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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 November 1983

*John Tahan,*

*A.S.C. 24/11*  
*f.c.*

Visit of Prime Minister of Canada

In your letter of 11 November you asked for advice on Mr Trudeau's idea that the CDE should open in Stockholm in January at the level of Heads of Government.

The Foreign Secretary's advice is that it would not be appropriate to start off the CDE at Heads of Government level, and that it would be positively damaging to allied unity to attempt to do so.

As the Prime Minister indicated when she saw Mr Trudeau on 11 November, there is a danger of over-loading the CDE politically. The CDE, although important, is only one of a number of follow-up meetings envisaged in the Madrid Concluding Document. None of the other meetings, which include those on Human Rights and Human Contacts, will be treated in this way. To highlight the CDE as Mr Trudeau proposed would therefore damage the Western aim of maintaining balance between the security and the human rights parts of the CSCE, and Sir Geoffrey would advise strongly against it.

In practice the idea which is running is that the CDE opening should be attended by Foreign Ministers. Mr Shultz emphasised to Sir G Howe at the time of the UNGA that he personally had considerable reservations even about that. The French and Germans have however been active in seeking to get Mr Shultz to agree to attend the opening meeting in Stockholm on 17 January, and Sir Geoffrey sees some merit in this in terms of resuming contact between the US and the Soviet Union at a senior level. Nevertheless in discussion with our Partners in the Ten, we have so far taken the position that, while we will be represented at Ministerial level at the opening ceremony, it has not yet been decided whether the Foreign Secretary himself would attend. We would prefer this decision to be taken on the basis of further discussions in NATO, possibly with a preliminary airing among our closest allies.

You have also asked for views on the detailed paper which the Canadians have given us elaborating Mr Trudeau's ideas about a five-power conference on nuclear arms control.

/We have looked

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We have looked at the Canadian paper, and are frankly very sceptical. We believe it would not improve the prospects for US/Soviet agreement on strategic nuclear arms control; and, as a recipe for procedure after such reductions are agreed and implemented, is premature and only one of a number of theoretical possibilities for the future. The brief prepared for the Prime Minister's use at the CHOGM (as amended by my letter to you of 18 November) sets out our reservations on this and the other arms control proposals (including MBFR and the Non-Proliferation Treaty). We could, in conjunction with the MOD, provide a more detailed commentary covering all these points if you so require.

Finally, Sir Geoffrey considers that it might be useful if we were now to take an overall view on the value of Mr Trudeau's initiative. His judgement is that, while we would agree with Mr Trudeau on the importance of the political dimension in East/West relations, and the need to maintain regular contacts with the Soviet Union, it would be damaging if Mr Trudeau were to put his detailed views on arms limitation questions to the Russians and imply that they commanded general assent in the West. I enclose a Speaking Note on which the Prime Minister might draw in talking to Mr Trudeau in the margins of the CHOGM.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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East/West Relations

Talking Points for use with Mr Trudeau at CHOGM

1. Have been reflecting on views you put to me on 11 November. Interested to hear what response you got from Japanese and others.
2. Agree on importance of political dimension in relations with the Soviet Union and political control over individual arms limitation negotiations.
3. Have in my recent public statements made it clear that we are looking for sensible and realistic dialogue with Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Intend to make sure that our contacts are adequate for conveying our views clearly to Russians and Eastern Europeans (contacts with Russians where a good case for them at senior official not Ministerial level; going myself to Hungary in 1984). Important to use contacts to try to avoid misunderstandings.
4. Believe main message we should be trying to get over to Russians is that West and specifically Americans, are interested in genuine arms control agreements. Progress must be achieved in the specific negotiations. Will not be achieved by public propaganda statements aimed at Western public opinion.
5. Concerned that if in any meeting with, or message to, Andropov you were to imply that five-power nuclear conference or other specific arms control suggestions in your speeches had general Western backing without prior coordination and agreement in NATO, we might send wrong signal to Russians and actually make them less inclined to negotiate flexibly in various fora. They might believe that Western concessions were imminent.
6. [If discussion turns to specific issues, these are covered in Brief PMVE(83) for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.]

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follow up on EA/West  
Relation

21 NOV 1983





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Pamie Martin  
only desk  
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 November 1983


Joe John

CHOGM Brief: Trudeau Initiative

Sir Geoffrey Howe has commented on para 11 of the CHOGM Brief on the Trudeau initiative (PMVE(83)(B30) that it takes an insufficiently firm line on the proposal for a 5-power negotiation on nuclear disarmament.

We would suggest that it be substituted by the following text:

'Britain has stated publicly the circumstances in which we would be ready to review the position on the British nuclear deterrent in relation to arms control. Five power negotiations on nuclear disarmament are only one among a number of theoretical possibilities for the future. If we had to take a position on this now, it would be negative. The circumstances are premature. The first necessity, as we have repeatedly stated is for super powers to negotiate substantial reductions.'

