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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Annie Minister

Paul

28 February 1980

Dear Michael,

Visit of the President of Cyprus: 29 February

With my letter of 25 February I sent you briefing for President Kyprianou's visit. Since then (on 25 February itself) the Ambassador at Ankara has spoken to the Turkish Government to impress on them that the British Government favour an early resumption of intercommunal talks on Cyprus and to advocate greater flexibility on the part of the Turkish side in discussions of formulae with the UN. The same point was made on 26 February to the Turkish Embassy in London, in particular that there was no merit in trying to pre-negotiate the Secretary-General's opening statement at the resumed talks. Meanwhile, Dr Waldheim has made no request for further British intervention.

All the foregoing points could be made to Mr Kyprianou.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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28 FEB 1960, 1960.



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

26 February 1980

As
Paul
26/2

Dear Michael,

Visit of President Kyprianou

As requested in your letter of 11 January to Roderic Lyne, I enclose briefs for the Prime Minister's use during her meeting with President Kyprianou of Cyprus at 12.00 on Friday 29 February.

The briefs are somewhat long and detailed. But President Kyprianou is likely to expect a detailed discussion and some of the issues involved may not be familiar to the Prime Minister who, apart from a short meeting with President Kyprianou at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka in August 1979, has not hitherto been involved in the Cyprus problem.

Briefs Nos 1 and 3 refer at various points to the important British interests in the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs).

* Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4)
(Wayland, 15 July 2014) * Further briefing
on this subject, if required, is available from the FCO or the Ministry of Defence.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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BRIEF NO 1

VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS: 29 FEBRUARY 1980

Objectives

- (i) Maintain good relations with a fellow Commonwealth Head of Government, in order to protect important British interests in Cyprus;
- (ii) Encourage a constructive Greek Cypriot attitude over the intercommunal dispute and discourage the establishment of a new UN Committee on Cyprus;
- (iii) Stress British goodwill towards the Greek Cypriots but discourage ideas of a 'British initiative' to gang up on the Turks;
- (iv) (Defensive). Promote realism over absurd Cypriot aid claims in respect of Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs).

Cypriot Objectives

- (i) Seek general British support for the Greek Cypriot case in the light of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot intransigence;
- (ii) Secure agreement to put pressure on the Turks to accept Greek Cypriot ideas on the conduct of intercommunal talks;
- (iii) Press Cyprus Government aid claims in respect of SBAs.

Background and Tactics

2. The visit is at President Kyprianou's initiative; every 18 months or so he invites himself to the main Western European capitals to canvass support for the Greek Cypriot cause. He will have seen President Giscard on 28 February and is going on to Rome after a weekend in London with the Greek Cypriot community; he may then visit Bonn but Chancellor Schmidt is reportedly reluctant to see him because of his recent acceptance of an invitation to visit East Germany officially (there has, however, been a recent visit to Bonn by the Director General of the Cyprus Foreign Ministry).

/3.



3. President Kyprianou will probably wish to expound at length the Greek Cypriot ideas for the conduct and content of intercommunal talks, already outlined to Lord Carrington by the Cyprus Foreign Minister on 8 February. He will be looking for a commitment to put pressure on Turkey to make the Turkish Cypriots accept his ideas and, in particular, accept Dr Waldheim's most recent proposals for restarting the talks.
4. The President shows little inclination to adopt realistic policies in search of a settlement of the Cyprus problem. He relies largely on international pressure, eg through the UN General Assembly resolutions the passage of which annually disrupts intercommunal contacts, to force the Turkish Army to leave Cyprus. He has tended to backtrack on Makarios's commitment to a bizonal solution, and still talks of "'safeguards'" for the Turkish "'minority'" in a State the Government of which would be dominated by the Greek Cypriots. He harbours illusions that the mass of Turkish Cypriots would welcome him as the President of all Cypriots if Mr Denktash and the Turkish Army would let them.
5. President Kyprianou's domestic position is weak. He relies heavily on a left-wing coalition in which the Communists are strong. They and moderates such as Foreign Minister Rolandis advocate realism and flexibility in negotiation with the Turkish Cypriots. But there is strong resistance to concessions from the nationalistic left and right wings and particularly from the Cyprus Orthodox Church. And the "'refugee'" lobbies, with particular interests over the contents of any settlement, are influential.
6. Apart from the general British concern for peace in Cyprus and a settlement of Graeco/Turkish differences, the main British interest is in the facilities in the SBAs; they are physically located largely in the Greek Cypriot sector. Their effective use depends much more on the Greek than the Turkish Cypriots.
7. It is desirable that the President, who is vain, should be satisfied that he received a patient and sympathetic hearing for his complaints about the Turks and advocacy of his preferred solutions both to the short term problem of getting worthwhile talks resumed and to the overall Cyprus problem. He will expect _____ /at



