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TELNO 298 OF 1 JUL 82

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO,
KABUL, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW
SAVING FOR INFO ALL EC POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, JEDDA, TOKYO, PEKING.

YOUR TELNO 358

AFGHANISTAN: GENEVA TALKS.

1. NIAZ NAIK, THE NEW FOREIGN SECRETARY, WHO WAS AT GENEVA GAVE ME A DETAILED ACCOUNT TODAY (HE APOLOGISED THAT HE HAD NOT HAD TIME TO BRIEF US IN GENEVA). IN GENERAL, THE PAKISTANIS WERE VERY SATISFIED. CONTRARY TO SOME OF THE PRESS REPORTS, THEY HAD MADE NO CONCESSIONS ON IMPORTANT MATTERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN SOME MOVEMENT ON THE AFGHAN SIDE AND THE PAKISTANIS HAD GAINED A NUMBER OF POINTS. THEIR INFORMATION WAS THAT THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE HAD PLAYED A HELPFUL ROLE THROUGHOUT IN PERSUADING THE AFGHANS TO BE FLEXIBLE. IF THIS WERE SO, THE RUSSIAN MOTIVES WERE NOT YET CLEAR TO THEM.

2. THE AFGHANS HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT TO START WITH AND HAD SIMPLY

2. THE AFGHANS HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT TO START WITH AND HAD SIMPLY TROTTED OUT ALL THE FAMILIAR ACCUSATIONS (TRAINING CAMPS, ETC). YAQUB HAD TOLD CORDOVEZ THAT IF THIS WAS TO BE THE PATTERN THEN THE TALKS NEED ONLY LAST TWO DAYS AND IT WAS HARDLY WORTH THEIR COMING. CORDOVEZ, APPARENTLY THROUGH THE RUSSIAN, PERSUADED THE AFGHANS TO TALK BUSINESS.

3. THE TWO INITIAL AFGHAN HURDLES TO OVERCOME WERE:

(I) THEIR VIEW THAT THE INDIRECT TALKS SHOULD DEAL ONLY WITH MODALITIES AND SHOULD PROCEED QUICKLY TO SUBSTANTIVE DIRECT TALKS. BUT AFTER A DAY OR SO THEY WERE DISCUSSING THE AGENDA ITEMS WITHOUT INSISTING THAT THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE DIRECTLY.

(II) THEIR INSISTENCE ON DEALING WITH INTERFERENCE AND GUARANTEES AS THE FIRST ITEMS. ACCORDING TO THEM THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS HAD TO BE END OF INTERFERENCE, GUARANTEES, WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS, RETURN OF REFUGEES. THE PAKISTANIS REPEATEDLY DENIED INTERFERENCE AND SAID THAT ALL THE ITEMS WERE INTER-LINKED. THIS VIEW THEY SAY WAS ACCEPTED.

4. ON THE SPECIFIC AGENDA ITEMS:

(A) WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF LINKAGE, THE IDEA OF A "TIME FRAME" WAS ACCEPTED. IT WOULD START WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS: THE RETURN OF REFUGEES WOULD START AFTER A SUITABLE INTERVAL AND AT THE RIGHT POINT THE GUARANTEES AGAINST INTERFERENCE WOULD BE GIVEN. CORDOVEZ INTENDS TO WORK OUT A TIME FRAME WITH SIX DATES MARKING THE BEGINNING AND END OF EACH OF THE THREE PROCESSES.

(B) RETURN OF REFUGEES. THE AFGHANS HAD AGREED THAT THE REFUGEES SHOULD BE CONSULTED AND HAD SLIGHTLY IMPROVED THEIR AMNESTY, ETC, OFFERS, BUT WERE ADAMANT THAT THE REFUGEE LEADERSHIP SHOULD NOT BE ASSOCIATED. A FORM OF WORDS HAD HOWEVER BEEN ACCEPTED TO THE EFFECT THAT A MECHANISM FOR CONSULTING THE REFUGEES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AND THE PAKISTANIS RECKONED THAT THIS GAVE THEM FREEDOM TO CONSULT THE REFUGEE LEADERSHIP. IF A MECHANISM REALLY WAS AGREED, THEN IT SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE UNHCR TO CARRY OUT THE CONSULTATION (THEY ARE STILL EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO DO SO).9

(C) INTERFERENCE AND GUARANTEES. THE AFGHANS WANTED BILATERAL GUARANTEES IN AN OBVIOUS BID TO SECURE RECOGNITION. THE PPAKISTANIS INSISTED ON UNILATERAL GUARANTEES AND NO IMPLICATION THAT THEY HAD IN FACT BEEN INTERFERING. THEY ALSO INSISTED THAT AS PART OF

