

*Afghanistan*

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~~FROM UKH NEW YORK~~ 21908Z SEPT 81

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 885 DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 81

INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW,

INFO SAVING BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

~~SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS OF PAKISTAN ON  
22 SEPTEMBER 1981 AFGHANISTAN~~

1. AGHA SHAHI PREDICTED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD SEEK TO MAKE PROPAGANDA MILEAGE OUT OF PAKISTAN'S ALLEGED UNWILLINGNESS TO TALK. IN FACT, HE HAD MADE QUITE CLEAR TO WALDHEIM THAT THE PAKISTANIS WERE READY TO PUT FORWARD THEIR VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER AND TO COMMENT ON THE VIEWS OF OTHERS THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE. ON MATTERS CONCERNING THE REFUGEES, THEY WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT THE REFUGEE LEADERS (HE ACCEPTED THAT IT WOULD BE TOO MUCH TO ASK THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONSULT THEM DIRECTLY) AND THIS WOULD MAKE THEM TO SOME EXTENT PARTIES TO THE TALKS. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF PAKISTAN FORCING THEM TO RETURN, AND THEY WOULD NOT RETURN VOLUNTARILY BEFORE THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL: SO THE HEART OF THE QUESTION WOULD THUS BE REACHED. AGHA SHAHI EXPLAINED THAT THE PAKISTAN CABINET DECISION NOT TO ACCEPT THE EMPTY CHAIR FORMAT HAD BEEN INFLUENCED BY A CONCERN TO AVOID CRITICISM FROM IRAN AND FROM THE REFUGEES.

2. AGHA SHAHI SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE WORTH EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY HELD OUT IN THE 24 AUGUST PROPOSALS OF SIMULTANEOUS TALKS ON GUARANTEES. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE RUSSIANS WERE TO SPELL OUT WHAT GUARANTEES THEY HAD IN MIND, THOUGH THEY WOULD ALSO HAVE TO SPELL OUT THE CONDITIONS FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR THE RUSSIANS TO STAY PUT WHILE OTHERS PROCEEDED WITH GUARANTEES. LORD CARRINGTON REMARKED THAT THE 24 AUGUST PROPOSALS SEEMED TO EXCLUDE THE SOVIET PRESENCE FROM THEIR DEFINITION OF INTERFERENCE. AGHA SHAHI AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE FORMAL POSITION BUT THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT NEVERTHELESS BE WORTH PROBING FURTHER.

3. AGHA SHAHI WAS INCLINED TO BE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE AFRICANS AND ARABS FOR DIFFERENT REASONS WERE NOT WELL DISPOSED TO THE US ADMINISTRATION. NAIK ON THE OTHER HAND DREW AN ANALOGY WITH THE VOTE ON KAMPUCHEAN CREDENTIALS AND THOUGHT THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN AND PERHAPS EVEN SLIGHTLY INCREASE THE VOTE IF THE AFGHANISTAN RESOLUTION REMAINED SUBSTANTIALLY ON THE SAME LINES AS LAST YEAR'S.

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4. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PROBABLY NOT UNDER SUFFICIENT PRESSURE EITHER MILITARILY OR IN TERMS OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE NON-ALIGNED TO FEEL THE NEED FOR A SETTLEMENT. HE WONDERED WHETHER MORE COULD BE DONE TO EMPHASISE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM (THREE MILLION IN PAKISTAN AND IRAN OUT OF A POPULATION OF SEVENTEEN MILLION). AGHA SHAHI AGREED THAT THIS WAS WORTH THINKING FURTHER ABOUT.

5. ~~FINALLY AGHA SHAHI EMPHASISED THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT ANY~~

~~STATEMENT ABOUT AFGHANISTAN EMERGING FROM CHINA SHOULD~~

~~BE NO WEAKER THAN WHAT WAS PROPOSED IN THE DRAFT U.S.~~

~~RESOLUTION~~ HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE INDIANS WOULD MAKE SOME HEADWAY WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT THE PAKISTANIS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AS THEY SAW ADVANTAGE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IN TERMS OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH (AND SUPPLIES FROM) THE UNITED STATES.

FCO PASS SAVING BONN, PARIS

PARSONS

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AFGHANISTAN STANDARD:

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CABINET OFFICE

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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