  
(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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*File 16*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 November 1983

Thank you for your letter of 14 November containing a paper setting out Prime Minister Trudeau's ideas on a five-power nuclear conference, together with a copy of Mr. Trudeau's speech in Montreal on 13 November.

I shall bring these to the attention of the Prime Minister.

A. J. COLES

Mr. John Schram.

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*file 16*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 November 1983

ARMS CONTROL: MR. TRUDEAU'S IDEAS

Following Mr. Trudeau's discussions with the Prime Minister here last Friday, I have received from the Canadian High Commission the enclosed paper setting out in more detail Mr. Trudeau's proposal for a five-power nuclear conference, together with the enclosed text of the speech which he gave in Montreal on his return to Canada.

*SK1*

I should be grateful for early comments on Mr. Trudeau's ideas.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

**A. J. COLES**

Roger Bone Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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ONT  
HAUT-COMMISSARIAT DU CANADA.  
DIVISION DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES  
ET ECONOMIQUES,  
MACDONALD HOUSE,  
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE,  
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Bf  
CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  
DIVISION,  
MACDONALD HOUSE,  
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE,  
LONDON, W1X 0AB.

Telephone: 01-629 9492 Ext.

November 14, 1983


Mr. John Coles  
Private Secretary  
Office of the Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London

Dear Mr. Coles,

Mr. Robert Fowler, our Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet for Foreign and Defence Policy, has asked us to pass to you copies of the attached papers expalining Prime Minister Trudeau's ideas on the five-power nuclear conference which he discussed with you at Prime Minister Thatcher's lunch last Friday. The papers may go some distance in responding to concerns raised by Prime Minister Thatcher as to how the Canadian proposals would deal with the aggregation of the U.S.A., U.K. and French deterrents, and the need for modernization of U.K. nuclear forces.

We are also forwarding copies of the speech which Prime Minister Trudeau gave in Montreal November 13th.

Yours sincerely,

  
John Schram  
Counsellor

I have asked the F.I.C.O.  
to comment.

A.S.C. 15  
h.a.



I Subject:

This paper describes the substance of an initiative which could result in a structure of arms limitation for the five declared nuclear weapons states.

II Background

Arms control negotiations designed to limit strategic nuclear weapons have thus far only taken place between the Superpowers. The other three declared nuclear weapons states (France, Great Britain and China) have not been involved, and their arsenals remain unconstrained by international agreement.

III The Proposal

A framework for the regulation of nuclear forces would lend overall predictability to the strategic balance, thereby reducing incentives to increase deterrent forces. Should negotiations produce a ratio of allowed strategic forces as between the parties, the expansion of forces beyond these mutually agreed levels would be constrained. This predictability, and the quantitative ceiling on national forces, would in turn increase the chances for meaningful arms reductions.

This initiative is designed to avoid the serious pitfalls contained in other proposals of this type. These include: the unacceptable aggregation of British, French and U.S. forces; the discussion of the forces of other states in bilateral fora; and unwarranted and unacceptable restraints on national deterrents in the absence of significant reductions in Superpower forces.

The following are designed to serve as general guidelines and considerations bearing upon the substance and process for negotiations designed to create an agreement on global nuclear arms limitation.

Process

- (a) Formal negotiations should be preceded by working-group consultations designed to set the agenda, terms of reference, and guiding principles of subsequent talks.
- (b) These initial meetings should be convened without substantive preconditions except for agreement as to the overall purpose of the process. Preconditions as to substance are to be avoided since these may well decrease incentives to participate.



- (c) Talks should not be conducted on a bloc-to-bloc basis, but on the basis of individual state participation. Each state would retain a veto on the substance of any agreements.

Substance

- (a) The overall purpose of the negotiations would be to reach agreement on fixed ratios of national strategic forces.
- (b) In order to secure Superpower agreement, those ratios would have to reflect Superpower de jure equality, thereby avoiding the deficiencies of such approaches as the current Soviet INF proposals.
- (c) Actual ratios should be the subject of negotiations.
- (d) The unit of account should be left open to negotiation, but agreement would be most likely if "warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles" were to be adopted as the unit of measurement. This would have the virtue of corresponding to Western and Soviet principles in the INF and START negotiations; of encouraging a move towards less vulnerable, single-warhead systems and away from vulnerable and destabilizing MIRVed systems; of preventing circumvention of the intent of the agreement through placing a larger number of warheads on a fixed number of launchers; and of not "handicapping" British, French, and Chinese forces which generally have less MIRV potential.
- (e) Currently planned modernization programs would have to be accommodated within the negotiated ratios, in order to secure agreement.
- (f) These negotiations and the resulting agreement should not be a substitute for ongoing START and INF talks, or their successors, but rather a complement. Should circumstances dictate, the agreement could be renegotiated to reflect the outcome of these other negotiations. These other agreements could not, however, violate the agreed limits contained in the global accord. They might, however, result in additional constraints and measures designed to reduce weaponry beyond those measures agreed to in the five-power agreement.
- (g) Parties should be entitled to withdraw from the agreement given adequate notification (to be negotiated) in situations of perceived threat to their national security.



