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FROM MOSCOW 251545Z APRIL

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 423 OF 25 APRIL

INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL MADRID AND STOCKHOLM

INFO SAVING TO OTHER NATO POSTS, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, WARSAW AND PRAGUE

MY TELNO 422 : MR RIFKIND'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

DISCUSSION WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIENKO

ON 25 APRIL : CSCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

1. MR RIFKIND NOTED THAT ATTEMPTS WERE CONTINUING IN MADRID TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. EAST/WEST RELATIONS HAD BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY ACTIONS IN THE SPHERE OF PERSONAL RELATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH APPEARED CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT. THIS WAS NOT A NEW SUBJECT. THERE WERE EXAMPLES GOING BACK MANY YEARS, SUCH AS THE CASE OF RAOUL WALLEMBERG (WHOSE SISTER HAD TELEPHONED HIM JUST BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR MOSCOW). IT WOULD BE VERY WELCOME IF THE SOVIET UNION COULD CLEAR UP THE QUESTION OF WALLEMBERG'S FATE TO THE SATISFACTION OF HIS FAMILY.
2. THERE WAS GREAT CONCERN ABOUT PEOPLE WHO HAD TRIED TO MONITOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT, SUCH AS SHCHARANSKY. MRS SHCHARANSKY HAD VISITED HIM BEFORE HE LEFT LONDON, AND WAS HOPING FOR HER HUSBAND'S RELEASE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. SHE HAD ALSO MENTIONED THAT SHCHARANSKY'S MOTHER HAD NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO SEE HIM.
3. MR RIFKIND ALSO MENTIONED THE CASES OF BEGUN, NUDEL, ORLOV AND SAKHAROV. HE SAID THE CHARACTER OF EAST / WEST RELATIONS WOULD BE AFFECTED POSITIVELY BY A SOVIET GESTURE ON SUCH CASES.
4. KORNIENKO SAID THE SOVIET UNION FAVOURED A DETAILED AND SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT IN MADRID. THE SOVIET UNION THOUGHT IT PARTICULARLY NECESSARY TO TAKE DECISIONS CONCERNING SECURITY IN EUROPE, FOR THIS AFFECTED THE BASIC HUMAN RIGHT TO LIFE. THEY WERE NOT AGAINST DISCUSSING OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS. HOWEVER, THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO HAVE THE VIEWS OF

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OTHERS IMPOSED ON THEM ON SUCH QUESTIONS OR TO ACCEPT THAT THEY WERE OBLIGED TO ANSWER ON INDIVIDUAL CASES. THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THEY COULD RAISE INDIVIDUAL CASES IN THE UK. BUT WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE ?

5. MR RIFKIND POINTED OUT THAT SHCHARANSKY HAD BEEN TRYING TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT. KORNIENKO SAID THAT THE CASE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HELSINKI. ALL THE CASES RAISED BY MR RIFKIND CONCERNED SOVIET EMIGRATION RULES. DID MR RIFKIND WANT HIM TO RAISE BRITISH IMMIGRATION LAWS ?
" YOU HAVE YOUR PROBLEMS , WE HAVE OURS ". MR RIFKIND ASKED IF KORNIENKO COULD HOLD OUT ANY HOPE FOR SHCHARANSKY. KORNIENKO SAID HE HAD NO IDEA, AND HAD NEVER ENQUIRED. IT WAS THE SOVIET UNION'S DOMESTIC BUSINESS.

6. F C O PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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VNY TELNO 422 : MR RIFKIND'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

DISCUSSION WITH KORNIENKO ON 25 APRIL : INF.

SUMMARY.

1. MR RIFKIND STRESSED EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR THE AMERICAN POSITION AND FIRMLY REJECTED THE INCLUSION OF BRITISH SYSTEMS. KORNIENKO TOOK A HARD LINE ON THIS LATTER POINT BUT BARELY MENTIONED OTHER ASPECTS. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NEVER AGREE NOT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF BRITISH WEAPONS. NOR COULD IT BE MOVED ON A QUESTION OF SOVIET MISSILES IN THE FAR EAST. AT NO POINT DID KORNIENKO MENTION THE PRAGUE DECLARATION.

DETAIL.

