Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 December 1983

Prime Minister.

I also attach a note by the European Democratic Group. A.J.C. 1/12

Dear John,

Visit of M. Chirac

M. Chirac is calling on the Prime Minister from 1030 to 1115 tomorrow, Friday 2 December. He is here on a private visit, but his programme is very full: I enclose a copy. I also enclose a copy of the speech he made on 30 November at Chatham House.

The attached biographical note sets out the main lines of Chirac's personality and thinking. He has used his position as Mayor of Paris to consolidate his position as France's leading Opposition politician, ahead of both M. Giscard d'Estaing and M. Barre. In the March municipal elections all 20 local counsellors fell to the Opposition. Elswhere, his own party, the Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) has been the principle beneficiary of the swing to the Opposition in various by-elections. His attention is now focussing on the 1984 European Elections as the next opportunity to demonstrate at the polls that the Left no longer commands majority support. (He readily admits that as far as he is concerned, these elections are of purely national significance to be fought and won on the Government's record.) To this end he has become the principle advocate of Opposition unity, although some, notably M. Giscard, have been reluctant to join him yet. M. Chirac will persist in his efforts, successful so far, to persuade public opinion that he is a unifying rather than a divisive force in the Opposition.

M. Chirac sees his visit to London as an important chance to improve his image as a national political leader. From our point of view his visit provides a good opportunity to influence M. Chirac's thinking, since his views are likely to become of increasing importance to us as the decade advances. He has, in the past, been noted for quite radical changes of view where this has seemed politically expedient.

/M. Chirac's

M. Chirac's views seem to be evolving most, at the moment, on the question of European defence. While recognising the importance of retaining the American nuclear umbrella and of keeping them involved in the defence of Europe, he also believes that the Europeans need to consult more closely among themselves, and consequently that the Germans will have to play a bigger role. He is not suggesting German ownership of nuclear weapons but believes that a formula to associate the Germans more closely with joint security decisions is required. He envisages a situation in which France and Britain with their planned increases in nuclear capacity, could constitute an even more essential component in European defence and considers that "the Governments concerned" (by implication including the Germans) would have to discuss how and in what circumstances the weapons might be used. He argues that a proper European defence could also lead to renewed detente under which European solidarity could be extended beyond the present artificial borders which cut Europe in two. But his twin aims remain to combat the temptation of neutralism and guarantee peace.

There has also been some evolution of M. Chirac's thinking on Europe and his party has recently adopted a more positive policy format on European co-operation. But, despite protestations to the contrary, M. Chirac clings to many of his prejudices, particularly where the European Community and some aspects of British policy are concerned. His radio interview on 'Today' this morning suggested he was more optimistic about the outcome of the Athens Council next week than our earlier contacts had suggested. Only a month ago he was describing British and French interests in agriculture as totally incompatible. He thought then that the preparations for the Athens Council had got nowhere and that confrontational deadlock there would continue until after the European Elections. He says he is bound to see Community matters from the French point of view. It will, therefore, be important to leave M. Chirac with the impression that there are many Community areas where British and French views are close and convince him that we are seeking to play a constructive role in Europe.

You may wish to be aware that M. Giscard d'Estaing will be passing through London at the beginning of next week. He is to address a Financial Times Conference on reform of the International Monetary System on the morning of Tuesday 6 December. He will also be calling at the Bank of England before flying on to the United States. He has not asked to see anybody else in London so far as we are aware.

/Subject

Subject to the Prime Minister's agreement, M. Chirac would like to be accompanied at his meeting with her by the RPR Foreign Affairs Director, Ambassador Koscinsko-Morizet. He will also have two Private Secretaries with him, but will not be expecting them to attend the meeting. He will bring an interpreter and a photographer (our News Department has been in touch already about the latter).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

PP (R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

PRIVATE VISIT BY M. CHIRAC: 30 NOVEMBER - 2 DECEMBER 1983

PROGRAMME

Wednesday 30 November

1430	Arrive at London Heathrow on AF814 - Hounslow Suite
1630	Call on the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr Lawson) at 11 Downing Street.
1715 - 1845	Address Chatham House
Dinner	Franco-British Council/Whitbreads. Chiswell Street

