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PS TO PM NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

DESKBY F C O 151130Z JULY

DESKBY UKDEL CSCE MADRID 151130Z JULY

DESKBY WASHINGTON 151130Z JULY

FROM MOSCOW 151000Z JULY

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 788 OF 15 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL CSCE MADRID, WASHINGTON (FOR S. OF S'S PARTY), BONN, PARIS AND UKDEL NATO .

CSCE : SHCHARANSKY.

1. AT THE FRENCH NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION YESTERDAY EVENING, ADAMYSHIN, HEAD OF THE FIRST EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT AT THE MFA AND RESPONSIBLE FOR CSCE , DREW ME ASIDE TO SAY THAT , AS HE SAW THE POSITION IN MADRID ALL THE PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS BUT ONE HAD NOW AGREED TO THE SPANISH PROPOSALS. I SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT MY UNDERSTANDING SEMICOLON THERE WERE STILL CERTAIN ISSUES , BOTH OF SUBSTANCE AND RELATING TO THE TEXTS WHICH REMAINED TO BE AGREED. ADAMYSHIN RETORTED THAT, AS HE SAW IT, THE ONLY ISSUE OF SUBSTANCE WHICH WAS HOLDING UP FINAL AGREEMENT WAS U S INSISTENCE ON WHAT THEY TERMED ' SOVIET PERFORMANCE '. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD REALISE THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT YIELD TO THIS KIND OF LAST MINUTE BLACKMAIL. I SAID THAT, AS ADAMYSHIN WAS WELL AWARE, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ALSO ATTACHED MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO SOVIET ' PERFORMANCE ' IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD.

2. AFTER A MOMENT OF HESITATION, ADAMYSHIN SAID THAT , AS I WOULD APPRECIATE, WHAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT WAS THE SHCHARANSKY CASE. THE US GOVERNMENT WAS HOLDING OUT FOR HIS RELEASE. I SAID THAT AS HAD BEEN STATED ON MANY OCCASIONS IN PRIVATE AND IN PUBLIC, BRITISH MINISTERS WERE ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE SOVIET TREATMENT OF SHCHARANSKY. I WAS NOT INFORMED IN DETAIL BUT WAS OF COURSE AWARE THAT THE CASE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND U S GOVERNMENTS. ADAMYSHIN REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NOT AT ANY TIME GIVEN ANY ASSURANCE TO THE AMERICANS THAT SHCHARANSKY WOULD BE RELEASED. BEFORE OR AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE MADRID MEETING. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION , HE STATED SPECIFICALLY THAT NO SUCH ASSURANCE HAD BEEN GIVEN BY ANY SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE INCLUDING KONDRASHEV OF THEIR DELEGATION IN MADRID. I REPEATED THAT I WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED ON SUCH BI-LATERAL EXCHANGES AS MIGHT HAVE TAKEN PLACE

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WITH THE AMERICANS BUT THAT MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE ACTION OVER SHCHARANSKY. ADAMYSHIN REPEATED THAT THEY HAD NOT. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF THE AMERICANS INSISTED ON AN UNDERSTANDING OVER SHCHARANSKY BEFORE AGREEING TO THE SPANISH PROPOSALS , THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT WOULD LIE WITH THEM. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME FOR MADRID BUT WERE NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THIS.

3. IN REFERRING TO SOVIET ASSURANCES I HAD IN MIND THAT (SEE PARA 1(B) OF MY MINUTE OF 13 JULY COPIED BY BAG ON 14 JULY TO HEAD OF EESD) EARLIER THIS WEEK MY U S COLLEAGUE HAD TOLD ME HE WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED AT REPORTS WHICH SUGGESTED THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT NOT HONOUR COMMITMENTS ON PERFORMANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH RELATED TO WHAT KONDRASHEV HAD SAID TO KAMPELMAN ON SHCHARANSKY.

SUTHERLAND

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