

see PC

Prime Minister.

I will come in for Foreign and Commonwealth Office
 this call on Sunday evening, unless you would rather be alone.

London SW1A 2AH

6 April 1984

2. Hugh Thomas is giving Mr.

Kirkpatrick tea before she sees you.

See John

A.F.C. $\frac{6}{4}$

mt

Visit of Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick

I enclose briefs for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick at 7 p.m. on Sunday 8 April. The purpose of Mrs Kirkpatrick's visit to London is to give two lectures, one at Chatham House and one at the Institute of European and Defence Studies.

Mrs Kirkpatrick has told us that she has no particular topics in mind for her meeting with the Prime Minister. Mrs Kirkpatrick has, however, suggested that the Prime Minister might be interested in her views on US internal affairs, particularly as she knows personally most of the leading personalities on the Democratic side. I enclose a background note on the US Internal Scene (Brief No 1). For her part, Mrs Kirkpatrick would undoubtedly welcome the chance to hear the Prime Minister's views on development in the European Community.

Mrs Kirkpatrick has told our Ambassador at the United Nations that she has given an interview to the Sunday Times which will be published on 8 April. We do not know exactly how much the newspaper will print, but Mrs Kirkpatrick expects that the extracts will include her views on the Falklands War following the publication of General Haig's memoirs, and possibly on the intervention in Grenada.

I also enclose briefs on UN matters (Brief No 2), Central America (Brief No 3), Lebanon and Arab/Israel (Brief No 4), Iran/Iraq (Brief No 5), East/West relations (Brief No 6) and NATO: Europe/US Relations (Brief No 7) in case these should be raised by Mrs Kirkpatrick. I should add that she will be calling at the FCO at 4 p.m. on 9 April for talks with Lady Young and Mr Whitney.

I also enclose a note on Mrs Kirkpatrick prepared by Sir J Thomson (Brief No 8) which supplements the biography enclosed with my letter to you of 23 March.

See
 [Signature]

(R B Bone)
 Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
 10 Downing Street


John

Romola has been in contact with the US Embassy about Mrs Kirkpatrick's visit. She was told that Mrs Kirkpatrick would be accompanied by Mr JOEL BLOCKER who, I understand, is her personal press adviser. Romola pointed out that Mr Blocker would not be able to attend the meeting. She is concerned ~~that~~ that both Mr Blocker and herself put out similar lines when discussing the meeting with the Press.

Romola hopes that you will be able to let her know how long the meeting was and the essential discussion points so that she can agree a line with Mr. Blocker. Mrs Kirkpatrick has a number of interviews arranged for Monday and Romola is anxious to avoid

Mr Blocker embowering the PM.
Romola is particularly conscious of
Mrs Kirkpatrick's pet interest in
N. Ireland.

Mark
8/4



VISIT OF US AMBASSADOR TO THE UN

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

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BACKGROUND BRIEF: US INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE

1. The American internal political scene is dominated by the campaign for the Presidential election on 6 November. The Republican Party Convention in Dallas on 20 August will endorse President Reagan and Vice President Bush for a second term. But it remains an open question who will win the Democratic nomination at the Convention in San Francisco on 16 July.

2. Until the first caucus in Iowa on 20 February, former Vice President Walter Mondale was the firm favourite, with Senator John Glenn as his main rival. Iowa was won decisively by Mondale, but Senator Gary Hart, the 47 year old Senator from Colorado, surprisingly took second place. Hart went on to win a number of other primaries and caucuses and at one stage looked as if he might take the lead. However, Mondale stayed ahead in the major round of primaries on 13 March, carried the important state of Illinois on 20 March and won a convincing victory in New York on 3 April. The other surprise in the race has been the showing of the Rev Jesse Jackson who has sufficient support, mainly from the young black community, to be able to stay in the race until the Democratic Convention. John Glenn failed to do well in any of the primaries or caucuses and has withdrawn from the contest along with the other back-runners. Nearly

half of the convention delegates out of a total of 3,933 have now been chosen. The breakdown at 4 April was:-

Mondale (864), Hart (514), Jackson (147)

3. Mondale appears to have the edge. He has the support of the organised labour groups and many of the more conservative groups within the Democratic Party. Despite considerable charisma, doubts are increasingly being expressed about Hart's lack of substance. However, the result is far from being a foregone conclusion. Hart could still do well in the major primaries in Texas on 5 May and California on 5 June and the contest is likely to remain open up to the Democratic Convention itself.

