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PRIME MINISTER

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Mr. Carbaugh

Mr. Carbaugh, who you will remember is one of Senator Helms' aides, called on me this morning. (He had, as usual, asked in the first place to see you.)

Mr. Carbaugh asked me to convey Senator Helms' best wishes to you, which I undertook to do. The main purpose of his call, however, was to convey a warning about what he saw as an impending divergence between the policy of President Reagan's Administration and that of HMG on Namibia and Southern Africa generally.

Namibia

Mr. Carbaugh said that there was at present a battle going on in Washington for control of policy towards Southern Africa. However, he was confident that those whom he described as "the conservatives" would win. Senator Helms had the support of 25 or more other members of the US Senate. This was more than enough to ensure that his views, or those similar to his, would prevail. In any case Mr. Clark, the Deputy Secretary of State and himself a conservative, had already taken control of policy towards Southern Africa away from Mr. Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State (of whom Mr. Carbaugh made little effort to conceal his low opinion). Senator Helms and his colleagues intended shortly to force the repeal of the Clark amendment, which limits the extent to which the Administration could involve itself in, eg Angola, and to ensure that full use was made of the opportunities thus created.

Where Namibia was concerned, the intention of the conservatives would be to chart a new course. In their view, the present policy of the Five was wrong both in regard to Namibia and in regard to the relationship assumed between the situations in Namibia and in Angola.

/ In Mr. Carbaugh's

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In Mr. Carbaugh's view , a settlement of the situation in Angola must come first. Mr. Savimbi must be given the means - financial and military - to secure victory. This was entirely possible. If, for instance, Mr. Savimbi were given adequate supplies of Redeye missiles to shoot down the Antonov transport aircraft used by the Cubans, the Cubans would soon get bored with their mission and go home. Mr. Casey and the CIA shared this assessment. Mr. Carbaugh said, stressing the sensitivity of the information, that he had been in touch with the Chinese about the possibility of their giving, or channelling, assistance to Mr. Savimbi. Mr. Carbaugh said that among the reasons for supporting Mr. Savimbi was the fact that there were enormous potential oil reserves in Angola, particularly in the Cabinda region. Mr. Savimbi had made it clear that those who helped him now would have first refusal of these new resources once they were developed. In Mr. Carbaugh's view it was foolish to argue - as many, including Mr. Crocker did - that President dos Santos would, sooner or later throw out the Cubans, as President Sadat had done with the Russians. This analysis overlooked the fact that President dos Santos relied on the Cubans to keep him in power.

Once Mr. Savimbi was in power in Angola, he would, of course, expel SWAPO. SWAPO would then either have to surrender their arms in Namibia or fight - in which case they would be defeated. This was the necessary prelude to a free and fair election in Namibia. Senator Helms and his colleagues were determined to ensure that Namibia did not fall into the hands of the Marxists and that the country did not go the way of Zimbabwe.

In Namibia itself the approach would be:

(a) to exclude the United Nations from the action. The United Nations had disqualified itself both by its backing of SWAPO and by the evident ignorance of the vast majority of its membership about democracy and free elections;

(b) the attempt

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(b) the attempt to find a solution in Namibia would instead be conducted by a new group which did understand democracy and which would include the US and, hopefully, the UK, FRG, Nigeria, Kenya, one or two Scandinavian countries, Peru and one or two other Latin American countries. (Mr. Carbaugh was unable to explain why he thought Nigeria and Kenya would be prepared to associate themselves with his new approach. He did not claim that any approach had been made to either Government.);

(c) once free and fair elections had been conducted in Namibia, the United States would recognise the resulting government whatever its complexion. They would not be deterred from doing so if European or African governments failed to follow suit - though naturally it would be hoped that these governments would do so. Mr. Carbaugh expected that up to 25 countries would be prepared to follow America's lead but he made it clear that the degree of support that the US received was, in his view, immaterial. The US was tired of waiting for other people.

