TO MENTION IT IN THE SECTION ON THE FALKLANDS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED IN DETAIL THE CAREFUL PREPARATIONS WHICH WE HAD MADE FOR THE BERNE TALKS AND THE WAY IN WHICH THE ARGENTINES HAD ACTED COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONCLUDED THAT WE WOULD TAKE A SERIOUS VIEW OF ANY CHANGE IN THE NEW ZEALAND POSITION.

7. SIR JOHN THOMSON ADDED THAT, WHILE MR LANGE'S ASSURANCE THAT HE WOULD NOT GIVE ANY INDICATION TO PRESIDENT ALFONSIN WAS OF SOME VALUE, THE MAIN POINT WAS THE NEW ZEALAND POSITION ON THE VOTE ITSELF. THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION WAS EVEN LESS SATISFACTORY THIS YEAR THAN PREVIOUSLY AND A CHANGE BY NEW ZEALAND NOW WOULD BE A VERY LARGE SIGNAL.

8. MR LANGE COMMENTED THAT WHAT SEEMED TO BE THE PROBLEM WAS A POSSIBLE CHANGE OF VOTE BY NEW ZEALAND RATHER THAN THE VOTE ITSELF. IF NEW ZEALAND HAD ABSTAINED IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND WAS GOING TO ABSTAIN AGAIN THIS TIME, PRESUMABLY THERE WOULD BE LESS OF A PROBLEM. ONE OF MR LANGE'S OFFICIALS ADDED THAT NEW ZEALAND HAD GOT INTERESTS WHICH IT WOULD LIKE TO DEVELOP WITH ARGENTINA NOW THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HAD BEEN RESTORED. SIR JOHN THOMSON SAID THAT THE NEW ZEALANDERS HAD ALREADY GOT A RESTORATION OF RELATIONS WITHOUT HAVING TO PAY FOR IT, SO THAT THEY OWED THE ARGENTINES NOTHING ON THAT SCORE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THAT THERE COULD BE NO NEGOTIATIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY IN VIEW OF THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE ISLANDS, BUT WE HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE TO TRY TO NORMALISE RELATIONS IN OTHER IMPORTANT AREAS. HE REPEATED THAT A CHANGE OF VOTE BY NEW ZEALAND WOULD BE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY.

#### NUCLEAR NAVAL VISITS

9. AFTER A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON THE PEACE MOVEMENTS IN BOTH COUNTRIES, IN WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE EMPHASIED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S FIRM COMMITMENT TO PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL, THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR SHIPS VISITS.

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10. MR LANGE SAID THAT THE ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN RAISED IN THE UK CONTEXT SINCE THERE HAD BEEN NO RECENT VISITS OF SHIPS WHICH WOULD FALL INTO THAT CATEGORY. THE PROBLEM HAD ARISEN WITH THE UNITED STATES, THOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE BRITISH POSITION ON DISCLOSURE WAS SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE UNITED STATES. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE COULD NOT ORGANISE A VISIT TO NEW ZEALAND BY AN OBVIOUSLY NON-NUCLEAR VESSEL, JUST TO CONFIRM NEW ZEALAND'S INTEREST IN NAVAL VISITS.

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THAT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NUCLEAR-PROPELLED VESSELS AND VESSELS WHICH MIGHT CARRY NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ON THE FIRST THERE WAS GENERALLY NO PROBLEM ON VISITS TO PORTS. BUT IT WAS CLEARLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO CONFIRM OR DENY WHETHER THE VESSELS WERE CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE THIS WOULD HAVE OBVIOUS STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS. WE HAD MANAGED TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE AUSTRALIANS, SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA AND VERY MUCH HOPED THAT SUCH AN ACCOMMODATION WOULD BE POSSIBLE WITH NEW ZEALAND. IF THE PROBLEM GOT OUT OF HAND IT COULD THREATEN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DETERRENT.

12. MR LANGE SAID THAT NEW ZEALAND, AS A SMALL COUNTRY IN THE PACIFIC, DID NOT FEEL THAT THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT WAS RELEVANT TO ITS DEFENCE, SINCE IT WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER, IN THE EVENT, THE DETERRENT WOULD BE INVOKED. NEW ZEALAND THOUGHT THAT CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE WAS MUCH MORE RELEVANT TO HER NEEDS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE BASIS FOR A FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, AND CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IF WE DID NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR SHIPS VISITS THIS MIGHT PRECLUDE ROYAL NAVAL VISITS AS A WHOLE TO NEW ZEALAND. HE REPEATED THAT WE HAD REACHED ACCOMMODATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND HOPED THAT WE COULD REACH SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS WITH NEW ZEALAND.