4. A prolonged battle between the Democratic contenders can only help President Reagan. Recent opinion polls tend to show the President ahead of either Mondale or Hart. The President has a number of advantages including his command of television and virtually unlimited access to funds. His natural optimism and geniality project an image which appeals to a large number of Americans as does his campaign theme that "America is back". Nevertheless, there is a natural Democrat majority among the American electorate. Reagan won in 1980 by a combination of public disenchantment with President Carter and his ability to woo much of the middle ground. Since then many groups have become disaffected with the President's performance, and women, blacks, Jews, Hispanics and organised labour appear to be fairly

certain to vote Democrat.

5. The major issue in the election is likely to be the President's handling of the economy. The President made much in his State of the Union address on 25 January and his announcement of his intention to stand for re-election, of the dramatic turnaround in the economy since his taking office. The decline in inflation, and in unemployment, together with the healthy growth in the economy are all points in his favour, but the implications of the continuing budget deficit are causing serious concern. The 1985 budget which President Reagan presented to Congress at the beginning of February is clearly aimed at preserving the current economic and financial strategy. Even his more recent proposals to reduce the deficit carefully avoid unpopular measures.

6. The President's handling of foreign policy has done much for his popularity. The success of the Grenada intervention had a dramatic effect. Although most informed judgement holds that the President's policy in the Lebanon has failed in electoral terms, the withdrawal of US troops has removed a serious political liability. But the situation in Central America could always take a turn for the worse. There are also worries about the nuclear arms race and relations with the Soviet Union, though the President's conciliatory speech of 16 January will have done much to reassure moderate public opinion.

5 April 1984

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VISIT OF US AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 8 - 9 APRIL

UN MATTERS

2

POINTS TO MAKE

UN General

1. Value excellent cooperation between Mrs Kirkpatrick and Sir John Thomson.
2. Western positions under constant pressure at the UN. Active US participation vital in defending common interests.
3. We take it the United States do not at present plan to withdraw from any more UN agencies or institutions.

UNESCO

4. Reviewed our policy towards UNESCO in 1983. Decided to remain a member and work for change from within. Further review at end of 1984. Unless there are significant indications of change will consider withdrawal.
5. Mr Raison wrote to Director-General M'Bow, on 2 April indicating broad areas in which we seek change. US saw this letter in draft and supported it.

UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT

4 APRIL 1984

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VISIT OF US AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 8 - 9 APRIL

UN MATTERS

BACKGROUND

Mrs Kirkpatrick and the UN

1. On becoming US Permanent Representative to the UN in 1981 Mrs Kirkpatrick (see separate personality notes) introduced a marked change in style and approach from her predecessors. Her political philosophy had led her to serve in Mr Reagan's Foreign Policy Advisory Group during his 1980 Presidential campaign notwithstanding her previous lifetime support for the Democratic Party. She had in particular attracted Republican approval by canvassing the benefits of US cooperation with, rather than ostracism of "authoritarian" regimes where the possibility of liberalisation might exist, in contrast to Marxist regimes. She shared, more generally, the President's views on the dangers of creeping collectivism and the need to confront communism globally and at the UN.
2. Mrs Kirkpatrick thus started off with a good deal of contempt and hostility towards the UN. Her abrasive and confrontational style attracted publicity. She declined to turn a blind eye to routine rhetorical attacks on US policies. She regularly deplored the USA's "isolation" and the willingness of many of America's allies to tolerate a high level of criticism from non-aligned and Eastern European delegations. Her manner of representing her policies and her raising of the temperature of East/West confrontation at the UN caused irritation and concern to many Third World delegates and to some Europeans - though her relations with Sir Anthony Parsons and Sir John Thomson have been excellent. She has more recently adjusted her style. She retains some of her scepticism. But she has come to see that it is unwise for the US to ignore the UN especially in its guise as the supreme political forum for the Third World. She has also come to realise that a great deal can be done through persistent persuasion, explanation, and the cultivation of political friendships.

