

TOP SECRET

*of Surely the names  
of some of the  
witnesses should not  
be published.  
? Apprehensions?  
not*

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PRIME MINISTER

Report by the Security Commission

You may care to glance through the attached copy of the Report by the Security Commission on the review of the security procedures and practices currently followed in the public service which you announced in your statement on 26 March 1981 you were setting up in the wake of the allegations contained in Mr. Chapman Pincher's book. Unfortunately although the Commission summarise their conclusions at the end of their Report (pages 18-19), they have not consolidated their recommendations in a single list and instead ~~they~~ <sup>have</sup> left them scattered through the text of the Report. They are however printed in heavy type and are therefore easily picked out.

I have asked for advice on both the substance and the handling of the Report. I suspect that handling may prove more difficult than the substance. In your statement on 26 March you said of the Commission's review:

"It will be my intention to make its findings known to the House in due course, to the extent that it is consistent with national security to do so."

I gather that the Commission are quite anxious to see their Report published virtually complete (despite its present grading of Top Secret). But one major hurdle we shall have to jump before there can be any question of publication is the fact that the Report is sprinkled with references to the SIS, and if these remain in a published document, the Government will be avowing the existence of the SIS for the first time. This may be something which you and your colleagues will decide that you are ready to do, particularly since there have now been many public references to the existence of the SIS in recent years, not least those made by Mr. Callaghan and Mr. Merlyn Rees in the debate on Blunt. But it will still be a big step, and I guess that the SIS itself will be opposed to it (though the Security Service, whose existence has of course been avowed for many years, will be all in favour, since they would love nothing more than to see the SIS put on the same footing as themselves).

*AW.*

18 December 1981

TOP SECRET

SECRET

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Security

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

The Security Commission

We have received today from the Security Commission the report of their investigation of the security procedures and practices currently followed in the public service which the Prime Minister announced in the House on 26 March 1981. I understand that a copy of the report has already been sent to you.

I should be grateful if you could let the Prime Minister have, as soon as possible, advice on the Security Commission's conclusions and recommendations and on the handling of their report.

CAW

16 December 1981

SECRET



Covering TOP SECRET

2A

**Management and Personnel Office**

Whitehall London SW1A 2AZ

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C A Whitmore Esq  
Principal Private  
Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date

16 December 1981

*Dear Mr Whitmore,*

THE SECURITY COMMISSION

I attach a copy, and a spare, of the Report of the Security Commission following their investigation, announced by the Prime Minister in the House on 26 March. I have sent a copy to Sir Robert Armstrong. A restricted number of copies will be circulated tomorrow to others who need to know.

*Yours Sincerely*

*Paul Adams James*

P A James  
Secretary, Security Commission

ENC

Covering TOP SECRET

*attached to letter  
in folder at rear of Paul*

TOP SECRET

COPY NO 2

# REPORT OF THE SECURITY COMMISSION

December 1981

*Diplomat / Area / Bridge*

*16.12.81*

TOP SECRET

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## PRIME MINISTER

## INTRODUCTION

1. In your letter of 6 April 1981, you asked the Security Commission "to review the security procedures and practices currently followed in the public service and to consider what, if any, changes are required".
2. These terms of reference are the same as Part I of the terms of reference of an *ad hoc* Committee on Security Procedures in the Public Service under the Chairmanship of Lord Radcliffe ("the Radcliffe Committee") which was appointed in May, 1961, and reported in November of that year, except that their terms of reference made specific mention of "recent convictions for offences under the Official Secrets Acts" in the light of which their review was to be undertaken. This was a reference to the notorious Portland spies, two of whom had been civilian employees of the Admiralty, and to a former member of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), George Blake. The investigation of the security issues involved in the Blake case formed Part II of the Radcliffe Committee's Report, ("Radcliffe") and Part III related to the procedure for D Notices. A heavily edited and expurgated version of Part I of Radcliffe, which also incorporated Part III of it verbatim, was published in April, 1962, under the title "Security Procedures in the Public Service."
3. The occasion of the present reference to the Security Commission was the publication of Mr Chapman Pincher's book "Their Trade is Treachery". This dealt with a number of cases of proven or suspected disclosure of highly sensitive secret information to the Soviet bloc intelligence services by persons who had been recruited to the Foreign Office or one of the Secret Services (SIS and the Security Service) many years before the improvements recommended in Radcliffe had been put into effect and for the most part before even a rudimentary form of Positive Vetting, for those with access to particularly sensitive information, was first introduced in 1952.
4. It does not fall within our terms of reference to examine once again allegations against individuals who now are either dead or have long ago been publicly exposed. As mentioned in your speech in which the current reference to the Security Commission was announced in Parliament, the cases with which Mr Chapman Pincher's volume deals have all been the subject of intensive examination and re-examination in the utmost detail and no useful purpose could be served by our going yet again over the same well-trodden ground.
5. Like Radcliffe, we have taken "security" in our terms of reference to mean the safeguarding of such information in the possession of the Government as would by its unauthorised disclosure cause injury to the interests of the country. (Information which falls within this description we shall refer to under the generic description "classified information".) Thus, our Report does not cover the protection of Government buildings or their contents or vital installations against sabotage or terrorist attack, although it does cover physical precautions for denying access to classified information by unauthorised persons.
6. We have regarded our task as best performed by re-examining Radcliffe in the light of the experience of the last twenty years, and the changes that have occurred during that period (1) in the nature of the threat against which security precautions are directed, (2) in changes of attitudes among the public, the media, and the Civil Service itself, (3) in legislation, and (4) in technology, including particularly the use of computers and other forms of office automation.
7. In carrying out this task, we have used the unexpurgated version of Part I of Radcliffe, which differs considerably from the published version, and of which only a few copies still remain in existence. Although the extant copies are still classified as TOP SECRET, the recommendations contained in the unexpurgated Radcliffe, with only a few insignificant exceptions, have been fully implemented. They can be found in the pages of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures and its sixty-one annexes upon a careful and persevering perusal of those documents. Because they are accessible elsewhere we do not find it necessary to reproduce the Radcliffe recommendations here, but **we strongly recommend that this Manual and its companion volume, Security in Government Departments, should be re-arranged, re-edited, and in many parts, re-written, so that each of the instructions they contain can be readily found and understood by those who have to comply with them.** We understand that this task is now in train.

8. Before embarking upon a more detailed consideration of the changes that have taken place since 1961 to which we have referred above, we think it right to state at once our general impression that, subject to what we have to say later about the need for an urgent evaluation of the risks involved in electronic information processing and the means of countering them, the security procedures in the public service as they have been applied since Radcliffe have worked well. Provided always that they continue to be applied conscientiously, we see no major reason for disquiet. Occasional failures there are bound to be as a result of human cupidity, laziness or error. Slackness in observance of routine precautions may affect individuals or even whole branches of departments, as happened in the case of the indeterminable number of magnetic tapes which disappeared from the Ministry of Defence between 1976 and 1979, on which we reported as recently as May 1981 (Cmnd 8235). The very success of counter-espionage precautions makes it more difficult to maintain general awareness in the public service of the seriousness of the threat to which failure to observe them would expose this country. A sensational spy case, such as those which were the occasion of the appointment of the Radcliffe Committee, would no doubt provide the necessary stimulus to greater diligence in observing the prescribed procedures on the part of those members of the public service who find them time-consuming and tedious; but this would be too high a price to pay, and we can only echo Radcliffe in urging the importance of educating and regularly reminding all public servants who have access to classified information about the gravity and reality of the threat.

### The Threat

9. As was to be expected having regard to the occasion of its appointment, Radcliffe identified the most serious threat as being external; the intelligence activities of the secret services of foreign states and in particular those that formed part of the Soviet bloc. The internal threat Radcliffe regarded as relatively minor and as coming from subversive organisations within Great Britain with ideological ties or sympathies with the Soviet bloc. Of these the only one that then called for special mention was the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB).

10. Now, twenty years later, the external threat from Soviet bloc intelligence services, although it has been contained with greater success than before 1961, remains, in our view, undiminished in its potential strength if precautions were to be relaxed. Radcliffe rightly regarded this as over-shadowing any threat from the intelligence services of other foreign powers, though the existence of such threats was recognised as at least an occasional possibility. However, the external threat, in the atomic field in particular, may have expanded somewhat since 1961 to include, among others, non-aligned countries desirous of obtaining the necessary know-how to enable them to manufacture for themselves the most up-to-date types of nuclear weapons.

11. The internal threat, on the other hand, has altered considerably since Radcliffe. It has become more varied and viewed as a whole we consider it to have grown more serious. The threat offered by the CPGB, upon which Radcliffe concentrated, has probably diminished as a result of the fall in the number of its members and the disillusionment of many of them with Soviet policy since 1961 in invading Czechoslovakia and, more recently, Afghanistan. The fall in CPGB membership, however, has been accompanied by proliferation of new subversive groups of the extreme Left and extreme Right (mainly the former) whose aim is to overthrow democratic parliamentary government in this country by violent or other unconstitutional means, not shrinking in the case of the most extreme of groups from terrorism to achieve their aims. Membership of individual groups is small, but for the most part, active and conspiratorial. They might well seek to make public information injurious to the interests of this country, not at the behest or for the benefit of any foreign power, but simply to harm this country itself, whether by causing a rift between it and its allies or otherwise, and by these means to weaken its defences against the overthrow of democratic government here by force.