at least that from a Guarantor Power with strong historical and cultural links. He should be encouraged to be realistic and advised against establishing a new UN Committee on Cyprus; but there is little object in pressing him really hard since the Turkish side is very unlikely to show flexibility in the near future; modest progress might be made but a real breakthrough is improbable.

Cyprus Problem (Brief No 2)

8. Mr Rolandis told Lord Carrington this was the "only subject" Mr Kyprianou wished to discuss. The Greek Cypriots are making the most of being the "reasonable" side at present, having accepted the latest Waldheim initiative whilst the Turkish Cypriots continue to stall. But grave doubts remain about Greek Cypriot willingness to make the concessions essential if a settlement was to be reached. The truth is that both sides are unreasonable and inflexible and, even if talks restarted, the prospects for real progress would be poor.

9. Longer-term prospects for a settlement are also poor, barring favourable conjuncture: ie a strong Turkish Government prepared to push the Turkish Cypriots, a strong and moderate Greek Cypriot Government and a helpful line from Athens. At present only the third element is present. Britain can live with the existing reasonably stable de facto situation, which offers little current threat to the SBAs; but a settlement is highly desirable in the interests of stability in Greek-Turkish relations.

Varosha

10. There have been reports that the Turkish Cypriots intend to open up hotels in the "sealed-off" area of Varosha, former Greek Cypriot resort quarter of Famagusta, under Turkish military control since 1974. This may be only a tactical move to put pressure on the Greek Cypriots over intercommunal talks; it seems to have succeeded. Recovery of Varosha has assumed high symbolic importance for the Greek Cypriots, who want talks to open with agreement to return it in exchange for economic concessions to the Turkish Cypriots (see Brief No 2).



11. Strong UK and other Western representations have been made to the Turkish Government and Turkish Cypriots warning against action likely to jeopardise the talks; Greek Cypriots have been told of these representations. Turkish Cypriot action on Varosha would, however, be likely if at Greek Cypriot instigation a UN Committee on Cyprus was established (Brief No 2).

Cypriot Aid Claims (Brief No 3)

12. Mr Kyprianou discussed payments for the SBAs with the Prime Minister at Lusaka in August 1979 and may return to the charge. He wants £200-300 million. There is nothing new to say; it is as well to discourage any hope that more aid will be forthcoming and to persuade the Cypriots that neither side has anything to gain from public acrimony.

Afghanistan

13. Cyprus abstained in disreputable company on the 14 January General Assembly resolution on Soviet intervention, and again on the 14 February resolution in the UN Human Rights Commission. The Cyprus Government say that they cannot afford to alienate Soviet bloc support for their case at the UN, which they claim the Soviets threatened to withdraw. They also argue that their abstention was a protest at Western failure to condemn Turkey's invasion and occupation of Cyprus since 1974. Lord Carrington told Mr Rolandis on 8 February that he would be ill-advised to rely heavily on Eastern bloc support; the price is enforced isolation from non-aligned and Western friends. The Turkey parallel is misleading and irrelevant.

