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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY  
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO ON 19 JAN

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MET GROMYKO FOR ONE AND A QUARTER HOURS AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY. AFTER AN INITIAL ATTACK ON THE US, GROMYKO ADOPTED A REASONABLE AND BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH (ALTHOUGH HE REACTED PREDICTABLY WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED HUMAN RIGHTS). IT WAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MORE SUBSTANTIAL MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTERS BEFORE THE UNGA; DETAILS TO BE SETTLED SEPARATELY.

2. GROMYKO PRESSED THE MAIN POINTS IN HIS CDE SPEECH (UKDEL TELNO 12) (NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NO FIRST USE OF FORCE) AS IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO LOWERING TENSION AND INCREASING CONFIDENCE. HE DREW A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS SUSPENDED ARMS CONTROL TALKS. MBFR WAS ONLY IN RECESS. HE THOUGHT A DATE FOR ITS RESUMPTION MIGHT BE IN ABOUT 2 MONTHS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED THE MIDDLE EAST AND RECEIVED A NOT TOTALLY NEGATIVE RESPONSE. (REPORTED SEPERATELY NOT TO ALL IN MIFT)

DETAIL

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE OPENED THE DISCUSSION. OUR OVERRIDING INTEREST WAS IN A MORE PEACEFUL WORLD WITH GREATER PROSPERITY FOR OUR PEOPLE. WE WISHED, ON A LONG TERM BASIS, TO EXPLORE WITH THE SOVIET UNION A VARIETY OF WAYS OF ACHIEVING THIS. AS FAR AS TODAY'S DISCUSSIONS WERE CONCERNED IT WOULD NOT BE PROFITABLE TO GO BACK OVER THE CAUSES OF THE DISPUTES THAT DIVIDED US. WE WISHED TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HOPED TO SEE AN IMPROVEMENT IN OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS. KOSTANDOV'S VISIT HAD BEEN USEFUL. MR CHANNON WOULD BE VISITING MOSCOW IN MAY. WE ALSO VALUED OUR EXCHANGES AT VARIOUS LEVELS WITH THE MFA. MR RIFKIND'S TALKS LAST YEAR WITH KORNIENKO HAD BEEN VALUABLE. WE HOPED KORNIENKO COULD COME TO LONDON SOON. (GROMYKO CONFIRMED THAT

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AN OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE FOUND. HE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT MEETINGS OF SENIOR OFFICIALS SHOULD PROCEED AS NORMAL.) THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT AT TODAY'S MEETING, TIME DID NOT ALLOW, ALL ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED. AN OPPORTUNITY SHOULD BE TAKEN, NOT JUST IN THE MARGINS OF MEETINGS AT MADRID OR NEW YORK FOR A MORE SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSION.

5. GROMYKO SAID THE SOVIET UNION VALUED ITS TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE UK. THEY SHOULD BE FURTHER DEVELOPED. IN GENERAL IT WOULD BE GOOD IF ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS WERE QUOTE SERIOUSIFIED UNQUOTE (IE PUT ON A MORE SERIOUS FOOTING). DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN BRITISH AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES COULD BE USEFUL. IN LATER DISCUSSION HE ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THAT HE AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIVE MEETING BEFORE THEIR USUAL MEETING AT THE UNGA IN SEPTEMBER. DETAILS COULD BE ARRANGED TO SUIT BOTH SIDES. DESPITE THE WRECKING OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS BY CRUDE US ACTIONS, THERE WAS MUCH TO DISCUSS AND DIALOGUE MUST BE MAINTAINED.

#### US/SOVIET RELATIONS

6. GROMYKO MADE A STRONG CONDEMNATION OF US NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOUR AND THE RECENT DEPLOYMENT OF NEW US MISSILES. THIS WAS A QUOTE SHARPLY NEGATIVE FACT UNQUOTE WHICH COULD NOT BE IGNORED IT WAS BOUND TO AFFECT SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE US, UK AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. THE UK SHOULD DISABUSE ITS US ALLIES FROM THE VIEW THAT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD EVENTUALLY RESUME AS THOUGH NOTHING HAD HAPPENED. THE SOVIET UNION REFUSED TO BE AN ACCOMPLICE TO SUCH A GAME. WASHINGTON HAD QUOTE EXPLODED UNQUOTE THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WORLD KNEW IT.

#### ARMS CONTROL

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE UNDERLINED THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL EXPRESSED IN HER SPEECH AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE. AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN RAISING CONFIDENCE WAS WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS. THE UK REGRETTED THE SOVIET POSITION. THE WEST HAD CONTINUED NEGOTIATING WHILE SOVIET MISSILES WERE BEING DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES SHOULD ALSO BE RESUMED. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOT BROKEN OFF BUT IN RECESS. IT REMAINED ONLY TO AGREE A RESUMPTION DATE, WHICH HE THOUGHT COULD BE IN ABOUT TWO MONTHS' TIME. OF COURSE, IF NEGOTIATING PARTNERS ENGAGED IN OBSTRUCTION, OR NEGOTIATION FOR ITS OWN SAKE, THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT HAVE TO THINK AGAIN.

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8. GROMYKO SAID THAT THERE COULD BE TWO APPROACHES TO THE CDE. IT COULD DEAL EITHER WITH MINOR ISSUES (TRANSLATED AS QUOTE TRIVIAL UNQUOTE) SUCH AS MILITARY EXERCISES, MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS, PARAMETERS, AND THE SCOPE OF OBLIGATIONS: OR MAJOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES SUCH AS A DECLARATION ON NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NOFUN), AND AGREEMENT ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE BETWEEN STATES (NOFUF). THESE WOULD CREATE A FAVOURABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR LATER DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS. HE FAVOURED THE LATTER APPROACH.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE HAD LISTENED WITH INTEREST. WE AGREED ON THE NEED TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE. BUT THE PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING THE NOFUF PROPOSAL WAS ALREADY SUBSCRIBED TO BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE UN. CONFIDENCE WAS LIKE A TREE. IT GREW FROM A RELATIVELY HUMBLE BEGINNING. THE CDE SHOULD DEVELOP IN THE SAME WAY ON THE BASIS OF THE MANDATE AGREED AT MADRID.

#### HUMAN RIGHTS

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE FULFILMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS WAS ONE OF SEVERAL IMPORTANT FACTORS AFFECTING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE. THEY WOULD BE GIVEN A GREAT BOOST IF THE SOVIET UNION COULD RESPOND FAVOURABLY, PARTICULARLY IN CASES WHERE THE INDIVIDUAL'S HEALTH WAS IN JEOPARDY. MRS BONNER AND SHCHARANSKY WERE ONLY TWO EXAMPLES AMONG MANY. GROMYKO COMMENTED THAT THE MENTION OF THIS SUBJECT HAD LOWERED THE LEVEL OF THE MEETING. HE HAD NO INTENTION OF DISCUSSING IT.

#### COMMENT

11. GROMYKO'S TONE AND APPROACH WAS A LONG WAY FROM HIS BLUSTERING BEHAVIOUR AT MADRID. HE WAS CAREFUL TO MAINTAIN THE SOVIET LINE ON THE MAIN ISSUES DISCUSSED, BUT NOT IN A WAY WHICH PRECLUDED FURTHER DISCUSSION OR THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME MOVEMENT IN THE FUTURE. ON BILATERAL CONTACTS THE IMPRESSION WAS OF WANTING THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE TO RESUME BUT CONCERN TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF BEING THE DEMANDEUR.

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