Thursday 1 December

0945	Call on the Conservative Party (Mr Gummer)
1100	Visit to the Free French memorial at No. 4 Carlton Gardens
1130	Call on the Lord Mayor at the Mansion House
1600	Call on the Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Heseltine)
1730	Tea with the Lord Mayor of Westminster
1830 - 2000	Address Bow Group
Dinner	Bow Group

Friday 2 December

Breakfast	Breakfast with French Ambassador
0945	Call on the Foreign Secretary (Sir G Howe)
1030 - 1115	Call on the Prime Minister
1145 - 1230	Press Conference at the London Press Centre, 76 Shoe Lane
Lunch	French Ambassador
1730	Depart for Paris on AF817 - Hounslow Suite

M. Chirac will be staying at the Intercontinental Hotel

CHIRAC, JACQUES

Former Prime Minister, President of the RPR, Mayor of Paris.

Born 1932. Education included a summer course at Harvard. Fought in Algeria. Ecole Nationale d'Administration. First came to notice as an energetic member of M. Pompidou's Cabinet in 1962. Entered politics in 1967, winning from the Left a constituency in the Corrèze. Retained his seat in subsequent elections. Junior Minister for Social Affairs and Employment in 1967. Junior Minister under Giscard d'Estaing at the Ministry of Economy and Finance 1968-71 (where the two got on well). Subsequently Minister responsible for the Government's relations with Parliament. Minister of Agriculture (1972-74) and briefly Minister of the Interior before being appointed Giscard's first Prime Minister on 27 May 1974. Secretary-General of the Gaullist UDR from December 1974 to June 1975 and thereafter Honorary Secretary-General. Resigned as Prime Minister in August 1976. Regained his parliamentary seat in the Correze in a by-election in November 1976. President of the new Gaullist movement, the RPR, in December 1976. Mayor of Paris, since 1977. Member of the European Parliament 1979-80.

M. Chirac's rise has been meteoric. He began as an ambitious technocrat, bent on making it to the top. He made some early mistakes: he was a failure when handling the Government's relations with parliament. But he rapidly acquired a keen political sense. He is a tireless schemer; his calculation that Chaban-Delmas would be a bad candidate in the 1974 presidential elections and encouragement of defections from the Gaullist camp put Giscard in his debt and helped to make him the obvious choice for Prime Minister. At first the Giscard-Chirac tandem worked well. Chirac re-imposed discipline on the UDR, contriving to get himself elected Secretary-General of the movement only six months after ditching Chaban, its chosen presidential candidate, in Giscard's favour. His record in government was equally impressive, and he helped to steer the country through the shoals of economic recession, while selling Giscard's reforms to parliament and to the country. In foreign affairs his role was restricted and his performance more uneven.

Despite a scrupulous facade of loyalty to the President, Chirac began to fall out with him at least a year before his resignation as Prime Minister. Their differences were both temperamental and political. Chirac resented Giscard's monarchical tendencies and became increasingly convinced that his strategy of winning over the soft fringe of the Left by liberal reform was keenly mistaken. The crunch came in the cantonal elections in March 1976, which were a severe defeat for the President. Characteristically, however, Chirac moved too quickly to take advantage of Giscard's setback, and the President, after losing his footing for a moment, fought back, progressively reducing the powers of his Prime Minister to a point where Chirac had little alternative but to resign.

Chirac quickly relaunched himself in national politics. In an attempt to revitalise and rejuvenate the UDR, he changed its name to the RPR and was elected President of the new movement in December 1976. There was some grumbling from the old guard, but most had no choice but to fall into line, no comparable leader being available.

Meanwhile Chirac's relations with the President deteriorated sharply as he intensified his criticism of Giscard. Chirac's victory in 1977 in the first direct election for the Paris Mairie against the Elysée candidate, d'Ornano, further aggravated relations.

Chirac campaigned energetically and effectively for the Government Majority in the 1978 Legislative elections. Subsequently, he considered that Giscard and Barre did not give the Gaullists sufficient credit for their part in the Majority's victory. Chirac refused to support the Opposition to bring down the Government in motions of no-confidence But his criticisms of Giscard

/broadened

broadened to encompass all aspects of Government policy. The Gaullist setback in the 1979 European election led Chirac to moderate the tone of his public criticism of Giscard. After a period of several months self-imposed silence, in February 1981 Chirac finally announced his decision to stand against Giscard for the Presidency. He received 17.99% of the first round vote.