Cuba

Mr. Carbaugh went on to say that there was a growing sentiment in the US in favour of "doing something" about Cuba. If the Soviet Union were to interfere physically in Poland this would certainly be a trigger. The US would then proceed on the basis that Cuba was in its sphere of influence just as Poland was in that of the Soviet Union.

He said that some steps had already been taken. The number of radio broadcasts beamed at Cuba was being stepped up. Military deployments in Florida and Guantamano were being increased. Serious consideration was being given to the possibility of returning to Cuba the worst of the criminals who fled to Florida a few months ago.

In reply to my question about what military action, if any, might be taken against Cuba and in what circumstances, Mr. Carbaugh

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sketched out a rather imprecise scenario. This involved a war in Central America, which would start with hostilities between Nicaragua and Honduras, which would spread to neighbouring countries, into which Cuba would be drawn and which would provide the US with a case for action against Cuba, starting with a blockade. There was an implication, though no more, in what Mr. Carbaugh said that it would be no bad thing if matters developed in this way and that there might be something to be said for helping them along.

General

Mr. Carbaugh referred more than once to the growth of neo-isolationism in the US and to weariness there with the attitude of Europe. There was, according to Mr. Carbaugh, a feeling that money spent in defence in Europe might be better spent in the US. The impending announcement of changes in UK defence policy would not help. Americans would not understand that our defence expenditure was being increased: they would see only the cut in the surface fleet.

Mr. Carbaugh was unmoved when I remarked on the sharply increased polarisation which would result from the implementation of his policies. He did not think his fellow citizens would be worried either - although "regrettably" the US was not at present ready for an outright confrontation with the other super-power.

Conclusion

Recording Mr. Carbaugh's remarks in detail risks giving them more significance than they merit. Mr. Carbaugh's credit does not, I fancy, stand very high in Washington at present. He was the source of some embarrassing leaks during the transition period before President Reagan's inauguration. When I questioned him this morning, he was notably vague on the detail - and the feasibility - of the policy he was outlining. One wonders whether his thoughts had been exposed to the kind of critical analysis that they would get in, for instance, discussion with the State Department's experts.

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Nonetheless, Mr. Carbaugh represents an important strand of opinion in Washington, particularly where Southern Africa is concerned. Senator Helms and his colleagues appear to be having a significant impact on policy in this area. You should therefore be aware of the kind of input they are making.

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24 June 1981

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 July 1981

I wrote to you on 24 June about my conversation with Mr. Carbaugh here. I am writing now to record a further point, which I mentioned to you a day or two later on the telephone just before my departure for Australia.

Mr. Carbaugh gave one of his other contacts in London an extra piece of information which, he said, he had refrained from passing on to me because on a previous occasion I had allowed some documents which he had passed to me in confidence to be copied to the Embassy in Washington. (This is true.) The additional point was to the effect that American contacts with the Chinese about aid to Dr. Savimbi in Angola had progressed a good deal further than he had told me and that they had indeed resulted in some kind of understanding. The subject had been raised by Mr. Haig on his recent visit to Peking.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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USA

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 June 1981

Dear Brian,

I enclose a copy of a minute which I have done for the Prime Minister regarding my conversation with Mr. Carbaugh this morning. I doubt whether there is very much in the minute which will come as a surprise to you. But Mr. Carbaugh laid great stress on the confidentiality of his information. It is probably marginally useful that he gives us the benefit of his wisdom from time to time. I should be grateful therefore if you could give this letter and its enclosure a very limited distribution. I do not think a copy should be sent to the Embassy in Washington, though there would, of course, be no objection to Sir N. Henderson seeing it while he is here.

*Yours ever**Richard Alexander*

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JS

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13 July 1981

Thank you for your minute. I enclose a copy of the record of my conversation with Carbaugh. I also enclose a copy of a letter I have just written to Brian Fall. The latter makes clear why I am slightly sensitive about these records and why I should like to have both record and letter back! I would be grateful if you did not discuss either with the other Helms' staffer.

MODBA

MRR. Morland, Esq.

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