## CLASSIFICATION

### The Classification System and Personnel Security

12. The aim of both personnel and physical security is a limited one: to prevent the disclosure of information acquired by a public servant in the course of his official duties to anyone who would be likely to use it to the injury of this country in any of the ways discussed above. The method used is to deny access to such information by persons whose loyalty and reliability have

not been confirmed by previous investigation, the thoroughness of the investigation depending upon the classification accorded to the information to which they are to be given access. The system of classification adopted thus lies at the root of security procedures in the public service. The importance of non-access as the most reliable of protective measures has increased considerably since Radcliffe. The growing reluctance of successive Attorney-Generals to prosecute under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act over the last decade has rendered criminal sanctions against unauthorised disclosure almost a dead letter, except in cases of deliberate espionage. The movement in popular opinion, fostered by the media, in favour of what is beguilingly termed "open government" and the adoption of aggressive "investigative journalism" by the press, including some newspapers with a reputation for acting responsibly, have weakened the moral sanction against disclosure by public servants of confidential information acquired in the course of their public duties, as witness the number of "leaks" that have occurred in recent months. Use of the remaining sanction, dismissal from the public service for a disciplinary offence, raises problems in connection with employment legislation and the increasing activism of some of those trade unions by which white-collar civil servants are represented.

### Security Classification of Information

13. The classification of information, access to which should be restricted to those only who need to know it, lies at the very root of all security procedures. The principal current classifications in use in the United Kingdom, together with their definitions are:-

TOP SECRET	Information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation.
SECRET	Information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which would cause serious injury to the interests of the nation.
CONFIDENTIAL	Information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the interests of the nation.
RESTRICTED	Information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which would be undesirable in the interests of the nation.

The security classification system itself, as distinct from "privacy markings", is complicated by the addition of a number of categories of information relating mainly, though not exclusively, to defence which are the subject of agreement with a variety of our allies, particularly the United States, and on their insistence are accorded a higher degree of protection from any access than is required for occasional access to TOP SECRET material of a more general kind.

14. Alongside the four official security classifications, there have come into use since Radcliffe a number of additional markings described in the current manual "Security in Government Departments" as "privacy markings". A privacy marking that is commonly in use in a number of departments contains the words "In Confidence" accompanied by some other expressions specifically limiting disclosure, such as "Staff In Confidence" or "In Confidence - Named Distribution Only". In those departments which are the recipients of sensitive commercial or industrial information that requires protection against unauthorised disclosure, the privacy marking "Commercial in Confidence", with or without the additional of "Named Distribution Only", is in general use and is the subject of instructions in Appendix O of Security in Government Departments. Other forms of privacy markings, and the nature of precautions taken to protect them from unauthorised disclosure, lack uniformity and are left to be determined by individual departments.

15. The descriptions of material which falls into one or other of the four main categories by reference to the degree of harm that would be caused by its unauthorised disclosure are couched in wide terms which call for the exercise of individual judgment on the part of the originator of material as to the category in which it properly falls, and, without further guidance, it would seem inevitable that there would be wide divergences in the way in which the judgments of individual originators were exercised. As responsibility for security within each department lies with the department itself, each has provided for the guidance of its own members examples of the application of the classification to the kinds of material with which that particular department is accustomed to deal.



16. For the purposes of personnel security, the most important dividing lines are between TOP SECRET and SECRET, and between CONFIDENTIAL and RESTRICTED, for these determine what type of vetting, if any, must be applied to those persons who, in the case of TOP SECRET material, have **regular and constant** access to it and in the case of material that is classified as CONFIDENTIAL or above have **any** access to it. No vetting is required for access to RESTRICTED material by those members of the public service who have been recruited in the United Kingdom, but staff locally recruited in communist countries must not be given access to it. This is not to say that the distinction between SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL is without importance. Physical precautions to be taken in use, storage and transmission are more rigorous and time-consuming for SECRET than for CONFIDENTIAL and, apart from any question of vetting, add to the cost of dealing with material in the higher classification.

#### Over-Classification

17. Over-classification is, in our opinion, the error that is most commonly committed in carrying out current security procedures. Radcliffe recorded the unanimous opinion of those who gave evidence in 1961 that the security system then was trying to protect too much and suggested, for consideration by departments, various methods by which over-classification might be reduced. The problem has been considered periodically by a series of working parties since then and has been the subject of two reports by distinguished senior ex-civil servants. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that considerable over-classification still persists. This is not only objectionable upon grounds of managerial efficiency and economy; it adds considerably to the expense of the security procedures and the manpower needed to carry them out. It also tends to weaken the efficiency of the procedures by bringing them into disrepute not only with the press and the public generally, but also with those civil servants themselves whose duty it is to carry them out and upon whom the effect of obvious over-classification cannot be other than to encourage laxity.

18. To give but one example, which strikes us as unnecessary, there is the classification as SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL of the mere fact of the existence of Cabinet committees with the consequence that any document which refers to a Cabinet committee must bear that classification even though the information itself which the document is intended to convey does not warrant any security classification. The existence of Cabinet committees is a matter of public knowledge. It is often referred to in the press to which hostile intelligence services can have recourse if the information is of any interest to them.

19. The descriptions of the four main categories of classified information now in force are the result of a revision undertaken after Radcliffe in 1962. Prior to that, the description CONFIDENTIAL included information the disclosure of which to unauthorised persons "would cause administrative embarrassment or difficulty". These words on Radcliffe's recommendation have now been eliminated from the definitions. Nevertheless, the list of current examples of the application of the classification system which was issued for the guidance of civil and defence departments and is published as Appendix A in Security in Government Departments, and also those examples which appear in the guidance given to members of their own staffs by individual departments, still include instances of material which has no bearing on (1) defence, (2) foreign relations, or (3) intelligence, counter-intelligence or anti-subversive operations undertaken by the United Kingdom organisations to which we shall refer collectively as "secret intelligence work".

20. These three matters clearly qualify for inclusion in the higher categories of classified information. Some other matters also, such as emergency plans by government to deal with strikes or disruptive action in the essential services or industries, measures to be undertaken which will affect the rate of exchange, Budget proposals before their announcement and other proposed measures, where premature disclosure would defeat their effectiveness or enable those individuals to whom they were disclosed in advance to profit financially (to give but a few examples), also merit some degree of classification higher than RESTRICTED. But we are satisfied that several of the examples, the application of which must be responsible for the classification of many documents dealt with by departments as CONFIDENTIAL or above in the Home Civil Service, are really directed to the avoidance of political or administrative embarrassment despite Radcliffe's condemnation of the use of the classification system for this purpose.

1. In this connection the current climate of opinion in favour of "open government" to which we have referred provides an added reason for not classifying material as CONFIDENTIAL or above instead of as RESTRICTED or under a privacy marking only, merely because its disclosure to the public through the media might cause political or administrative embarrassment. To confine access to such material to public servants who had passed the Normal Vetting process only would not, in our view, provide a solution to the problem of "leaks". Normal Vetting brings to light only criminal convictions and evidence of tendencies hostile to this country or to its constitutional system of democratic parliamentary government. Those persons who are likely to leak to the public information obtained in the course of their duty as civil servants, which they are under a contractual obligation not to disclose, are just as likely to be those who leak such information to the media, either upon their own initiative or at the instigation of investigative journalists, out of a desire to promote the popular cause of more "open government".

22. We recommend and regard it as important that the Official Committee on Security should conduct a thorough review of the classification system. This should include a rigorous revision of the examples which are given in Appendix A to Security in Government Departments and those included in the additional guidance given to their own staff by individual departments, with a view to de-grading to RESTRICTED or to privacy markings, of information where the reason for its being classified is political or administrative embarrassment that its disclosure to the public would cause. As respects material still meriting classification as CONFIDENTIAL or above after the removal of politically or administratively embarrassing information to the RESTRICTED security category or to privacy markings only, consideration could usefully be given once again in each department to the grade within the service at which an officer should have the power to originate material in each of the three higher classifications. Where the need to prevent an unauthorised disclosure is only temporary, as may often be the case outside the fields of defence and secret intelligence work, consideration could also be given to the possible advantage in the originator of such classified material recommending a period after which de-classification would be automatic.

#### THE VETTING SYSTEM

23. Radcliffe refers to two kinds of security clearance of personnel:

a. Normal Vetting (NV) which in general is **covert** and applied to all persons who have any access to material classified as CONFIDENTIAL or above, and are members of the public service in a civilian capacity or of the armed forces, or the police, or the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) or are employees of British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) or of any firm of contractors engaged on government contracts (List X firms); and

b. Positive Vetting (PV) which is largely an **overt** process and is applied to those persons in any of the categories mentioned above and who, at any rate in theory if not always in reality, have regular and constant access to material classified as TOP SECRET.

c. Since Radcliffe there has been introduced a variety of NV known as "Full Record Check" that is **overt** and, on the insistence of the USA with whom much atomic information is shared, is applied to all recruits by UKAEA and BNFL. It is applied also to recruits to police forces. The only way in which this differs from ordinary NV is that the applicant for employment is required to fill in a written questionnaire in the same form as that which is used in PV and is thus made aware that he is being subject to vetting.

#### Normal Vetting

24. The nature of NV is described in Chapter II of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures, but there are no comprehensive statistics about its extent. The number of posts in the non-industrial Home Civil Service, for which NV is required, is estimated to be about 180,000, ie one-third of all Home Civil Service posts. This number might well be considerably reduced if our recommendation for removing from the security classifications of CONFIDENTIAL and above, information the disclosure of which to the public would cause political or administrative inconvenience, is vigorously pursued; but paucity of statistics makes it impossible to predict the extent of the reduction.