Chirac is a man of action rather than reflection; his nickname, the bulldozer, is apt. No-one else on the Right combines his advantages of youth, energy, experience and competence. Unlike many other major political leaders in France, he is not a rounded figure but a political monomaniac. He is however interested in contemporary poetry and has published poems himself. He is familiar with the work of living British poets. (Seamus Heaney and Kenneth White among others). The Left affect to regard him as a dangerous man with fascist tendencies, but there is no doubt that his combination of authority, drive and nationalism appeals to a wide range of conservative opinion. Since Mitterrand's election Chirac has held the centre of the stage for the opposition. He has made his peace with Giscard but the old rivalries look close beneath the surface.

He is married to a smart and pleasant wife, niece of M. de Courcel. They have two daughters. He speaks reasonably good English.

M. CHIRAC'S SPEECH AT CHATHAM HOUSE:
30 NOVEMBER

Mr Chairman,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is indeed an honour, and it is my privilege to be your guest to-day. It also provides an opportunity to convey, with the sincerity which befits old time friends, my feeling on difficulties and dangers which our two countries have to face and on the best ways and means of tackling and overtaking them.

My experience in public life , and the example given to me by such statesmen as Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou, have taught me that one is all the better understood for expressing oneself frankly.

It is therefore, in all sincerity that I would like to-day to put before you the following question and perhaps attempt to answer it : How can Great Britain and France, acting on a concerted basis, contribute towards the solution of the international problems before them ?

To make things clearer, let us highlight first what our two nations have in common at international level, what is common and specific in relation to our European Neighbours.

May I recall in the first place that Great Britain and France have inherited from their past positions an influence and an experience such that they have the capability and the obligation to consider International affairs within their widest

perspective and to take into account their worldwide implications.

I should also like to recall that our two Nations are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, which endows them with their special responsibilities in matter concerning Peace and Security.

I shall recall further that our two countries hold responsibilities in Germany and particularly in Berlin, which, at a time when the defense of Western Europe appears more topical than ever, is obviously of such paramount importance that it need not be stressed.

Finally, may I say that we each have at our disposal a nuclear force whose importance is far from negligible, and whose scope and effectiveness are on the increase.

We are both very careful not to boast about it. We are wise enough to realize that the fate of the world does not rest on us alone,far from it. We are, however, aware that our contribution to the safeguard of peace and the indispensable strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, is irreplaceable, especially in Europe.

Europe ! a highly controversial word between us.

The treaty of accession of January 22nd 1972 put an end to the controversy which concerned the conditions and timing

of your entry into the European Community. However our differences on several aspects of the construction of Europe have not completely disappeared. Of course, it is only natural, in an undertaking of such magnitude, that our interests should sometimes differ or, even contradict each other.

Not being in charge of the affairs of my country, I don't have the slightest intention of elaborating on our contentions, and ways and means of putting an end to them. I'm aware that Sir Geoffrey HOWE has recently, in the Financial Times, imparted the views of your Government.

I read the article with all due care and attention, and his argumentation provides undoubtedly food for thought. May I however make two remarks..

The first is about your concern for a significant decrease of your contribution to the Community's budget. That you should wish to economize is in itself quite natural, and you are undoubtedly not the only ones to feel that way. Let us however take care of not going too far with this approach.

The theory of the so called "juste retour" may at first glance seem attractive. It nevertheless presents the very great risk of irreversibly ruining what is the very basis of the construction of Europe - namely the notion of solidarity. The risk is to turn the European Community into an interstate

organisation of conventional type, depriving it at the same time of any prospects of further development. I should like to hope that this is not your real wish, and Sir Geoffrey HOWE's statements have on certain respects shed more light on your views. But let us be quite clear.

We belong to a community, not a Free Trade Area. Our contributions to the Community are rendered all the more significant in the light of our dependence on supplies from external sources. This is also an explanation for the situation you resent.

My second remark bears on the Common Agricultural Policy You consider it too costly, and in particular, that too much is spent, in France for instance, for the survival of farms which are not cost-efficient and would be more realistically left to disappear. May I point out in this respect that french agriculture has undergone intensive modernisation in the past twenty five years, that this trend continues, as evidenced by the greatly enhanced productivity, increased mechanisation, and the extension of agricultural units which has resulted in a decrease by about two thirds of our rural population.

