

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND  
PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU OF CYPRUS AT 0930 HOURS ON TUESDAY 26 JULY  
AT 10 DOWNING STREET

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Present:

Prime Minister	President Kyprianou
Mr. James	Mr. Nicos Rolandis
Mr. Wilberforce	Mr. Tasos Panayides
Mr. Wilson	Mr. Constantinos Michaelides
Sir Anthony Parsons	Mr. Alecos Siambos
Mr. Coles	

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President Kyprianou said that, in his talks with the Prime Minister, he would like to concentrate on the Cyprus problem, but also deal with the question of finalising Cyprus's Association Agreement with the European Community and two or three other items.

With regard to the Cyprus problems, the intercommunal talks had been proceeding for some time without substantial progress. Cyprus had welcomed the intention of the United Nations Secretary General to involve himself personally and undertake a new effort. This was not to say that Cyprus was abandoning intercommunal talks. But it believed that the Secretary General, because of his knowledge of Cyprus and his previous service there, would be able to help.

He had discussed the matter with Mr. Perez de Cuellar in New Delhi in February. No conclusions had been reached at that time. When he had met him again in Paris on 24 April, the Secretary General had said that he wanted to begin a new approach based on consultations with the parties involved and with other governments in order to promote a solution. In essence, he wished to practice the kind of quiet diplomacy that he had employed with regard to Afghanistan.

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There had then been threats from the Turkish side. Superficially, these had been a reaction to the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. But he personally believed that the Turks had simply used that as a pretext to create new tension. It was doubtful whether Denktash, who had always been in favour of partition, wanted a solution. So efforts should be directed even more than before at Ankara. Turkey must decide what it wanted.

It was now nine years since the unprecedented crime committed against Cyprus in 1974. Despite all efforts, there had been no progress. Cyprus had always favoured a peaceful solution. In 1977 it had put forward proposals for a bi-regional federation, although the idea of federation had always been ruled out in the past. However, it was federation which was envisaged, not partition. For so long as the occupation continued, Cyprus could not be asked to stop trying to secure international support. Everyone accepted that the United Nations had a role in the matter.

Denktash was obstructing the resumption of intercommunal talks. Cyprus believed that the possibility of such talks must be kept alive for if the Secretary General made progress, this would provide food for the talks. But Denktash now said that it must be accepted that Cyprus was inhabited by two peoples. By that he meant two peoples with separate rights, including the right of self-determination. For thirty years it had been pointed out that if the right of self-determination was applied to every community in the world, the whole map of the world would change. Cyprus was too small for this concept. Denktash had also referred to "equality of political status". By this he appeared to mean equality in every respect. In effect, the Turks were seeking their own solution.

Denktash complained that the Cyprus Government was receiving international recognition. But that was a fact of life. The area of Cyprus in which Denktash lived was under occupation by a foreign country.

/ Denktash



Denktash also asked for a "moratorium". By this he envisaged a unilateral moratorium so that he was free to do what he liked while the Cyprus Government did nothing to promote a solution.

In 1974 everyone had cast doubt on the decision to seek negotiations before Turkish troops withdrew. But it had been decided that it would be unrealistic to stick to this condition. His Government possessed the will to solve the problem. The situation could not go on indefinitely. A solution had to be found in the interests of peace and security in the area. Any solution must ensure a lasting peace and the smooth running of the country. He could not accept a solution that was based on the results of the invasion. Thus, partition and confederation were ruled out. But geographical reality would have to be accepted. Cyprus would always remain close to Turkey. Any eventual federation must be based on elements which contributed to unity. In the final analysis that would be very much in the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. The "free area" of Cyprus was developing economically while the economy in the occupied area was stagnant. The Turkish Cypriots had little in common with the Turkish immigrants or the Turkish troops. If the latter were replaced by an international force the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots would want good relations with the Greek Cypriots. The territorial arrangements for a federation must be based on reality. The smaller the area under Turkish Cypriot administration within a federation, the larger the number of Greek Cypriot refugees who would return to their homes under the Greek Cypriot administration. Turkish Cypriots would not need to return to the area of Greek Cypriot administration - the principle of freedom of movement must be ensured.