- (h) Qualitative modernization programs which did not violate the agreed ratios should be allowed, subject to the other arms control agreements.
- (i) All air, land, and sea-based systems deemed through negotiations to be strategic in nature should be included.
- (j) If forces of less than intercontinental range were deemed to be strategic by the participants, they could be aggregated with those of intercontinental range with a freedom to deploy systems wherever this was deemed desirable by the parties, subject to the restrictions of other arms control agreements. (This could force a tradeoff between Superpower intercontinental and theatre forces which could both dampen incentives for an arms race in the European theatre, and at the same time allow some asymmetries in the theatre deployments which could solve some of the problems arising in the current INF negotiations in Geneva).
- (k) It would probably be necessary (and desirable) to attach specific numerical totals to the agreed ratios, thereby precluding quantitative increases beyond the agreed ratios which would legitimize proportional increases in the size of the forces of other parties.
- (l) In order to accommodate ongoing arms control efforts, the establishment of precise ratios may have to await the outcome of the START and INF negotiations. These negotiations will provide the necessary predictability for the establishment of realistic ratios. In order to provide incentives for agreement in START and the INF talks, it would be desirable if the Superpowers committed themselves to global talks as part of these other agreements, should they be negotiated.
- (m) Other agreed qualitative restraints could be negotiated as desired by the parties, as could collateral measures designed to enhance crisis management and increase confidence between the parties. These might include:
  - (i) a ban on high altitude ASAT systems.
  - (ii) a requirement for verifiability by National Technical Means
  - (iii) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.



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---PM MONTREAL SPEECH

FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF PM S SPEECH

2. EMBARGO UNTIL 12:30 OTTAWA TIME. TEXT BEGINS:

NOTES FOR REMARKS BY THE PM ON PEACE AND SECURITY MONTL 13NOV.

ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, I HAVE TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY OF THESE EVENTS TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF QUEBEC AND OF CDA. BROADENING OUR HORIZONS TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK TO YOU ABOUT PEACE, ABOUT DISARMAMENT, AND ABOUT OUR FUTURE AS INHABITANTS OF A WORLD IN DISARRAY.

WE MEET TOGETHER AS PART OF THE LONG-STANDING DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THIS COUNTRY--A PROCESS WHICH, AS YOUR GENEROUS PRESENCE SHOWS, IS ALIVE AND WELL IN CDA. WE TAKE PRIDE IN THE VIGOUR AND DIVERSITY OF OUR POLITICAL LIFE, IN THE BRIGHT PROMISE OF OUR FUTURE.

IF OUR FUTURE DEPENDED ON CDNS ALONE, WE COULD BE CONFIDENT THAT IT WAS SAFE AND SOUND.. BUT NO/NO NATION TODAY HOLDS ITS FUTURE SECURELY IN ITS OWN HANDS. WE SHARE THIS PLANET WITH ABOUT 160 OTHER NATIONS, ALL OF WHOM INTERACT WITH US IN A GLOBAL SYSTEM EMBRACING OUR SECURITY, OUR ECONOMY, THE HEALTH OF OUR ENVIRONMENT, AND THE QUALITY OF OUR LIVES.

...2



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THOSE 160 GOVTS ARE, HOWEVER, BY NO MEANS THE ONLY PLAYERS. THE STAGE IS CROWDED WITH ALLIANCES, WITH REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, WITH INNATL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE UN, WITH MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, WITH CARTELS, PRESSURE GROUPS AND LOBBIES OF ALL KINDS.

WE ARE ALL OF US--YOU AND I AND OUR FAMILIES, CITIZENS, GOVTS AND CORPORATIONS--ON THAT CROWDED GLOBAL STAGE, WHICH IS ALIVE WITH OUR HOPES AND OUR FEARS, OUR FAILURES AND OUR SUCCESSES. BUT THERE ARE TODAY THREE DOMINANT AND DISTURBING TRENDS WHICH, WHEN SET SIDE BY SIDE, THREATEN TO BRING DOWN THE CURTAIN ON OUR HUMAN PERFORMANCE.

THE FIRST TREND IS AN INCREASING RESORT TO THE USE OF FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF INNATL DISPUTES. DESPITE THE SOLEMN AFFIRMATION OF THE UN CHARTER THAT QUOTE ALL MEMBERS SHALL REFRAIN IN THEIR INNATL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE UNQUOTE THERE HAVE BEEN, SINCE 1945, APPROXIMATELY 130 CONFLICTS IN WHICH 35 MILLION HUMAN LIVES HAVE BEEN LOST.