I would further note that, in our country as in yours, vast regions are underprivileged, and that, for the sake of a balanced demography, the maintenance of a rural population is an economic and social imperative and in fact absolutely vital. In this respect, the CAP is interrelated with thepolicies

within the regions, to which you attach a well founded importance, on that we readily agree.

Agriculture and therefore British Economy has greatly benefited from the Common Agricultural Policy, as testified by the increase of your production.

Needless to elaborate further on these difficulties, to which one might add those arising from Community preferences in the widest sense of the term, and the financial resources of the Community. Our common wish should be, in agreement with our partners, to solve all these problems, so that the future development of the Community is not sacrificed because of the sole objective to make savings come what may.

Even if we overcome these obstacles, the future of Europe still remains uncertain.

I am not disappointed when the construction of Europe did not shape out, as some had thought, as a supra-state with a federal structure whithin which our nations would have had to abdicate their own responsibility, their international obligations, as well as their own personalities. You very wisely never believed in that, no more than those in France who refer themselves to General de Gaulle. I will add further that the terms "supranationality" and "integration" have disappeared from terminology.

Let us not regret that realism won over idle dreams.

If I feel disappointed and concerned, it is because the construction of Europe is in the doldrums.

Some of you may remember that, during the negotiation of 1970 - 1972 bearing on the admission of new member countries to the Community, chiefly yours, the keywords in these negotiations were completion, enlargement, development of new policies.

Completion meant the adoption of a finalized system in respect of the financial resources of the Community (which was done).

The enlargement process has been successfully carried out. But, about the development of new policies, the only significant progress accomplished by Europe since then, has been the setting up of the European Monetary System which remains to a certain extent incomplete for a number of reasons, one being the fact that your currency is out of it.

For the remainder, the balance of what has been accomplishe since the coming into force of the Rome Treaty is undoubtedly positive, both as regards the development within the European Economic Community and external relationships. It is, however, not fully satisfactory. Impediments and compartimentalization still limit the range of free trade in industrial products. The Common Agricultural Policy has undergone deep changes - "own resources" for the financing of the Community expenses have become insufficient -.

Harmonization of economics policies had a negative rather than a positive effect, because of the world crisis which led member states to watch, more keenly than ever, over their national interests. Apart from a few projects, some being successful, coordination of activities in the all-important field of technological and scientific research and development of key industries has not been translated into reality. No significant progress has been achieved towards an improved consistency in the energy policies and the supply of raw materials. Finally, political cooperation has only brought about academic pronouncements without any real impact on events.

It is without any complacency, and rather despondently, that I have briefly recalled what is still incomplete, or even barely started, in the most essential sectors of this vast European undertaking, which is both so necessary and with such high potential.

This should lead us to thinking in common of the way in which our two countries might use their assets to give a new and decisive momentum to the construction of Europe.

But there must be a will. Every one knows the nature of the problems. It is no longer the time for analysis and discussion. Now is the time to speak clearly and make decisions.

The kind of Europe we plan together to build, must first and foremost be a place for freedom. Political and civic freedom of course, but also freedom in our economic lives. It is the only way for all of us to restore within our firms and for our citizens the taste for initiative and responsibility - that being the only incentive towards economic and social progress. Harmonization of economic policies, both structural and taking into account the conjoncture of the member states of the Community, will then become an accessible goal.

Thus stable relationships between european currencies could be facilitated on a sound basis, for the mutual benefit of Intercommunity trade. May I say again, on this topic, how deeply I wish that the pound sterling might one day, in conditions to be defined, be part of the European Monetary System. Of course, one can not ignore the specific traits of your currency. It's specific obligations and assets which give it an international role thereby way beyond the European framework. Neither is it possible to be unaware of the world-wide importance of the London Stock Exchange, a field where your experience and know-how have acquired a universal reputation. I nevertheless express the wish that the progress of European construction as well as your will to contribute to it, will induce you to review your monetary policy, in a way which will be more favorable to Europe.