EC/Cyprus Relations

14. The Cyprus Government are pressing for early implementation of Stage II of the EC/Cyprus Association Agreement, envisaging a customs union. Talks about the content of Stage II are to start shortly; Stage I has meanwhile been extended for a further transitional period until December 1980. The UK has given consistent general support, and will continue to do so, while maintaining that the benefits of EC association must go to both communities. Obstruction is likely from producers of rival agricultural produce within the Community (France, Italy).

/University Fees

University Fees

15. The recent decision to increase to full cost the fees for overseas students at UK higher education institutions has drawn strong Cypriot protests, some at high official level. The Cypriots argue that their students suffer particularly because there is no university in Cyprus and their educational system is strongly UK-orientated. They also say more Cypriot students will go to Eastern Europe, with consequent damage to Western interests; and the common English language/culture is important to reconciliation with the Turkish Cypriots. But they have been told that the decision is firm: there is no prospect of reversal or special treatment for Cyprus.

UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

16. The UK contribution costs £5.5 million per annum in addition to the basic cost of troops' pay. [NOT FOR USE] We are seeking a review by troop contributors. The Greek Cypriots are sensitive to tampering with UNFICYP, which reassures them in face of the Turkish Army and is economically convenient.

Southern European Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
25 February 1980



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BRIEF NO 2

VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS: 29 FEBRUARY 1980

CYPRUS PROBLEM

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Welcome Greek Cypriot acceptance of latest Waldheim proposals for resumption of intercommunal talks; Turkish Cypriots should follow suit. British Government prepared in principle to support Waldheim, eg in speaking to Turkish side (and has told him so). But Cyprus Government themselves make the point that the initiative must remain with the UN.

2. Britain conscious of responsibilities: Guarantor Power, historical links, long and close association. Willingness to help but important not to cut across UN. Hope Cyprus Government will always keep in close touch: be frank with each other even when we disagree.

3. Question utility of further internationalising the dispute. UN General Assembly resolutions little real help. Establishment of a General Assembly Committee on Cyprus particularly unhelpful. Cuba a member? Scope for mischief making. Likely to kill Waldheim initiative and would doubtless provoke Turks to open Varosha hotels.

4. Important to be realistic about what the other side will accept, eg in terms of a quid pro quo for concessions on Varosha: unlikely to give it up except as part of an overall settlement package.

5. Time not on the side of those who genuinely want a settlement. Need for flexibility on both sides. Turks unlikely to look at anything which does not give them complete control of security in their own region; bound to mean restrictions in practice on freedom of movement/settlement, at least initially.

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/BACKGROUND



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BACKGROUND

6. Turkish Cypriots (18% of population), maltreated 1963-74, occupy 40% of the island since 1974 invasion, since when de facto partition. The Greek Cypriots have made a remarkable economic recovery. _____

7. Various attempts have been made to promote a negotiated intercommunal settlement. Intercommunal talks have been intermittent and made little progress. In 1978 the US, UK and Canada tabled compromise proposals for resumed negotiation in the form of a framework for a settlement. The Greek Cypriot (who now rather wish they had not) rejected it but the UN was then able to take up the running. In May 1979 they eventually got President Kyprianou and Mr Denktash to meet and agree to resume intercommunal talks. Talks were interrupted after only four meetings, the Turkish Cypriots insisting on first clarifying the concepts of 'bizonality' and 'security'. (these terms both mean in practice Turkish Cypriot determination to protect themselves from the harassment which they faced between 1963 and 1974). UN efforts to restart the talks were hampered by the annual campaign by the Greek Cypriots to drum up international support, starting in Lusaka (mildly pro-Greek Cypriot passage in communiqué) and culminating in the UN General Assembly's strongly pro-Greek Cypriot resolution. This implied that sanctions should be imposed on Turkey, called for the demilitarisation of 'Cyprus' (which would mean not just the Republic but SBAs as well) and provided for a General Assembly Committee if progress was not reported before 31 March. All Western countries (and all UNFICYP troop contributors) except Greece abstained; the UK and many others voted against the Committee. The Turks were indignant, alleging violation of Point 6 of the Kyprianou/Denktash May 1979 agreement, which outlawed action which might jeopardise the talks. But political instability in Turkey and Mr Denktash's own very negative approach were nonetheless major constraints on progress.