THERE IS A HABIT OF AGGRESSION WHICH IS GAINING GROUND. AN ABDICATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN DEFERENCE TO MILITARY SOLUTIONS. A COARSE ELEMENT OF BELLIGERENCE, OF MENACING RHETORIC, OF GOVTS WHICH RISE AND FALL AT GUN-POINT. THE TREND IS GLOBAL--AND IT IS GATHERING SPEED.

THIS BRUTALIZATION OF POLITICAL LIFE TAKES ON A PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS TONE WHEN IT IS DRIVEN BY THE CLASH OF CONFRONTATIONAL IDEOLOGIES, AND ARMED WITH SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS. WEAPONS CLAIMING AN ANNUAL EXPENDITURE ON THE ORDER OF 600 BILLION DOLLARS FOR

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PAGE THREE IDDZ0128 RESTR

NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS COMBINED. WEAPONS CLAIMING TOO GREAT A SHARE OF THE BUDGETS OF IMPOVERISHED THIRD WORLD NATIONS. WEAPONS WHICH PROMOTE A RISING TIDE OF VIOLENCE AND ENGULF MORE PEACEFUL WAYS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES.

THE SECOND TREND IS THE STEADY UNRAVELLING OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THIS PROLIFERATION HAS TWO FUNDAMENTAL DIRECTIONS. WE CALL IT VERTICAL PROLIFERATION WHEN WE MEAN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVER-LARGER NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS, EVER MORE-ADVANCED IN DESTRUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, BY THE FIVE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES: THE USA, USSR, FRANCE, UK AND CHINA. WE CALL IT HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION WHEN WE MEAN THE POTENTIAL SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHER STATES. SOME OF THESE OTHER NATIONS HAVE THE CAPACITY NOW TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR ARMS. SOME ARE ON THE VERGE OF DOING SO.

WE ARE TODAY PREOCCUPIED MAINLY WITH THE EVIDENT NEED TO ASSERT RESTRAINT OVER THE ARSENALS OF ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS. BUT FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, AND IN THE NEAR TERM, THE CONSEQUENCES OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION POSE AN EQUALLY GRAVE THREAT. PERHAPS MORE GRAVE, SINCE THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY OTHER NATIONS WOULD BE UNCHECKED BY THE ASSURANCE OF MUTUAL DESTRUCTION WHICH OBTAINS AMONG THE FIVE POWERS.

IT WAS PRECISELY TO ARREST BOTH KINDS OF PROLIFERATION THAT A FORMAL AGREEMENT--THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY--CAME INTO EFFECT IN 1970,

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AND IS UP FOR REVIEW IN 1985. THAT TREATY REPRESENTED AN IMPLICIT COVENANT BETWEEN THOSE NATIONS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THOSE WITHOUT: AN UNDERTAKING BY THE NUCLEAR POWERS THAT THEY WOULD PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON ARMS CONTROL AND ON LIMITING THE SPREAD OF THEIR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY; AND AN UNDERTAKING BY OTHER STATES THAT THEY WOULD FOREGO THE MILITARY USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN RETURN FOR THE BENEFITS OF ITS PEACEFUL USE, IN FIELDS SUCH AS ENERGY, MEDICINE, OR AGRICULTURE.

BUT THE TREND IS FOR THIS BARGAIN TO COME UNSTUCK. THE TREATY STANDS NOW AT A CROSS-ROADS BETWEEN PEACEFUL ASPIRATION AND MILITARY STRATEGY. IT IS THE CROSSROADS AT WHICH NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES--EAST AND WEST, NORTH AND SOUTH--PREOCCUPIED WITH THEIR SURVIVAL, WITH THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, OR WITH CURRENT CONFLICTS, WILL DECIDE WHETHER THE COVENANT STILL HOLDS.

THE THIRD TREND WHICH THREATENS THE GLOBAL SYSTEM IS THE WORSENING STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, PARTICULARLY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. TWO WEEKS AGO, WHEN I SPOKE IN GUELPH, I DEPLORED THE ABSENCE OF HIGH POLITICS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND THE TENDENCY FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS TO RUN THEIR COURSE OUTSIDE ANY STRUCTURE OF UNDERSTANDING OF, AND RESPECT FOR, EACH OTHERS SECURITY NEEDS. I REAFFIRMED OUR FIDELITY TO THE NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION, AND DECLARED MY HOPE THAT WE MIGHT ADD A QUOTE THIRD RAIL UNQUOTE OF POLITICAL ENERGY, OF DIALOGUE AND OF CONFIDENCE, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE DOWNWARD COURSE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

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I ASK YOU NOW TO CONSIDER THESE THREE TRENDS IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER--LAMINATED TOGETHER, AS THEY ARE IN LIFE. AN INCREASING RESORT TO USE OF FORCE. THE GROWING REALITY OF THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AND A SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP WHICH IS CHARGED WITH ANIMOSITY. I BELIEVE IT IS EVIDENT THAT ONLY A GLOBAL APPROACH TO PEACE AND SECURITY CAN REVERSE THE PATH OF THIS SINISTER, COMPOSITE TREND-LINE.