But some matters are more important and more urgent. Europe is allowing itself to be overtaken in an irretrievable way

by

competitors such as the United States and Japan in all that relates to the modernisation of production methods and the development of key industries. We have at our disposal, both of us, teams of very high quality of research workers and industrial firms of high value. That applies to most of the other members states of the European Community. What are we waiting for to combine our efforts rather than work in a disorderly way.

Our societies will find their own modernisation capability and adjustment to technical progress, only if we develop cooperation and liberate the vast market of Western Europe from all hindrances. It is urgent to solve these serious problems which are partly the responsibility of our business enterprises and our banking Institutions and partly that of our Governments. Particular attention needsto be given to tax incentives, to the promotion of free movement of capital, and to the opening up of public markets.

Again what are we waiting for to embark in more consistent policies regarding our energy and raw material supplies ? If Mother Nature favoured your country with oil, and the Netherlands with gas, it still remains true that the Community as a whole is largely dependent on imports for supplies of hydrocarbons and other raw materials, frequently from high political risks countries. We have both increased our nuclear energy production. Let's try not to leave it at that : whether it is a question of trade in energy products within the Community, or research on new or conventional energy sources, or even our diplomatic actions vis a vis the main oil exporting and raw

materials producing countries, the European Community should take the initiative of common action in which you must take part despite your privileged situation.

What other conclusions can be drawn from these thoughts than that Europe, even if only in the economic field, needs a new impetus if it is to survive in a world dominated by pitiless and exacting competition ? There must however be general agreement as to the political will and the need to define the ways and means of success. The essential unanimous political will is the obvious driving force for decision making at the level of the Community's Council. In this respect it is with interest and satisfaction that I noted that, at the last European Council in Stuttgart, your delegation expressed itself, on the procedures for decision of the Council, in the same terms as the french delegation when drawing up the famous Luxembourg Compromise of January 1966.

Fortunately, we have never had any divergences between us on the operation of the Community's institutions, quite to the contrary.

The importance both our peoples attach to their traditions and free choice of their destiny should, it seems to me, prompt them to play an essential role in the field of european political cooperation, whose gaps as well as weaknesses I have just underlined. I know, and I am glad, that you pay great attention to this aspect of the construction of Europe. It is a

fact that political cooperation to-day, as well as to-morrow, is more necessary than ever. There will be no Europe without better coordinated economics. No Europe either without more convergent policies on major issues in the world. Faced with conflicts which tear apart so many regions and which may, at any moment, extend or multiply, the Nations of Western Europe owe it to themselves and their allies not to remain passive even more so that, here or there, their vital interests, be it of economic or strategic nature, may be exposed to grave dangers. This is why I think it essential that their diplomatic initiatives be as closely coordinated as possible, particularly in those regions which are close to us, the Mediterranean and Africa. It is obvious that none should be excluded from this concertation, but it seems to me that the example should come from the most important Nations of the Community which avail themselves of ways and means of action such as to effectively support their diplomatic interventions. The European Council should, in this field, provide the necessary impetus and define guidelines for action to be implemented by the Council of Ministers. Should it have a permanent political secretariat completely independant from the Commission, responsible for the preparations of the Council's deliberations and their follow up ? This project discussed about ten years ago, deserves to be reconsidered.

I might add that the experience we both have in what is called to-day the Third World, experience in fact unequalled, should urge our two governments to have periodic consultations, on all issues arising from Europe's relationships with develo-

ping countries, according to an agenda not necessarily restricted to the LOME convention, but which would include political as well as economic matters.

Finally if European political cooperation were to succee in asserting its credibility and effectiveness, there is, I feel, no reason why it could not include East-West relationships which, it becomes clearer every day, have a direct impact on the fate of Europe.

This mention of East-West relations quite naturally brings me to the issue of the defense of Western Europe, which is topical.

The supreme guarantee of our security rests on the atlantic alliance to which our two countries are so indefectibly linked. However, we have to acknowledge that this security to-day, is threatened. Security which obviously does not apply only to the integrity of our territory, but also to the safeguarding of our freedoms and culture. Despite the efforts we both deployed to alleviate international tension and to create in Europe the conditions for a durable peace, Soviet Russia engaged in a gigantic rearmement both conventional and nuclear, on land, sea and in the air. None can assert that the possession of such an inventory is the expression of deliberate offensive intent. But who could think that it's inspired from a will for peace ? It's a fact that the resulting desequilibrium of Forces is in itself a danger, the demoralisation of democratic nations not being the least.

