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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 290330Z NEW DELHI

DESKBY 290730Z UKREP BRUSSELS

FM FCO 281830Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 929 OF 28 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

IMMEDIATE

RECEIVED

ON **29 NOV 1983**

DUPLICATES

OF LETTER
 OF ENCLOSURES
 LOCATION

Prime Minister.

Agree the line?

A.S.C. 29/11

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER AND PUS

GOA DECLARATION: EAST/WEST AND ARMS CONTROL

1. SUBJECT TO THE VIEWS OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN BRUSSELS, AND WITH AN EYE ON POSSIBLE REACTIONS IN WASHINGTON. WE PROPOSE THAT THE LEADER OF THE HOUSE SHOULD TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE IF QUESTIONED ABOUT THE GOA DECLARATION IN THE HOUSE ON 29 NOVEMBER. THIS WOULD ALSO SERVE AS GUIDANCE TO FCO NEWS DEPT IN RESPONDING TO PRESS ENQUIRIES.

POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

2. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS MADE CLEAR IN A NUMBER OF SPEECHES AND INTERVIEWS, FOR EXAMPLE IN HER GUILDHALL SPEECH ON 14 NOVEMBER, THAT HMG WANT A BETTER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND ARE READY TO PURSUE A SENSIBLE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE. THE PRIME MINISTER HERSELF HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO VISIT HUNGARY EARLY NEXT YEAR. IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF DIALOGUE FOR ITS OWN SAKE. THE POINT IS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND TO RESTORE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. THAT IS ALSO THE MESSAGE OF THE GOA DECLARATION.

IS THIS A TIME OF CRISIS?

3. CERTAINLY TRUE THAT THE PRESENT STATE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS IS A MATTER FOR SERIOUS CONCERN. MANY ASPECTS OF THIS, INCLUDING A SOVIET MILITARY BUILD UP, INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, POLAND AND HUMAN RIGHTS. IT IS NECESSARY TO DEAL COOLLY AND AS CONSTRUCTIVELY AS POSSIBLE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS ON THE AGENDA. BUT SUCCESS DOES NOT DEPEND ON THE WEST ALONE. PROGRESS CANNOT BE MADE WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE SOVIET RESPONSE. THE SOVIET WALK-OUT FROM GENEVA IS A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION.

MR TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE

4. WE FULLY SHARE HIS BELIEF IN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS. BUT, AS HE KNOWS, WE HAVE SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THE PRACTICALITY OF SOME OF HIS SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS.

FIVE POWER NEGOTIATIONS (IF PRESSED)

5. SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE PREMATURE AT THIS STAGE. THE FIRST PRIORITY MUST BE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS IN THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS. WE THEREFORE REGARD IT AS ESSENTIAL THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD SOON RETURN TO THE INF TALKS AND THAT THEY SHOULD NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN THE START TALKS ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

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