BECAUSE, AS TENSIONS BUILD, THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP BECOMES PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO EVENTS ON THE PERIPHERY. AN ENDEMIC INSTABILITY IS EVIDENT IN AREAS LARGELY UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OF ONE OR THE OTHER SUPERPOWER. AT OTHER FLASHPOINTS, SUCH AS THE EVER-VOLATILE MIDDLE EAST, WE SEE THE TINDER FOR A SPREADING CONFLAGRATION.

THE PENETRATION OF EAST-WEST RIVALRY INTO THE THIRD WORLD WILL REACH ITS DEEPEST AND MOST DANGEROUS POINT IF, DESPITE THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, FRONT-LINE ANTAGONISTS--LOCKED IN RIVALRY OR COMBAT--BEGIN TO ARM THEMSELVES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

(TRANSLATION)

AS CDNS, OUR ENERGIES ARE DEEPLY DEVOTED TO THE SECURITY OF THE WESTERN COMMUNITY, ON THIS CONTINENT AND IN EUROPE. BUT OUR LOYALTIES, OUR NATIONAL AND GLOBAL INTERESTS, BY NO MEANS END THERE.

CDAS PLACE ON THE PACIFIC RIM GIVES US A PRIVILEGED RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN, WITH CHINA, AND WITH THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS AND, OF COURSE, WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

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OUR EXTENSIVE PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TAKES US TO MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD, REMOTE IN DISTANCE, BUT CLOSE IN PARTNERSHIP. OUR STANDING IN THE COMMUNITY OF FRANCOPHONE NATIONS, AND IN THE COMWEL, DEMANDS THAT WE SHARE THE FULL RANGE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CONCERNS TO WHICH OUR NATIONAL CHARACTER GIVES US ACCESS.

THAT IS WHY, IN PURSUING AN INITIATIVE TO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE, I DETERMINED FROM THE START THAT OUR APPROACH MUST BE GLOBAL IN SCOPE AND IN PERSPECTIVE. SUCH AN APPROACH IS DICTATED BY THE COMPLEX INTERLINKAGE OF DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT; OF SUPERPOWER ANIMOSITY AND THIRD WORLD RIVALRIES; OF THE RESORT TO FORCE AND THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS; OF NUCLEAR BALANCES IN EUROPE AND IN ASIA.

ONE MAN REPRESENTING ONE COUNTRY CANNOT PROMISE A MIRACLE, LET ALONE DELIVER ONE. I HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUES IN PLAY. NONETHELESS IT IS ESSENTIAL, IN MY JUDGEMENT, TO SEEK STABILITY AT A NUMBER OF POINTS ALONG THE DOWNWARD TREND-LINE, AND TO RECOGNIZE THAT PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MODERN AGE ARE INDIVISIBLE.

MOREOVER, I AM NOT ALONE. OTHER LEADERS HAVE JOINED THEIR CONCERNS WITH MINE. THERE IS A GROWING COMMUNITY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WHICH IS DETERMINED TO SUBJECT THE SCIENCE OF ARMS TO THE ART OF POLITICS. I DRAW ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE SUPPORT OF THAT COMMUNITY.

YOU WILL KNOW THAT I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM MEETINGS IN EUROPE WITH  
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SEVERAL LEADERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, WITH HIS HOLINESS THE POPE, AND WITH HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS. I RETURN FROM EUROPE WITH CLEAR EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR MY INITIATIVE, CONFIDENT THAT MY SENSE OF URGENCY IS SHARED BY OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. I FOUND A PARTICULAR CONSENSUS ON THE NEED TO LAY DOWN A THIRD RAIL OF CONFIDENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS--A RAIL CHARGING OUR DEALINGS WITH THE OTHER SIDE WITH A CURRENT OF POLITICAL ENERGY..

I TOOK TO MY EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES FOR DISCUSSION, AND FOR REFINEMENT IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR OWN VIEWS, ELEMENTS OF A PROGRAM FOR POLITICAL MANAGEMENT OF THE CURRENT CRISIS. I RETURN WITH THE ASSURANCE OF THEIR PERSONAL ATTENTION TO THIS PROGRAM. LET ME SET OUT SOME OF THE ELEMENTS.

THE FIRST IS THE NEED TO ESTABLISH, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN THE COURSE OF THE COMING YEAR, A FORUM IN WHICH GLOBAL LIMITS MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED FOR ALL FIVE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES. THIS PROPOSAL IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE INF OR START TALKS BETWEEN THE USA AND USSR. BUT THOSE TALKS, AND RIGHTLY SO, DO NOT COVER BRITISH, FRENCH OR CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES.

