

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Wed 4 July
10.30 - 11.00

June 14, 1979

The Honorable Margaret Thatcher, M. P.
Prime Minister
House of Commons
Westminster, England

VERY CONFIDENTIAL !!

Dear Mrs. Thatcher:

Our mutual friend, Bill Simon, has shared with me your concern about U.S. actions toward lifting sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

I write this letter to you, in strictest confidence, concerning several private conversations that I have had with President Carter, Secretary Vance and Mr. Brzezinski concerning this matter.

From those meetings and conversations, all of which occurred over the past week, I assure you that the President's private posture is quite different from his public one on this matter. I am convinced that what President Carter seeks is a graceful exit from his present policy, one which will cause as little offense to his anti-Rhodesia constituency as possible.

He has requested, affirmatively, my aid in this endeavor. I have offered my assistance to him.

As part of this process, which will lead to a lifting of sanctions by the United States at an early date, I have asked Mr. Muzorewa to visit the United States as my guest. During this visit, which will begin, officially, on July 9, Mr. Muzorewa will meet privately with President Carter, again at the President's request, conveyed through me to the Bishop on Friday of last week.

After that meeting, and hopefully in coordination with you and your government, President Carter will proceed to lift sanctions.

Needless to say, the President desires that the entire matter, most especially his involvement in it, remain in the strictest confidence.

To explain further to you the full scope and details of this activity, I seek the opportunity to meet with you at your convenience, sometime in the period July 4, 5, or 6. Again, because of the delicacy of the matter, I would desire that the meeting be completely private. There is a very important aspect of this matter in which you might wish to involve yourself, relating to Prime Minister Muzorewa's meeting with the President, which might lead to a highly satisfactory conclusion of the Rhodesian problem for all parties.

As you are no doubt aware, there is little support in Congress for the President's Rhodesia policy. On Tuesday, the Senate upheld, 52-41, a section of the defense procurement bill which mandates the lifting of sanctions upon enactment of the legislation. The informed opinion is that, when the House of Representatives acts upon the defense measure, it will accept the Senate provision. The date of enactment, and hence the mandatory lifting of sanctions, will depend upon when the bill is presented to the President for signature, and his decision to sign or to veto. Through parliamentary tactics, this decision can easily be postponed until after the meeting with Bishop Muzorewa.

No one other than your own good self knows the extent that I have been conferring with the President, and I assure you that no one will be informed by me that I have met with you. If you can find time in your schedule, I have reason to believe that the result will be quite substantive. I would appreciate it very much if your personal secretary could contact one of my aides, Dr. James Lucier or Mr. John Carbaugh, with a date and a time. (Our phone number is 202-224-6342.) No other details need be discussed on the telephone.

I note with great satisfaction the courage with which you are moving to implement your economic policies. The election of your government may well be the catalyst for the rescue of the West. I am very proud of you.

Sincerely,

Jesse Helms

to be emulated by other nations in Africa and the Third World? If the U.S. foreign policy possesses even the barest element of fairness and good faith, we must now do what we pledged to do when the Case-Javits amendment passed the Senate.

As Senators will recall, the Case-Javits amendment was an amendment to my proposal to lift sanctions within a specified time. The Senate accepted the compromise proposal worked out by Senators CASE and JAVITS. I have cooperated in good faith since that time to make certain that the U.S. commitment clearly stated in the terms of Case-Javits would be met.

Those terms have been met, Mr. President. They have been met.

I am troubled that our State Department has not followed suit. Since Case-Javits was signed into law by the President, it should have been a good-faith guideline for executive branch actions dealing with Rhodesia. The State Department's record, sad to say, falls short of good faith, let alone even a reasonable adherence to the commitment, explicit in Case-Javits.

BACKGROUND OF CASE-JAVITS

On June 28, 1978, I offered an amendment to the foreign relations authorization bill. This amendment sought to lift sanctions against Rhodesia until the end of fiscal year 1979. While the amendment was successfully tabled, the vote, 48 to 42 disclosed a degree of support for lifting sanctions that could not be ignored.

Subsequent to that, I asked Prime Minister Ian Smith if Bishop Muzorewa would be willing to come to the United States to present the Rhodesian case to the Congress. Smith consulted with Muzorewa; Muzorewa agreed to come.

Muzorewa spoke eloquently about the hopes and aspirations of the majority of Rhodesians. He emphasized that Rhodesians wanted a peaceful transfer of power from white to majority rule—via the ballot box, not with violence. He urged Congress to lift sanctions, so that Rhodesians might have hope, and positive incentives to participate in the electoral process.

