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TELEGRAM NUMBER 169 OF 22 JULY

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VISIT OF PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU FOR THE ROYAL WEDDING

1. IN ANTICIPATION OF HIS VISIT TO LONDON I SAW THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING. HE CONFIRMED THAT DURING HIS TALK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 28 JULY HE WOULD WISH TO CONCENTRATE ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, THOUGH HE WOULD NATURALLY WELCOME ANY POINTS WHICH MRS THATCHER MIGHT WISH TO MAKE ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING.

2. KYPRIANOU SAID THAT IT WAS NOW ALL UP TO THE TURKISH SIDE. UNDER THE PROCEDURE AGREED FOR THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS THEY HAD AN OBLIGATION TO SUBMIT A TERRITORIAL PROPOSAL. THIS WAS THE ONE GAP IN THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY BOTH SIDES ON THE TOPICS AGREED FOR DISCUSSION. MOREOVER, HE HAD THE IMPRESSION, AT LEAST FROM THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, THAT THE TURKS HAD PROMISED THAT THERE WOULD BE TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS. KYPRIANOU EMPHASIZED THAT ANY PROPOSAL MUST BE QUOTE REASONABLE UNQUOTE TO ENABLE NEGOTIATIONS TO CONTINUE. HE REFUSED TO BE SPECIFIC ABOUT WHAT HE WOULD REGARD AS REASONABLE, SIMPLY STATING THAT THE PROPOSAL MUST BE QUOTE OBJECTIVELY JUDGED UNQUOTE TO BE REASONABLE.

3. I SAID THAT I ASSUMED THAT, IF THE TURKISH SIDE MADE WHAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SAW AS A REASONABLE MOVE ON TERRITORY, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD BE PREPARED TO MOVE ON THE CONSTITUTION. ONE MUST NO DOUBT SEE THE PROPOSALS ALREADY TABLED AS FIRST PROPOSALS TO BE REGARDED AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.

4. KYPRIANOU SAID THAT THERE WAS SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION ON THE CONSTITUTION, BUT THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A FIRST MOVE. IT WAS A DETAILED PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. THERE COULD BE SOME ADJUSTMENT TO BE AGREED IN NEGOTIATION.

5. I SAID THAT I ASSUMED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD WANT TO TAKE SERIOUSLY ANY PROPOSAL FROM THE TURKISH SIDE AND AVOID A QUICK NEGATIVE REACTION WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE THE FUTURE OF THE TALKS. IF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS CAME FORWARD WITH SOMETHING WHICH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS DID NOT REGARD AS REASONABLE OR IF THERE WERE NO PROPOSALS WHAT DID THE PRESIDENT THINK OF A MOVE BY THE UN?

6. KYPRIANOU SAID THAT ANY PROPOSAL WOULD OF COURSE BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL. BUT THE FEELING AT THE LAST MEETING OF THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN THAT THE TALKS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO DRAG ON JUST FOR THE SAKE OF CONTINUING THEM. IF THE TURKISH SIDE FAILED TO KEEP ITS PROMISES, THE NEXT STEP WOULD PROBABLY BE RECOURSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS. HE DID

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NOT SEE MUCH VALUE IN A MOVE BY THE UN IF THE TURKS THEMSELVES WERE UNABLE TO COME FORWARD WITH REASONABLE PROPOSALS. WOULD THE TURKISH SIDE ACCEPT ANY UN SUGGESTIONS?

7. I SAID THAT NATURALLY ONE COULD NOT GUARANTEE ACCEPTANCE IN ADVANCE OF ANY UN SUGGESTIONS. BUT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT, IF THE TALKS WERE TO END AND RECOURSE WERE TO BE MADE TO THE UN AT THIS STAGE IT WOULD BE AT LEAST SOME MONTHS BEFORE ANYTHING FURTHER COULD BE DONE. THE OPPORTUNITY, WHICH MANY SAW AT THE PRESENT TIME, WOULD BE LOST.

8. KYPRIANOU SAID THAT HE AGREED THAT THE OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE LOST. THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE WERE READY TO TAKE UP ANY OPPORTUNITY. IT WOULD NOT BE THEIR FAULT IF THE TURKS FAILED TO MAKE THE NECESSARY MOVE.

COMMENT.

