

RH

Prime Minister
13/11

GRS 900
CONFIDENTIAL
FM CAIRO 120855Z OCT 81
DESKBY 121000Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 574 OF 12 OCTOBER

CONFIDENTIAL

CLOSED UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT 2000

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT HUSNI MUBARAK

1. FOLLOWING IS MY RECOLLECTION OF MAIN POINTS OF THE DISCUSSION
THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD WITH MUBARAK
AT 5.00 P.M. ON 10 OCTOBER, AFTER SADAT'S FUNERAL. MR
CALLAGHAN WAS ALSO PRESENT.

2. MUBARAK BEGAN WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE ASSASSINATION. HE HAD
BEEN JOKING AND ARGUING WITH SADAT ABOUT HOW TO RE-ORGANISE THE
PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY NEXT APRIL, WHILE WATCHING THE AIR FORCE FLY-PAST
AND AEROBATICS. HE HAD THUS NOT NOTICED THE ARMY TRUCK STOP NOR
THE SOLDIERS JUMP OUT, AND HAD ONLY BEEN DIMLY CONSCIOUS OF THE
LARGE FIGURE OF A MAN THROWING SOMETHING FOLLOWED BY A BANG. THE
PRESIDENT HAD STOOD UP AS IF TO RECEIVE A SALUTE, EXCLAIMED "WHAT'S
THAT", AND AT THE SAME TIME AS TELLING SADAT AND THE OMANI
REPRESENTATIVE TO GET DOWN MUBARAK HIMSELF HAD BEEN THROWN TO THE
GROUND. WHEN THE FIRING STOPPED HE GOT UP AND SAW THE PRESIDENT
LYING WITH BLOOD GUSHING FROM HIS MOUTH, AND HE REALISED THERE WAS
NO HOPE. MUBARAK'S HAND WAS BANDAGED BUT HE MADE LIGHT OF THE
WOUND (I UNDERSTAND IT IS GRENADE FRAGMENTS, WHICH CAN ONLY BE
REMOVED WHEN HE CAN FIND TIME FOR AN OPERATION WITH A GENERAL
ANAESTHETIC).

3. MUBARAK STRESSED THAT SUCH ACTS OF VIOLENCE WERE ALIEN TO THE
EGYPTIAN CHARACTER AND TRADITION, AND WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
INTERNAL STABILITY. EGYPT UNDER HIS PRESIDENCY WOULD PURSUE EXACTLY
THE SAME POLICIES AS SADAT, AND THERE NEED BE NO FEAR OF FURTHER
DISTURBANCES OR CHANGE.

4. ASKED ABOUT THE REACTIONS OF THE OTHER ARABS MUBARAK SAID THAT
IT WAS SHAMEFUL THAT THEY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO RISE ABOVE THEIR
POLITICAL DIFFERENCES TO SHOW RESPECT FOR THE MEMORY OF A GREAT MAN.
EVEN KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO, WHO HAD TELEPHONED CONDOLENCES AND
ANNOUNCED THAT HIS PRIME MINISTER WOULD ATTEND THE FUNERAL, HAD
THEN BACKED OFF ON THE ABSURD PRETEXT THAT THE PRESENCE OF MR BEGIN
WOULD AFFECT PROSPECTS FOR THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE THAT MOROCCO
WAS TO HOST LATER THIS YEAR. KING HUSSEIN HAD SENT MESSAGES, AS
HAD THE SAUDIS, BUT STIPULATED THAT THE FACT SHOULD NOT BE MADE
PUBLIC. AS TO THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A RAPPROCHEMENT IN THE FUTURE

CONFIDENTIAL / BETWEEN

BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE OTHER ARABS. MUBARAK SAID THAT THERE WAS NO REASON WHY THIS SHOULD WAIT UNTIL APRIL 1982. THERE HAD BEEN CONTACTS FOR SOME TIME, LIKE HIS OWN MEETING WITH PRINCE BANDAR IN WASHINGTON, AND THROUGH EGYPTIAN VISITORS TO SAUDI ARABIA, AND THESE WOULD CONTINUE. LORD CARRINGTON MENTIONED (I THINK, THOUGH PERHAPS IT WAS ONLY TO BOUTROS GHALI) HIS COMING VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA TO DISCUSS PRINCE FAHD'S POINTS AND SAID HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH THE EGYPTIANS AGAIN AFTERWARDS.

5. MUBARAK WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL NEXT APRIL WOULD TAKE PLACE ACCORDING TO PLAN. AT HIS MEETING WITH BEGIN THE PREVIOUS DAY HE HAD TOLD HIM VERY BLUNTLY THAT HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH EVERY WORD OF WHAT HAD PASSED BETWEEN BEGIN AND SADAT AT THEIR RECENT MEETINGS AT ALEXANDRIA AND SHARM EL SHEIKH, AND EXPECTED HIM TO ADHERE SCRUPULOUSLY TO THE COMMITMENTS HE HAD GIVEN. BEGIN HAD PROMISED TO KEEP HIS WORD. AS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF OBSTRUCTIONISM BY ISRAELI SETTLERS, THIS WAS BEGIN'S PROBLEM, AND HE WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH IT.