3. The Administration have conducted a review of US policy towards all UN institutions. The major result was the US withdrawal from UNESCO. UNCTAD is currently under particular scrutiny. But the State Department have said that the US is not at present planning to withdraw from any other UN agencies or institutions. In some instances in fact (eg United Nations Development Programme) support is being increased. But the exclusion of Israel from any UN organ or agency would almost certainly lead to instantaneous US withdrawal.

UNESCO

4. The announcement of US withdrawal was made last December. It will take effect on 31 December 1984. We had not sought to influence the US decision although other Western States had sought to dissuade them. The US public position is that their decision is "firm but not final", but we think it unlikely that it will be rescinded.

5. The UK review was independent of the US one. It stemmed from our continuing unease about the organisation's drift into controversial political areas and about the growing size of the budget and about the intrinsic worth of many UNESCO activities, although it was acknowledged that the organisation did valuable work in its basic programmes (education, science and culture).

6. The General Conference held in October/November was however fairly satisfactory. The budget was reduced somewhat and UK and US efforts to hold the line on freedom of the press were successful. Hence our decision to stay in UNESCO for the time being and fight for further reforms.

UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT

4 APRIL 1984

VISIT OF US AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS: 8 - 9 APRIL

CENTRAL AMERICA

POINTS TO MAKE.

Nicaragua

3

1. We understand US security concerns in Central America and have been as supportive as possible of US policy objectives. Our abstention on the Nicaraguan resolution in the Security Council on 4 April was designed to be helpful.
2. But it is becoming increasingly difficult to defend this position. There would have been an outcry if the recent incident involving a ship with a British crew had led to loss of British lives.
3. The US would be guilty by association if a ship hit a mine while on free and lawful passage into a Nicaraguan port. Our position is well known and consistent. As a maritime nation we are committed to the freedom of navigation. We cannot support illegal action.
4. (If raised) The French have not suggested that we should join them in sweeping Nicaraguan ports. We have no intention of taking such action.

El Salvador

5. Glad that Duarte victory likely. And that Congress may now be more willing to allow aid funds.
6. Our observers preparing their report. Will probably attend second round.

BACKGROUND

Nicaragua

1. Elections are to be held on 4 November. They are likely to endorse the ruling Sandinista Front's hold on power. The circumstances of the election are clearly unfair to the opposition parties, who are in any case weak and divided.
2. The US continues to support the counter-revolutionaries operating from Honduras and through Costa Rica. They have effectively dropped the public pretence that they are not doing so. "Contra" operations by land, sea and air have caused a stream of Nicaraguan protests at the United Nations. We alone abstained on a Nicaraguan-inspired Security Council Resolution on 4 April, which the US vetoed condemning external support for such activities. But our speech deplored the mining of Nicaraguan ports and reaffirmed our commitment to the principle of freedom of navigation.
3. The mining of a Soviet tanker on 20 March, and of other vessels, in Nicaraguan waters as the result of US-backed "Contra" operations led to our expressing concern to the Americans at official level. On 28 March a Liberian vessel, the "Ivor Chaser", struck a mine off the Nicaraguan port of Corinto: because the vessel carried a British crew (and had been British until 14 March) Sir Antony Acland called in the US Minister on 30 March to express further concern.
4. We are concerned that such developments can be exploited by those who criticise British support for US policy objectives in Central America. (A report of our protesting to the Americans over the mining incident appeared in "The Guardian" of 31 March). We and other European allies moreover believe that supporting the "Contras" is a sterile and self-defeating policy: there is no prospect of the Sandinistas being dislodged, and attempts at a peaceful settlement are meanwhile obstructed. The Americans argue that the Sandinistas have only themselves to blame for having started with giving material aid to the left-wing insurgents in El Salvador. This does not justify the US following suit, and even on practical grounds it is hard to argue that the expedient is likely to lead to a