As to the constitutional aspect, the Turkish Cypriots spoke of federation but in reality sought a confederation or two separate states with a loose link. That would be the end of Cyprus. There had to be a change of attitude in Ankara. There was no doubt that every detail of Denktash's approach in the

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negotiations had to be approved in advance by the Turkish Government.

There could be no solution without the withdrawal of Turkish troops. Some time ago he had proposed the replacement of all troops with an international force which would police Cyprus for as long as necessary until there were no longer any security problems. If there was to be a lasting solution there must be no Greek or Turkish military presence in Cyprus. The Greek Government agreed with that. In the context of a solution, even Cypriot troops should be dismantled and replaced by an international police force or some other kind of force with internal security duties.

The Prime Minister said that we agreed that partition was beginning to look permanent. That was bad for Cyprus. We had told the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Government that we could not agree to independence for the area under Turkish occupation. Cyprus was a unit. Unless an initiative were taken soon, it would appear that we were contributing towards partition.

It seemed desirable that the Cyprus Government should first determine what it could accept in the way of a solution. There would then be the problem of how to start negotiations. There had long been the basic equation - certain constitutional arrangements for the Turkish Cypriots in return for suitable territorial arrangements. President Kyprianou now seemed to be adding the idea of the demilitarisation of Cyprus.

President Kyprianou said that he agreed that a determined effort was now needed. All should do what they could to assist the United Nations Secretary General. If we simply confined ourselves to urging the resumption of intercommunal talks we would get nowhere. The United Nations Secretary General was the best instrument for making progress. The new effort should be based on the concept of federation, but it had to be a workable federation. The territorial aspect and constitutional rights

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should be discussed together. Once he knew what the territorial arrangements would be, he could envisage a different approach to the question of autonomy. Any suggestion with regard to constitutional rights could be considered provided it did not promote further divisions and ensured unity and the fundamental rights of everyone. It was absolutely essential that the territorial aspect should be clarified, but Turkey had given no indication of its views.

The Prime Minister asked whether, if the Secretary General proposed territorial adjustments, a measure of Turkish autonomy and demilitarisation on the lines suggested by President Kyprianou, that would be acceptable. President Kyprianou said that it would be acceptable as a framework, subject to discussion of detail. The Prime Minister asked whether the Turkish Government was aware of that. President Kyprianou said that he had arrived at an understanding with the United Nations Secretary General that when he was ready to begin his effort, the views of the Cyprus Government would be conveyed to him.

The Prime Minister commented that Mr. Perez de Cuellar, by virtue of his service in Cyprus, must know the problem unusually well. It might be helpful if we tried to persuade him to involve himself to a greater degree. President Kyprianou said that Mr. Perez de Cuellar was present at all the discussions he had had with Mr. Denktash in 1979, when the ten-point agreement had been secured. He had outlined to the Secretary General the framework suggested above but on an unofficial basis. It had been agreed that substance would be discussed later. At this stage the Secretary General did not wish to put forward any proposals of his own. He had said that he wanted to discuss the problem not just with the parties directly concerned, but with others who might be able to help. He had even mentioned the United States. The Prime Minister said that time was passing. It was necessary to seek agreement on a framework and get on with discussing the details. President Kyprianou said that he could repeat his own formula. But the Secretary General was

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worried that anything he put forward would be rejected out of hand by the Turks. The Prime Minister said that it was our impression that Turkey did not want partition. President Kyprianou said that this was the line taken by Turkey. But a series of measures were being adopted in the occupied area which appeared to promote partition.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, President Kyprianou said that it would be helpful if we urged the Secretary General to make a particular effort now to bring new impetus for a solution. Mr. Wilberforce commented that in reply the Secretary General would say that it would be helpful if President Kyprianou would give him more to work with. President Kyprianou said that the Secretary General must also obtain some movement from the other side. History would say that his Government had been wrong to make its proposals in 1977 for it had then abandoned the basic concept of a unitary state and accepted the idea of federation, but had obtained nothing in response, despite a promise by Mr. Clark Clifford that Turkey would respond immediately.

