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MIPT: CYPRUS

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF KYPRIANOU'S SPEAKING NOTES:

BEGINS: 1. A BASIC PREREQUISITE TO A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS TO BE COMPLETELY DEMILITARISED. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ALL TURKISH OCCUPATION TROOPS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN TOGETHER WITH THE COLONIZERS IMPORTED FROM TURKEY. AT A LATER STAGE ALL TROOPS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE (GREEK AND TURKISH CONTINGENTS) SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN, AND THE CYPRUS NATIONAL GUARD THE SO-CALLED QUOTE TURKISH CYPRIOT SECURITY FORCE UNQUOTE SHOULD BE DISBANDED. DEMILITARISATION IS INTENDED TO CONTRIBUTE AS AN ELEMENT OF INTERNAL STABILITY BUT ALSO ALLEVIATE TURKEY'S PARADOXICAL QUOTE FEARS UNQUOTE THAT CYPRUS MAY BE USED AGAINST HER MILITARILY.

2. AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMPRISING MEN FROM COUNTRIES WITH NO DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM SHOULD BE STATIONED IN CYPRUS TO SECURE ITS EXTERNAL DEFENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY. IN ADDITION, CERTAIN POLICE DUTIES COULD BE ALLOCATED TO IT FOR AN AGREED PERIOD OF TIME. THIS ARRANGEMENT IS NOT ONLY ESSENTIAL FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM BUT IT WOULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS CONSOLIDATING A PEACEFUL SITUATION AND CREATING THE APPROPRIATE CLIMATE AND CONDITIONS FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES RECONCILIATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN GREEK CYPRIOTS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

3. THE QUESTION OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES IS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE IN VIEW OF THE BITTER EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST. THE INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, UNITY (AND NON-ALIGNMENT) OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS SHOULD BE GUARANTEED BY INTERNATIONAL TREATY. INTERESTED POWERS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE TREATY. THE DUTY OF THE GUARANTORS SHOULD BE A COLLECTIVE ONE AND THE USE OF FORCE SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED FROM THE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE TREATY.

4. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS SHOULD BE A FEDERAL STATE. IN CONSIDERING THE TERRITORIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF A FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THE BASIS FOR SOLVING THESE ISSUES, AS IN FACT ALL OTHER ISSUES AND ASPECTS,

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ARE THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE HIGH-LEVEL AGREEMENTS (MAKARIOS-DENKTASH 1977 AND KYPRIANOU-DENKTASH 1979). IN DETERMINING THE TERRITORIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES THE COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF CYPRUS MUST ALWAYS BE BORN IN MIND. AN OUTLINE OF THE SOLUTION ENVISAGED FOLLOWS.

5. TERRITORIAL ASPECT

DESPITE THE INHERENT DANGERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN THE CONCEPT OF TWO REGIONS OR TWO PROVINCES, YET THIS CONCEPT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED.

IT MUST OF COURSE BE EMPHASISED THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS CONSTITUTE THE 18 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION OF CYPRUS. COLONIZERS FROM TURKEY AND ANY OTHER PERSONS IMPORTED INTO CYPRUS SINCE THE INVASION IN 1974 CAN UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BE REGARDED AS CYPRIOTS. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE RATIO OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT POPULATION IS ONLY 18 PER CENT, YET IT HAS ALREADY BEEN STATED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 30TH SEPTEMBER 1983 THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE IS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF 23 PER CENT FOR THE REGION OR PROVINCE TO BE UNDER TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION. HOWEVER, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING WITHOUT DELAY AN OVERALL SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER AGREEING THAT 25 PER CENT OF THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC BE UNDER TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION, PROVIDED THAT AREAS SUCH AS FAMAGUSTA AND MORPHOU, WHICH WERE THICKLY POPULATED BY GREEK CYPRIOTS, BEFORE THEY WERE FORCIBLY UPROOTED FROM THEIR HOMES BY THE TURKISH INVADING FORCES, WOULD BE UNDER GREEK CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECT

IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT, UNDER A FEDERAL SYSTEM, THE REGIONS OR PROVINCES WILL HAVE CONSIDERABLE AUTONOMY AND POWERS. THEREFORE, ANY CHECKS AND BALANCES AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL SHOULD BE RESTRICTED AND BE OF SUCH A NATURE AS NOT TO IMPEDE THE SMOOTH FUNCTIONING OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ORGANS OR LEAD TO IMPASSES AND DEADLOCKS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT SINCE, IN A FEDERATION, THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL ORGANS ARE THOSE WHICH SAFEGUARD THE UNITY OF THE STATE: AND, THEREFORE, IF THESE FUNCTIONS ARE DISRUPTED THE STATE RUNS THE DANGER OF DISSOLUTION.

