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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 325 OF 10 NOVEMBER  
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA  
INFO SAVING BONN ROME PARIS BRUSSELS MOSCOW AND PEKING

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OTTAWA TELNO 578 TO YOU: TRUDEAU'S EAST/WEST INITIATIVE

1. TRUDEAU PAID A BRIEF VISIT TO THE NETHERLANDS ON 8 NOVEMBER. THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT IS BASED ON TALKS BETWEEN SIR J BULLARD AND JACBOVITS (NETHERLANDS POLITICAL DIRECTOR) AND ON A COMMUNITY BRIEFING.
2. WHAT TRUDEAU SAID HERE ADDED LITTLE TO HIS SPEECH AT GUELPH. HIS MAIN CONCERN WAS THE DETERIORATION IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS, WHICH HE ATTRIBUTED TO POLITICAL NEGLECT AND THE OVER-INVOLVEMENT OF TECHNOCRATS/MILITARY SPECIALISTS, PARTICULARLY IN DISARMAMENT TALKS. HE ARGUED THAT - DESPITE ITS OBVIOUS DANGERS - INF DEPLOYMENT (WHICH HE EXPLICITLY SUPPORTED) MIGHT HAVE A BENEFICIAL IMPACT ON US/SOVIET RELATIONS. THE AMERICANS WOULD FEEL ABLE TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE ONCE THEIR DETERMINATION HAD BEEN DEMONSTRATED, AND THE RUSSIANS WOULD THEN BE OBLIGED TO BEGIN SERIOUS TALKS ABOUT INF REDUCTIONS, BECAUSE THEIR PEACE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN HAD FAILED TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES.
3. HE DESCRIBED CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS (PARTICULARLY MBFR) AS THE MAIN AREA IN WHICH AMERICA'S ALLIES COULD BRING THEIR INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE VIENNA TALKS WERE BOGGED DOWN IN TECHNICALITIES AND A MAJOR IMPETUS WAS NEEDED FROM WESTERN POLITICIANS - OTHERWISE THEY MIGHT AS WELL 'KILL OFF' THE MBFR PROCESS FOR GOOD AND ALL. SIMILARLY, HE ARGUED THAT POLITICANS SHOULD TAKE AN ACTIVE PART IN THE CDE (EG BY FOREIGN MINISTERS ATTENDING THE OPENING CEREMONY IN STOCKHOLM).
4. ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TRUDEAU DID NOT ENLARGE SIGNIFICANTLY ON HIS GUELPH PROPOSALS, BEYOND STRESSING THAT 5-POWER NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT BE 'BLOC-TO-BLOC', AND THAT THE CAUSE OF HORIZONTAL NON-PROLIFERATION WOULD BE HELPED BY SUCH A DISPLAY OF INTEREST IN VERTICAL NON-PROLIFERATION AMONGST THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

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5. THE DUTCH APPEAR TO HAVE LISTENED MUCH MORE THAN THEY TALKED. THEY AGREE THAT EAST/WEST RELATIONS ARE IN THE DOLDRUMS, BUT QUESTION BOTH TRUDEAU'S ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES AND HIS PROPOSED SOLUTIONS. IN PARTICULAR, THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION RESULTS FROM A LACK OF POLITICAL WILL-POWER OR THAT POLITICAL ACTS OF WILL CAN OVERCOME THE NEED FOR GENUINE, DETAILED AGREEMENTS IN FIELDS SUCH AS MBFR. THEY ALSO THINK IT WRONG TO UNDERESTIMATE THE DEGREE TO WHICH CURRENT HAWKISH US POLICY IS A REFLECTION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, RATHER THAN MERELY THE CREATION OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION. THEY DO HOWEVER SHARE TRUDEAU'S VIEW THAT THE WEST NEEDS TO RECOVER THE INITIATIVE IN THE MBFR TALKS.

6. THUS, WHILE AGREEING THAT CLOSE POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE WHOLE PROCESS OF DETENTE IS IMPORTANT, THE DUTCH FEEL THAT TRUDEAU NEEDS TO PUT A LOT OF FLESH ON THE BONES OF HIS IDEAS BEFORE THEY WILL BE CONSIDERED SERIOUSLY BY ANYBODY IN EAST OR WEST. THEY VIEW THE REACTIONS OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENT AS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN THE CONTEXT OF TRUDEAU'S IDEAS ABOUT A MULTILATERAL CONFERENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

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