WHAT WE MUST SEEK TO PROVIDE IS A NEGOTIATING FORUM FOR THOSE FIVE STATES WHICH RECOGNIZES THE RIGHTS OF THE USA AND THE USSR AS STRATEGIC EQUALS--WHAT A RECENT TRILATERAL COMMISSION REPORT CALLS QUOTE INEVITABLE PARITY UNQUOTE BETWEEN THEM--AND WHICH PROVIDES A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND STABLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE OTHER THREE STATES AND THOSE OF THE SUPERPOWERS.

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PAGE EIGHT IDDZ0128 RESTR

IN THIS WAY NEITHER BRITAIN, NOR FRANCE, NOR CHINA NEED FEAR THAT THEIR FORCES WILL BE SUBJECT TO RESTRAINTS WHICH DO NOT/NOT RECOGNIZE THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS.

ONCE RELATIVE LEVELS OF ARMAMENT WERE STABILIZED, I BELIEVE THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS COULD BEGIN TO ADDRESS THE REDUCTIONS CALLED FOR BY THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AND TO CONSIDER MEASURES TO CONTROL THE QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE.

A SECOND ELEMENT IS REMEDIAL ACTION TO SHORE UP THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ITSELF--THAT COVENANT BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES WHICH I MENTIONED A FEW MINUTES AGO. THE TREATY HAS BEEN SIGNED BY SOME 119 NATIONS. BUT A NUMBER OF KEY STATES REMAIN ALCOF, INCLUDING SEVERAL WITH THE CAPACITY NOW, OR THE POTENTIAL SOON, TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN NUCLEAR ARMS.

IF THE FIVE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES COULD BEGIN TO STRENGTHEN THEIR SIDE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION BARGAIN, THEN THE REST OF US COULD MORE EASILY BRING GOOD SENSE TO FEAR ON THOSE WHO HAVE NOT/NOT YET SIGNED ON. NO/NO DOUBT WE NEED TO INCREASE THE INCENTIVES FOR THIRD WORLD STATES TO FOREGO NUCLEAR WEAPONS--THERE MUST BE A DIRECT LINKAGE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. AND WE SHALL ALSO HAVE TO ENSURE THAT A FULL RANGE OF SAFEGUARDS ADEQUATELY GOVERNS THE TRANSFER, FROM ALL NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS, OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE AREA OF SAFEGUARDS IS ONE IN WHICH CDA HAS TAKEN A LEADING PART FOR MANY YEARS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

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PAGE NINE IDDZ0128 RESTR

THOSE TWO ELEMENTS BEGIN TO ADDRESS THE GLOBAL DIMENSION OF SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. BUT WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS IN THE HEART OF EUROPE A MOST DANDEROUS CONCENTRATION OF FORCES --CONVENTIONAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR. A WAR IN EUROPE COULD DESTROY EVERYTHING THAT EACH SIDE DESIRES TO PROTECT.

THROUGHOUT MY TALKS WITH EUROPEAN LEADERS, THERE RAN A COMMON THEME OF CONCERN AT THE PRESENT IMBALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THE WSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES HEAVILY OUTWEIGHT THOSE OF NATO. THERE IS AN APPREHENSION IN WESTERN EUROPE THAT THE WSAW PACT FORCES COULD BE TEMPTED TO GAMBLE ON A CONVENTIONALLY-ARMED ATTACK. THEY WOULD THROW DOWN THE CHALLENGE TO WESTERN LEADERS EITHER OF ACCEPTING DEFEAT, OR OF BEING THE FIRST TO RESORT TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OUR OWN DEFENSE..

AS LONG AS THIS IMBALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES PERSISTS, SO DOES THE RISK THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE BROUGHT INTO ACTION AT AN EARLY STAGE OF ANY CONFLICT. THAT IS WHY WE SAY THAT THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IN EUROPE IS TOO LOW. AND OF COURSE WE CAN NEVER BE CERTAIN THAT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE WOULD NOT/NOT ESCALATE RAPIDLY TO EVER MORE-MASSIVE NUCLEAR RETALIATION ON AN INTERCONTINENTAL SCALE. THE CONCLUSION WE DRAW IS THAT THE BEST WAY TO RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IS TO ESTABLISH A MORE REASONABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

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HOW THEN DO WE ACHIEVE THIS BALANCE? THIS QUESTION PROMPTS THE THIRD ELEMENT OF MY APPROACH. THE SIMPLE, THOUGH EXPENSIVE, ANSWER IS FOR THE WEST TO INCREASE ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES UNTIL THEY MATCH THOSE OF THE WSAW PACT. I SEE THIS AS A LAST RESORT. THE FAR MORE SENSIBLE APPROACH WOULD BE FOR BOTH SIDES TO REDUCE THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO MUTUALLY AGREED LEVELS, A TASK TO WHICH WE HAVE DEVOTED THE PAST TEN YEARS AT THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION (MBFR) TALKS IN VIENN. THERE IS TODAY SOME SIGN OF MOVEMENT IN THOSE TALKS, BUT AT FAR TOO SLOW A PACE. HARD QUESTIONS REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED. THAT IS WHY I EXPLORED, WITH MY COLLEAGUES IN THE ALLIANCE, WAYS TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK IN VIENN, WAYS TO GIVE FRESH POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE MBFR TALKS.

