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TO ROUTINE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 58 OF 20 JUNE 1980

MADRID CSCE REVIEW MEETING

1. AS AGREED AT THE FIRST CSCE REVIEW MEETING AT BELGRADE IN 1978 (CMD 7126), A SECOND MEETING WILL BEGIN IN MADRID ON 11 NOVEMBER (WITH A PREPARATORY ORGANISATIONAL MEETING TO BEGIN ON 9 SEPTEMBER). THE PURPOSE OF THIS GUIDANCE IS TO GIVE POSTS THE GENERAL LINE ON HMG'S APPROACH TO THE MADRID MEETING, FOR USE AS THE SUBJECT ARISES IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE DISCUSSION.

LINE TO TAKE

2. (A) THE CSCE REVIEW PROCESS HAS VALUE IN FOLLOWING UP THE SATISFACTORY FRAMEWORK FOR RELATIONS IN EUROPE ESTABLISHED, ON PAPER, IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IN 1975 (CMD 6198). WE WISH TO MAINTAIN BOTH THE FRAMEWORK AND THE REVIEW PROCESS.

(B) THE MADRID MEETING MUST BE SEEN AND CONDUCTED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE TIME. IT CANNOT BE ISOLATED FROM THE TENSION CAUSED BY THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. SO LONG AS THIS CONTINUES, THERE CANNOT BE BUSINESS AS USUAL AT MADRID (THE SOVIET AIM), AS IF DETENTE HAD BEEN UNAFFECTED.

(C) THE EMPHASIS AT MADRID MUST LIE ON THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. RESPECT FOR THE TEN QUOTE PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES UNQUOTE IS FUNDAMENTAL. SUCCESS AT MADRID IS NOT TO BE MEASURED BY THE NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS ADOPTED OSTENSIBLY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF DETENTE BUT WITHOUT REGARD TO THEIR RELEVANCE IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

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/ (D) WE INTEND,

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32625 - 1

(D) WE INTEND, SUBJECT TO DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS BETWEEN NOW AND MADRID AND DURING THE MEETING, TO WORK FOR A MANDATE ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR NEW CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (COMS) WHICH WOULD MAKE A GENUINE CONTRIBUTION TO MILITARY SECURITY IN EUROPE: AND TO SEEK IMPROVEMENTS PARTICULARLY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI PROVISIONS CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN CONTACTS AND INFORMATION.

ADDITIONAL POINTS (TO BE DRAWN ON FREELY

3. THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN ABOUT THE SCOPE AND MEANING OF DETENTE MUST BE FACED AT MADRID, IF THE CSCE REVIEW PROCESS IS TO REMAIN CREDIBLE. IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT (END OF THE SECTION ON PRINCIPLES), THE PARTICIPATING STATES DECLARED THEIR INTENTION TO CONDUCT THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES IN THE SPIRIT OF THE PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN THEMSELVES. BUT THIS PROVISION IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE FACTS THEMSELVES IN DEMONSTRATING THE LINK BETWEEN SOVIET BEHAVIOUR IN OTHER AREAS AND THE DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE WHICH CAN BE SUSTAINED IN EUROPE.

4. WE INTEND TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES FRANKLY BUT WITHOUT UNNECESSARY POLEMICS. WE HAVE NO DESIRE OURSELVES TO RAISE TENSION. WE WANT A SOUNDLY-BASED DETENTE. WE HOPE THAT THE TREATMENT OF THESE ISSUES IN THE CSCE CONTEXT AT MADRID (AND IN THE RUN-UP TO IT) WILL CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS SOVIET RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL RESTORE AFGHANISTAN TO GENUINE INDEPENDENCE.

5. THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION AT MADRID SHOULD COVER ALL FIELDS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, INCLUDING RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (PRINCIPLE VII) AND THE BASKET III CHAPTERS ON HUMAN CONTACTS AND INFORMATION. THIS HUMAN DIMENSION OF DETENTE IS OF LONG-TERM IMPORTANCE AS WELL AS BEING OF IMMEDIATE POLITICAL AND PUBLIC INTEREST. OUR OBJECTIVE IS NOT THE SHORT-TERM

CONFIDENTIAL

32625 - 1

TRANSFORMATION OF COMMUNIST SYSTEMS OF SOCIETY. BY HOLDING TO THE CONTENTS OF PRINCIPLE VII, THE CSCE PROCESS CAN BE USED TO TRY TO ENCOURAGE THE CURRENT OF CHANGE IN THOSE SOCIETIES IN THE DIRECTION OF LIBERALISATION, AND TO COUNTER TENDENCIES (EVIDENT AT THE MOMENT IN SOME COUNTRIES) TO RESORT TO REPRESSION. AT THE SAME TIME, MODEST PRACTICAL IMPROVEMENTS MAY BE SECURED THROUGH PROVISIONS ON HUMAN CONTACTS (EG OVER REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES) AND INFORMATION (EG OVER THE WORKING CONDITIONS OF JOURNALISTS). OUR PROPOSALS WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARDS THESE REALISTIC ENDS.