(1) EXECUTIVE

THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM PROVIDED UNDER THE 1960 CONSTITUTION IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD BE PRESERVED:

- (A) THERE SHOULD BE A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, WHO SHOULD BE A GREEK CYPRIOT, AND A VICE-PRESIDENT WHO SHOULD BE A TURKISH CYPRIOT.

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(1) PROVIDED THAT THE PROCESS OF TAKING DECISIONS IS SUCH AS NOT TO LEAD TO IMPASSES AND TO THE DISRUPTION OF THE SMOOTH FUNCTIONING OF THE STATE, THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF MINISTERS COULD INCLUDE A HIGHER PROPORTION OF MEMBERSHIP OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS THAN THEIR POPULATION RATIO, NAMELY THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WOULD BE COMPOSED OF 70 PER CENT GREEK CYPRIOTS MINISTERS AND 30 PER CENT TURKISH CYPRIOTS MINISTERS.

(2) LEGISLATURE

IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF CYPRUS, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT A UNICAMERAL SYSTEM IS MORE APPROPRIATE. MECHANISMS WOULD BE PROVIDED TO ENSURE SPEEDY RESOLUTION OF ANY PROBLEMS THAT MIGHT ARISE.

ALTERNATIVELY, THERE COULD BE A BI-CAMERAL SYSTEM CONSISTING OF:

A LOWER CHAMBER: REPRESENTATION OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES TO BE ON THE BASIS OF POPULATION RATIO: AND

AN UPPER CHAMBER: REPRESENTATION IN THE UPPER CHAMBER WOULD DEPEND ON THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF SUCH CHAMBER AND ON THE PROVISION OF DEADLOCK-RESOLVING MECHANISMS SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IS NOT IMPEDED.

3. JUDICIARY

EQUAL REPRESENTATION OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT IN RESPECT OF ALL FEDERAL MATTERS.

4. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND PROVINCIAL POWERS

THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO BE SUCH AS TO ENSURE THE UNITY OF THE STATE.

INDICATIVELY, THESE SHOULD INCLUDE:

(I) FOREIGN AFFAIRS (INCLUDING CITIZENSHIP, BUT CERTAIN FUNCTIONS MAY BE PROVINCIALY DELEGATED):

(II) FEDERAL FINANCE (INCLUDING CUSTOMS):

(III) DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY:

(IV) IN

TERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS (AIR AND SEA):

(V) INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS:

(VI) APPOINTMENT OF FEDERAL OFFICERS:

(VII) NATURAL RESOURCES:

(VIII) FEDERAL JUSTICE

(IX) CO-ORDINATION, HARMONISATION, STANDARD SETTING AND ADVISORY FUNCTIONS:

(X) PROVISION FOR TRANSFER OF POWERS FROM FEDERATION TO PROVINCES AND VICE-VERSA IF AGREED.

LIST OF EXTENSIVE PROVINCIAL POWERS TO BE AGREED.

5. HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS (INCLUDING THE THREE FREEDOMS OF MOVEMENT, SETTLEMENT AND RIGHT OF PROPERTY) SHOULD BE SAFEGUARDED BOTH AT FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS, AND SHOULD FORM PART OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

ANY ARRANGEMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE THREE FREEDOMS (OF MOVEMENTS, SETTLEMENT AND RIGHT OF PROPERTY) SHOULD RELATE SOLELY TO OVERCOMING CERTAIN PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION AND SHOULD NOT NEGATE OR RESTRICT THEM.