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/satisfactory

satisfactory outcome.

5. AFP have reported that Cheysson offered in a letter to President Betancur of Colombia French assistance, in cooperation with one or more European powers, in sweeping Nicaraguan ports for mines. The French have not denied the report and Mrs Kirkpatrick is likely to discuss it with Cheysson on 7 April.

El Salvador

6. The Presidential elections are due to go to a second round on about 29 April, which the Christian Democrat Napoleon Duarte is likely to win. This has already made easier the US Administration's task of securing Congressional approval for emergency military and economic aid for El Salvador. The military situation is stalemated, with little prospect of improvement for a number of years, and continuing economic disruption by the strong insurgent forces.

7. The two British observers have agreed in principle to attend the second round. They have yet to submit their report.

Honduras

8. The civilian President of Honduras has demonstrated the strength of his authority in his surprise move on 31 March replacing and expelling the Head of Armed Forces, General Alvarez, and five other senior officers. The event appears to have taken the Americans by surprise, who valued Alvarez's pugnacious attitude towards Nicaragua. President Suazo has said publicly that there will be no change in policy and the new major US/Honduran military exercise in Honduras has proceeded as planned. (A major US Naval exercise in the area is also due to take place shortly).

Contadora

9. The Contadora initiative has run out of steam, but no party relishes admitting this openly. Contadora Foreign Ministers are to meet at the end of April but little substantial progress can be expected. Blame for failure is often directed at the United States, but in reality the differences between the Central American states are too great to allow a ready solution.

VISIT OF US AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS: 8-9 APRIL

LEBANON AND ARAB/ISRAEL

Points to Make

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Lebanon

1. Syrians also finding Lebanon's problems hard to solve. Will probably persevere - do not want worse chaos in Lebanon into which Syrian forces might be drawn.
2. Outsiders can do little at present. Would like to see UN more actively involved in peacekeeping. Hope we can exploit any opportunity to expand UNIFIL's mandate in next few months, even if simple renewal is only immediate option. Israeli scepticism notwithstanding, could provide additional element of security for Israel/Lebanon border.
3. Shultz's message (to Sir Geoffrey Howe) reviewed our MNF cooperation. Agree we must do better in future and keep in close touch over Middle East and other issues.

Arab/Israel

4. Gravely concerned about US/Jordan tensions. Glad to help soothe and mend fences. Mr Luce took the opportunity of the State Visit to encourage the Jordanians to devote the next few months to laying the groundwork for future progress rather than dramatic short-term gestures.
5. Vitally important to reactivate the peace process quickly after the US election. Reagan Plan remains the best basis for progress. Israeli Labour party accepted it, Labour government now possible after July. Must all do what we can between now and 1985 to further prospects for success of a revamped Reagan Plan.