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8. Recently there have been signs of a more constructive Greek Cypriot attitude, possibly influenced by Turkish Cypriot threats to reopen hotels in Varosha, the sealed-off former Greek Cypriot resort quarter of Famagusta now under Turkish military control. Mr Kyprianou in January announced 'conciliatory' measures (eg payments of pensions to Turkish Cypriots who had paid in to the State scheme); the Cyprus Government have now confirmed their willingness to resume talks on the basis of a 'non-formula' proposed by the UN. Turkish Cypriot reactions so far have been negative, particularly concerning the proposed opening statement by the UN at the talks, which is not being cleared textually with either side in advance. But Mr Denktash has not rejected a resumption; he and Ankara are likely to stall to avoid being blamed for intransigence.

9. In New York and Washington, and subsequently with Lord Carrington, Mr Rolandis recently canvassed Greek Cypriot ideas for handling the talks. The main (and to Turkish Cypriots most objectionable) feature is that talks should open with a prenegotiated exchange: the Greek Cypriots getting Varosha in return for various forms of aid for the Turkish Cypriots, and possibly the reopening of Nicosia airport. None of these are likely in Turkish Cypriot eyes to compensate for Varosha, which is the main card which they have to play in the overall negotiation and which has considerable symbolic importance for both sides. And Mr Rolandis' suggestion implies either naivety or another deliberate effort to prevent progress while appearing 'reasonable'.

10. Mr Kyprianou will look for commitments to press the Turkish side and may suggest that Western aid to Turkey should be used as a lever. Western Governments have said that they are prepared in principle to use their influence to support the UN initiative. As the US arms embargo in 1975/78 showed, however, the Turks fiercely resent linkage between their relations with the West and the Cyprus problem; the present political situation in Turkey inhibits the Turkish Government from anything other than a cautious policy on Cyprus. But we do point out to both sides the drawbacks of incurring blame

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for lack of progress; linkage of a sort, albeit tenuous, does exist.

11. If talks do not resume within 4-6 weeks, the Greek Cypriots will be tempted to try to get a UN General Assembly Committee set up to 'assist' Dr Waldheim. It would consist of non-aligned countries and doubtless include Cuba. Mischief-making would result. But the Turkish Government are determined not to yield to unwarranted UN resolutions: their response might be the opening of hotels in Varosha and even threats of UDI: the Waldheim initiative would probably not survive.

Southern European Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
25 February 1980

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VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS: 29 FEBRUARY 1980

AID TO CYPRUS: 'APPENDIX R'

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Aware that our interpretation of UK aid obligations differs from yours. But no prospect whatever of demands for £200 million or more being met. No advantage to either side in public acrimony or in raising unrealistic expectations.
2. Best to concentrate on signing and finding projects for the use of the £7.5 million loan offered in 1978.
3. Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) make a substantial contribution to the economy of the Republic. Appreciate Cyprus Government cooperation over SBAs; understand the pressures on you; but public controversy best avoided.

BACKGROUND

4. Under Appendix 'R' of 1960 Treaty, the UK undertook to provide £12 million over 5 years to 1965, and to consult thereafter before determining the amount of further aid. 1965-78 no aid was offered except technical assistance and refugee relief, because of difficulty of ensuring that aid would get to both communities. The Cyprus Government intermittently claim £200-300 million in aid and for 'use of the bases' and certain facilities in the Republic. The UK considers its aid obligations discharged and does not accept any obligation for payments for the bases, which are sovereign British territory retained after independence in 1960. Services provided are paid for (and spending in Cyprus runs at some £40 million pa). Greek Cyprus has a relatively high GNP per head and is not 'aid-worthy'. Nonetheless in 1978 a £7.5 million soft loan was offered for projects benefiting both communities; the Cyprus Government accepted in principle, reserving its position over larger claims. The loan agreement has not yet been signed and no specific projects for its use have been



agreed.

