

PS

FALKLAND ISLANDS: PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF PERU

A 1. Our Ambassador in Lima has recommended that the Secretary of
State should send a reassuring message to President Belaunde
B following our discouraging response to the recent ceasefire
proposals from the Presidents of Colombia, Peru and Brazil.
Mr Wallace implies that this might bolster Belaunde's resolve in
resisting pressures from the Peruvian military for open alignment
with Argentina.

2. I do not find this a convincing argument. Belaunde has proposed several peace initiatives but these have come to nothing. The Peruvians have been quick to put the blame for this on us. While a reassuring message would do no harm, it is unlikely to do any good: indeed it might only provide further variations of ceasefire proposals which we would have to turn down. Moreover, however much Belaunde may have closed his eyes to the provision by the Peruvian military of war material to Argentina, there is convincing evidence of such supplies and it is most improbable that Belaunde has been unaware of what has been going on. Press reports of recent statements by the Peruvian Foreign Minister indicate a move towards a more open Peruvian alignment with Argentina; and Peru voted for the Argentine resolution at last week's Rio Treaty meeting, after claiming that the Argentines had demonstrated much more flexibility throughout the conflict than had the UK.

3. In these circumstances, I can see no reason to send the President a reassuring message. The question then arises whether we should instruct our Ambassador to remonstrate with Belaunde about Peru's material support for Argentina. But it would be difficult to do this at such a high level without firmer evidence of delivery of arms supplies and we should be alienating the President without being able to affect the continuation of the supplies. On balance, I would advise against any message to the President. Instead, I recommend that we instruct HMA Lima to take up with the Foreign Minister his remarks at a recent press conference about Peru's attitude to providing military assistance to Argentina. I submit a draft telegram.

A. J. Kearney

P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

SECRET


OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats		Precedence/Deskby
SECRET		IMMEDIATE
1	ZCZC	
2	GRS	
3	SECRET	
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6	FM FCO JUNE 82	
7	TO IMMEDIATE LIMA	
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER	
9	INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MODUK	
10	YOUR TELNO 213: FALKLAND ISLANDS	
11	1. We appreciate the difficulty of Belaunde's position and	
12	accept that he may have difficulties in keeping his military	
13	under control.	
14	2. But the fact is that there have been numerous high-level	
15	contacts with Belaunde. These have not had any noticeable effect	
16	and it is unlikely that further attempts to keep Belaunde in play	
17	will lead him to recognise the realities of our position or to	
18	bring his influence to bear in any useful way on the Argentines.	
19	Indeed the Peruvians are alleging that it was we, not the	
20	Argentines, who rejected Belaunde's earlier proposals	
21	(Washington telno 1941).	
22	3. It would also seem inappropriate for me to send a further	
23	conciliatory message to Belaunde, given the increasing evidence	
24	of Peruvian supply of military equipment to Argentina. It may	
25	well be the case that this has not been on Belaunde's direct	
NNNN ends telegram		Catchword responsibility
File number	Dept EMERGENCY UNIT	Distribution FALKLANDS GENERAL
Drafted by (Block capitals) P R FEARN		
Telephone number 233 4692		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference Time of despatch		

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

		Classification and Caveats SECRET	IMMEDIATE	Page
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <<<< <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; width: 80%;"> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: flex-start;"> <div style="width: 40px; text-align: center;">1</div> <div> <<<< responsibility, but it is hard to believe that he knows nothing about it. Furthermore, Peru voted in favour of both Rio Treaty resolutions and press reports of Belaunde's and the Foreign Minister's comments (Washington telno 1959 and your telno 214), if accurate, leave little doubt of where Peruvian sympathies lie. 4. If, therefore, I were to send a message, it would not only have to be unforthcoming on the scope for a negotiated settlement, it would also have to be tough on the question of arms supplies. I assume that this would not help Belaunde vis-a-vis his military or have any effect on the continuation of Peruvian military supplies: in which case it would best not be sent. 5. There is however a need to register at a suitably high level our concern in the question of arms supplies to Argentina. Grateful if you would therefore seek an early appointment with Arias and say that we have noted what he and the President have said about military support for Argentina: and the many press and other reports that Peru is already providing material assistance. You should say that we would take a grave view of any such action: it would clearly be a serious development for Anglo-Peruvian relations. Our quarrel is with the Argentine Government, not with other countries in the region: countries which allow the conflict to widen in scope will be doing themselves and the cause of peace a grave disservice. The fact is that Argentina was the aggressor: the UK the victim. We have been forced to fight, with the greatest reluctance, to defend our rights and those of the Falkland Islanders. We have remained flexible throughout, seeking only the full implementation of the Security Council's resolution 502, which is binding on all member states. It is Argentina that has failed to comply with the demands of the international community and it is therefore Argentina, not Britain, which has been intransigent. Most recently the Argentine Government had the opportunity to accept the British draft interim agreement, which provided for a </div> </div> </div> </div>				
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2 ceasefire with mutual withdrawal. They now have only themselves
3 to blame for the situation they are in. The provision of military
4 support for Argentina by third countries would be an endorsement
5 of Argentine aggression and likely only to prolong and
6 exacerbate the conflict.

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