6. ASKED FOR HIS OPINION ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE MULTILATERAL FORCE FOR SINAI, MUBARAK SAID THAT ITS PRIME IMPORTANCE WAS AS A POLITICAL (HE ACTUALLY SAID "MORALE") ASSURANCE TO ISRAEL OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR HER DEFENCE. IN HIS VIEW IT DID NOT HAVE MUCH MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. SINAI WOULD REMAIN LARGELY DE-MILITARISED, AND THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF EGYPT TRYING TO INFILTRATE ADDITIONAL FORCES. HER SOLE CONCERN WAS TO GET ON WITH PEACEFUL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

7. MUBARAK ADMITTED THAT HE WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE SUDAN, WHERE THE ECONOMY WAS IN A MESS AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION BADLY UNSETTLED AND THREATENED BY QADDHAFI. THIS HAD BEEN THE MAIN REASON FOR HIS RECENT TRIP TO WASHINGTON. THE SAUDIS HAD NEVER HONOURED THEIR PROMISES OF ECONOMIC AID, AND OWED AT LEAST 150 MILLION DOLLARS. HE HAD URGED MR HAIG TO PUT IT TO THE SAUDIS THAT THEY WERE MENACED BY SOVIET CLIENT STATES TO THE SOUTH AND ACROSS THE RED SEA, AND IF THE SUDAN WERE TO FALL UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE THEY WOULD BE VIRTUALLY SURROUNDED, ESPECIALLY AS THEY WERE ONCE AGAIN AT LOGGERHEADS WITH IRAQ. HE BELIEVED THAT HAIG HAD SPOKEN ON THESE LINES TO PRINCE SAUD IN NEW YORK. HE EXPECTED THAT THE SUDAN WOULD BE THE MAIN TOPIC OF DISCUSSION WITH MR HAIG ON 11 OCTOBER.

8. AS TO THE AUTONOMY TALKS, MUBARAK THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE SOME LIFE IN THEM YET, AND EGYPT WOULD CERTAINLY PERSEVERE. HE HOPED THEY MIGHT GET AGREEMENT ON A SET OF PRINCIPLES, BUT THERE COULD BE ENDLESS ARGUMENT OVER TRANSLATING THEM INTO DETAIL. IN ANY

2
CONFIDENTIAL

/EVENT

CONFIDENTIAL

EVENT EGYPT DID NOT REGARD NEXT APRIL AS A DEADLINE AND WOULD BE READY TO CONTINUE THE TALKS BEYOND THAT DATE. THE ISRAELIS MIGHT FIND IN THE DATE SOME INCENTIVE FOR MAKING PROGRESS BEFORE THEIR EVACUATION WAS COMPLETE, BUT EGYPT'S ATTITUDE WOULD REMAIN THE SAME. HE KNEW THE ISRAELIS WERE HOPING THAT IN THE MEANTIME EGYPT WOULD GIVE THEM AN EXCUSE FOR RENEGING ON THE WITHDRAWAL, BUT THEY WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED.

9. MUBARAK SAW NO ROLE FOR KING HUSSEIN AT THIS STAGE, APART FROM THE CONTINUING CONTACTS ALREADY MENTIONED. HE WAS CONTEMPTUOUS OF THE PALESTINIANS, MOST OF WHOM HE BELIEVED DID NOT REALLY WANT A PALESTINIAN STATE. THEY WERE DOING TOO WELL IN THEIR ADOPTIVE COUNTRIES LIKE KUWAIT AND THE GULF STATES, AND HATED THE IDEA OF A HOMELAND TO WHICH THEY MIGHT BE OBLIGED TO RETURN. ARAFAT WAS EQUALLY HYPOCRITICAL, AND ONLY WANTED TO GO ON ENJOYING HIS MASSIVE ARAB SUBSIDIES, WHICH HE WAS SALTING AWAY IN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS, E.G. JAPAN.

10. FINALLY ON BILATERAL RELATION, AFTER SOME PLEASANTRIES ABOUT MRS MUBARAK'S WELSH CONNECTIONS, MUBARAK VOLUNTEERED THAT EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH THE UK WERE NOW EXCELLENT. HE HOPED THAT OUR CLOSE COLLABORATION IN THE VARIOUS FIELDS WOULD BE MAINTAINED AND INDEED IMPROVED.

11. AT THE AIRPORT ON DEPARTURE THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH BOUTROS GHALI, OF WHICH I ONLY HEARD SNATCHES. GHALI SAID THAT BEGIN WAS NOW A VERY WORRIED MAN, FEARING THAT THE LOSS OF HIS FRIEND SADAT MIGHT MEAN THE UNRAVELLING OF THE TREATY OR AT LEAST A LESS SYMPATHETIC RECEPTION FOR HIS WORDS AND ACTIONS. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO REASSURE HIM. ON THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE GHALI SAID HE WOULD BE CONTENT IF THE UK WOULD INDICATE A WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO PARTICIPATE.

12. SUBJECT TO ANY CORRECTIONS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, PLEASE REPEAT TO POSTS AS NECESSARY.

WEIR

LIMITED PS/MA HURD
NENAD PS/PUS
ME.D SIR A AGLAND
DEF.D SIR J GRAMAM
PS MR GILMORE
PS/LPS MR NOBERRY

CLOSED UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

ACT 3 2000

CONFIDENTIAL