25. In addition there are 12,500 NV posts in British Telecommunications, and about 1,000 in the Post Office. In the armed forces, NV is applied to all officers, and in the Navy and Royal Air Force to the majority of other ranks as well, requiring some 203,000 clearances in all. In 1980 NV was applied to 12,200 employees of List X firms.

26. We were surprised by the limited nature of the information about individuals which is disclosed by Normal Vetting. It is restricted to an examination of departmental records for evidence of unsuitability, to a search by the Security Service for any traces of suspected disloyalty to this country or membership or active support of any subversive organisation, and to a search by Scotland Yard for any previous convictions of reportable offences which the subject of the check may have committed and are recorded against him in what used to be called the Criminal Record Office (CRO) but has been re-named the National Identification Bureau (NIB).

27. Out of nearly 300,000 NV checks in 1980, only 540 (0.19%) were given adverse assessments by the Security Service, but a substantially higher proportion, some 1.16%, had previous convictions for reportable offences recorded against them in NIB.

28. **We have naturally considered whether, in the light of these results, NV is worth continuing. We have, however, no doubt that it is. The cost of NV is relatively small, about £6 per submission. The time taken to complete the check is short and although when stated as a percentage of the total number of checks undertaken the number of persons debarred from access to classified material may look small, the actual number of individuals involved is not inconsiderable and any single one of them may be capable of causing serious injury to the interests of the nation.**

29. A possible weakness in the NV system results from the historical anomaly that, while the Security Service is responsible for maintaining records of members and supporters of subversive and terrorist organisations in the United Kingdom, other than those concerned with Irish Republican extremism, the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police is responsible for maintaining these records in relation to Irish Republican extremism. The Special Branch records are not checked as a matter of routine in all cases, but only if the Security Service in the course of its own check perceives what it considers to be an "Irish connection". There are no hard and fast rules as to what constitutes an "Irish connection", but the guidance given to those responsible in the Security Service for deciding whether or not to check the Special Branch records in an individual case seem to us to be sensible and reasonable. We accept that the disproportionate cost and sheer volume of work involved rule out that all NV cases should include a Special Branch check, but we think that attention should be directed to the risk of a slip-up between the two organisations which could result in suspected Irish terrorists or their sympathisers remaining un-identified by NV. **We recommend that the Home Office should, as a matter of urgency, consider carefully the relations between these two bodies with a view to seeing whether anything further needs to be done to reduce that risk to a minimum.**

30. We have also considered whether NV ought still to remain covert. The risk involved in not informing the subject of an NV check who has not obtained clearance of the reason for his NV failure is the possibility, remote though it may be, of a mistake by the Security Service or the NIB as to his identity. If he were informed of the reason for his failure he would have the opportunity of clearing himself by correcting the error.

31. There is thus some risk of an injustice being done to some individuals although we are satisfied that the precautions taken to establish the identity of the subject of any NV check make the risk very small indeed. It is one which we consider must be accepted in the interests of the nation. Little harm would be done by revealing that failure was due to previous convictions recorded against him by NIB although some might suspect that the police check was not limited to convictions as such. Previous convictions in fact constitute the reason for some six out of seven NV failures; but if any of them were to be given on request reasons for their failures, it would not be possible in an increasingly actively trade unionised service to give reasons in some cases and to refuse them in others. In most of that minority of cases in which the failure resulted from a Security Service check, it might well be that reasons could not be given without disclosing information in the possession of the Security Service obtained from highly sensitive sources, which would endanger those sources or at least prejudice their future usefulness. This seems to us to be a conclusive reason why NV should continue to be covert and the nature of the NV check should not be disclosed - even though it must be widely realised that some sort of check of a person's antecedents is likely to have been made. **We recommend that consideration should be given to withdrawing Annexes 59 and 60 of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures which give to departments a limited discretion to disclose to the individual concerned who was under consideration for an NV post, not only the fact that he was rejected on security grounds but also in some cases the reason for his failure.**

32. In reporting to departments the result of its security check in NV cases, the Security Service either states that there is no security objection or uses one of three formulae, A, B, and C, according to the degree of suspicion which the Security Service records raise as to the loyalty or subversive sympathies of the subject of the check. These formulae are set out in Annex 12 of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures. They range from advice that the subject should **not** have access to information classified as CONFIDENTIAL or above, to advice that the information about the subject in the Security Service's records should not necessarily debar him from access to information classified as CONFIDENTIAL or above, but that the department may prefer to make other arrangements if particularly delicate information is involved.

33. We regard it as important that whenever formula A, B or C is used, the department concerned should inform the Security Service as soon as practicable of the action it has taken in relation to the subject of the check. The Security Service's standard letter to departments asks that this should be done, but we are not satisfied that departments do in all cases comply with this request or, if they do eventually, do so with reasonable promptitude. **We recommend that the importance of keeping the Security Service informed of the action they have taken in response to the Security Service's advice should be drawn to the attention of all departments.**

#### Positive Vetting

34. The nature of the procedures followed in PV are set out in Chapter III of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures. Compared with NV, it is an expensive and time-consuming process, but if properly carried out it does expose, as NV fails to do, "character defects" which render uncertain the subject's trustworthiness or discretion, or his ability to resist pecuniary temptation or exposure to blackmail. It is character defects rather than disloyalty for ideological reasons or subversive tendencies (which should have come to light on NV checks) that have been the cause of all known cases of disclosure of information to hostile intelligence services that have occurred since Radcliffe. PV, however, has three disadvantages:-

a. As already mentioned it is expensive, particularly in the use of manpower in the field-work undertaken by investigating officers in interviewing the subject of the PV check and his referees. The average cost of field-work alone is estimated at some £700 per investigation and this in our view is probably an under-estimate.

b. The PV process involves considerable time, its completion averaging three months or more in ordinary cases, though in cases of urgency the process can be carried through much more expeditiously than that. In those departments or services, viz the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the three services engaged in secret intelligence work, the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), where, with relatively minor exceptions, all candidates for recruitment have to be PV'd, the delay may result in the loss of valuable recruits especially those with specialised qualifications who accept other offers of employment during the waiting period.

c. In a department in which there are many PV posts, the failure of a member of the staff of the department to obtain PV clearance upon transfer to a PV post may block his chances of promotion and, under the existing rules, would prevent his reaching the grade of under-secretary or above. In any event it may well affect adversely the prospects of his career in lower grades of the public service, although it would appear that, in the majority of cases in the Home Civil Service, it has been found possible by good management to avoid this result, as the paucity of appeals against refusal of PV would appear to show. In fully PV'd departments, however, the withdrawal of PV for a character defect may well mean that the officer may be compelled to accept early retirement unless it is found possible to transfer him to a non-PV post of an appropriate grade in the Home Civil Service.

35. The criteria of unfitness for a PV post are if there is evidence:

I. that the subject or his spouse, or his parent or guardian with whom he is or has recently been living

a. has been involved in an act of sabotage, espionage, treason, sedition, or any breach of the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts;

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

- b. has been an associate of suspected spies or saboteurs;
  - c. has any connections with a subversive organisation;
- II. that the subject himself
- d. has grossly infringed security regulations;
  - e. falsified an application form or a security questionnaire;
  - f. has been convicted of a criminal offence indicating habitual criminal tendencies or serious character deficiencies;
  - g. has shown himself by act or speech to be unreliable, dishonest, untrustworthy or indiscreet;
  - h. has engaged in infamous, immoral or disgraceful conduct;
  - i. has significant financial difficulties;
  - j. has been an alcohol or drug addict;
  - k. has suffered from any illness which might affect his judgment;
  - l. is a homosexual and therefore vulnerable to a blackmail approach;
  - m. has been held captive or interned for a substantial period in Communist hands;
  - n. does not conform to the nationality rule of the department concerned.

36. The criteria listed under I and II.d are security reasons for refusing PV. In contrast those listed under II m. and n. are sometimes described as defects of circumstance. The rest of those listed under II are referred to as character defects.

#### Homosexuality as a bar to PV clearance

37. The most controversial of the character defects is male homosexuality because of the change in English law and public opinion on this subject that has taken place in the post-Radcliffe years. It is claimed that an unconcealed, acknowledged and stable relationship in England and Wales with another consenting adult of the same sex in which no homosexual acts take place in public no longer involves a party to such a relationship in any vulnerability to blackmail and thus does not constitute a security risk in officers whose service is confined to these countries. Homosexual relationships between consenting male adults are, however, still offences against the criminal law of a number of foreign states to which persons serving in the Diplomatic Service and the services engaged in secret intelligence are liable to be posted,

**In these services we recommend that homosexuality, even if acknowledged, should continue to be a bar to employment in any PV post though an exception might be made for officers employed by GCHQ for specialist work which will not involve their ever being posted outside England and Wales. In the armed forces, homosexual acts, even between consenting adults, are disciplinary offences rendering the perpetrator liable to compulsory discharge. Here too we recommend that homosexuality must, on security grounds, remain a bar to appointment to a PV post.**

38. Homosexual tendencies may remain latent only or may manifest themselves in so broad a gamut of forms from inconspicuous stable relationships through promiscuity or exhibitionism to paederasty that we consider that, in the Home Civil Service, homosexual inclinations or relationships should not necessarily be treated as an absolute bar to PV clearance, but should be dealt with on a case to case basis, paying particular attention to whether the way in which the individual has indulged his homosexual tendencies casts any doubt upon his discretion or reliability.