6. ECONOMIC MATTERS

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS SHOULD ENSURE THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CYPRUS AS A WHOLE AND SHOULD SAFEGUARD FOR ALL CITIZENS OF CYPRUS AN EQUAL STANDARD OF LIVING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO PROGRESS, DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE. SUITABLE MACHINERY SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO IMPLEMENT THIS POLICY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE WHOLE POPULATION. THUS, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WILL BE GIVEN TO LESS ECONOMICALLY DEVELOPED AREAS. FURTHERMORE, MEASURES COULD BE DISCUSSED OF A TEMPORARY, TRANSITIONAL NATURE, IN RESPECT OF THE ECONOMY, TO TAKE EFFECT AFTER A SOLUTION.

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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
SIR C TICKELL
SIR J LEAHY
MR ADAMS
MR CARTLEDGE
MR EGERTON
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
MR HANNAY
MR THOMAS
MR JENKINS

ADDITIONAL DISTN
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Fett:

Bi-regional

Shapman for

FRAMEWORK FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT

OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

Amend 541
on second point.

Help Turkish economy
with the army

Procedures

1. A Basic prerequisite to a solution of the Cyprus problem is for the Republic of Cyprus to be completely demilitarised. In the first instance all Turkish occupation troops should be withdrawn together with the colonizers imported from Turkey. At a later stage all troops provided for under the Treaty of Alliance (Greek and Turkish contingents) should be withdrawn, and the Cyprus National Guard and the so-called "Turkish Cypriot Security Force" should be disbanded. Demilitarisation is intended to contribute as an element of internal stability but also alleviate Turkey's paradoxical "fears" that Cyprus may be used against her militarily.
2. An International force under the auspices of the United Nations comprising men from countries with no direct involvement in the Cyprus problem should be stationed in Cyprus to secure its external defence and internal security. In addition, certain police duties could be allocated to it for an agreed period of time. This arrangement is not only essential for a solution to the Cyprus problem but it would also contribute towards consolidating a peaceful situation and creating the appropriate climate and conditions for the reunification of the country and the people. In such circumstances reconciliation and cooperation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would be possible in a very short period of time.
3. The question of effective international guarantees is of great significance in view of the bitter experience of the past. The independence, territorial integrity, unity (and non-alignment) of the Republic of Cyprus should be guaranteed by International Treaty. Interested powers should be excluded from participating in the Treaty. The duty of the guarantors should be a collective one and the use of force should be specifically excluded from the possible courses of action in the enforcement of the Treaty.

4. The Republic of Cyprus should be a Federal State. In considering the territorial and constitutional arrangements of a Federal Republic of Cyprus, the basis for solving these issues, as in fact all other issues and aspects, are the Resolutions of the United Nations and the High-level Agreements (Makarios-Denktash 1977 and Kyprianou-Denktash 1979). In determining the territorial and constitutional issues the composition of the population of Cyprus must always be born in mind. An outline of the solution envisaged follows.

5. Territorial Aspect

Despite the inherent dangers and constitutional difficulties involved in the concept of two regions or two provinces, yet this concept has been accepted.

It must of course be emphasised that the Turkish Cypriots constitute the 18% of the population of Cyprus. Colonizers from Turkey and any other persons imported into Cyprus since the invasion in 1974 can under no circumstances be regarded as Cypriots. Despite the fact that the ratio of the Turkish Cypriot population is only 18%, yet it has already been stated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 30th September 1983 that the Greek Cypriot side is willing to negotiate on the basis of 23% for the region or province to be under Turkish Cypriot administration. However, for the purpose of securing without delay an overall solution of the Cyprus problem, it would be possible to consider agreeing that 25% of the territory of the Republic be under Turkish Cypriot administration, provided that areas such as Famağusta and Morphou, which were thickly populated by Greek Cypriots, before they were forcibly uprooted from their homes by the Turkish

25% b.

invading forces, would be under Greek Cypriot administration.

6. Constitutional Aspect

*Turkish
the President
Council of Ministers
70:30.
Unicameral
legislature*

It should be borne in mind that, under a Federal system, the regions or provinces will have considerable autonomy and powers. Therefore, any checks and balances at the Federal level should be restricted and be of such a nature as not to impede the smooth functioning of the Federal Government organs or lead to impasses and deadlocks. This is particularly important since, in a Federation, the powers and functions of the Federal organs are those which safeguard the unity of the State; and, therefore, if these functions are disrupted the State runs the danger of dissolution.