A clever combination of air superiority and pacifist propaganda produces, here and there, results which we should follow up with great vigilance.

Fortunately, the determination shown by european governments and particularly your own, gives reason to hope that Western nations will not allow themselves to be abused and that their will to re-establish balanced forces, a prerequisite for the safeguarding of peace, will finally prevail.

Another reason for comfort comes from the resolution of the United States of America, in case of failure of the Geneva talks, to counterbalance the massive deployment of Soviet S.S. 20, by deploying in several Western European countries, intermediate range nuclear weapons. Thus, the confirmation of the intent of our american allies to play an effective part in the defense of Western Europe and devote considerable means to it. This is a fact whose significance and scope the Kremlin rulers seem to be perfectly aware of. I am one of those who feel they will draw their own conclusions and that the re-establishment of balanced forces, far from creating a serious crisis as sometimes mentioned, is the best way to provide the Soviets with a better appreciation of how far they can go. Free peoples will only remain so with the will to resist any intimidation. I am not a great believer in historical laws, except, perhaps for this one. And how could I not mention it, being after all in Churchill's country and coming from de Gaulle's ?

We should however not forget that the United States of America have their own interests as a superpower and their territory is vulnerable to soviet nuclear missiles. Let's just take note of it, but draw the conclusion that the nations of Western Europe, members of the atlantic alliance, must, from their side, increase and improve their defense capabilities.

Great Britain and France, having availed themselves of nuclear deterrent forces, consequently assume specific responsabilities which will become more and more significant, with future major progress of the effectiveness of their means. Despite the similarity which thus exists between our two countries, we must bear in mind the very important difference between your nuclear forces and ours. Hence, difficulties for a closer cooperation... but, I do not exclude the possibility that circumstances may in a more or less near future make it desirable and necessary.

We have in common our firm determination not to be drawn into negotiations whose effects, more or less covertly, would be to question our right to enhance the quality of our nuclear armement, then capability, being anyhow, a great deal less than those of the two superpowers. I ardently hope that this determination will not be undermined by possible pressures. It's in the interest of our allies, as well as ours.

Furthemore, I feel that Western European members of the atlantic alliance should devote as great a share of their budget as possible to the expansion and improvement of their conventional defense capabilities. This effort, however must be truly effective. Hence the need for close cooperation over a wide field in manufacture of modern and costly weapons. This cooperation is, currently, practically at a standstill. In the past, France and Great Britain together did cooperate in designing and developing high level projects, especially in the field of aeronautics, for example the Jaguar. I would like to see us follow this route again, if possible, together with other european countries wishing to cooperate in achieving a high degree of standardisation.

Finally, it is my feeling that Western European nations should not neglect the dangers to which their vital interest might be exposed outside Europe, whether on land or at sea. Those who have the capability would do well to equip themselves with the means of dealing with situations requiring rapid reaction. Should they not, then, consider the conditions under which combined interventions might be called for, and plan for joint manufacture of appropriate equipment for this type of mission, for example, long range transport aircraft ?

If these suggestions were to be followed, Great Britain and France, which for reasons I have already mentioned, are in the best position to appreciate the possibility of such risks and to assess their implications, could have an essential role

to play, in line with their traditions, experience and responsibilities.

The strenghtening of our nuclear deterrent, the development of our cooperation in conventional weaponry, better coordination outside Europe - is this enough ? I believe we should also consider whether the defense measures of Europe are appropriate to current conditions and completely efficient. In a word, think about our mutual obligations and responsibilities within the Atlantic alliance.

For almost twenty years, french forces have no longer come under the command of the integrated Atlantic organization. I will not mention again the reasons for General de Gaulle's decision - reasons which are still fully apply to-day. France, however, has remained a reliable and sound partner of the alliance. Proof has been given of this, in times of difficulty, and I believe our european and american allies have well understood our position. I also believe that they agree that the french efforts in Defense matters strenghtened the military power of Western Europe.

This specific situation has not prevented the french government from planning and defining the conditions under which our forces would, on the basis of its own decision, participate in joint defense operations if faced with agression which put at stake France's committments in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaties.