VISIT OF US AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS: 8-9 APRIL

LEBANON AND ARAB/ISRAEL

Essential Facts

LEBANON

Military Situation

1. The French finished their withdrawal on 31 March. The latest ceasefire of 29 March continues to hold, though sporadic small arms exchanges have increased around the Green Line and on the Shouf ridge. Both the Higher Security Committee (under President Gemayel) and the (smaller) Ceasefire Committee have met regularly but with no substantive progress so far. In an Israeli-sponsored deal between the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) and Druze, LF forces have been evacuated from the Khanoub area, south of the Shouf. Attacks on IDF in South Lebanon continue. A campaign of civil disobedience has been ordered by Shiite religious leader Sheikh Shamseddin from 30 March in response to alleged Israeli brutality. Two Katyusha rockets fired from South Lebanon at village of Haon in Northern Israel on 1 April (no casualties). IDF shelled alleged Palestinian guerilla bases in Syrian-occupied Bekaa Valley for three hours on 2 April.
2. Series of attacks on Western diplomats: French diplomat shot and wounded in Beirut on 27 March, amateur bomb attack against British Council premises on 21 March. Still no news of US diplomat kidnapped on 16 March. No evidence yet of direct connection with fatal shooting of British Council officer in Athens, for which Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Moslems (about which nothing is yet known) has claimed responsibility. This organisation has also sent a message to our Embassy in Beirut (received on 3 April), threatening to 'continue the Jihad (holy war) against imperialist infiltration' and to 'liberate Moslems from British prisons'.

3. The MNF formally expired on 31 March following the US announcement of their intention to withdraw completely and the departure of the last French soldiers. BRITFORLEB returned to the UK on 27 March. The former French positions on the Green Line have been taken over by the ISF. 40 French Observers have arrived to help oversee the ceasefire.

Political Developments

4. The Syrians have made further efforts to promote a solution, in talks in Damascus with all the Lausanne participants or their representatives. But there is so far no sign of compromise over the relative powers of (Christian) President and (Muslim) Prime Minister, over which Lausanne talks broke down. The Arab press forecast an early visit by President Gemayel to Damascus.

UN

5. No moves since Soviet veto (29 February) of French draft SCR authorising a UN force for Beirut. Both we and Americans support a wider role for UNIFIL. But the Lebanese representative at the UN has indicated that he will seek the simple renewal of the mandate by the Security Council on 19 April. The Israeli attitude towards a wider mandate for UNIFIL appears to have softened somewhat recently, though they still insist that UNIFIL cannot be responsible for security adjacent to the Israel/Lebanon border. The Israeli Government may be keen to make a further partial withdrawal from South Lebanon before the July elections. Brian Urquhart (UN Secretariat) returns to New York shortly from a Middle East tour and may have some proposals in mind.

6. The text of Shultz's "MNF valedictory" message of 31 March to Sir Geoffrey Howe about the MNF is attached. We assume that similar messages have been sent to other MNF partners. It contains nothing new. Shultz's claim to be "buoyed by the quality and quantity of our consultations" (para 5) is hard to take seriously. A reply is not (not) contemplated.

ARAB/ISRAEL

7. Arafat visited Amman in late February. The joint communique, largely drafted by the PLO side, sold no passes: the two sides reaffirmed position of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and commitment to Fez. The result of the visit amounted to little more than agreement to continue the dialogue. A brief second visit by Arafat to Amman in early March added little. Prospects for real progress in the dialogue are not good. Arafat, though disengaged from pro-Syrian PLO rebels, still has difficulties with remaining hardliners. Syria can make its opposition felt through pressure both on the PLO and Jordan. Israel insists it will never negotiate with Arafat.

8. Unless the US is willing to put pressure on Israel, Arafat is unlikely to be able to reach agreement with King Hussein. Hussein asked the US to press Israel to allow Palestinians from the West Bank to attend a Palestinian National Council meeting, which Arafat hopes to convene to strengthen this hand against PLO hardliners. (The EC Presidency made a demarche in Tel Aviv on 7 March, urging the Israelis to allow Palestinians free movement in and out of the Occupied Territories. The Israelis said that they only restricted the movements of those linked to the PLO, because that was a terrorist organisation.) President Reagan declined to do so, and also told Hussein that his draft SCR on Israeli settlements, which did not describe them as illegal, was inappropriate and unhelpful. Hussein reacted badly and, in an interview with the New York Times published on 15 March, lambasted the US for one-sided support of Israel and rejected the Reagan proposals for Jordanian/Palestinian negotiations with Israel. Hussein has subsequently toned down his language and has reaffirmed his respect for the President personally. Nevertheless it is clear that he has no illusions that the US can give him much help before the elections. He may also have doubts about a sufficient US commitment to the peace process after the election. The Administration's failure to pursue the proposed sale of Stinger surface to air missiles will not help relations. The Administration is, however, opposed to Senator

Moynahan's draft legislation to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem (Senator Hart and Mr Mondale are said to support it).