39. Since PV is overt an officer knows that he is being PVd and where the reason for his failure is a character defect he may well have appreciated from questions put to him by the investigating officer what the character defect alleged against him is. The decision to refuse PV is taken by the department in which the officer is serving. The level at which it is taken varies from department to department and does not involve the permanent head of department. From this decision, if it is based on character defect, there is a right of appeal to the permanent

head of department at which the officer may, if he wishes, be represented by a "friend" who may be a trade union official. It was suggested to us by the Trade Union Side of the Diplomatic Service Whitley Council that it would be helpful if, in the event of an appeal, the officer were, if he so requested, given a written statement of the allegations made against him, though not the sources of the information on which the allegations were based. If this is not already the regular practice in all departments, **we recommend that it should be adopted in every case of appeal against refusal of PV on the grounds of character defect, except perhaps where the defect consists of mental instability of which it might be harmful to the subject's own mental health to inform him.**

#### Appeal to the Three Advisers

40. Where the refusal of PV is for security reasons there is a right of appeal to the Three Advisers who currently consist of two retired permanent secretaries of departments of the Home Civil Service and a former Secretary-General of the Civil Service National Whitley Council Staff Side. The procedure and the terms of reference of the Three Advisers are set out in Annex 33 of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures. This has become out of date in the light of the changes in the threat which have occurred since 1961, of which we have spoken above. The Three Advisers have not in fact sat on an appeal since 1969; which reflects the fact that character defects rather than security reasons have provided the grounds on which PV has been refused. Nevertheless, **we consider that a right of appeal to the Three Advisers should still be retained in future cases, if there should be any, on which PV is refused on security grounds. But we consider that the composition of this appellate body should be altered and in particular that the chairman should be a member of the judiciary.**

41. In theory there is a right of appeal to the Three Advisers when an employee of a List X firm has been refused PV clearance on grounds of character defect, as well as where the refusal has been for security reasons. This right of appeal is not referred to in the published Radcliffe. It has never been used and appears to be unknown. We regard it not only as an anomaly but also undesirable. If an appeal to an independent tribunal against refusal of PV clearance on this ground were known to be permitted in the case of employees of List X firms, we do not doubt that there would be a demand for a similar right of appeal to an independent tribunal in the case of members of the public service also with the loss of flexibility in the way of dealing with the problem by an alternative posting that is characteristic of an "in-house" appeal. **We accordingly recommend that the right of appeal by employees of List X firms to the Three Advisers against refusal of PV clearance on the ground of character defect should be abolished. For the same reasons we recommend that the right of appeal by British subjects employed by international defence organisations to the Three Advisers against withdrawal of PV clearance on the grounds of character defect should also be abolished.**

#### The Number of PV Posts

42. Altogether, there are about 68,000 posts for which PV clearance is required. Of these 16,600 are in the Home Civil Service, of which all, except some 3,500, are in the Ministry of Defence (MOD), 700 are in British Telecommunications and the Post Office and 3,150 in List X firms. There are 17,200 in the armed forces. The Diplomatic Service has 7,700, and the Security Service, SIS and GCHQ have 11,200 between them. UKAEA and BNFL have 9,100 and the Police (Special Branches) 2,350.

43. We have not been able to obtain reliable statistics of the proportion of cases in which PV has been refused. Those that we have been able to obtain vary between about 1% (UKAEA) and 8% (GCHQ). Of some 2,700 civilians employed by Government contractors and PV'd in 1980 by the Ministry of Defence for the first time, 125 (4.6%) were refused clearance.

44. **We have naturally considered whether this expensive procedure, with its accompanying disadvantages to which we have referred, ought to be continued but, at any rate so far as concerns PV on first appointment to a PV post, we have no hesitation in recommending that it ought.** If the criterion for a PV post, viz the regular and constant access to information classified as TOP SECRET is properly applied, the potential damage to the nation which could be caused if such information were disclosed to the intelligence services of a hostile state in our view justifies the very considerable expense of maintaining the system of PV, which is estimated in 1980 to have been of the order of £6,000,000, and the other disadvantages to which we have referred.

45. Nevertheless, we have the strong impression that departments in the Home Civil Service have been too ready to classify as requiring PV clearance posts which do not really satisfy the criterion of being classified as such. We make below some recommendations for reducing their numbers in the Home Civil Service, but **we also recommend that departments should themselves review each of their existing PV posts with a view to seeing whether the number of them could be reduced.**

#### Quinquennial Review of PV Clearance

46. The procedure for PV provides for a review of PV clearance at regular intervals, generally quinquennial but in some departments the review is undertaken at ten year intervals only. The extent to which the quinquennial review repeats the procedure followed upon the first PV clearance is subject to considerable variations from department to department. There is no hard evidence that there has been even a single case outside the armed forces in which a quinquennial review has brought to light grounds for withdrawal of PV clearance which would not have been already revealed by incidents that had been reported to the security branch in the department by supervising officers of the holder of the PV post under the system known as "after-care". The principal justification of the system of retaining quinquennial reviews that was suggested to us was that it tended to keep supervising officers on their toes in reporting incidents that might have security significance, if they were aware that they would be required at regular intervals to answer questions by a security investigation officer about any manifestation of character defects on the part of any holder of a PV post that had come to their knowledge.

47. **We recommend that at regular intervals of never more than ten years, but normally of five, there should be a review of PV clearance of holders of PV posts which should include as a minimum -**

- a. a routine check with the records of the Security Service and the NIB (ie a repetition of NV clearance);
- b. the bringing together of the security and personnel files of the PV post-holder and their scrutiny by a member of the security branch of the department; and
- c. reports, either written or oral, from all those who have been supervising officers of the PV post-holder during the period since the last review.

The extent to which this minimum requirement should be expanded to include checks with the local police in the area in which the post-holder lives or oral interviews conducted by security investigation officers with the post-holder himself or his referees, we think should be left to the discretion of the department concerned, although in the case of the services engaged in secret intelligence work we make additional recommendations under that heading.

#### Home Civil Service Departments excluding MOD

48. The rule that PV clearance as a matter of routine is required of all members of the Civil Service of the grade of under-secretary or above must account for the existence of considerable numbers of PV posts in departments in which material correctly classified as TOP SECRET is only rarely found; and neither under-secretaries nor even officers of higher grade in these departments would in fact satisfy the criterion of having regular and constant access to such material. We appreciate that the underlying reason for the rule is the theory that, in order to make the most effective use of their abilities, civil servants in the higher echelons should be fully transferable within and between departments; but this seems to us to be a wholly inadequate reason for subjecting a civil servant, whatever his grade, to PV clearance until he is required to fill some post in which he will in fact have regular and constant access to TOP SECRET material. **We recommend that this rule, which we regard as being without security justification, should be abandoned.**

49. A similar practice requiring PV clearance of all civil servants of whatever grade serving in the private offices of Ministers seems to us to be likewise unjustified where the Minister is not a member of the Cabinet and is a Minister or a junior Minister in a department where no one is required to have regular and constant access to TOP SECRET information and any access to it is occasional at most. **We recommend that the Official Committee on Security should undertake a review of the private offices of Ministers in the various departments of the**

Home Civil Service where the criterion of regular and constant access to information classified as TOP SECRET is not satisfied, with a view to abandoning the routine requirements of PV clearance of all civil servants posted to them.

Ministry of Defence

50. For obvious reasons the number of PV posts among the civilian staff of MOD would be large even if only the ordinary criterion for PV clearance of **regular and constant access** to TOP SECRET information applied. The number of PV posts is, however, added to for reasons outside MOD's control, by the requirements imposed on the insistence of one or more of our allies that **any** access to material bearing one or other of seven special security markings should be confined to persons holding PV clearance. In addition MOD, in our view rightly, requires PV clearance for all investigating officers constituting the Personnel Security Investigation Unit which undertakes the interviews and field work in connection with PV clearance not only for MOD itself but also for most other departments in the Home Civil Service, British Telecommunications and the Post Office, Police (Special Branches) and List X firms. The MOD security directorates, including the separate PV investigating units operating under the directors of security of the three armed forces, have recently been the subject of review and report by a committee chaired by Mr D H Payne. The Payne Report deals with detailed matters of organisation and management upon which we do not feel qualified to express a view; **but we strongly support the recommendation in the Payne Report that a scrutiny of all PV posts in the MOD and in the armed forces should be undertaken as a matter of urgency to see if they really warrant being graded as calling for PV clearance.**

The Armed Forces

51. The Navy, Army and Royal Air Force, each of which has its own separate security directorate and investigating officers for Positive Vetting, follow the guidelines set out in the Manual of Personnel Security Measures in initial PV checks; but the practice followed on periodical review of PV clearance varies considerably as between one service and another. Quinquennial reviews including the minimum steps that we have recommended for civilian members of the public service are undertaken in all three armed forces, but whereas the Royal Air Force conducts interviews with the subject, his superior officers and new referees at each quinquennial review, in the Navy and the Army although the superior officers of the subject are interviewed at each quinquennial review, the subject himself (but not any referees) is interviewed at ten year intervals only. We see no reasons for this difference and we have had no evidence that leads us to suppose that the quinquennial interviews with the subject and new referees undertaken by the Royal Air Force as a matter of routine serve a security purpose that could justify the considerable expense involved. **We recommend that the Royal Air Force should adjust its procedures on quinquennial reviews to conform with those adopted in the two other armed forces.**

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Diplomatic Service)

