

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 900
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 180930Z

FM WASHINGTON 180040Z DEC 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4957 OF 18 DECEMBER

Read in full

FOLLOWING FOR P U S

1. THE FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGED FROM THE TALK I HAD TODAY WITH RICHARD ALLEN.

HIS OWN STATUS

2. ALLEN TOLD ME THAT HE WAS GOING TO BE APPOINTED NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THOUGH THIS WAS NOT YET PUBLIC. HE SAW THE ROLE AS BEING DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IT WAS UNDER HIS PREDECESSORS. THERE WOULD BE NO BIFURCATION OF FOREIGN POLICY. THIS MEANT THAT HE WOULD BE LESS ACCESSIBLE TO FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES. HE WOULD ALSO BE KEEPING A LOW PUBLIC PROFILE. HE HAD NO PARTICULAR WISH TO LEAVE PRIVATE LIKE AND TAKE ON THE JOB. HE WOULD WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH HAIG. THEIR RELATIONS WERE EXCELLENT. HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT HAIG WAS GOING TO HAVE QUITE A TOUGH TIME SECURING CONFIRMATION. THE CONFIRMATION HEARINGS WHICH WERE DUE TO BEGIN ON 9 JANUARY COULD GO ON FOR QUITE A LONG TIME WHICH WOULD MEAN IN PRACTICE THAT HAIG WOULD NOT BE IN ANY POSITION TO DEAL WITH FOREIGN POLICY MUCH BEFORE 20 JANUARY.

3. IN THE MEANTIME, THERE WAS REALLY NO-ONE ELSE FOR ANYONE TO TALK TO ON FOREIGN POLICY OF THE INCOMING ADMINISTRATION EXCEPT HIMSELF SEMICLN AND HE DID NOT PRETEND THAT HE HAD ANYTHING VERY MUCH TO SAY.

THE ALLIANCE

4. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, ALLEN SAID THAT HE WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE POSSIBLE STRAIN ON THE ALLIANCE THAT A SOVIET INVASION OF POLAND MIGHT IMPOSE. HE THOUGH THAT U.S. OPINION MIGHT TAKE A VERY HOSTILE TURN TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN ALLIES AND THAT THIS COULD BECOME QUOTE CRITICAL UNQUOTE BEFORE 20 JANUARY. HE HIMSELF UNDERSTOOD THE GERMAN MENTALITY BECAUSE HE HAD LIVED IN GERMANY, BUT VERY FEW OTHERS WHO WERE GOING TO BE IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY IN THE USA DID SO.

CONFIDENTIAL

/EAST/WEST RELATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

5. I SAID THAT FOR THE EUROPEANS THE COROLLARY OF A TOUGH STANCE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND A READINESS TO ACCEPT TNF MODERNISATION WAS THE BELIEVE THAT THE USA WERE PREPARED TO TAKE THE SUBJECT OF ARMS CONTROL SERIOUSLY. ALLEN SAID THAT THE SOVIETS KNEW THAT THE AMERICANS WERE READY TO TALK ABOUT THIS WHOLE SUBJECT, AND NOT SIMPLY ABOUT CONTROL BUT ALSO ABOUT REDUCTION. HE HIMSELF THOUGHT THAT THE DEEP CUTS THAT THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION HAD TRIED TO PERSUADE THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT IN MARCH 1977 HAD BEEN REASONABLE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS. BUT THE TROUBLE WAS THAT THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN SPOILT.

MIDDLE EAST

6. I TOLD ALLEN THAT LINOWITZ, WHO WAS AT PRESENT ON A VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST, WAS MAKING MUCH OF THE COMMITMENT TO CAMP DAVID THAT HE, ALLEN, WAS SAID TO HAVE GIVEN ON REAGAN'S BEHALF. ALLEN IMPLIED THAT LINOWITZ WAS REALLY MAKING TOO MUCH OF THIS. THE U.S. POSITION, AT ANY RATE AT THIS STAGE, WAS STRAIGHTFORWARD. IF THE TWO PARTIES MOST CONCERNED WANTED TO PROCEED ON THE PRESENT BASIS THEN THE NEW U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT OF COURSE THWART IT. IF ON THE OTHER HAND, AS A RESULT FOR EXAMPLE OF THE ADVENT TO POWER OF A LABOUR GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL, THE TWO PARTIES WERE NO LONGER ABLE TO NEGOTIATE ON THIS PROCESS, THEN THE U.S. WOULD LISTEN TO ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF TACKLING THE SUBJECT. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF SAYING THAT I ASSUMED THAT ONE OF THE URGENT TASKS OF THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND THIS OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE U.S. ATTITUDE ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM. THIS WAS ONE OF SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH SOME MEMBER OF THE TRANSITION TEAM OR WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AFTER 20 JANUARY. ALLEN SAID THAT HE COULD UNDERSTAND WHAT I HAD SAID BUT IN FACT AT THE MOMENT THERE WAS NO-ONE WITH WHOM ANYONE COULD TALK ON THIS SUBJECT EXCEPT HIMSELF AND HE HAD NOT REALLY MUCH MORE TO SAY THAN HE HAD ALREADY TOLD ME.

NAMIBIA

7. I REFERRED TO THE MEETING DUE TO TAKE PLACE ON 7 JANUARY UNDER U N AUSPICES. WE WERE ALL COMMITTED TO THE UN PLAN WHICH OFFERED THE ONLY HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD BE READY TO GO AHEAD. IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DANGEROUS IF THEY THOUGHT THAT THEY COULD BRING ABOUT THE COLLAPSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE GROUNDS THAT A REAGAN ADMINISTRATION MIGHT PROTECT THEM FROM THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS BY THE U N. SOME REMARKS BY SOME AMERICANS MIGHT HAVE ENCOURAGED THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN THIS SENSE.

CONFIDENTIAL

8. ALLEN WAS EXTREMELY SCATHING ABOUT VARIOUS IRRESPONSIBLE REMARKS THAT HAD BEEN MADE ON THIS SUBJECT. HE ASSURED ME THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD NO GROUNDS FOR THINKING THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO SHELTER THEM FROM SANCTIONS IN THE WAY I HAD MENTIONED. HOWEVER, HAVING SAID THIS, ALLEN WENT ON TO EXPRESS PERSONAL DOUBTS ABOUT THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS UNDER THE U N PLAN. BUT HE ASSURED ME A SECOND TIME THAT, WHATEVER HIS VIEWS, THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD NO GROUNDS FOR COMING TO ANY CONCLUSION SUCH AS THE ONE I HAD SUGGESTED.

COMMENT

9. THROUGHOUT OUR CONVERSATION, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT ALLEN WANTED TO SOUND MODERATE AND REASONABLE. HE AVOIDED ANY SUGGESTION OF DRAMATIC DEPARTURES FROM OR REVERSALS OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATIONS POLICIES. BUT I DO NOT THINK HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO THINK THE ISSUES THROUGH IN ANY GREAT DETAIL YET: NOR HAS ANYONE ELSE.

HENDERSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

LIMITED

NAD
EESD
MED
NENAD
S AF D
ACDD
ERD
WED
PLANNING STAFF
NEWS D
FUSD
DEF D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD

PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR A ACLAND
MR BULLARD
SIR J GRAHAM
MR DAY
LORD BRIDGES
MR HARDING
MR FERGUSSON
MR P MOBERLY
MR J MOBERLY
SIR L ALLISON

COPIES TO
SIR R ARMSTRONG
CABINET OFFICE