9. THIS DISCUSSION CONFIRMS KYPRIANOU'S APPARENT OPPOSITION TO THE SUBMISSION OF UN PROPOSALS IF THE TURKISH SIDE FAIL TO COME UP WITH ANYTHING WHICH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SEE AS QUOTE REASONABLE UNQUOTE ON TERRITORY. IT IS IN LINE WITH WHAT ROLANDIS TOLD THE U.S. CHARGE (MY TELNO 167). IN GENERAL KYPRIANOU WAS TAKING A VERY HARD LINE.

10. I MENTIONED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE L.P.S. HAD URGED FLEXIBILITY ON TERRITORY ON THE TURKS, BUT DID NOT REPEAT NOT REFER TO H.M. AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA'S RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH GURUN AND TURKMEN.

11. I ASSUME THAT KYPRIANOU WILL SPEAK ON SIMILAR LINES TO THE PRIME MINISTER WHO MAY WISH TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF FLEXIBILITY ON BOTH SIDES IF THERE IS TO BE ANY HOPE OF PROGRESS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO MODUK (FOR DS11).

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Tel.233.4116

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 July 1981

His Excellency
Mr Tasos Panayides
High Commissioner for Cyprus
Cyprus High Commission
93 Park Street
LONDON W1Y 4ET

as seen by es.

Dear High Commissioner,

I am writing to confirm arrangements which we have made over the telephone for the meeting between the President of Cyprus and the Prime Minister at No 10 Downing Street next week.

Mrs Thatcher is looking forward to meeting President Kyprianou at 09.15 on Tuesday 28 July for about half an hour. I understand that you are expecting to accompany the President. If you have any questions about the arrangements which have been made, I hope that you will get in touch with Mr Plumbly in Southern European Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Tel.233.4189) or with me.

Yours sincerely,

Duncan Lothian.

D F Lothian (Miss)
Private Office

b.c.to:

Miss Stephens (No 10) ✓
Mr T L A Daunt (SED)
Mr R M J Lyne (Private Secretary)

20 JUL 1981

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS:
28 JULY 1981

Points to Make

Cyprus Problem

1. Post election period a unique opportunity. Need for sober and flexible diplomacy on both sides. Turks must give on territory. Have asked them to make realistic proposals. Hope you will revise your proposals on constitution. Original positions unrealistic.
2. Present government in Ankara more flexible than predecessors or likely successors. Strong indications of real preparedness to negotiate seriously.
3. Important to keep atmosphere surrounding talks calm: no good to represent particular meetings as make or break: intercommunal talks only possible forum, and negotiation only road to settlement. Outside Governments will be following developments closely and expecting real effort from both sides.
4. Hope you will examine any Turkish ideas calmly. Should put Turks under pressure by making counter proposals - in particular get real dialogue going by presenting revised constitutional proposals.
5. UN proposals will probably be necessary to bridge gap, and winkle Turks further out of their shell on territory. Ideas advanced by UN Secretary General's representative seem ingenious; they, or something like them from UN, will be needed as basis for negotiation. Hope you will encourage UN to help with suggestions as basis for negotiations.

Denktash Statement on territory (Defensive)

6. Denktash's 13 July statement typical bluster: should not be taken too seriously. Not an excuse for no movement on Greek side.

British/Western/European initiative (Defensive)

7. Press speculation ill-founded: not the time to cut across UN efforts. Will give the UN every possible support.

/Aid to Cyprus

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Aid to Cyprus (Defensive)

8. Discussions useful. Our position unlikely to change; all legal obligations discharged. But prepared for further meetings if you want them. Public dispute would benefit neither of us.

EC/Cyprus (If Raised)

9. UK largely responsible for agreement last year that transition to stage two of the association to begin in January 1981: will do all we can to help in this year's negotiation.

Background

10. UK interests in Cyprus | _____ arise from:

- (a) *Passages deleted and retained under Section 3(4). (Mayland, 15 July 2014)*
- (b) need to preserve peace between Greek and Turkish allies;
- (c) residual role as guarantor power;
- (d) Cypriot community in UK.


Cyprus Problem

11. Between 1963, when bicomunal independence constitution broke down, and 1974, Turkish Cypriots were enclaved and harassed by Greeks. Since Turkish invasion in 1974, de facto partition. The only possible basis for settlement is a loose biregional federation, with Greek Cypriots conceding a constitution giving the Turkish Cypriots effective autonomy (in any case complete control over their own security) and the Turkish Cypriots conceding substantial territory (at present 20% of the population, occupying nearly 40% of Republic).