On July 26, 1978, I moved again to attempt to lift sanctions, this time until the end of the year—as a trial period to assess the transitional government's good faith in moving toward open and free elections. The Case-Javits substitute to my amendment was supported by 59 Senators. A vote on a measure offered by Senator DANFORTH as an amendment to Case-Javits (in substance the amendment that I originally had offered) was taken. The Danforth-Helms amendment received 42 votes, and Case-Javits prevailed.

It is interesting that in these two votes, a total of 94 Senators went on record as favoring the lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia in some form or another.

Mr. President, a clear, unequivocal signal was sent to the State Department by the Senate that day. Unfortunately, if we are to judge by the subsequent actions by officials of the executive branch in general, and the State Department

By Mr. HELMS:

S. 996. A bill to amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1954 with respect to the enforceability of Executive orders which apply measures against Rhodesia; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA: IT IS TIME TO LIFT SANCTIONS

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, it is time to lift all sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

All conditions of the Case-Javits amendment have been met; the transitional government time and again has agreed to meet with the Patriotic Front, with every good faith attempt to conduct an all-parties conference arrogantly rebuffed by the Patriotic Front and its allies.

Moreover, Mr. President, the most free and open election in the history of the continent of Africa has just been concluded—despite efforts to frustrate it—with a 63-percent turnout at the polls.

So, Mr. President, how can the United States now refuse to normalize relations with the new government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia? What further excuse can be contrived as a basis for refusing to lift sanctions, and hold out the good-faith attempt by Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to set up a participatory democracy as an example

in particular, there was no inclination to abide by the Senate's wishes.

Following these efforts, after much wrangling with the Department of State, a visa was granted for Ian Smith to visit the United States. The Smith visit opened up a new chapter in Rhodesian-American relations. It was during this visit that Ian Smith and other members of the transitional government first agreed to attend an all-parties conference.

RHODESIA AGREES TO ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE

Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, Chief Chirau, and Mr. Sithole all visited the United States in early October of last year. It was a highly productive visit.

While here, Smith talked with many friends in the United States. Other members of the transitional government quickly came to agreement with Smith, and with Americans interested in a peaceful resolution to Rhodesia's problems. It was agreed that the transitional government should make clear its willingness to attend an all-parties conference without preconditions.

This information was communicated to the State Department, first under my direction, then by the transitional government members themselves.

When the willingness of the transitional government to attend an all-parties conference was transmitted to the State Department, the news was met with surprise and interest. It was even suggested, by one high ranking official at State—still basking in the euphoria of President Carter's Camp David success—that perhaps Camp David would serve as a good meeting place for such a conference.

I am informed that other places also were considered, including one site in New York.

All of this came to naught. State Department inquiries with Nkomo produced a negative response. Nor was Mugabe willing to meet.

Thus, as early as last October, the transitional government had indicated its willingness to attend an all-parties conference without preconditions. The Patriotic Front was not. This was acknowledged by the chairman of Africa Affairs Subcommittee last month, and has been acknowledged by members of the State Department on numerous occasions.

FREE AND OPEN ELECTIONS, INTERNATIONALLY OBSERVED

While the leaders of Rhodesia continued to remain open to an all-parties conference without precondition, they also proceeded with plans for free and open elections, with the participation of international observers, including a sizable corps of foreign press.

The elections were held last week. That they were, indeed, open and free is not in serious dispute. The newspapers have been filled with headlines about the freedom of the electoral process in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

The size of the turnout far exceeded any national election in our own 200-year-old history.

Surely all fair-minded Americans will now acknowledge that Rhodesia has be-

come a model for other African nations. Rhodesia's attempt to emulate the democratic process and tradition of our own country is commendable. Rhodesia, by these elections, has clearly become the most free and openly democratic nation on the African continent.

Thus, Mr. President, the time has come for the United States to lift sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and to normalize relations with this nation.

Now, Mr. President, there may be objections raised to lifting sanctions and normalizing relations with Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Some may question the continuing role of whites in the governmental process; or, the possibility of increased guerrilla activity—possibly with active Soviet participation.

But those concerns are irrelevant to our obligations to deal with Zimbabwe-Rhodesia fairly, and in good faith. This is a matter that I hope to explore in more detail at a later date.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

B. 998

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 is amended—

(1) by striking out the second and third sentences of subsection (a) and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "In recognition of the settlement of March 3, 1979, reached by leaders representing a majority of Rhodesians, and of the willingness of the transitional government established pursuant to such settlement to participate in and negotiate in good faith at an all-parties conference without preconditions, and of the government chosen by free elections held in April, 1979, and observed by international observers, no Executive order issued under this subsection may be enforceable after such elected government is installed;" and

(2) by striking out subsections (b) and (c).