5. In June 1979 the Cyprus Foreign Minister proposed a joint committee to study the question and undertook to submit a memorandum outlining Cypriot claims. Following further discussion of the subject at Lusaka CHGM between the Prime Minister and President Kyprianou, the High Commissioner replied to Mr Rolandis: no further aid was possible in the present economic climate; he suggested that priority be given to concluding the £7.5 million loan agreement. The Cypriot memorandum has not yet been received (and is not wanted!).

6. The Cyprus Government's periodic revival of this question is usually influenced by intermittent left-wing Greek Cypriot campaigns against the SBAs. There is little such pressure at present and the Cypriots are apparently content to play the matter long. And they are generally cooperative over the SBAs, which are located in the southern (Greek Cypriot) part of Cyprus and depend on Cyprus Government goodwill. But recent renewed anti-SBA noises by Mr Denktash may have made Mr Kyprianou nervous that his 'non-aligned' clothes are being stolen and he may be tempted to use the opportunity of his London visit to revive the question.

7. The SBA facilities are of great importance to Britain. There is no intention to withdraw. But the Cyprus Government may not be sure what pressure it would be safe to exert. The SBAs are no longer of vital economic importance but the Cyprus Government must know that, if Britain pulled out of either, the Turks would not just stand back and let the Greek Cypriots take over.

Southern European Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
25 February 1980

CYPRUS: VITAL STATISTICS

1. Population and Land Area (whole island)

(a) Land Area	9251 km ²
(b) Population	670,000
	(approx 550,000 Greek-Cypriots)
	(approx 120,000 Turkish-Cypriots)

2. Basic Statistics

<u>Gross National Product</u>	<u>1978</u>
(a) Total	1,370 US \$m
(b) Growth Rate (1974-77 GK/CY Part)	12.86%
(c) Per Capita	2,110 US \$

3. Trade with UK

	<u>1978</u>	%
Exports to UK	22.5	
Imports from UK	22.1	

	<u>1979</u>
Total Value of Exports to UK	120.1*
Real Growth of Exports (five years ending 1978)	2.3% pa
Position in UK's Export League Table	51 (of 150)

* preliminary

PRIANOU, SPYROS

* ~ * Passage deleted and temporarily retained under Section 3(4)
(Wayland, 15 July 2014)

President of the Republic of Cyprus since 1977.

Born 1932. Educated locally and then in London; Barrister (Gray's Inn). Represented Makarios in London, 1952-54; 1955-59 Representative of the Ethnarchy Council and the principal EOKA contact in London 1955-59. Returned to Cyprus and, on Independence was briefly Minister of Justice, then Minister of Foreign Affairs. Serious heart attack in March 1969. He resigned, very reluctantly, in 1972 after pressure from the Greek Military Government; but remained close to the Archbishop.

As Foreign Minister he was a leading advocate of a tough policy and no concessions to the Turks. Very much at home in the UN, where he conducted the Cyprus case skilfully, paying particular attention to the non-aligned. In his dealings with the West he was often prickly, stubborn, and narrowly legalistic.

In May 1976 Kyprianou launched a new pro-Makarios party of the Centre-Right, the Democratic Front, to fight the House of Representatives elections; the electoral coalition which he formed with the Communist party, AKEL, and the extreme left-wing party EDEK, polled three-quarters of the votes cast. Appointed President of the House, he thus became Acting President on the death of Makarios on 3 August 1977. Elected second President of the Republic of Cyprus by acclaim on 31 August 1977, following the agreement of all political parties, in the cause of 'national unity', not to oppose him. Re-elected unopposed for full 5-year term in February 1978.

Kyprianou's performance as President has been weak and indecisive. He has lost the confidence of some important elements in his party due to his handling of affairs since becoming President, most recently when he failed in August 1979 to reshuffle his Cabinet to weaken the Left-Wing influence there. Lacking personal support he tries to proceed by consensus and this inevitably lays him open to Right-Wing charges of being a prisoner of the Left.

* ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
* In 1976 he was taken ill several times and in 1977 some doubted that he could survive the physical strains of being President. Married with 2 sons. Speaks English well.