12. Intercommunal talks resumed in September 1980. Progress slow; both sides set out maximalist bargaining positions. Major omission: Turkish failure to produce any proposals on territory - Greek proposals on constitution detailed, but unrealistic, offering none of security guarantees or effective provincial autonomy required by Turks. UN attempt in Spring to promote "'interim arrangement'" foundered: it involved trade-off between reopening of Nicosia airport (Greek concession, involving partially lifting their economic embargo on Turks) and opening of Varosha for resettlement (Turkish concession: Varosha is former Greek suburb of Famagusta, now empty and in Turkish hands).

13. Talks marked time over Greek Cypriot parliamentary elections in May and Turkish Cypriot elections in June, (Kyprianou's party

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did well, securing 20% of votes: it holds balance between Communists and Right Wing Rally party).

14. Talks now approaching delicate and probably decisive state: widespread acceptance that 'window of opportunity' exists following elections: highly innovative UN representative in Nicosia (Gobbi, an Argentinian); potentially flexible Government in Ankara. But, if no progress, window will close with UN General Assembly (when Greek Cypriots will be tempted to go again for traditional propaganda resolution and Turks will then break talks) and probable Papandreou advance in Greek elections. Crucial that during 'window' period Turks agree to major concessions on territory (eg. 30% or less) and Greek Cypriots agree that constitution will be very loose federation (with Turks controlling own security).

15. Gobbi has drafted guide-lines for constitutional and territorial framework which meet these criteria: would be basis for negotiation in the intercommunal talks. Greeks see them as leaning to the Turks, (inevitable as Turks hold most of the cards, and have to be tempted.) Waldheim hesitant about presentation by UN: he has boxed himself in by giving both sides impression that they have veto on his doing so, and is impatient of Gobbi's independent style. Gobbi called back to New York on 21 July for week's consultations.

16. Kyprianou by temperament intransigent on intercommunal questions, and anxious to avoid difficult choices. Greek Cypriots insisting on no UN move before Turks produce territorial proposals. Would like talks concentrated on criticism of a Turkish territorial offer - avoiding discussion of constitution. Attention focused on 5 August meeting of talks, which will concern territory: Greeks have told Americans in confidence that they will announce failure of talks if no Turkish move then.

17. Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, even more intransigent than usual after poor election showing. Indulged in deliberate wrecking on 13 July, saying that Turks hold land barely sufficient to 'live as human beings': summoned to Ankara for consultations on 21 July. (NOT FOR DISCLOSURE) In reply to demarche by HM Ambassador on 21 July Turkish Foreign Minister said that Turks would make proposals on territory - and would put the necessary pressure on Denktash. But Denktash may yet wriggle out.

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18. Press speculation on Western initiative: none, but activity in support of Gobbi: lobbying in New York, and in Ankara (NOT FOR DISCLOSURE) Consultation with France, Germany and Italy as well as US on action to help UN.

Aid for Cyprus

19. In 1960 Treaty Britain undertook to grant £12m to Cyprus in the first five years of independence and to determine future amounts of aid, if any, in succeeding five year periods. Cypriots sometimes put this as a continuing obligation to pay for Sovereign Base Areas, or for military facilities enjoyed in Republic: legally they have no case. The £12m was paid but break down of constitution in 1963 removed political rationale for further aid under 'Appendix R'. Nonetheless high British expenditure, particularly on UN Force in Cyprus to which largest contributor (cost £20m in 1981/82): in 1978 offer of £7.5m loan (not yet taken up). Early 1981 under strong pressure from Cyprus Government, which expected electoral trouble, agreed to informal discussions. Two meetings held covering legal aspects. Friendly but inconclusive. (NOT FOR DISCLOSURE) We will do nothing more unless Cyprus Government press further; indications that they are uncertain how to take matter forward, and will not reopen it at present.

EC/Cyprus

20. EC-Cyprus Association Agreement concluded 1972; specifies two stages leading eventually to full customs union. Community delayed movement to stage two because of political division of island, and French and Italian concern about agricultural products. Until Greek accession Britain was Cyprus main supporter in the EC (relatively cost-free insurance for interests in bases: also major customer for Cyprus products, eg. new potatoes). Largely responsible for November Association Council's face-saving agreement that 'process of passage to the second stage' should begin January 1981. Backing Cypriot and Greek attempts to secure improved regime this year.

