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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 July 1979

*Dear Bryan,*

CALL BY SENATOR JESSE HELMS ON THE PRIME MINISTER, WEDNESDAY  
4 JULY

--- I enclose a brief on Rhodesia for the Prime Minister's  
use when receiving Senator Helms tomorrow.

As the background note makes clear, it is not at present thought likely that the Senate will succeed in its attempt to oblige the US Administration to lift sanctions before the autumn. Bishop Muzorewa will be having talks in Washington, probably on 10 July. We shall be letting the Americans have an account of Lord Harlech's discussions in Salisbury. Mr Vance will impress on Bishop Muzorewa the need to work with us - as the constitutionally responsible authority - to gain wider acceptance. It is not yet known whether Bishop Muzorewa will see President Carter.

*Yours etc*

*Paul*

(P Lever)

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10 Downing Street

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CALL BY SENATOR HELMS ON THE PRIME MINISTER : WEDNESDAY 4 JULY

RHODESIA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. The Rhodesian elections showed the extent of popular support for Bishop Muzorewa, and acceptance of a new form of government. Lord Boyd and others consider they were as free and fair as was possible in the circumstances. Our intention is to work with Bishop Muzorewa to achieve international acceptance. It is in western interests to support a moderate solution in Rhodesia.
2. But we have to carry other countries with us. Otherwise, there will be strong reactions in Africa and the Commonwealth and increased opportunities for Soviet and Cuban involvement.
3. Parliament is unlikely to renew sanctions in November. But we should try to build support for Bishop Muzorewa and bring Rhodesia to legal independence in such a way as to attract the widest possible acceptance among other western countries and the more moderate western states in Africa.
4. In Lord Harlech's talks with African leaders he found a widespread desire for a solution and a disposition to acknowledge that the situation had changed. But to gain wider acceptance a solution will have to stem from us, as the legal authority. It will probably also have to involve some improvements on the status quo, including the departure of Smith and <sup>possibly</sup> some improvements to the Constitution (though the changes should not go so far as to undermine white confidence).
5. Lord Harlech is discussing these reactions with Muzorewa. We hope that in Washington Senator Helms and others will impress on him that he can have confidence in our intentions; but that he must work with us and show the flexibility needed to win wider acceptance. If he just sits tight and waits for sanctions to be lifted, political support could drain away from him. There is a /real need



real need to exert his authority inside Rhodesia. We will be seeking to help him; but we cannot solve his problems for him. We hope that Muzorewa's friends in the United States will impress on him the need:

- (a) to show that he is in charge in Salisbury
- (b) to work closely with us to win wider acceptance (and thereby help to deprive the Patriotic Front of their backing).



## RHODESIA : BACKGROUND

1. The security situation remains difficult. The series of cross-border attacks carried out by the security forces before the elections against Patriotic Front bases in Zambia, Mozambique and Angola, and the mobilisation of all available manpower to protect the election, won the Rhodesians a respite. But, as General Walls has acknowledged, guerrilla activity is once again running at a high level, particularly that carried out by ZANU (Mugabe). The security forces are in control of the towns and the main European farming areas; but they cannot give full protection to the Tribal Trust Lands and lines of communication. The military stalemate will continue so long as the morale of Rhodesian whites and a high level of South African support are sustained. But the Rhodesians will not make significant military progress unless there are defections from ZANU and ZAPU. So far only a handful of guerrillas have taken up the offer of an amnesty.

2. To counter the resurgence of guerrilla activity, the security forces have resumed their cross-border attacks on Zambia and Mozambique. Bishop Muzorewa has presumably been consulted about the broad strategy, but may not have been involved in the decision to mount particular raids. The raids into Zambia on 26 June and 1 July have reduced the chances of a meeting between him and President Kaunda.

3. Within Rhodesia there is concern that hopes of a scaling down of the war with the transfer to an African-led Government have not been fulfilled. Bishop Muzorewa's supporters in the UANC are somewhat dissatisfied that he has not begun to pursue policies of his own. Sithole's 12 MPs are still refusing to take their seats in parliament; Chikerema's 7 MPs have been barred from doing so under a temporary court injunction. The UANC remains by far the largest party (with 44 seats). There is a clear need for more decisive leadership from Muzorewa.