(1) Executive

The Presidential system provided under the 1960 Constitution is considered appropriate and should be preserved:

- (a) There should be a President of the Republic, who should be a Greek Cypriot, and a Vice-President who should be a Turkish Cypriot.
- (b) Provided that the process of taking decisions is such as not to lead to impasses and to the disruption of the smooth functioning of the State, the Federal Council of Ministers could include a higher proportion of membership of Turkish Cypriots than their population ratio, namely the Federal Council of Ministers would be composed of 70% Greek Cypriots Ministers and 30% Turkish Cypriots Ministers.

(2) Legislature

In the circumstances of Cyprus, it is considered that a Unicameral System is more appropriate. Mechanisms would be provided to ensure speedy resolution of any problems that might arise.

Alternatively, there could be a Bi-cameral system
consisting of:

a Lower Chamber: representation of the two Communities
to be on the basis of population ratio; and

an Upper Chamber: representation in the Upper
Chamber would depend on the powers and functions
of such Chamber and on the provision of deadlock-
resolving mechanisms so as to ensure that the
legislative process is not impeded.

3. Judiciary

Equal representation of the two Communities in the
Federal Supreme Court in respect of all federal matters.

4. Powers and Functions of Federal Government and Provincial
Powers

The powers and functions of the Federal Government to
be such as to ensure the unity of the state.

Indicatively, these should include:

- (i) Foreign Affairs (including Citizenship, but
certain functions may be Provincially delegated);
- (ii) Federal Finance (including Customs);
- (iii) Defence and National Security;
- (iv) International Communications (air and sea);
- (v) International Telecommunications;
- (vi) Appointment of Federal Officers;
- (vii) Natural Resources;
- (viii) Federal Justice
- (ix) Co-ordination, harmonisation, standard setting
and advisory functions;
- (x) Provision for transfer of powers from Federation
to Provinces and vice-versa if agreed.

List of extensive Provincial Powers to be agreed.

5. Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (including the three freedoms of Movement, Settlement and Right of Property) should be safeguarded both at Federal and Provincial levels, and should form part of the Federal Constitution.

Any arrangements with regard to the three freedoms (of Movement, Settlement and Right of Property) should relate solely to overcoming certain practical difficulties in their implementation and should not negate or restrict them.

6. Economic Matters

The Economic and social policy of the Federal Republic of Cyprus should ensure the economic progress and development of Cyprus as a whole and should safeguard for all citizens of Cyprus an equal standard of living and equal opportunities to progress, development and welfare. Suitable machinery should be established to implement this policy for the benefit of the whole population. Thus, economic assistance will be given to less economically developed areas. Furthermore, measures could be discussed of a temporary, transitional nature, in respect of the economy, to take effect after a solution.

11 January, 1994.



SOME COMMENTS ON MR. DENKTASH'S
STATEMENT OF 2ND JANUARY 1984.

The leader of the Turkish Cypriot Community Mr. Denktash has decided for reasons of his own to make certain proposals in a statement published on 2 January 1984, under conditions of maximum publicity. As the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has already declared; Mr. Denktash must certainly have known that this was not the appropriate method for the creation of prerequisites for substantive progress in the Cyprus problem, beyond the fact that in essence he has said nothing new. This was admitted by Mr. Denktash himself when, answering reporters' questions on the same date, he stated that he brought together, "into a single package", earlier "offers" which "were made piecemeal on many occasions and which, because of the piecemeal nature, were lost ..."

2. The motives which prompted Mr. Denktash to take this action and the aims which are discernible from the content of his public proposals are, on the one hand, the creation of misleading impressions internationally and, on the other, the attainment of concrete targets to facilitate the survival of the occupied part of Cyprus as a separate entity. This was also revealed by Mr. Denktash, when he publicly stated on the same date that he chose this particular time because, as he put it, "the Greek Cypriots declared the start of a campaign" and therefore he thought "of a method of drawing the world's attention ..."