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KYPRIANOU, SPYROS

President of the Republic of Cyprus since 1977.

Born 1932, educated locally and then in London. Barrister (Gray's Inn). Represented Makarios in London 1952-4. On Independence briefly Minister of Justice, then Minister of Foreign Affairs. Serious heart attack in March 1969. He resigned very reluctantly in 1972, after the Greek Military Government had made it clear that his continuance of office would be one of the major obstacles to the restoration of good relations between Athens and Nicosia.

As Foreign Minister was leading advocate of a tough policy and no concessions to the Turks. In dealings with the West he was often prickly, stubborn and narrowly legalistic.

In May 1976 Kyprianou launched a new pro-Makarios party of the Centre-Right, the Democratic Front (DEKO) to fight the House of Representatives elections. By prior agreement with Communists (AKEL) with whom Kyprianou formed an electoral coalition, his Democratic Front was allowed 21 candidates, who were duly voted in. Kyprianou, as leader of the largest party group in the Chamber, was chosen as President of the House, and thus became Acting President on the death of Makarios in August 1977. He was elected second President of the Republic of Cyprus by acclaim on 31 August 1977.

Re-elected President 1978 when only other candidate nominated (Clerides) withdrew as a gesture of 'national unity' when Kyprianou's son was kidnapped.

Kyprianou's performance as President has been weak and indecisive; lacking personal support, he has tried to proceed by consensus. This has laid him open to Right-Wing charges that he is a prisoner of the Left. But, despite large-scale defections from his party in 1980, it did relatively well in the parliamentary elections in May 1981, securing 20% of votes and 8 seats out of 35. It holds the balance between communists and right (12 seats each). Kyprianou seems assured of AKEL support for legislative purposes, and will probably again have their backing in 1983 presidential elections.

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His uncertain health (in addition to his heart condition, he is said to have a blood disorder) led to some doubts whether he could survive the physical strains of being President. Following three weeks in England in May 1980 for medical treatment, his health appears to have improved.

Married. 2 sons. His wife, who comes from Northern Greece, is accompanying him in London for the Royal Wedding. Both speak English well.

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** Passage deleted and temporarily retained under Section 3(4)*

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Wayland, 15 July 2014



CYPRUS: BASIC FACTS

1. Population and Land Area (whole island)

(a) Land Area	9251km ² of which: Greek Cypriot controlled: 59.2% Turkish Cypriot controlled: 35.1% 2.77% SBAs 3% Buffer Zone
(b) Population	620,000 (approx 505,000 Greek Cypriots) (approx 115,000 Turkish Cypriots)

2. Basic Statistics (Greek Cypriot sector)

Gross National Product

(a) Total (1978)	1,370 US \$m
(b) Growth Rate (1974-77)	12,86% p.a.
(c) Growth Rate (1980)	4.5%
(c) Per Capita (1978)	2,110 US \$

3. Trade with UK 1980 (est.)

UK Exports to Cyprus	£118.8 m
UK Imports from Cyprus	£113.9 m
UK Share of Cyprus imports	20%
UK Share of Cyprus Exports	23%

Position in UK's Export

League Table (1979)	50 (of 150)
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BRIEF FOR GENERAL USE WITH COMMONWEALTH VISITORS (INCLUDING THOSE FROM AUSTRALIA, BARBADOS, CYPRUS, GUYANA, INDIA, MALAWI, NIGERIA, SINGAPORE, SRI LANKA AND ZAMBIA) DURING ROYAL WEDDING

COMMONWEALTH MATTERS

POINTS TO MAKE

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHGM)

1. Looking forward to CHGM. Hope you/your head of government will be present. Relief to have a CHGM no longer dominated by Rhodesian problem. Could be very useful meeting.

COMMONWEALTH FINANCE MINISTERS MEETING (CFMM) (IF RAISED)

2. Regret disruption of Commonwealth business. Sympathise with New Zealand government who did all they believe they properly could to persuade those concerned to call off tour. Saw no justification for a change in venue of CFMM but, in interests of Commonwealth harmony, we shall attend Nassau.

GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT AND SPORTING CONTACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA (IF RAISED)

3. Hope Commonwealth will not allow consideration of Gleneagles Agreement to become over intrusive at CHGM. Do not think Agreement's modification warranted. Hope discussion of it can be reserved for informal consideration during (Canberra) weekend retreat.

FOR USE WITH AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER ONLY:

4. Share Australia's concern that CHGM should be a success. Particularly hope that it will not be dominated by Southern African issues.

5. Prime Minister enjoyed previous visits to Australia and much regrets unable to accept invitation to stay on in Australia for a few days after meeting.

FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS ONLY:

6. (If raised) Inappropriate to convene Commonwealth Committee on Cyprus at a time when it might cut across inter-communal talks.

FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT OF INDIA ONLY:

7. Would be delighted if 1983 CHGM were held in Delhi. India has obvious claim.

/8. (If raised)

8. (If raised) Pakistan's renewed Commonwealth membership a matter for Commonwealth as a whole. We for our part would welcome it, but are conscious of Indian caution; we would not wish to see issue promoted in circumstances that could lead to controversy within Commonwealth.

FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT OF MALAWI ONLY

9. Very sorry to hear President Banda will not be attending this year's CHGM.

FOR USE WITH PRIME MINISTER OF SINGAPORE ONLY:

10. Look forward to hearing your views at CHGM on international economic issues. Always welcome element of rationality which Singapore customarily injects into such discussions.

FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT OF SRI LANKA

11. Understand Sri Lanka Exhibition (at Commonwealth Institute) is great success.

COMMONWEALTH MATTERS

ESSENTIAL FACTS

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHGM)

1. In Melbourne 30 September-7 October with weekend retreat in Canberra. Replies due mid-July to Commonwealth Secretary-General's circular letter on agenda. We have recommended that Prime Minister's reply indicate general agreement with Mr Ramphal's ideas and make no substantive new proposals. Next step (probably early August) is circulation by Mr Ramphal of annotated agenda.

COMMONWEALTH FINANCE MINISTERS MEETING (CFMM)

2. Next meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers (CFMM) (22-23 September) will take place in Nassau, Bahamas, following discussion at two meetings (10 and 21 July) of Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa (CCSA) of Nigerian proposal that venue be moved from Auckland if Springbok tour of New Zealand which began 19 July, went ahead. Final decision taken (on 21 July) despite New Zealand Government appeal, which we supported, for its postponement until after Mr Muldoon's arrival in London on 27 July (for Royal Wedding). New Zealand Government will almost certainly not be represented at Nassau, but we shall attend in interests of Commonwealth harmony.

GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT

A 3. Copy annexed: certain to be discussed at CHGM. Four Caribbean Governments (including Barbados) have already indicated their intention of raising it there with a view to securing its more effective implementation; and Nigeria may produce a new draft agreement for consideration. We had hoped that this subject could be reserved for informal discussion by heads of government at weekend retreat, but the furore over the change in CFMM venue, and Mr Muldoon's resulting bitterness, now make this unlikely.

AUSTRALIA

4. CHGM hosts. Immensely keen to make meeting a success and eg

/have

have sent delegations (led by Ministers and senior back-benchers) to all Commonwealth countries attending. Australian Foreign Minister visited UK 10-14 June and had talks with Prime Minister on 12 June when he delivered invitation from Mr Fraser to stay on in Australia for a few days after Meeting (Prime Minister has declined because of Conservative Party Conference, at which Mr Fraser has agreed to speak). On agenda Australians share Pacific, Caribbean (and UK) concern that Southern African issues should not loom too large.

BARBADOS

5. Mr Adams attended last CHGM (Lusaka 1979) where he exhibited a special interest in Belize and world economic questions.

CYPRUS

6. Commonwealth Committee on Cyprus set up at 1975 CHGM (in Jamaica), a propaganda machine for the Greek Cypriots and, thankfully, dormant since 1977. But communique issued at 1979 CHGM (in Lusaka) included decision (in response to Cypriot pressure) to ask Commonwealth Secretary General to convene Committee at Ministerial level whenever appropriate. Ramphal has however told President Kyprianou that he does not intend to convene Committee unless so requested by President himself. Latter has not since done so.