ANOTHER NEGOTIATING FORUM WILL OPEN IN STOCKHOLM THIS JANUARY. ITS LENGTHY TITLE, SHOWING THE COMPLEXITY OF ITS TASK, IS THE QUOTE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE UNQUOTE. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THIS CONFERENCE NOT/NOT LOSE ITS WAY IN LITIGATION ABOUT PROCEDURES, OR IN THE LINGUISTICS OF TECHNICALITY. I HAVE THEREFORE PROPOSED THAT WE CONSIDER THE MERITS OF HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AT THE VERY START OF THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS.

A FOURTH ELEMENT IN MY INITIATIVE FLOWS FROM THE STRATEGY OF SUFFOCATION WHICH I FIRST PROPOSED TO THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT IN 1978. THAT STRATEGY--WHICH STILL REQUIRES, AND AWAITS,

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THE SUPPORT OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION--NEEDS FURTHER ELABORATION TO KEEP PACE WITH TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES. ARMS CONTROL MEASURES MUST ADDRESS THOSE NEW TECHNOLOGIES WHICH, BY THEIR VERY NATURE, WOULD MAKE STABILITY A MORE ELUSIVE GOAL.

I HAVE IN MIND A BAN ON THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF THOSE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO OPERATE AT HIGH ALTITUDE. SUCH WEAPONS COULD ATTACK THE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS WHICH ARE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT. DESTRUCTION OF THE OTHER SIDES COMMAND AND CONTROL NETWORK, AT A TIME OF CRISIS, WOULD LEAVE HIM BLIND AND MUTE AT THE VERY MOMENT WHEN STABILITY DEMANDS AWARENESS AND RESPONSE, NOT/NOT THE PANIC REACTION OF QUOTE LAUNCH ON WARNING UNQUOTE.

NEITHER SUPERPOWER HAS YET DEVELOPED AN ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM FOR HIGH ALTITUDES. AN AGREEMENT NOT/NOT TO DO SO IS THEREFORE STILL POSSIBLE. NO/NO AGREEMENT MEANS VAST EXPENDITURE BY BOTH SIDES--FUNDS SPENT ON MORE WORTHY PROJECTS. NO/NO AGREEMENT MEANS A FURTHER RENEWAL OF COMPETITION--A COMPETITION PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO ACCIDENT OR MISCALCULATION. MOREOVER AN AGREEMENT COULD ENCOURAGE MOVEMENT TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONRY DESIGNED TO OPERATE AT LOWER ALTITUDES.

I AM ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT ANOTHER POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING DEVELOPMENT, WHICH IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT NEW INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS MAY BE SO HIGHLY MOBILE AS TO BE VIRTUALLY INVISIBLE.

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THIS WOULD CALL INTO QUESTION THE ABILITY OF EITHER SIDE, OR ANY  
INTERNATIONAL BODY, TO VERIFY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

CDA CONTINUES TO DEVOTE ATTENTION, AND RESOURCES, TO PROBLEMS OF  
VERIFICATION WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED IF ARMS-CONTROL MEASURES ARE TO  
BE DURABLE AND TRUSTED. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS  
CONTROL WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY ENHANCED IF THE VERIFICATION FACTOR  
WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL STAGE OF ANY NEW  
STRATEGIC SYSTEM--RATHER THAN LEAVING IT TO THE POINT WHERE SYSTEMS  
ARE PUT ON THE BARGAINING TABLE.

IT IS THEREFORE MY INTENTION TO INTRODUCE, AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME  
AND IN THE APPROPRIATE DISARMAMENT FORUM, PAPERS CALLING FOR (A) INTERNATIONAL  
AGREEMENT TO BAN THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF HIGH-ALTITUDE ANTI-  
SATELLITE SYSTEMS; (B) TO RESTRICT EXCESSIVE MOBILITY OF ICBMS; AND  
(C) TO REQUIRE THAT FUTURE STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS BE FULLY  
VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

THESE ARE MEASURES OF SUBSTANCE, OFTEN TECHNICAL IN THEIR DETAIL. BUT  
IF WE CAN GENERATE A POLITICAL IMPULSE TOWARD A FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR  
CONFERENCE, TOWARD RENEWED POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO THE NON-PROLIFERA-  
TION TREATY, TOWARD ACTION AT THE MBFR TALKS TO BALANCE CONVENTIONAL  
FORCES AND TO RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IN EUROPE, TOWARD A  
RESTRICTION OF QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY, AND  
TOWARD THEIR VERIFICATION, THEN WE WOULD HAVE MOTIVATED A TRULY GLOBAL  
AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE CRISIS OF PEACE AND SECURITY.