3. It is pointed out that the so-called "Goodwill Measures Proposed by the Turkish Cypriot side" is merely a misleading document devoid of good will, combined with an attempt to extort more concessions from the Greek Cypriot side. Buried under the ostensibly "generous" suggestions

are a large number of issues and matters which will, should the proposals be accepted, give the Turkish Cypriot side all that it has been demanding by way of consolidating and legalizing the unacceptable situation created in the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus.

4. References to "two Peoples" and "two nations" are scattered throughout the proposals. If the Greek Cypriot side accepts these references it will be conceding that the Turkish Cypriot Community has a separate self-determination right, whereas, according to international law and morality, Cyprus as a whole is the unit of self-determination.

5. If the Turkish demands that the two sides should refrain from hampering each other's interests in the fields of trade, tourism, transportations, communication, etc. are accepted, the illegal regime in the occupied areas of the Republic will achieve in practice the capacity of and all benefits accorded to an independent state, without any adverse consequences arising from its illegality. It should be emphasised that the proposed steps would effectively grant the area under Turkish occupation the attributes of a de facto independent state. Such "arrangements" would in reality remove any inducement for a settlement of the Cyprus problem. The Turkish Cypriot side would have achieved all it seeks without having made any effective concession to the Greek Cypriot side and the Republic of Cyprus would have limited its international power and responsibilities and effectively have consolidated Turkey's control over Cyprus.

6. If the Turkish proposals for "each other's political equality" are accepted, then an unacceptable situation may arise, in view of Denktash's interpretation of "equality", which goes to power and to participation-



shares, as opposed to status, and which ignores all the internationally recognized democratic aspects of the issue. This applies also to the Turkish side's definition of "bizonality" in the sense of "partnership ... of these two Peoples", as clearly expressed in the above proposals.

7. As regards the Turkish side's reservation to the effect that "holding of negotiations on these issues will be without prejudice to the respective positions of the two sides with regard to each other's political status", it should be noted, and this was repeatedly declared by Mr. Denktash, that the Turkish side plans to use the negotiating process as a means to get recognition for its fictitious "state" by the Cyprus Government and other states.

8. The adoption of proposals envisaged in Mr. Denktash's statement of 2 January 1984, particularly those on trade, tourism, transportations, communication, assistance etc., would be tantamount to adoption of much of the Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposals as put forward earlier, which lead to the creation of two independent states under a confederation, contrary to the provisions of the February 1977 and May 1979 Agreements.

9. As regards the purported offer of Varosha, it is evident that, under the misleading title "Turkish Cypriot proposal on Varosha", there is a proposal to enter into protracted and conditional negotiations about an interim arrangement for a small part of Varosha. In particular, it should be noted that, according to the Turkish position, a) there will be negotiations concerning Varosha (and the Nicosia International Airport) on Mr. Denktash's proposals of 17 November 1983, b) "the modalities and conditions of this transfer (to interim U.N. supervision) shall be determined between the Turkish Cypriot side and the U.N.",



c) the area will not be returned to the Greek Cypriot side, but its final status awaits an ultimate solution, i.e. it may be Turkish Cypriot, or it may be Federal. Furthermore, according to the Turkish side's proposals of 17 November 1983 on Varosha and Nicosia International Airport, it is spelled out that there must be "progress towards a final comprehensive solution to the Cyprus question through intercommunal talks.

10. According to the Turkish position, negotiations for Varosha are to be complex and long-drawn-out, because first, there must be discussion and agreement on the interim U.N. supervision and administration between both sides and the U.N., then there must be the beginning of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement, and only then, simultaneously, can "the question of Greek Cypriot resettlement in the Varosha area" "be considered". The resettlement as an interim measure can begin after agreement is achieved on above issues.

11. On the opening of the Nicosia International Airport, it is clear that the Turkish side, by referring to "the handing over of the Airport by the parties to the interim U.N. administration", insists that they are equally entitled to the Airport.

12. The Turkish proposals are significantly silent about any return of any territory (other than the offer to negotiate about part of Varosha under interim U.N. auspices), despite the occupation of 36.4% of the island by the Turkish ~~zones~~ ^{forces}. Instead, there is evidence that this unacceptable situation will continue, a situation which Turkey has exploited by bringing in thousands of Anatolian settlers from Turkey, as well as the Turkish Army of 25,000 men and their families. Furthermore, on 21st December 1983, steps



began to be taken in the occupied area to give to the Turkish soldiers land, in order to encourage their permanent settlement (Yeniduzen, 21/12/83).

