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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 052240Z APR 64
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 350 OF 5 APRIL.
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON.

FOLLOWING FOR WILLIAMS UN DEPT

MY TELNO 336: MRS KIRKPATRICK'S VISIT

1. MRS KIRKPATRICK HAS NOW SENT ME THE STATEMENT ON THE FALKLANDS WHICH SHE HAS GIVEN TO THE SUNDAY TIMES. TEXT IN MIFT. SHE HAS COMMENTED TO ME "'I DON'T REALLY KNOW WHAT THEY WILL DO WITH IT. IT IS THE FIRST COMMENT I HAVE MADE'". AS YOU WILL SEE IT IS DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH THE RECENTLY PUBLISHED EXTRACTS OF GENERAL HAIG'S MEMOIRS.

2. MRS KIRKPATRICK TELLS ME THAT SHE WILL BE DINING IN PARIS WITH CHEYSSON AND GUTMANN ON SATURDAY EVENING. AT PRESENT SHE IS FURIOUS WITH THEM FOR THE INSTRUCTIONS THEY SENT TO NANTEUIL IN RELATION TO THE NICARAGUAN DEBATE CONCLUDED YESTERDAY. BUT I EXPECT THEY WILL MOLIFY HER. IN ANY EVENT I BELIEVE THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE INTERESTED IN MRS KIRKPATRICK'S ACCOUNT OF THE CONVERSATION.

THOMSON

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FM UKNIS NEW YORK 052300Z APR 84
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 351 OF 5 APRIL
INFO WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING FOR WILLIAMS UN DEPT

MIPT: TEXT OF MRS KIRKPATRICK'S FALKLANDS STATEMENT.

THEN, AS NOW, I BELIEVED THAT WAR BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA WOULD BE TRAGIC FOR THE MEN INVOLVED, A TERRIBLE LOSS OF WESTERN RESOURCES, AND VERY DAMAGING TO THE UNITED STATES. I THEREFORE SUPPORTED SECRETARY HAIG'S MEDIATION EFFORTS, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY. MY CONTACTS WITH ARGENTINE OFFICIALS DURING THE MEDIATION EFFORTS WERE EXTREMELY FEW, STRICTLY LIMITED TO UN MATTERS, ALWAYS CONDUCTED IN THE PRESENCE OF OTHER U.S. DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, AND FULLY REPORTED. ONLY WHEN SECRETARY HAIG ABANDONED THE MEDIATION EFFORT (A TIME WHEN WAR HAD NOT YET BROKEN OUT) DID I ENGAGE IN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONCERNING HIS MEDIATION EFFORT AND ATTEMPT ACTIVELY TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT THE TERMS OF THAT OFFER. I ALSO MADE A LAST EFFORT IN NEW YORK TO CONVINCE THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY SHOULD ACCEPT MRS THATCHER'S OFFER OF MAY 17. I BELIEVED IT TO BE A GENEROUS OFFER. I WAS, MOREOVER, ABSOLUTELY PERSUADED FROM THE OUTSET THAT ARGENTINA WOULD SUFFER A DEVASTATING MILITARY DEFEAT AT THE HAND OF THE BRITISH, A FACT WHICH THE ARGENTINES WERE TRAGICALLY UNAWARE OF. ONCE THE WAR HAD BROKEN OUT, I BELIEVED IT DESIRABLE TO BRING HOSTILITIES TO AS SPEEDY A CONCLUSION AS POSSIBLE. TO THAT END, I HAD SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNING PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. ALL CONTACTS WHICH I HAD WITH ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVES WERE AUTHORIZED BY AND REPORTED TO MY GOVERNMENT. I NEVER IN ANY WAY SUGGESTED TO ANY ARGENTINE THAT THERE WERE ANY CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD WITHHOLD CRITICISM OF THE ARGENTINE LANDING IN THE FALKLANDS. U.S. CRITICISM OF THAT LANDING WAS IMMEDIATE AND STRONG. I WHOLLY SHARED MY GOVERNMENT'S VIEW CONCERNING THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF ARGENTINA'S EFFORT TO

SETTLE THE ISSUE BY FORCE. SPECIFICALLY, I NEVER SUGGESTED TO ANYONE THAT ARGENTINE SUPPORT FOR U.S. EFFORTS IN NICARAGUA WOULD BUY AMERICAN SCQUESCENCE IN ARGENTINA'S FALKLANDS POLICY. I MADE NO PUBLIC COMMENT ON SECRETARY HAIG'S MEDIATION EFFORTS UNTIL AFTER HE HAD CREATED AN INTERNATIONAL SCANDAL BY INSTRUCTING ME TO VOTE ONE WAY IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THEN IMMEDIATELY INSTRUCTING ME TO CHANGE OUR VOTE. MY WORDS OR ACTS DURING MR. HAIG'S MEDIATION COULD NOT HAVE MISLED ANYONE BECAUSE I CAREFULLY AVOIDED CONTACT WITH ARGENTINES PRECISELY TO PRECLUDE ANY SUCH POSSIBILITY.

I BELIEVED THAT, ONCE THE MEDIATION EFFORT FAILED, U.S. INTERESTS AND THOSE OF THE WEST WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER SERVED BY A POLICY OF FORMAL U.S. NEUTRALITY. THE BRITISH, I THOUGHT, COULD EASILY MANAGE THE MILITARY PROBLEM AND WOULD, IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS, HAVE ACCESS TO U.S. SUPPORT OF MANY KINDS. ACTIVE PUBLIC U.S. SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN WOULD, ON THE OTHER HAND, PROFIT BRITAIN LITTLE AND SORELY DAMAGE U.S. RELATIONS IN THE HEMISPHERE BY STOKING THE FIRES OF ANTI-YANKEE, LATIN NATIONALISM. THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF SUCH A DECISION WOULD, I THOUGHT THEN AND NOW, BE BROAD AND LONG-LASTING - NOT JUST IN ARGENTINA BUT THROUGHOUT THE HEMISPHERE. I ALSO NOTED THAT THE BRITISH FREQUENTLY ABSTAINED IN THE UN ON RESOLUTIONS OF WHICH WE WERE THE TARGET, WHICH IS ANOTHER WAY OF SAYING THAT I HAD LEARNED AT THE UN THE BRITISH RESERVE FOR THEMSELVES THE RIGHT TO BE NEUTRAL ON ISSUES AFFECTING VITAL U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST.

I HAVE NEVER UNDERSTOOD THE MISREPRESENTATION OF MY VIEWS AND ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE FALKLANDS. I DO NOT KNOW FROM WHENCE THE FALSE REPORTS ORIGINATED NOR WHY.

I HAD PERSONALLY TWICE COMMUNICATED TO HIGH ARGENTINE OFFICIALS - ONCE IN BUENOS AIRES, ONCE IN WASHINGTON - THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WOULD NEVER "UNDERSTAND" AN EFFORT TO SETTLE THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE BY FORCE. I NEVER MADE THIS COMMENT WITH REGARD TO THE FALKLANDS - ONLY BECAUSE IT NEVER OCCURRED TO ME, NOR ANYONE ELSE, THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WOULD EVEN CONSIDER THE USE OF FORCE IN THAT CASE. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT SECRETARY HAIG'S ACCOUNT MAKES NO CLAIM TO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF ANY ACTIONS ON MY PART INCONSISTENT WITH THE ABOVE ACCOUNT. INSTEAD, HE ATTRIBUTES SUCH VIEW TO UNNAMED BRITISH SOURCES.

THOMSON

28 APR 1984

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