/SENATOR HELMS



## SENATOR HELMS

4. Bishop Muzorewa will be visiting the USA from 7-11 July on the invitation of Senator Helms (Republican, North Carolina), who is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Helms has been one of the leading Congressional supporters of the internal settlement in Rhodesia. In July 1978 he arranged for Bishop Muzorewa to visit Washington. He was one of the signatories of the invitation to Mr Ian Smith and his colleagues in the transitional government to visit the United States in September 1978, and played a prominent part in the visit itself. In March 1979 Senator Helms was associated with an attempt in the Senate to lift sanctions immediately after the Rhodesian elections. There were reports from Salisbury that Senator Helms advised Mr Smith to stay on in the government (possibly to use his departure as a bargaining counter for the lifting of sanctions).

Flag A 5. Following the Rhodesian elections, Senator Helms introduced an amendment to lift US sanctions against Rhodesia without waiting for President Carter's "determination" on the Case/Javits amendment. A copy of the Senator's speech introducing the amendment is attached. He declared the Rhodesian election to have been the most free and open election in the history of Africa, and said that the terms of the Case/Javits amendment had been fulfilled. His amendment was subsequently overtaken by Senator Byrd's amendment to the Defence Authorisation Bill, which called for the lifting of sanctions by 30 June.

## CONGRESSIONAL ACTION OVER RHODESIA

Flag B 6. On 15 May the Senate approved by 75 votes to 19 a "sense of Congress" resolution, declaring that the Case/Javits conditions had been substantially complied with and that the President should determine as much within 10 days of the installation of the new government in Salisbury and should lift sanctions. The Presidential determination (text attached) followed on 7 June. On 13 June the Defence Authorisation Bill, incorporating Senator Byrd's amendment, was passed by the Senate.

/7.



7. The House of Representatives has not passed a similar amendment to the Defence Authorisation Bill. Instead, on 28 June, the House adopted by 350 votes to 37 Representative Solarz's Bill calling for the termination of sanctions on 15 October unless the President determined that it would be against US national interests to do so (Washington telegram no 1470). The Administration lobbied hard in support of Representative Solarz's bill.

8. The two Houses of Congress are thus in a stalemate over sanctions. The next stage is for each House to nominate members to represent it on a Conference Committee on the Defence Authorisation Bill. The composition of the Committee, which will deal not just with Rhodesia but with the Defence Bill as a whole, will influence the final outcome. On past form, the Committee is expected to adopt the lowest common denominator, and therefore to accept an amendment closer to Representative Solarz's bill than to the stronger measures in Senator Byrd's amendment. The final outcome is expected to be known before Congress rises in August. One possibility is that President Carter will be required to make a further determination by September or October, but that the conditions of the determination will be more stringent than those proposed by Representative Solarz. If the President vetoed the Bill, he would probably be able to muster enough support to prevent the Congress from overturning his veto.

#### MUZOREWA'S VISIT

9. Senator Helms will obviously wish to use Bishop Muzorewa's visit to convince the Congress and American public opinion that he deserves their full support. The US Administration will impress on Muzorewa the need to work closely with us - to achieve wider international acceptance. Even if the Senate succeeded in its attempts to force the Administration to lift sanctions (which is now unlikely, at any rate before the autumn), the Administration would not be prepared to recognize Bishop Muzorewa's government on the basis of the status quo.

Rhodesia Department

3 July 1979

BF 2/7/79



USA

10 DOWNING STREET

MR. CARTLEDGE

I have put Jesse Helms in the diary for Wednesday 4 July from 10.30 a.m. until 11.00 a.m. I have not specified who is coming. It simply says "keep free, ask CS". Is it alright for his name to go in? And is any briefing required?

(cs)

22 June 1979

Briefing requested  
by 1700 on 2 July.  
B/F Her. Col 20/6