52. The fact that members of the Diplomatic Service spend much of their service career in posts abroad makes them obvious targets for the intelligence services of foreign powers. Whether at home or overseas they frequently handle or have access to information relating to external affairs which merits high security classification and which they may be inveigled into disclosing through indiscretion; while the introduction into the Diplomatic Service of a recruit willing to betray this country for ideological reasons must continue to be treated as an ever-present danger. **We accordingly regard it as essential on security grounds that the Diplomatic Service should continue to be a fully PV'd service.** The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) as part of its security department maintains its own vetting section of 18 investigating officers; it does not rely upon the Personnel Security Investigating Unit of the MOD for this purpose. This we think is right; the security risks to which members of the Diplomatic Service are exposed differ from those encountered by members of the Home Civil Service. **We also think, for reasons that we have already stated, that in the Diplomatic Service practising homosexuality should be treated as an absolute bar to recruitment and, if undiscovered upon initial PV, should result in removal from the Diplomatic Service when it does come to light, unless on a case-to-case basis it could be dealt with under the Alternative Certificate procedure to which we refer below. It would we think be only fair that a would-be recruit to the Diplomatic Service should be informed of this.**



53. Because of the time taken for completion of PV clearance, recruits other than those to posts in the administrative grades, research officers, economists, security officers and NATO staff, are engaged provisionally upon NV clearance pending completion of PV. **We regard this as acceptable provided that the recruit is not posted overseas until PV is complete and that care is taken to limit his access to the most sensitive material.**

54. Because the FCO is a fully PV'd department and because the security risk involved in disclosure of classified information through indiscretion while serving overseas makes freedom from character defects of particular importance in members of the Diplomatic Service, withdrawal of PV clearance raises problems for the FCO that are greater than those encountered in the Home Civil Service. Unless the officer whose PV clearance is withdrawn can be transferred to some non-PV post of appropriate grade in the Home Civil Service, an expedient that becomes more and more impracticable as the length of his service in the FCO increases, recourse must be had to premature retirement. To avoid adopting this drastic course as soon as grounds for even slight doubt as to reliability owing to character defect has arisen the FCO has a procedure under which an Alternative Certificate may be issued confining the officer to a particular post, generally in the United Kingdom. Any change of posting of an officer in this category has to be cleared with the FCO's security department.

#### SECRET INTELLIGENCE WORK

55. The methods of recruitment and personnel security measures that are currently in use in the three organisations engaged in secret intelligence work (the Security Service, SIS and GCHQ), in so far as they differ from those employed by other government departments, are not set out in the Manual of Personnel Security Measures. Because of this, and because the occasion of the present reference to us was the anxiety as to whether gaps in security in the recruitment procedures of MI5 and MI6, which undoubtedly existed before and during World War II, still continued to exist, we have thought it helpful to set out in summary form in Appendix A the present recruitment and vetting procedures of the Security Service, SIS and GCHQ.

56. Reference to Appendix A will show that there are differences between the three secret organisations particularly in relation to recruitment, which flow from differences in the extent to which the existence of each organisation is openly avowed. Insistence upon complete non-avowal, which applies only to SIS, also results in the classification as SECRET or TOP SECRET of many documents which on any sensible security grading would warrant no higher classification than CONFIDENTIAL or might be relegated to RESTRICTED only.

57. GCHQ is an openly acknowledged government department under the ministerial responsibility of the Foreign Secretary. As such it is required to recruit its staff, all of whom are subject to PV clearance, through the Civil Service Commission and no attempt is made to conceal the identity of members of its staff. Its staff are permitted to join trade unions and those of its white-collar staff who do so become members of the same trade unions as officers of similar grades in the FCO itself. That part of its work that is concerned with the protection of government telecommunications is also openly acknowledged but the major part, consisting of obtaining intelligence by the interception and decoding of telecommunications of foreign governments and of their armed forces, is not acknowledged; although any journalist or member of the public who takes any interest in such matters knows perfectly well that such is the case and so of course do foreign intelligence services. The more important of them do the same sort of thing themselves.

58. The existence of the Security Service is openly acknowledged and so, in very general terms, are its functions. It has in our view not been rendered any the less effective for that; nor has any embarrassment been caused to the Home Secretary, to whom the Security Service is answerable, by questions addressed to him in Parliament about its operations or the methods and techniques that it employs. Until 1979 the Security Service did not make use of the Civil Service Commission at any stage of its recruitment procedures. It now does so in the manner described in Appendix A. For obvious reasons the identity of members of the Security Service is so far as possible kept concealed; and unlike members of GCHQ they are not permitted to be members of a trade union.

59. The fact that the SIS has continued in existence after the end of World War II is officially supposed to be a secret with the consequence that any document that even mentions it by name is required to bear the classification SECRET, although it may contain no information whatever about SIS operations, methods or techniques, or the identity of any member of the service. The official pretence that SIS does not exist, quite apart from the expensive over-classification of documents that this entails, is in our view so absurd that it is calculated to bring with it into disregard by the media and the public, legitimate security measures to prevent disclosure of the operations, methods and techniques of all three organisations engaged in secret intelligence work which are essential if they are to perform their functions effectively.

60. That we have a secret intelligence service is common knowledge. It is frequently referred to in the press sometimes by its full title or more often as the "Secret Service" or by its former designation "MI6". While we were engaged in writing this report the obituary of Sir John Rennie appeared in The Times newspaper with the sub-title "Former Head of MI6". To go on officially pretending that no such organisation exists can do nothing but diminish the credibility of security measures in general and provide encouragement to aggressive investigative journalists to disclose to the public and thereby to hostile intelligence services information about our own secret intelligence work which it is vitally important to keep secret.

61. We have not heard any plausible reason for continuing the policy of non-avowal of SIS. We strongly recommend that it should be abandoned. The existence of SIS should be acknowledged; and it should in future be placed upon the same footing as the Security Service. The identity of its members should be concealed and this would preclude their joining a trade union.

#### Recruitment to Security Service and SIS

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63. Except for part-time cleaners, GCHQ do not employ anyone even in clerical or secretarial grades until completion of full PV clearance. This, in effect, is forced upon them by the requirement, in agreement with our allies, that access to any intelligence material that has been gathered by the means employed by GCHQ must be denied to anyone who has not obtained full PV clearance. Even if this were not the case **we think that this precaution should be retained even though the delay involved may risk the loss of suitable recruits with expert qualifications.** Severe damage would be done by indiscreet disclosure of an apparently innocuous fact from which a hostile intelligence might infer for instance that there was a risk that a particular code had been broken. Such a disclosure could well result in a change of code and thereby remove at least temporarily, if not permanently, a valuable source of information.

#### Review of Positive Vetting

64. The three organisations engaged in secret intelligence work do not follow the same practice as respects reviews of PV. The Security Service alone carries out the full PV procedure again at five year intervals. Despite its cost we would not suggest any departure from this practice. The staff of the Security Service is home-based. The addresses at which they live are widely scattered and their social life and habits are not under observation by their supervisors or their colleagues. Furthermore the Security Service as adviser to other Government departments and organisations on security matters should in its own personnel security procedures be seen to observe the maximum degree of caution.

65. SIS does not repeat the full PV procedure including interviews at five year intervals. In practice a quarter to a half of officers employed by SIS are interviewed by investigating officers at the regular quinquennial review; interviews are conducted in those cases where an

Examination of the personal files leaves any doubt unresolved. We consider that this more flexible practice is justified by the fact that most SIS officers spend much of their service abroad under diplomatic cover in the relatively closed community of an embassy where evidence of character defect or unreliability is difficult to conceal, and where they are reported on annually by the head of mission. **In the case of headquarters' staff, however, who have not been posted overseas since their last PV interview we recommend that consideration should be given to the desirability of an interview with the member of the staff himself, though not necessarily any referees, at five year intervals as in the case of the Security Service.**

66. GCHQ follows the same practice in quinquennial reviews as that followed by SIS, although an additional review is undertaken before an overseas posting. Only about a quarter of quinquennial reviews include an interview with the subject. Having regard to what we have said about homosexuality as a bar to PV posting in GCHQ **we consider that there should always be an interview upon posting abroad after more than five years have elapsed since the last PV interview**, and having regard to the highly sensitive nature of nearly all the material dealt with by GCHQ, **we recommend that as in the case of the armed forces there should be an interview with the subject himself at least at not less than ten year intervals.**

#### THE POLICE

67. All members of police special branches require PV clearance. This we regard as a necessary security measure even although no witness could recall a case of failure by a policeman to obtain PV clearance. The Metropolitan Police Special Branch, as a result of the historical anomaly which we have already mentioned, performs in relation to Irish Republican terrorist and subversive organisations intelligence functions similar to those performed by the Security Service as respects all other terrorist and subversive organisations; both it and the special branches of other police forces in England and Wales and Scotland are, in effect, the executive arm of the Security Service. It is they who execute search warrants and make the arrests and conduct the formalities leading to prosecution.

68. It would appear, although no instance of this has been brought to our attention, that if a policeman were to fail PV clearance for some reason that did not disqualify him for further service in the police force he would be transferred to some branch other than a special branch, and would have no recognised right of appeal against refusal of PV clearance. Though a right of appeal may well continue to be a theoretical rather than a practical question, **we consider that if PV clearance were refused there should be a right of appeal to the Three Advisers where the refusal was on the ground of disloyal or subversive traces and to the chief officer of police where the refusal was on the grounds of character defects.**

#### ATOMIC ESTABLISHMENTS

69. The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) is not a Government department. It is responsible for recruiting its own staff; it does not use the Civil Service Commission. It is also responsible for its own security and employs its own investigation officers; it does not use the Personnel Security Investigating Unit of MOD. UKAEA originally included the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) which in 1973 was transferred to MOD and now accounts for a substantial proportion of civilian PV posts there. UKAEA remains responsible for its own security and also that of British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) a company incorporated under the Companies Act whose capital is wholly government owned. Under an agreement with the USA all 30,000 employees of UKAEA and BNFL are subject to the special form of overt NV known as the Full Record Check; but although they are concerned with the peaceful use of nuclear power and have but little access to TOP SECRET information, the agreement reached with the US that persons without PV clearance must be denied access to any SECRET ATOMIC information, has led to some 9,000 of their employees being in PV posts.