Finally there will be no sound and durable security in Western Europe unless the Federal Republic of Germany feels that its security is fully guaranteed by its allies in all eventualities. Unless this feeling exists, the temptation of pacifism will remain. It is historically our responsibility in Western Europe to do away with any possible doubt on the part of West Germany. In this point, what are the ways and means ? I do not claim to have a final solution to this problem. I would simply like to see a complete reassessment of all the agreements made during the last thirty years, with a view, if need be, to bringing them up to date, and adapting them to the evolution of weaponry the balance of forces and peoples' aspirations.

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The will to innovate, to achieve and respect to the future, must be the trademarks of our actions.

We must innovate in setting up, for the construction of Europe, ways and means of preserving its cohesion, alleviate national antagonisms and devising avenues for future development, whether economic, industrial, monetary or political.

We must be realists : our nations have long traditions

and are living things. They do not want to lose their soul, nor do we want this to happen. Europe is not capable of solving all problems.

Let us learn how to work together, not abandonning our own individualities. Let us make our common will in the field of defense become a reality.

We must respect the future : the European Community is not the whole of Europe. In the Eastern part of our continent there are nations, close to us in terms of religion, culture and aspirations, artificially separated from us by historical injustice. Let us remain open to all possible cooperation with these peoples whose values are so close to our own.

But let's do so without any weakness. We, British and French, know fully the cost of feeding on illusions. It is by keeping our eyes open, by remaining resolute that we shall defend peace.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 October 1983

- on the diary
31/10

N. Bayley.

A.J.C. 31/10.

Dear John,

Visit of M. Chirac

Thank you for your letter of 24 October. M. Chirac has said he would be delighted to call on the Prime Minister at 1030 on Friday 2 December.

Yours ever

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

France Chirac Jan 82

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC GROUP

Secretariat

MEMORANDUM

To: John Houston
Stephen Sherbourne

Date: 29th November, 1983

From: Timothy Bainbridge

VISIT BY MR. CHIRAC

1. As you know, although Mr. Chirac's Party is allied with the Conservatives in the European Democrat Union (EDU), it does not sit in the same Group in the European Parliament. In the European Parliament, the Gaullists sit with Fianna Fail, Mrs. Ewing and a representative of the Danish Progress Party, in the European Progressive Democrats Group.

2. There have been persistent rumours that after the 1984 European Elections, Mr. Chirac's Party will seek to join us in the European Parliament; this move would be in parallel with similar moves in the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe and Western European Union.

3. An application of this kind from the Gaullists would be an extremely controversial question for our Group which, under its own rules of procedure, would be entitled to a final decision (involving of course the Danes) in the matter.

4. The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest that should this matter be raised by Mr. Chirac, a friendly but non-committal answer be given. However, it would be very useful to us to know if any firm indication is given in the course of his visit that an alliance of this kind is in fact part of his longer term plans. No formal approach has yet been made to our Group.

TB/pmi

file
cc David Cordery

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 October 1983

VISIT OF M. CHIRAC

Thank you for your letter of 20 October.

The Prime Minister would like to receive M. Chirac and could do so from 1030-1115 on Friday, 2 December.

AJC

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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①

Prime Minister

You will be terribly busy at this time (between Delhi and Athens).

Shall I try to get him to come at a more convenient time.

A.J.C. 21/10

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 October, 1983

He will be upset if he is not received.

MT

Dear John

Visit by M. Chirac

M. Chirac, the Mayor of Paris, is to visit London on 1 December to attend a luncheon Meeting of the Association of Mayors of European Cities, at which he is to be elected Chairman of the Association. His Diplomatic Adviser has contacted the Embassy in Paris to ask whether the Prime Minister might agree to receive him on either 1 December (morning or afternoon) or 2 December (morning). He is withholding his reply to the GLC invitation until he has received our reply.

M. Chirac was the Prime Minister's guest in March 1982, and in June 1983 when he attended the Inaugural Meeting of the International Democratic Union. He will be calling on Chancellor Kohl in Bonn later this month.

We have no particular reason to recommend that the Prime Minister receive M. Chirac at this time except that he remains an important opposition leader. But you may wish to inform her in case she should wish to do so.

Yours ever

Roger Bone

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Private Secretary

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