GUARANTEES IN AN OBVIOUS BID TO SECURE RECOGNITION. THE PARTIES ~~INSISTED ON UNILATERAL GUARANTEES AND NO IMPLICATION THAT THEY HAD~~ IN FACT BEEN INTERFERING. THEY ALSO INSISTED THAT AS PART OF THIS PROCESS THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER SHOULD BE ACCEPTED, A QUESTION WHICH THE AFGHANS WANTED TO DISCUSS SEPARATELY. WHAT SEEMS TO HAVE EMERGED IS THAT THE PROCESS WILL CONSIST OF UNILATERAL GUARANTEES, WITH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL GUARANTEES TO FOLLOW. ON MULTILATERAL GUARANTEES, THE PAKISTANIS ENVISAGE A CONFERENCE MUCH ON THE LINES OF OUR PROPOSAL (PARTIES CONCERNED, PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND SOME OUTSIDERS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES), OR IT COULD BE DONE THROUGH THE UN MACHINERY.

5. CORDOVEZ WILL NOW DRAFT A DOCUMENT INCORPORATING WHAT HAS BEEN AGREED AND THE NEXT STEP WILL BE FURTHER INDIRECT TALKS IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER. I DREW ATTENTION TO THE OBVIOUS POSSIBILITY THAT ONE AT LEAST OF THE RUSSIAN MOTIVES IN BEING HELPFUL (IF INDEED THEY HAD BEEN) COULD BE TO AVOID ANOTHER UNGA RESOLUTION. NIAZ NAIK SAID THAT THEY WERE WELL AWARE OF THIS, BUT THERE SHOULD BE TIME FOR THE AFGHAN/RUSSIAN ATTITUDE TO BE FULLY TESTED BEFORE THE UNGA DEBATE. IF IT BECAME EVIDENT IN SEPTEMBER OR BEFORE THAT THE AFGHANS WERE STALLING, THEN CORDOVEZ WOULD HOPE TO FIT IN ANOTHER ROUND OF VISITS TO CAPITALS IN TIME TO PRESENT A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL BEFORE THE AFGHANISTAN ITEM CAME UP. APART FROM THIS OBVIOUS RUSSIAN MOTIVE, NIAZ NAIK COULD ONLY THINK THAT THE DISPLAY OF FLEXIBILITY MIGHT BE CONNECTED WITH A SUMMIT MEETING WITH THE AMERICANS.

6. I THINK THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE PAKISTANIS HAVE STUCK FIRMLY TO THEIR PRINCIPLES AND DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE GIVEN ANYTHING AWAY. HOWEVER, THEY DO SEEM TO THINK THAT THERE HAS BEEN FLEXIBILITY ON THE OTHER SIDE (AND NIAZ NAIK IS NOT A MAN EASILY CONNED) AND THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN BEHIND THIS, THOUGH NIAZ NAIK ADMITTED THAT THEY WERE RELYING ON WHAT CORDOVEZ HAD TOLD THEM. HE ADMITTED THAT THE AFGHANS HAD AT THE LAST MOMENT TRIED TO INTRODUCE UNACCEPTABLE POINTS INTO THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, E.G. SPELLING OUT THE STEPS PAKISTAN MUST TAKE TO END INTERFERENCE, AND THAT THE DETAILED DRAFTING MIGHT REVEAL THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL CHANGE OF HEART. I COMMENTED THAT IF THE AFGHANS/RUSSIANS HAD REALLY AGREED TO START WITHDRAWING TROOPS FIRST THEN THERE MIGHT BE INDEED A BREAKTHROUGH, BUT I WOULD BELIEVE IT WHEN I SAW IT AND EVEN SO THERE WOULD BE PLENTY OF SCOPE FOR DECEPTION. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER NIAZ NAIK'S RATHER OPTIMISTIC READING OF THE GENEVA TALKS IS BOGNE OUT BY EVENTS.

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7. FINALLY, NIAK APOLOGISED FOR THE FACT THAT YAQUB HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GET TO LONDON. THEY HAD MADE GREAT EFFORTS TO FIT A QUICK LONDON VISIT IN, IF POSSIBLE AFTER THE TALKS, BUT YAQUB HAD HAD TO GO TO AMMAN (I THINK FROM WHAT HE SAID THAT CORDOVEZ HAD ALSO ADVISED AGAINST A VISIT AS GIVING THE OTHER SIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT PAKISTAN WAS ACTING ON WESTERN INSTRUCTIONS).

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