13. The absence of serious intent, on the part of the Turkish side, towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem is indicative of Mr. Denktash's statement of 2 January 1984. All that the current proposals do is to refer to "first steps" or to "short term" matters capable of resolution or to facilitating "progress" or to "the process of steadily moving towards a federal arrangement", or to the ability "to proceed towards a federal solution". The proposals for a Commission "to study" economic matters and the proposal for "a seminar on Federalism in general" show that after so many years of negotiations for a federal solution the Turkish side is not committed to taking any decisions on the issue, but is either looking at the question as an academic debate or as a delaying tactic.

14. With regard to the intercommunal talks, the Turkish side and Mr. Denktash have given the answer themselves. Mr. Denktash declared that the reason he wanted the negotiations was because he believed that in that way the Cyprus Government should recognise him and his fictitious "state". It should be stressed that the Cyprus Government will do nothing directly or indirectly that would mean recognition.

15. The Secretary-General is well aware that the purported declaration of "independence" in the occupied areas of the Republic took place when he was about to enter into substantive consultations for the purpose of preparing the ground for a meeting between President



Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash, as proposed by Mr. Denktash himself. This was another indication that it was not the intention of the Turkish side to genuinely negotiate. Their intention now is first of all to gain time to have the world accept what has happened, to have the Cyprus Government either directly or indirectly recognize their "state", and to follow the same method they were pursuing so far, for over nine years now, by pretending to negotiate and at the same time consolidating the faits accomplis.

16. Regardless of the motives and the aims of the Turkish side, which prompted them to make the above public proposals, there remains the imperative need for reversal of their secessionist move. If the "declaration of independence" is withdrawn, then the road will be opened for the finding of an early, just, lasting and comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.

17. The Government of the Republic feels that the United Nations, and especially the Secretary-General, should examine specific measures for the promotion of the implementation of all the provisions of Security Council Resolution 541 (1983). In the first place it is necessary for all states to exert influence on Turkey for the withdrawal of the secessionist declaration; it is also imperative to call upon Turkey to abandon its designs against the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, opening thus the way for a peaceful, just and lasting settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

9 January 1984.



STATEMENT BY H.E. SPYROS KYPRIANOU
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is more than anyone else anxious to secure a peaceful, just, lasting and comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem as quickly as possible, in the interest of the people of Cyprus as a whole, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike. For this purpose I have this morning submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a framework for such a settlement of the Cyprus problem. I strongly believe that this proposal, which is in full conformity with the Resolutions of the United Nations and the High Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979, provides in the circumstances the way for a speedy solution ensuring an independent, sovereign, territorial integral, united, peaceful and non-aligned Republic of Cyprus, without occupation troops and external interferences. The principles laid down within the context of this framework would fully meet the requirements for internal and external security and for a workable system of federation whilst ensuring the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus.

In order to achieve early results I proposed to the Secretary-General that after compliance with Security Council Resolution 541 in all its aspects there should be a meeting between myself and Mr. Denktash in the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This meeting which may take place anywhere, preferably in Cyprus or at the United Nations Headquarters should last for as long as necessary in a determined and sustained effort to achieve an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem. This of course depends on the goodwill both of Ankara and of Mr. Denktash, and whether the necessary political will does now exist on their part. Any attempts and plans for secession and partition must genuinely be abandoned for good. The framework for the overall settlement that I have today submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations does not exclude the possibility of raising and discussing at the meeting any other specific issue either to be raised by Mr. Denktash or myself or the Secretary-General of the United Nations.



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The proposal to meet with Mr. Denktash, as I have outlined it, is in addition to my support for the efforts that the Secretary-General will be making in pursuance of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 541 in all its aspects, and within the context of which I have today requested the Secretary-General to take up my framework proposal.

I call upon the Turkish Government and Mr. Denktash to respond positively and with goodwill with a view to terminating the tragedy of Cyprus and its people and rendering a real service to the cause of peace and security in the area.

11 January 1984.