70. The threat in the case of UKAEA and BNFL, unlike the case of AWRE, is not so much from the intelligence services of the Soviet bloc, who are unlikely to learn anything they do not already know from the sort of information dealt with by UKAEA, as from developing nations anxious to acquire know-how to enable them to manufacture nuclear weapons of their own, for there are common features between the use of nuclear fission for producing power and for producing destructive missiles. While we doubt whether this threat itself would justify the retention of so many PV posts, reductions in their number would need to be negotiated with the US government, upon whom we are heavily reliant for knowledge of technical advances in this field.

## LIST X FIRMS

71. Positive Vetting of employees of contractors in List X firms is described in the published version of Radcliffe. Security advice is given to these firms by the Security Service whose team of advisers has, as Radcliffe recommended, been substantially increased. The PV procedure is the responsibility of the contracting department, generally the MOD but sometimes the Property Services Agency, and interviews and field investigations are carried out by investigating officers of MOD. The risk of unauthorised disclosure of classified information would appear on the face of it to be greater in List X firms than in the public service itself; but we have not been told of any case in which the threat has materialised and **we see no necessity to recommend any change in the existing procedure except the abolition of the unused and probably unknown right of appeal to the Three Advisers referred to in the unpublished Radcliffe where PV clearance to an employee of a List X firm is refused on grounds of character defect. This right of appeal is not mentioned in the published version of Radcliffe.**

## MINISTERS

72. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that a Minister may himself be a security risk. Indeed the Security Commission in 1973 (Cmnd 5367) was driven to that conclusion in the case of a junior Minister on the grounds of character defects. We recognise however that the way in which ministerial posts are filled upon a change of government makes it impracticable to subject them to PV or even NV clearance before appointment and probably politically unacceptable to invite them to co-operate in PV clearance procedures upon themselves after appointment, although we understand that following the recommendation of the Security Commission in Cmnd 5367 Ministers on appointment to a department are given specific instructions upon its security problems and procedures. **We can do no more than repeat and re-emphasise that recommendation.**

## Parliamentary Private Secretaries

73. Parliamentary private secretaries (PPS's) to Ministers do not normally have much access to classified information. Under present arrangements that have been in force since 1977 PPS's are subject to a covert security check which is undertaken by the Prime Minister's Private Office, before the Prime Minister agrees to their appointment. If agreement is given to the appointment of a PPS about whom this check discloses security doubts, the permanent head of the department is consulted so that he may consider whether to recommend to the Minister concerned restrictions upon the PPS's access to classified information. Upon this delicate topic, like that of Ministers themselves we think that this is the best that can be done; and **we make no recommendation for altering the current practice.**

## Special Advisers to Ministers

74. These comparatively recent additions to those persons from whom Ministers seek advice in connection with the exercise of their governmental functions are not members of the Civil Service but personal appointees of the Minister concerned. Under the current directive issued by the Prime Minister **special advisers to Cabinet Ministers must be Positively Vetted. We agree that this is right. If, as has happened in the past, special advisers are appointed by other Ministers, we think that they should be required to comply with the vetting requirements applicable to their degree of access to classified information.** The test should be the same as that applied for service in the private office of the Minister; and under our earlier recommendation for reducing the security grading of posts in the private offices of Ministers of departments in the Home Civil Service the need for PV clearance of special advisers to Ministers may be similarly reduced.

## SPECIALIST ADVISERS TO HOUSE OF COMMONS SELECT COMMITTEES

75. These persons are in a category which did not exist at the time of Radcliffe but to whom, if the select committee system is to work effectively, it is desirable that access to classified information in the possession of Government should not be entirely barred. This presents special problems of its own. What they are and how they are currently dealt with are set out in Appendix B. The question of Positive Vetting is involved; **we are emphatically of opinion that no specialist adviser should be given regular and constant access to TOP SECRET**

information or any access at all to information which by agreement with any of our allies is confined exclusively to persons with PV clearance. NV clearance is, however, in our view, essential in the case of specialist advisers to the select committees on defence and foreign affairs and it may be, in addition, on particular subjects falling within the purview of other select committees. The difficulty arises from the fact that NV is covert and for reasons we have discussed ought in our view to remain so. A specialist adviser, or the member of the select committee who had recommended him, might well create a highly embarrassing situation and bring the whole question of NV out into the open if access by him to classified information were denied without its being possible to tell him or his sponsor that his disqualification from access was on security grounds. This danger could be reduced by subjecting specialist advisers to the system of overt NV known as the Full Record Check which is adopted in respect of all employees of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and British Nuclear Fuels Limited. The information provided by the specialist adviser in filling up the vetting form would, if true, provide the material to justify denying him access to classified material if this should be necessary on security grounds. If, however, it were untrue in any relevant respect that could be demonstrated without revealing delicate sources of information, the unreliability of the proposed specialist adviser justifying refusal of access to classified information would have been made manifest. **We accordingly recommend that consideration be given to the feasibility of introducing Full Record Check vetting for specialist advisers to the select committees on defence and foreign affairs and, where they would have access to CONFIDENTIAL information, for advisers to other select committees; unless they have been previously Positively Vetted, as may well be the case with some of them.**

#### CHANGES IN LEGISLATION SINCE RADCLIFFE

##### (1) Nationality Law

76. The Nationality Act 1981 will not call for any alteration in the substance either of the standard nationality rule for admission to the Civil Service or of the special and more stringent rules applicable to service in the Cabinet Office or the MOD or to the Diplomatic Service and GCHQ. Some verbal amendment to the rules may, however, be required. **The instructions contained in Annex 6 to the Manual of Personnel Security Measures, which deals with security precautions with persons not of United Kingdom origin or who have overseas connections, appear to us to be appropriate and should continue to be observed.**

##### (2) Employment Legislation and Anti-discrimination Legislation

77. The right to apply to an Industrial Tribunal for relief against unfair dismissal, including constructive dismissal, is now covered by the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978. Within the public service, dismissal for security reasons arises only where failure to obtain either NV or PV clearance is not capable of being dealt with by appointing the officer concerned to some post either in the same or some other suitable department of the public service where access to classified information is not essential to the performance of his duties; so there is no alternative but to dismiss him. Dismissal can, however, generally be avoided by careful management and although the possibility of the issue under the applicable legislation of a ministerial certificate that the dismissal was on security grounds remains as a long stop, it has not so far been found necessary to resort to it. A certificate if given is conclusive and removes from the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal the question whether the dismissal was unfair or not. **We recommend that the ministerial certificate procedure be retained in any future legislation on this topic.**

78. Similar problems are capable of arising in the case of employees of List X firms. In such a case the respondent to the employee's application to the Industrial Tribunal would be the List X firm itself but the ministerial certificate procedure would nonetheless be applicable. Although the substance of the current "unfair dismissal" legislation has been in force since 1974 no case involving dismissal of an employee of a List X firm for security reasons appears to have arisen under it.

79. The legislation prohibiting discrimination on grounds of race et cetera is most likely to be invoked at the stage of recruitment to the public service but it may also arise in connection with subsequent promotion to a post that requires either NV or PV clearance. The nationality rules applied by departments, since they are made under statutory authority, do not contravene the anti-discrimination legislation. For individual cases of refusal to recruit or to promote a public servant on security grounds notwithstanding that he is eligible under the nationality

ules there is a similar procedure if racial prejudice is alleged for a ministerial certificate by way of a long stop. So far, however, it has not been found necessary in any case to resort to a ministerial certificate. There have in fact been only a handful of cases which involved security considerations under either the employment or the anti-discrimination legislation. We consider the safeguards for personnel security under the existing anti-discrimination laws to be adequate.

#### PHYSICAL SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

80. We have examined the detailed instructions laid down in Part III of Security in Government Departments and entitled "The Protection of Classified Information". These instructions are kept under review by the Security Policy and Methods Committee and its various specialist sub-committees. They appear to us to be adequate in content but we draw attention once again to the desirability of re-issuing them in a more digestible and readily intelligible form as soon as this is practicable. It is not, however, in the written rules but in the human factor in their application that the weakness will always lie. The safeguard that can be provided by even the most elaborate and rigorous system of vetting those persons who are authorised to have access to classified material is rendered ineffective unless illicit access to such material by persons not so authorised, particularly for the purpose of copying or abstraction, is prevented.

81. We have already drawn attention to the temptation to slackness in the strict observance of security measures for the protection of classified material that over-classification brings in its train; it also adds significantly to the cost of government. To give but one example, we were informed that the cost of providing government offices with security equipment is running at the rate of £3m a year, although the actual additional cost represented by the security element in this figure would be somewhat less, since if security furniture were not provided office furniture would presumably be needed to replace it. But the greatest cost, which defies any accurate estimate, is in the additional man hours spent upon precautionary procedures that are required for materials that are unnecessarily marked CONFIDENTIAL or above as distinct from RESTRICTED, or a privacy marking, which is all they merit. **This is an added reason for pressing on with the review of the classification system by the Official Committee on Security which we have already recommended.**

#### COMPUTERS AND OFFICE AUTOMATION

82. The use of computers in the public service for the storage and retrieval of classified information is not mentioned in Radcliffe; if it occurred at all then it can have been no more than minimally. Since that time, however, and particularly over the last ten years it has progressed rapidly and so has the use of word-processors and other forms of office automation. We do not doubt that this trend will continue and indeed accelerate with continuing developments in computer technology and will bring in its train new security problems, which themselves will not stay static, in the safeguarding of classified information made accessible at the terminals of large central computers or stored in mini-computers or on floppy discs or other forms of storage used for word processing machines.