ROLANDIS, NICOS A

Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1978.

Born Limassol 1934. Educated locally and in London (Middle Temple); Barrister 1956. Practised law in Cyprus before turning to business and becoming the Managing Director and major shareholder in one of the biggest industrial groups in Cyprus.

Kyprianou probably chose Rolandis as a loyal supporter who would carry out orders rather than himself shape foreign policy. But Rolandis, who has shown a mind of his own, privately gives every sign of supporting a realistic solution to the intercommunal problem. But in the last resort Rolandis, a relative newcomer to politics, does not carry sufficient weight to persuade Kyprianou to change his mind on fundamental issues.

Markedly more pro-Western than Kyprianou, he has been actively reforming the Cyprus Diplomatic Service.

Speaks English fluently. Married, two daughters and one son.

PELAGHIAS, GEORGIOS

Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1975).

Born 1924, of a wealthy landowning family. Educated locally and at Athens University (Law); Barrister (Gray's Inn). 1956-7 acted as a go-between for Grivas and Harding, but then moved to Athens; became member of the Greek Diplomatic Service. 1959 returned to Nicosia and joined the Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1962-9 Chief of Protocol.

A trusted confidant of Archbishop Makarios, from whom he took his line.

Married. 1 child. Speaks good English. Friendly in manner and basically pro-West. Said to have handled some of Makarios' private business and affairs. Amusing, salacious.

PANAYIDES, TASSOS CHR

High Commissioner for Cyprus in London since 1979.

Born 1934. Educated in Cyprus; diploma in Education at London University (British Council Scholarship). Worked in Cyprus as a teacher 1959-60. Appointed to President Makarios' Office in 1960; Director 1963-69. Ambassador in Bonn 1969-1978.

Courteous and intelligent; but he has not made great mark as High Commissioner. Much of his energies are devoted to the large Cypriot community in Britain.

Married with three children. Speaks good English.

VISIT OF H E PRESIDENT SPYROS KYPRIANOU,

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS:

28 FEBRUARY - 4 MARCH, 1980

Miss Stephens
Hf.
Miss

NOTE: This is a private visit and the Cyprus High Commission will be arranging much of the programme for the visit, including engagements with the Cypriot community and a press conference.

Accompanying President Kyprianou will be:

Mr Nicos Rolandis - Foreign Minister
Mr George Pelagias - Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr H Vovides - Director of the President's Office

Thursday, 28 February

Arrival at Heathrow Airport by flight BA319 from Paris (De Havilland VIP Suite)

1730 hrs

Doors Open.

Met by:

The Lord Hamilton of Dalzell, MC, Lord-in-Waiting to Her Majesty The Queen;

H E Mr Tasos Panayides, High Commissioner for Cyprus;

Sir John Stow GCMG, KCVO, the Special Representative of the Secretary of State

Leave for the Grosvenor House Hotel, Park Lane, W1

Friday, 29 February

1200 hrs

Call on the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP, at No 10 Downing Street

1300 hrs

Lunch at No 10 Downing Street, hosted by the Prime Minister

Monday, 3 March

Private: The Cypriot High Commission are arranging a lunch for UK press at Grosvenor House.

/Tuesday,

Tuesday, 4 March

Departure by flight BA502 for Rome.

At the De Havilland suite the following will bid farewell:

Sir Donald Logan, Special Representative of the Secretary of State;

H E Mr Tasos Panayides, High Commissioner for Cyprus;

The Lord Somerleyton, Lord-in-Waiting to Her Majesty The Queen

0855 hrs

Doors Close.

USEFUL TELEPHONE NUMBERS

Cyprus High Commission	-	499 8272
Grosvenor House Hotel	-	499 6363
Protocol & Conference Department, FCO (Inward Visits)	-	233 5016
News Department, FCO	-	233 8618/3191
Lord Hamilton of Dalzell	-	0483 892002
Lord Somerleyton	-	821 0496
Sir John Stow	-	370 1921
Sir Donald Logan	-	589 4010
London Heathrow Airport, Special Facilities	-	759 7146

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