/ The Prime Minister



The Prime Minister asked whether the Cyprus Government had agreed internally on the kind of territorial adjustment and constitutional arrangements which it could accept. President Kyprianou said that it would be possible to reach such agreement. But his problem was that he did not know what kind of solution the Turkish Government desired. If he had to negotiate with the Prime Minister, having watched her performance on Zimbabwe, he would put all his demands on the table. But the Turks indulged in oriental bargaining - they pocketed whatever was put on the table. President Kyprianou said that he had two suggestions to make - first, that we encouraged the Secretary General as much as possible; second, that we made further approaches in Ankara. The Prime Minister asked whether we could indicate to the Secretary General the general formula described by President Kyprianou. President Kyprianou said that we could do so and added that the Cyprus Government was ready to describe to him the extent to which it could go on territorial arrangements and the extent of its flexibility on constitutional arrangements.

Sir Anthony Parsons said that he believed that the Secretary General would be concerned that if he became more involved all his prestige would be at stake. Any proposal he put forward would be liable to be disliked by both sides. He would want to be sure that neither party would adopt a disruptive attitude. President Kyprianou commented that if he were in the Secretary General's position he would try to find out from both parties how far they could go. Cyprus attached great importance to the help of the United Kingdom as a Commonwealth partner and a guarantor power. Britain could have taken a firmer attitude at the time of the Turkish invasion. He now urged us to take an active interest. The Prime Minister assured him that we attached great importance to Cyprus. President Kyprianou said that he hoped that the Secretary General could begin work in late August. It might be possible to register some progress by the time of the Commonwealth Conference in New Delhi where the matter would be raised.

/The Prime Minister



The Prime Minister congratulated President Kyprianou on his Government's handling of Arab terrorism and, in particular, the recent hi-jacking incident at Larnaca.

President Kyprianou then raised the question of the Association Agreement between Cyprus and the European Community. He had discussed this question recently in Rome, Paris and Brussels. He had agreed with the President of the Commission that the time had come for the Commission to seek directives from the Council of Ministers for the negotiation of the final stage of the Agreement, i.e. a customs union. He understood that the Council expected to deal with this problem in September. Since the United Kingdom had entered the Community, Cyprus had had various economic problems. But that was not the actual reason why it wished to complete its Association Agreement. There was also the political consideration that Cyprus wished to be as close as possible to Europe where it properly belonged. It had been a member of the Council of Europe from the outset. It was understood that Cyprus could not obtain full membership of the Community. It was mainly the objections of France and Italy with regard to certain agricultural products which were holding up progress towards a customs union. He had received certain assurances from France and Italy that they would do what they could to help. So he hoped that the difficulties could now be overcome. M. Thorn had said he would do all he could.

The Prime Minister said that we wanted to be helpful (President Kyprianou interjected that we had been and he was grateful). Cyprus would doubtless press its case hard during the Greek Presidency. It was important that, while keeping in mind the objective of full customs union, Cyprus should do all it could to protect its interests in the Mediterranean acquis.

President Kyprianou said that there were three matters which he would discuss with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary later in the day. First, there was the question of "payment for the bases". He wondered whether it might be

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possible for some sum to be conceded without prejudice to the final solution. The Prime Minister said that our differences on this point would continue but we understood that there was a political imperative which made the President raise the matter.

President Kyprianou said that the other two matters which he would mention to Sir Geoffrey Howe were the treatment of Cypriot refugees who had come to the United Kingdom after 1974 and for which the Cyprus Government was generally grateful; and the possibility of some further effort to encourage Cypriot students to come to the United Kingdom.

President Kyprianou asked whether the Prime Minister had any plans to attend this year's session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Prime Minister said that she had no plans to do so unless Mrs. Gandhi's initiative came to fruition. She saw no point in a gathering of Heads of Government unless Mr. Andropov was able to attend.

The discussion ended at 1025.

26 July 1983



CC MASTER



File

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 July 1983

Dear Roger,

VISIT OF PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS

I enclose a record of the conversation between the Prime Minister and President Kyprianou of Cyprus at No.10 this morning.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Robert Lowson (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food).

Yours ever  
John Giddens

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.