83. This is the area of physical security which causes us the greatest disquiet. The amount of data that is capable of being stored upon a single disc or magnetic tape and the rapidity approaching instantaneity with which the data can be retrieved means that any vulnerability to access by hostile intelligence services of material stored in computers or word processors could be a major disaster to this country and in particular to the efficacy of the three services involved in secret intelligence work. The problems of dealing with security in this field are highly technical in themselves already, yet they are unlikely to remain static since they are liable to be affected by the very rapid changes that will continue to take place in computer and micro-chip technology, most of which originate outside this country. No doubt it was because of this that we ourselves found Chapter 17 of Security in Government Departments which deals with "Security in Computer and Data Processing Systems and Installations" so difficult of comprehension; yet the instructions need to be applied by security officers in the various departments whose technical understanding of what, in the way the installations work, is capable of rendering the information stored in them vulnerable to unauthorised access, may be not much more profound than is our own.

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85. There is a great demand outside the public service for trained computer staff, particularly those capable of undertaking those tasks which require the highest forms of expertise. In the private sector of industry and commerce, persons with these qualifications have been able to command salaries substantially higher than those paid to civil servants. In consequence there has been experienced in the public service a comparatively rapid turnover of computer staff after they have acquired the skill and experience that enables them to earn higher salaries elsewhere. Despite the current recession we think that this tendency will continue. Compared with other civil servants computer staff should be regarded from the security point of view as birds of passage. This means that in the case of classified information stored in computers there are likely to be outside the public service persons with intimate knowledge of the programming and the hardware and software of the computer in which the information is stored. This cannot but increase the risk of such knowledge being passed on to hostile intelligence services. **We draw particular attention to this, but we see no way in which it can be eliminated.**

86. In the Report on the Wagstaff case in May 1981 we recommended that responsible officials should institute a study of the special problems involved in the storage of information in the various types of magnetic media. The Wagstaff case was simply one of gross breaches of security procedures in the storage of magnetic tapes in cupboards while not in use on the word processors for which they were designed. The study which we recommended was undertaken by a sub-committee of the Security Policy and Methods Committee then known as the Committee on Computer Security but since July 1981 entitled the Security Committee for Electronic Information Processing.

87. In our current review our attention has been drawn to the much broader and more technical aspects of the security risks involved in electronic information processing than those upon which our attention was focussed in the Wagstaff case. Although we do not doubt the expertise of those who now compose the re-named sub-committee we think that its relatively lowly status in the central hierarchy concerned with security in the public service may not adequately reflect what we consider may well present today the greatest potential threat to the protection of classified information. **We recommend that consideration should be given to placing the responsibility for evaluating the various forms this threat may take and the devising of the most effective methods for combating them upon a more senior committee reporting directly to the Official Committee itself. It should also maintain the closest possible liaison with experts who have a corresponding responsibility for security of electronic information processing in the USA.**

## CONCLUSIONS

88. Our investigation has taken place over nine months. We have taken a considerable volume of written and oral evidence. We have held thirty-two meetings and interviewed thirty-six witnesses. A list of those who gave oral evidence is at Appendix C.

89. The general impression with which we are left as a result of our review of security procedures and practices is one of re-assurance. The Positive Vetting procedures as they have been applied since Radcliffe can, we think, be relied upon to prevent infiltration of the FCO, or any of the three organisations engaged in secret intelligence work at the recruitment stage, by hostile intelligence services such as occurred in the 1930's and 1940's. If the "after-care" procedure is conscientiously followed by supervising officers and departmental security branches - and this depends upon the human factor - it should disclose character defects or other circumstances that make a person an unreliable recipient of TOP SECRET information and which have either developed since the initial PV or somehow escaped notice then. While we have made some recommendations for tightening-up the after-care procedure, these are only minor.

90. We are satisfied that the FCO, the SIS, the Security Service, and GCHQ should remain fully PV'd departments; but in the Home Civil Service we think that the number of PV posts could and should be reduced. In the MOD agreements with our Allies about denying **any** access to particular categories of information by persons who have not had PV clearance impose significant limitations

on the ability of that department and of the armed services to effect a substantial reduction in NV posts; but in the other departments of the Home Civil Service we think that there is considerable scope for doing so; in particular, we can see no reason for making Positive Vetting an automatic requirement for appointment to the grade of under-secretary or above or to the private offices of Ministers not in the Cabinet. It should be applied selectively to those posts only which do in fact involve regular and constant access to TOP SECRET information. Positive Vetting is an expensive process and any reduction in the need for it is to be commended on these grounds alone; but the automatic requirement of PV clearance for appointment to the grade of under-secretary means that failure to obtain it, possibly because of defects of circumstance only, is bound to have a serious adverse effect on the career of the officer concerned which may be quite unnecessary on security grounds.

91. We are satisfied that the Normal Vetting procedure should continue to be applied to all persons who have access to information classified as CONFIDENTIAL and above; and that it should remain covert except for the Police where it is in practice overt and in the case of UKAEA and BNFL where, by agreement with the USA, it has to be overt and takes the form of a Full Record Check. In the case of specialist advisers to some Parliamentary select committees, we think that here too it should take the overt form of a Full Record Check.

92. The system of classifying information for security purposes in ascending order of sensitivity as RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET lies at the root of both personnel and physical security. It is in the over-classification of information under this system as it is at present interpreted by departments that we think the greatest risk to security under the present procedures and practices lies.

93. Over-classifying documents as CONFIDENTIAL or above rather than as RESTRICTED or subject to a privacy marking only, not only involves wasteful expenditure but, in our view, has harmful consequences on the security procedures as a whole. If information is classified as CONFIDENTIAL, not because it would be of value to the intelligence service of some foreign power but because its public disclosure would be politically or administratively embarrassing, this brings security classification into disrepute not only with the media and the public, but also with the Civil Service whose duty it is to give effect to them. It blurs the distinction between information the "leaking" of which to the press may be thought to be justified in the interests of open government; and information of real security importance. Nor is NV designed to identify those who are likely to leak information to the press.

94. The principal other matter which has caused us some unease is the risk of access by hostile intelligence services to highly sensitive information, which may be presented by the rapidly expanding use of computers and other electronic equipment for storing and retrieving it. While we have no reason to suppose that this risk has yet become an actuality, we consider that constant study and monitoring of the threat presented by technological developments in the whole field of office automation should be given high priority.

LORD DIPLOCK

LORD ALLEN OF ABBEYDALE

LORD BRIDGE OF HARWICH

16 December 1981



**TOP SECRET**

APPENDIX A

RECRUITMENT AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN THE SECRET AGENCIES

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Secret Intelligence Service

13.

Like the Security Service, it operates through a system of talent-spotters, and it has over 100 confidential contacts in a position to recommend potential recruits to the Intelligence and General Service Branches and to the supplementary intelligence and transcriber officer grades. Most of these talent-spotters are in universities throughout the country. A few are in industry and commerce. Other recommendations come from officers of the armed forces who have had official contact with SIS, and serving or retired staff of SIS, the Diplomatic Service, the Home Civil Service and the Security Service.

14. University talent-spotters are sought among academic teaching staff and members of university careers advisory services who appear ready to assist the British intelligence community and have an extensive knowledge of undergraduate and post-graduate students and good judgment in assessing their attitudes and potential. Before an explicit approach is made to enlist anyone's aid as a talent-spotter, a character reference and an assessment of suitability must have been obtained from an existing contact of the Service or a member of its staff, and recruitment as a talent-spotter is dependent upon satisfactory completion of extensive independent agent vetting. Over the years a countrywide network of academic talent-spotters has been established; this now extends to almost every university. Only a relatively small number of talent-spotters actually initiate nomination of candidates; their main task is to give comments, when asked, on those candidates who appear, for example, on the list of candidates for the Diplomatic Service.

15. Similar arrangements for talent-spotting exist in industry and commerce, and a project is currently in hand to recruit more mature candidates from industry and commerce by involving the collaboration of a long-standing contact who heads an established management recruitment agency. It would recruit by normal agency methods under the guise of acting for a commercial client, telling selected candidates that the advertised vacancy had fallen through, but offering an introduction to a "public sector alternative".

16. Clearly, the appointment of talent-spotters is a key area in ensuring protection of the Service against the risk of hostile penetration, and every effort is made to check and double-check the system. No potential talent-spotter is recruited without preparatory security checks and a recommendation from an established contact. No nominee of any talent-spotter may be processed as a candidate before an independent recommendation is obtained from some other contact - although this precaution results in the fact that many nominees are discarded at this stage and remain unaware that they were ever considered. At the end of the Positive Vetting process, successful candidates are formally questioned by SIS Security Branch as to what they know, or believe, to be the chain of circumstance by which they were introduced to the Service. The in-depth interviews conducted by recruiting officers before candidates proceed to selection boards provide opportunity to probe areas of initial doubt. The recruitment process is so selective that the majority of nominees (9 out of 10, for example, for the Intelligence Branch) fail to gain appointment. A permanent record is kept and scrutinised periodically by the Security Branch of all nominations, whether successful or not, made by a particular talent-spotter. Candidates reaching SIS through a talent-spotter whose role, it is suspected, may have become known outside the Service are scrutinised with especial care to guard against the risk that they have been planted by hostile organisations. Finally, no talent-spotter can commit SIS to contact with any nominee; regardless of what nominations are received, the decision to initiate direct dealings with SIS rests with the Service alone.