6. AT HELSINKI THE PARTICIPATING STATES ALLOWED FOR THE REVIEW PROCESS TO INCLUDE NEW PROPOSALS QUOTE ON THE DEEPENING OF THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, THE IMPROVEMENT OF SECURITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION IN EUROPE, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IN THE FUTURE UNQUOTE. WE WOULD WISH EVENTUALLY TO SEE BALANCED PROGRESS ON THESE LINES IN ALL THE FIELDS COVERED BY THE FINAL ACT. BUT THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE AT BELGRADE, AND THE PROSPECTS AT A TIME WHEN EXISTING COMMITMENTS ARE NOT BEING HONOURED SEEM NO MORE ENCOURAGING FOR MADRID. IT WOULD DO THE CSCE PROCESS NO GOOD IF CONSENSUS WERE SOUGHT ON A RANGE OF NEW PROPOSALS OR ACTIVITIES (EG FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS OF EXPERTS) WHICH LACKED SUBSTANCE AND CONTRIBUTED TO NOTHING BUT THE APPEARANCE OF BUSINESS AS USUAL. NEW PROPOSALS AT MADRID SHOULD BE SEEN TO BEAR A REALISTIC RELATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AT THE TIME. THEY SHOULD BE BOTH SUBSTANTIAL AND DEMONSTRABLY IN THE WEST'S INTEREST.

7. EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN HAVE MADE THE SOVIET DECLARATORY APPROACH TO THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY (UNDER THE PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE ON MILITARY DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE) EVEN LESS ACCEPTABLE THAN BEFORE. THEY HAVE ALSO HIGHLIGHTED THE LIMITED VALUE (NEVER MORE THAN POLITICAL) OF THE EXISTING MILITARY CBMS, AND THE FACT THAT THE PRINCIPAL CBM IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES, APPLIES ONLY TO THE WESTERN 250 KM

CONFIDENTIAL

22625 - 1

OF SOVIET TERRITORY. NATO COUNTRIES HAVE AGREED (DEC 1979 COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE) QUOTE TO WORK TOWARDS THE ADOPTION DURING THE MADRID MEETING, AS PART OF A BALANCED OUTCOME, OF A MANDATE FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE CSCE ON MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, APPLICABLE TO THE ENTIRE CONTINENT OF EUROPE UNQUOTE IE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. THIS WILL BE A GOOD TEST OF THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO DETENTE.

FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION

8. (FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION) AS THROUGHOUT THE CSCE PROCESS, WE INTEND TO WORK IN THE CLOSEST CONCERT WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE NINE AND OUR ALLIES IN NATO. POLITICAL EVENTS (EG THE GERMAN AND US ELECTIONS), COMBINED WITH SOME DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH TO EAST/WEST RELATIONS AT THIS TIME, MAY MAKE THIS MORE DIFFICULT THAN USUAL. RECONSIDERATION, IN THE LIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN, OF EARLIER PREPARATORY WORK FOR MADRID HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED. THIS GUIDANCE SHOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY RELEVANT COMMUNIQUEES OF THE NINE AND OF NATO AS THESE APPEAR.

9. WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THE US CONTINUES TO HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF A CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) AS PROPOSED BY FRANCE. THE ALLIANCE HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN MAKING CONSIDERABLE USE OF FRENCH IDEAS FOR A PHASE I CONFERENCE CONCERNING CBMS IN FORMULATING ITS APPROACH TO MADRID. THE UK SUPPORTS A FIRST PHASE CONFERENCE (ON THE BASIS OF THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 7 ABOVE) BUT WE HAVE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH FRENCH IDEAS FOR A SECOND PHASE WHICH ENVISAGES THE NEGOTIATION OF DISARMAMENT MEASURES. THESE RESERVATIONS ARE SHARED BY THE FRG IN ADDITION TO THE AMERICANS.

10. HOWEVER, AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR POLICY IS TO KEEP FRENCH IDEAS UNDER CONTROL BY INCORPORATING THEM IN A COMMON ALLIANCE POLICY. MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE IN NATO ON THE OUTLINE PACKAGE OF NEW CBMS WE SHOULD SEEK AND ON THE TERMS OF THE MANDATE FOR A POSSIBLE CONFERENCE ON CBMS TO BE PROPOSED AT

CONFIDENTIAL

32625 - 1

MADRID. HOWEVER, WE CAN EXPECT THE WARSAW PACT AND NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED (THE LATTER PROPOSE THE MODIFICATION OF EXISTING CBMS, WHICH WOULD OFFER THE RUSSIANS A SOFT OPTION) TO TAKE THE LEAD ON THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY AT MADRID. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE EAST REMAIN DEMANDEURS ON THIS ISSUE. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS A RISK THAT CONCENTRATION ON THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS IN THIS FIELD DURING THE EARLY STAGES AT MADRID WILL DISTRACT ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE NEED FOR BETTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI PRINCIPLES AND CONTINUING EMPHASIS ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF DETENTE.

CARRINGTON

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