GUYANA

7. Was represented at 1979 CHGM (in Lusaka) by Guyanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

INDIA

8. Mr Ramphal has suggested to Mrs Gandhi that India host next (1983) CHGM. Mrs Gandhi responded positively but apparently worried whether offer would be welcome to other heads of government. It will be South Asia's turn in 1983 to host a CHGM. Three possible candidates: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India. Latter is regionally the most significant, has the most suitable capital and, as the last

/Commonwealth,

- 3 -

Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting (CHGRM)'s successful host, has good claim.

9. President Zia would like to see Pakistan rejoin Commonwealth. Pakistan's readmission in British, Pakistani and Commonwealth interests. Until recently informal soundings have met with strong Indian objections suggesting little prospect of movement before CHGM, but in wake of Indian Foreign Ministers's recent visit to Pakistan and expectation of some improvement in their bilateral relations, Pakistan now seems to be contemplating some form of initiative. Agha Shahi recently approached Secretary of State on matter in New York. Difficult as yet to know likely Indian reaction, which is key. At the least, CHGM could see useful discussion of matter in corridors.

MALAWI

10. President Banda has let it be known that he will not attend this year's CHGM. In no way surprising: he appeared only for opening day of Lusaka CHGM.

NIGERIA

11. Nigerian delegation to 1979 CHGM was led by (then) Minister for External Affairs.

12. Nigerian Government hold very strong views on issue of sporting contacts with South Africa (see paragraphs 2 and 3 above).

SINGAPORE

13. Long standing bilateral tension between Singapore and Australia over latter's protectionism may lead Lee Kuan Yew to take a critical (and thus moderating) view of any Australian rhetoric at CHGM on world economic matters.

SRI LANKA

14. As part of their celebrations of 50 years of universal franchise Sri Lanka is mounting major exhibition at Commonwealth Institute

/17 July

17 July-13 September depicting aspects of Sri Lanka's history and culture, and of its social political and economic life. The Queen opened Exhibition on 16 July.

15. The Queen has accepted invitation from President Jayawardene to pay state visit to Sri Lanka on her way back from CHGM in October 1981.

ZAMBIA

16. Hosted 1979 CHGM and President Kaunda apparently regards himself as Chairman of the Commonwealth (no such office) until next CHGM.

COMMONWEALTH STATEMENT ON APARTHEID IN SPORT

The member countries of the Commonwealth, embracing peoples of diverse races, colours, languages and faiths, have long recognised racial prejudice and discrimination as a dangerous sickness and an unmitigated evil and are pledged to use all their efforts to foster human dignity everywhere. At their London Meeting, Heads of Government reaffirmed that apartheid in sports, as in other fields, is an abomination and runs directly counter to the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which they made at Singapore on 22 January 1971.

They were conscious that sport is an important means of developing and fostering understanding between the people, and especially between the young people, of all countries. But, they were also aware that, quite apart from other factors, sporting contacts between their nationals and the nationals of countries practising apartheid in sport tend to encourage the belief (however unwarranted) that they are prepared to condone this abhorrent policy or are less than totally committed to the Principles embodied in their Singapore Declaration. Regretting past misunderstandings and difficulties and recognising that these were partly the result of inadequate inter-governmental consultations, they agreed that they would seek to remedy this situation in the context of the increased level of understanding now achieved.

They reaffirmed their full support for the international campaign against apartheid and welcomed the efforts of the United Nations to reach universally accepted approaches to the question of sporting contacts within the framework of that campaign.

Mindful of these and other considerations, they accepted it as the urgent duty of each of their Governments vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by withholding any form of support for, and by taking every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organised on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin.

They fully acknowledged that it was for each Government to determine in accordance with its laws the methods by which it might best discharge these commitments. But they recognised that the effective fulfilment of their commitments was essential to the harmonious development of Commonwealth sport hereafter.

They acknowledged also that the full realisation of their objectives involved the understanding, support and active participation of the nationals of their countries and of their national sporting organisations and authorities. As they drew a curtain across the past they issued a collective call for that understanding, support and participation with a view to ensuring that in this matter the peoples and Government of the Commonwealth might help to give a lead to the world.

Heads of Government specially welcomed the belief, unanimously expressed at their Meeting, that in the light of their consultations and accord there were unlikely to be future sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries or their nationals and South Africa while that country continues to pursue the detestable policy of apartheid. On that basis, and having regard to their commitments, they looked forward with satisfaction to the holding of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and to the continued strengthening of Commonwealth sport generally.

London, June 15 1977.