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PAGE THIRTEEN IDDZ0128 RESTR

IT IS ESSENTIAL, AS I TOLD MY COLLEAGUES IN EUROPE, THAT THIS INTERLOCKING PROGRAM, THIS SAFETY NET FOR OUR VERY SURVIVAL, BE GUIDED BY POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. THAT OUR OWN CONSULTATIONS, AND TALKS WITH OTHERS, BE QUICKENED BY A JOLT OF POLITICAL ENERGY. THAT WE WORK TO IDENTIFY STEADILY INCREASING AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, STARTING FROM OUR COMMON HUMANITY AND OUR COMMON FATE ON THIS EARTH.

I RETURN FROM EUROPE PROFOUNDLY ENCOURAGED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH MY PURPOSES ARE SHARED BY A COMMUNITY OF OTHER LEADERS. THEREFORE I WOULD LIKE TO CONFIRM TONIGHT MY INTENTION TO TRAVEL TO JAPAN, TO CONSULT PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE IN TOKYO NEXT SATURDAY.

JAPAN'S ASSOCIATION WITH THE WILLIAMSBURG DECLARATION LAST MAY, IN WHICH THE LEADERS OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES AGREED TO DEVOTE OUR FULL POLITICAL RESOURCES TO REDUCING THE THREAT OF WAR, EXPRESSES BOTH THE RESONANCE OF HISTORY AND THE REALITY OF THE PRESENT DAY. MY VISIT THERE WILL BEAR WITNESS TO THE INDIVISIBILITY OF GLOBAL SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE.

I CAN ALSO ANNOUNCE THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE CONSULTATIONS UNDER WAY WITH THE USA, I HAVE INITIATED CONSULTATIONS WITH THE USSR AND WITH CHINA--TWO NUCLEAR POWERS ON WHOM MUCH DEPENDS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO TAKING AN ACTIVE PART IN THE DISCUSSION OF PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES AT THE DELHI MEETING OF COMWEL HEADS OF GOVT, WHERE I WILL BE HEADING AFTER JAPAN. I LOOK FORWARD PARTICULARLY TO CONSULTATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI ON THE MATTER OF NON-PROLIFERATION, AND ON HER PERSPECTIVE, AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS, ON THE LINKAGE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT.

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PAGE FOURTEEN IDLZ 2128 RESTR

I AM ENCOURAGED BY THIS MOMENTUM, AND HEARTENED BY THE RESPONSE. BUT I AM ALSO WELL AWARE THAT CRITICS OF MY INITIATIVE HAVE DIFFICULTY IN GRASPING THIS STEP BY STEP APPROACH. SOME WOULD PREFER THE PASSIONATE EMERACE OF AN UNATTAINABLE IDEAL. OTHERS ARE PARALYZED BY THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE ISSUES IN PLAY. I BELIEVE THAT PEACE MUST BE WAGED STEADILY, WITH CAUTION AND WITH REALISM. WE MUST WORK WITH DUE RESPECT FOR THE FRAGILITY OF POLITICAL TRUST, FOR THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING CAREFULLY, FOR THE NEED TO SEARCH OUT COMMON GROUND ON WHICH TO STAND.

THE IMPERATIVE OF POLITICAL ACTION IS MADE ALL THE MORE URGENT BY THE PACE OF CONFLICT AND CONFRONTATION, WHICH THREATENS TO OVERTAKE OUR ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND WHAT IS HAPPENING, AND OUR CAPACITY TO MANAGE IT.

LET ME REMIND YOU TAHT WHEN ALFRED NOBEL INVENTED DYNAMITE IN 1867 HE BELIEVED THAT THE PROSPECT OF ITS MILITARY APPLICATION WAS SO AWESOME THAT GOVTS WOULD BE FORCED TO LIVE IN PEACE. AND YET TODAY WE HAVE LONG SINCE LOST THE ABILITY TO COMPREHEND THE FORCE OF A NUCLEAR BLAST IN TERMS OF ANY COMPARISON WITH TRADITIONAL EXPLOSIVES.

PEACE AND SECURITY ARE NOT/NOT COLD ABSTRACTIONS. THEIR PURPOSE IS TO PRESERVE THE FUTURE OF MANKIND, THE GROWTH OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT, AND THE PATRIMONY OF OUR PLANET.

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THE CHOICE WE FACE IS CLEAR AND PRESENT. WE CAN WITHOUT EFFORT  
ABANDON OUR FATE TO THE MINDLESS DRIFT TOWARD NUCLEAR WAR. OR WE CAN  
GATHER OUR STRENGTH, WORKING IN GOOD COMPANY TO TURN ASIDE THE FORCES  
BEARING DOWN ON US, ON OUR CHILDREN, ON THIS EARTH.

AS FOR ME, I CHOOSE TO MOVE FORWARD, AND I KNOW I DO SO WITH YOUR  
SUPPORT. TEXT ENDS.

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