17. The recruitment process for members of the "fast-stream" Intelligence Branch is similar to that for equivalent members of the Security Service described above. Candidates are first interviewed by a recruiting officer, and they are seen again a few weeks later and given a second interview by another recruiting officer if, on the strength of the first interview, both sides wish to take the matter further. At this stage the serious contenders for selection are given an account of the Intelligence Branch career and work style. They then appear before the Civil Service Selection Board, either through the normal channels because they had already applied for the Home Civil Service or the Diplomatic Service, or, if not, before a special Civil Service Selection Board in which the normal observer is replaced by a mid-career SIS Officer. Successful candidates are then interviewed by the Final Selection Board which consists of a senior (under secretary or above) SIS officer as chairman and two mid-career officers as members. Candidates are taken through the first three stages of the Positive Vetting process during recruitment so that if any adverse trace occurs, they can be turned down, if necessary at a "dummy" interview to conceal the reason for rejection. Any offer of employment at Final Selection Board is conditional on successful completion of Positive Vetting. Over the past 10 years an average of 16 new "fast stream" candidates have been recruited each year. The target intake for 1981 and each of the immediately following years is 24; this higher intake results from the post-war recruitment bulge now reaching retirement age.

18. The supporting staff are in general subjected to a 2-stage interview process similar to that used by the Security Service. Members of the General Service Branch, which provides most of the administration staff and is, in general, a home-based career, are recruited through talent spotters or from members of the Diplomatic Service who can no longer accept the mobility obligations inherent in that career. The first interview is with a recruiting officer of the FCO Co-ordination Staff, and the Final Selection Board is chaired by a senior General Service Branch SIS officer. Supplementary intelligence officers, who are required to bring specialist skills to specific appointments, have a similar recruitment procedure, with the Final Selection Board specifically designed to meet the requirements. The timing of the positive vetting process is identical to that for Intelligence Branch. Transcribing officers are recruited in exactly the same way, but because of the sensitivity of their work, Positive Vetting is always completed before a candidate is brought to the Final Selection Board, and the candidate is unaware of what the work involves until he is successful at the Final Selection Board.

19. Selection of candidates for the Secretarial Branch is achieved mainly through applicants coming forward from secretarial colleges with which SIS is in regular contact, but who believe that their applications are for the Diplomatic Service. SIS and the Diplomatic Service ensure that the personnel departments of the two services have an arrangement whereby every relevant college is an exclusive

preserve of one or the other. Because of the high staff turnover among secretaries, Positive Vetting is not normally completed until after entry, although references are taken up well before and recruits are restricted to specially approved types of work until PV is finished. Recruitment arrangements for Clerical Branch members are similar, although SIS, along with other employers in London, has difficulty in finding enough good quality candidates. They come from a wide variety of sources including those interested in the Civil Service in general and are brought to the attention of SIS by talent-spotters, or introduced by members of staff or referred by vetted agencies with a knowledge of SIS requirements.

20. The Positive Vetting arrangements in the Secret Intelligence Service are modelled on those of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The summary writers in the SIS's own Security Branch vetting section make a summary of all the relevant information available about the candidate and this summary, together with the completed security questionnaire, forms the raw material for field enquiries carried out by the Positive Vetting Investigation Officers. The field reports cover interviews with schools, universities, previous employers, referees and the subject himself, and sometimes a check is made with the local police.

21. The PV process can be expected to involve 5 or so interviews, including those with two character referees as well as employer or academic referees, before the personal interview with the candidate. No candidate for a particularly sensitive post is accepted before the successful completion of Positive Vetting, although in certain secretarial and clerical grades recruiting would be impossible if candidates were asked to wait 3 months, and some candidates are employed on work which is less sensitive by SIS standards until Positive Vetting is completed. Candidates who subsequently fail Positive Vetting are not permitted to stay on, although in difficult cases they may be kept on until the end of their probationary period. In other cases every effort is made to find them alternative employment. Because the organisation is at present not avowed, it has no blanket authority for immunity from employment legislation, and any case which arose would probably have to be the subject of a Ministerial certificate.

22. SIS conducts its own NV check, through the Metropolitan Police Special Branch as a channel to avoid direct contact with the National Identification Bureau.

23. Reviews are carried out annually for those under 21 and every 5 years for those over 21, and there is also a review, which includes an interview with the subject when any member of staff returns from a posting

At review, the papers are examined to see if there is any reason why a personal interview with the subject would be useful; in the event, between a quarter and half of annual reviews include a personal interview. It is general policy that each individual should be personally interviewed at least three times in the course of his career, once on entry, once in mid-career and once towards the end

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of the career. Spouses of officers are NV'd, but not PV'd. They are also given an induction course of the general work of the Service, and are encouraged to be associated with their husband's work.

24. An important difference between vetting in the SIS - and, indeed, all the secret agencies - and that in the Home Civil Service is the seriousness with which adverse factors are regarded; two examples are that homosexuality is regarded as an absolute bar to employment, and officers who marry must leave the Service if the security background of their spouses cannot be verified.

Government Communications Headquarters

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## SPECIALIST ADVISERS TO HOUSE OF COMMONS SELECT COMMITTEES

1. Specialist advisers to select committees have been subject to vetting clearance since Ministers in 1969 endorsed a recommendation of the Official Committee on Parliamentary Procedure that they should be Normally Vetted where they have access to CONFIDENTIAL information. Ad hoc arrangements for implementing this were established where necessary. In the defence field, for example, most specialist advisers were drawn from among those who had been vetted as consultants to the MOD.
2. In 1974 rules to govern the protection of classified information disclosed to select committees were drawn up and agreed between the Government and the House authorities. In the light of this, in 1976 more formal arrangements were established for the vetting of specialist advisers, and a procedure was agreed between the Civil Service Department and the Clerk to Committees. They reflect the fact that specialist advisers are employed by the House of Commons Commission and the Government neither has nor wishes to have any influence in their appointment.
3. Specialist advisers who are required, in the course of their duties, to have access to CONFIDENTIAL information are therefore NV'd. Decisions on vetting are made by the Management and Personnel Office in consultation with the Security Service. In any case of doubt the department mainly concerned is also consulted. If it should prove impossible in certain circumstances to grant vetting clearance to a specialist adviser, the Clerk to Committees is informed by the Management and Personnel Office that, under the agreed arrangements, the specialist adviser should not have access to classified information.
4. The Committees mainly involved are those on defence and foreign affairs. It is recognised that, from time to time, it may be necessary to NV specialist advisers on other select committees but there is no general requirement in these.
5. Since the restructuring of the select committee system at the end of 1979, a total of 19 specialist advisers have been subject to NV clearance. Of these, two have been refused clearance. One of these remains a specialist adviser on the Foreign Affairs Committee. The other was allowed to complete his assignment on the Energy Committee, but was not subsequently re-appointed.

## LIST OF WITNESSES

## a. Government departments

Cabinet Office

Sir Antony Duff GCMG CVO  
DSO DSC

Intelligence Co-ordinator

Civil Service Department

Sir Ian Bancroft GCB  
Mr S R Davie

Head of the Home Civil Service  
Head of the Department's Security  
Policy Division

Ministry of Defence

Sir Frank Cooper GCB CMG  
Mr E Pendlebury  
Mr F Taylor  
Rear Admiral W D Lang CB  
Major General H E M L Garrett  
CBE  
Group Captain G E Winch

Permanent Under-Secretary of State  
Executive Director, Civilian  
Management (B)  
Deputy Director of Security  
(General), Procurement Executive  
Director of Naval Security  
Director of Security (Army)  
Deputy Director, Personnel  
Security (RAF)

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

Sir Michael Palliser GCMG  
Mr D Brighty  
Mr I S Winchester

Head of the Diplomatic Service  
Head of Personnel Operations  
Department  
Head of Security Department

Government Communications Headquarters

Sir Brian Tovey KCMG  
Mr D J Wakefield

Director  
Director of Organisation

Home Office

Sir Brian Cubbon KCB

Permanent Under-Secretary of State

## b. Other organisations

British Telecommunications/Post Office

Mr M Argent  
Mr A J Roberts  
Mr J L S Archibald

Secretary, British Telecommunications  
Secretary, Posts and Girobank  
Departmental Security Officer,  
British Telecommunications

Democratic Service Staff Side

Mr A H Grey	Chairman
Mr P W Grice	Secretary
Mr E Brent	Society of Civil & Public Servants
Mr F Phillips	Civil Service Union

Metropolitan Police

Mr G J Kelland CBE QPM	Assistant Commissioner (Crime)
Mr C V Hewett QPM	Deputy Assistant Commissioner

Secret Intelligence Service

Mr C F Figures CMG OBE
Mr C Curwen

Security Service

Mr J Jones	Director General
Mr P Sherman	Director of Protective Security

Strathclyde Police

Mr P Hamill QPM	Chief Constable
Mr R Nicolson	Assistant Chief Constable
Mr W Baird	Deputy Secretary to the Scottish Home & Health Department

United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority

Mr A M Allen CBE	Deputy Chairman
Mr F J Sidwell	Director of Security
Mr G S Constable	Deputy Director of Security

THE FOLLOWING SUBMITTED WRITTEN EVIDENCE ONLY:

Mr Chapman Pincher  
 Council of Civil Service Unions  
 Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians

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