COMMENT

13. AT FIRST MR LANGE SEEMED NOT TO HAVE GRASPED THE FULL IMPORTANCE OF OUR RELATIONS OF A CHANGE OF VOTE ON THE FALKLANDS. ALTHOUGH HE GAVE NO COMMITMENT, HE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN SHAKEN BY THE GROWING REALISATION OF THE EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS WHICH A CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND'S VOTE WOULD HAVE. SIMILARLY, ON NUCLEAR SHIPS VISITS. HE SHOWED SOME INTEREST IN THE IDEA OF AN ACCOMMODATION OF A KIND WHICH HAD BEEN REACHED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. HE MAY WELL BE OPEN TO FURTHER PERSUASION ON THESE TWO POINTS WHEN HE SEES THE PRIME MINISTER AT THE WEEKEND. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOUND HIM INTELLIGENT, OPEN AND PERCEPTIVE, STILL RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED BUT APPARENTLY PREPARED TO LEARN.

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SIR. W. HARDING  
MR. BOYD.

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LANGE (pronounced Longey), DAVID MP

(Labour, Mangere)

Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of New Zealand, since July 1984

Leader of the New Zealand Labour Party, since February 1983

Born 1942. LLM at Auckland with First Class honours in criminal law, criminal behaviour and medico-legal problems. Before his election to Parliament was a tutor and lecturer at the Auckland Law and Medical School.

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Joined the Labour Party in 1963 and first stood for Parliament in 1975. He was elected in March 1977 at a by-election caused by the resignation of the former Labour Minister of Agriculture, Colin Moyle.

A rousing, witty, orator, who once weighed 26 stone (in February 1982 he underwent an operation to help him to lose weight). Opinion polls from time to time showed him to be more popular than his then leader, Bill Rowling, and he only narrowly failed to replace him as leader in late 1980. His star then waned somewhat and he was, for a time, no longer regarded as the automatic successor to Mr Rowling although remaining the favourite. He was elected Leader of the Party in February 1983. Almost immediately, he made a mark by having the party accept choice of opposition spokesmen by the leader rather than by caucus election. Differences between him and the left wing, especially on nuclear matters, in mid-1983, did not prevent him for leading the party to a convincing win in the snap general election of July 1984. He concentrated attention on the economy, and struck a chord in the New Zealand electorate which Sir R Muldoon could no longer do. He also avoided (unlike Muldoon) personal polemics in the campaign.

He visited Britain as a sponsored visitor in 1981 and January 1984 when he met the Prime Minister and Secretary of State.



HON F D (FRANK) O'FLYNN QC MP

(LABOUR, ISLAND BAY)

MINISTER OF STATE, MINISTER OF DEFENCE, MINISTER IN CHARGE OF WAR PENSIONS, MINISTER IN CHARGE OF REHABILITATION, DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND ASSOCIATE MINISTER OF OVERSEAS TRADE AND INDUSTRY. RANKS NO 9 IN CABINET.

BORN IN GREYMOUTH 1918. SERVED IN THE RNZAF DURING WORLD WAR 2. BARRISTER SINCE 1954 (QUEENS COUNSEL). A TRUSTEE OF THE NORMAN KIRK MEMORIAL TRUST FUND AND PAST PRESIDENT OF THE ST THOMAS MORE SOCIETY (OF CATHOLIC LAWYERS).

ELECTED MEMBER FOR KAPITI 1972. LOST THE SEAT IN 1975. WELLINGTON CITY COUNCIL 1977 AND MP FOR ISLAND BAY SINCE 1978. OPPOSITION SPOKESMAN ON HEALTH 1978-82.

MARRIED, FOUR GROWN CHILDREN. A PRACTISING CATHOLIC. HAS MODERATE VIEWS ON NORTHERN IRELAND (PROTESTANT MOTHER). NOT AN AUTOMATIC SUPPORTER OF BRITISH OR US POLICIES AND INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS THIRD COUNTRIES. A CRITIC OF MULDOON'S POLICY OF TOTAL SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN AT THE TIME OF THE FALKLANDS. BASICALLY A NEW-ZEALAND-FIRSTER WITH JUST A WHIFF OF THE ISOLATIONIST ABOUT HIM.

NORRISH, MERVYN (MERV)

Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Born 1926 Ashburton. First Class honours degree in French, Canterbury University. Joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1949 and served in Wellington, Paris and New York before being appointed in June 1967 Ambassador to Belgium and Head of the New Zealand Mission to the European Communities. Deputy High Commissioner, London, 1972-73. Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs 1973. New Zealand Ambassador in Washington 1978. Secretary of Foreign Affairs 1980.

Norrish is one of the ablest New Zealand diplomats of his generation as his appointment as Number 1 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the age of 53 suggests. He became much involved in the EEC negotiations and ably assisted the then Deputy Prime Minister, Jack Marshall, in discussions leading to the Luxembourg Protocol.

Norrish is amiable, relaxed, possesses abundant common sense and is friendly to the UK.

Married with two children. His wife, Françoise, of French extraction, is charming and personable. Both interested in modern painting.