2. MR RIFKIND OPENED THE DISCUSSION OF INF BY STRESSING THAT THE WEST WAS UNITED . THE EUROPEANS WERE RESOLUTE IN THEIR SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN POSITION. THE ORIGINAL DECISION TO DEPLOY NEW MISSILES IF NECESSARY HAD BEEN THE RESULT OF A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO HOPE THAT THE SO-CALLED PEACE MOVEMENTS WOULD CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENTS' ACTIONS . HE WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO LINK A REDUCTION IN SOVIET MISSILES WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR DETERRENTS WAS, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE, TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. WE WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS: THE NEED WAS FOR PARITY BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS: THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF AMERICAN ACCEPTANCE OF INFERIORITY TO THE USSR. THE SOVIET UNION WAS TRYING TO LINK WEAPONS WHICH WERE NOT COMPARABLE. AS THE RUSSIANS HAD RECOGNISED IN THE PAST, BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE STRATEGIC. THE WEST WAS ANXIOUS FOR AGREEMENT IN INF; START AND ELSEWHERE, BUT PARITY BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS WAS THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS.

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3. KORNIENKO SAID THAT JUST AS WITH SALT II THE WEST HAD RECOGNISED THE EXISTENCE OF PARITY BUT HAD THEN CHANGED ITS MIND SO WITH INF THEIR VIEWS HAD SHIFTED. AT THE TIME OF THE DOUBLE TRACK DECISION IN DECEMBER 1979, AND AS LATE AS MID-1981, NATO LEADERS WERE SAYING THAT THE BALANCE HAD NOT YET BEEN DISRUPTED. A FEW MONTHS LATER WITH THE ZERO OPTION THEY WERE DEMANDING THE REMOVAL OF SOVIET MISSILES WHICH HAD ALREADY EXISTED IN 1979 AND EVEN THOSE WHICH HAD EXISTED IN 1976 BEFORE SS20 DEPLOYMENT BEGAN.

4. MR RIFKIND SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN CONSISTENT. FURTHER SS20 DEPLOYMENT SINCE 1979 HAD EXACERBATED THE IMBALANCE. THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONCERNED WITH HOW TO ESTABLISH A MORE STABLE SITUATION.

5. KORNIENKO ARGUED THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS WERE MEDIUM-RANGE. HE DENIED THAT THEY HAD BEEN ACCEPTED AS STRATEGIC IN SALT: THERE WAS NO UNDERSTANDING WITH THE AMERICANS ON WHAT WAS STRATEGIC EXCEPT FOR LAND-BASED ICBM'S. ASKED BY MR RIFKIND WHETHER IN HIS VIEW OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE STRATEGIC OR MEDIUM-RANGE KORNIENKO SAID THAT THIS WAS NO MORE THAN A PLAY ON WORDS. FOR THE SOVIET UNION ANYTHING WHICH COULD HIT THEIR TERRITORY WAS STRATEGIC. IF HYPOTHETICALLY SOME SS20S WERE GIVEN TO OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD THE WEST BE PREPARED TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM THE BALANCE? (MR RIFKIND RESPONDED THIS WOULD DEPEND ON WHO HAS ULTIMATE CONTROL OVER THEM, BUT IT WAS A VERY HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION). KORNIENKO CONTINUED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT CLOSE ITS EYES TO BRITISH, FRENCH AND CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. LIKE THOSE OF THE AMERICANS THEY WERE AIMED AT THE USSR, AND THE TOTAL OF THEIR WARHEADS WAS CONSIDERABLE. KORNIENKO MORE THAN ONCE ASKED MR RIFKIND WHETHER BRITISH SYSTEMS SHOULD BE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF IN START.

6. MR RIFKIND REPEATED THAT BY ANY MEANINGFUL DISTINCTION OUR WEAPONS WERE STRATEGIC. THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT TRY AND COUNT THEM BOTH WAYS: IT COULD NOT ARGUE ONE DAY THAT THEY SHOULD BE COUNTED AS STRATEGIC AND THE NEXT AS MEDIUM-RANGE. NO ONE HAD EVER SUGGESTED THAT THE UK NOR FRANCE WOULD EVER CONTEMPLATE A FIRST STRIKE, WHEREAS THE US AND SOVIET UNION WERE CONCERNED ABOUT EACH OTHER'S CAPABILITY IN THIS RESPECT. STABILITY, 8 -, 56343%943 PARITY, BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS WAS THE KEY TO WORLD PEACE.

7. IN CONCLUSION KORNIENKO SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NEVER AGREE NOT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR WEAPONS. LIKEWISE IT WOULD NEVER AGREE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOVIET FAR-EASTERN SYSTEMS WHILE THE TALKS WERE ABOUT EUROPE. THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN PRINCIPLE PREPARED TO HAVE SEPARATE TALKS ON SYSTEMS IN ASIA. "THESE TWO STONES OF SOVIET POLICY CANNOT BE MOVED".

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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2
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