9. The King's attack on the US will have done his less harm with the Arab world. Distancing himself from Washington may be of some help in building a Jordanian/PLO position, and in defusing Syrian propaganda claims that he is preparing to sell out to Israel and the US. But for the next stage - negotiations with Israel - Jordan cannot do without US support. We should therefore expect Jordanian/US relations to recover in due course, but real progress will be difficult until the US election is over.

UN

10. Mrs Kirkpatrick's own objection to the Jordanian draft SCR on settlements was an important factor behind the President's refusal to support it. She is inclined to take a distinctly pro-Israeli line on Arab/Israel and to regard King Hussein as not entirely serious in his commitment to a negotiated settlement. The only Arab/Israel game currently in play at the UN is the proposal for an International Conference on the Middle East which has long been advocated by the Soviet Union. The US and Mrs Kirkpatrick herself are firmly opposed to this. HMH have taken the line that a conference could at some stage be useful, but that it is unrealistic to call for one until the parties directly concerned are ready to do business.

NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA DEPARTMENT

4 APRIL 1984

SECRET

March 31, 1984

Dear Sir Geoffrey:

For the past year, our two countries, along with France and Italy, have worked together in Lebanon. We did so because we shared a common premise that an opportunity existed to bring peace and stability to Lebanon and the people after some nine years of civil war.

We knowingly took a considerable chance; needless to say, and despite our support for the reconciliation process in Lebanon, it has not worked out the way we hoped. Too many lives -- particularly Lebanese, but also American, French and others -- have been sacrificed. While our efforts provided the Lebanese with an opportunity they would otherwise not have had, the situation we face today is far from the one we sought. Nevertheless, we were motivated by the right purposes and we were right to try.

Peace in the Middle East requires a modus vivendi between Arabs and Israelis. In Lebanon, as you know, we supported a democratic, pro-Western government which negotiated an agreement with Israel. Unfortunately, the Government of Lebanon was unable to move ahead, in large part because of pressure from extremists and terrorists backed by Syria, Libya, and ultimately the Soviet Union.

It is too soon to predict the final outcome of events in Lebanon. In the aftermath of President Gemayel's journey to Damascus, the repudiation of the May 17 agreement, the Lausanne conference, and, most recent, the termination of the MNF, we have clearly entered a new phase. Diplomacy continues with the aim of ending the fighting and promoting Lebanese sovereignty. The challenge of finding a viable formula for Israeli withdrawal has reemerged. The conflict has yet to run its course, and we in the West still possess opportunities to shape it. I look forward to working with you on this endeavor.

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Indeed, as I contemplate the future, I am buoyed by the quality and quantity of our consultations to date. They constitute a signal accomplishment. This is not to deny our differences on lapses, but simply to recognize that on balance we managed an extremely difficult challenge quite well.

Even a quick review of our efforts produces an impressive record. The President and most recently the Vice President have discussed this issue with Prime Minister Thatcher. The Foreign Ministers of the four MNF participants met at least three times in 1983 alone for the purpose of discussing Lebanon. We sent numerous messages to one another, as I did with your predecessor Francis Pym. Phil Habib, Bud McFarlane and Don Rumsfeld frequently stopped in Europe. Ambassador Wright here as well as our Ambassador in London coordinated closely, as did our representatives in Lebanon. I know that General Vessey stayed in close touch with his opposite number, and that our military personnel did the same on the ground.

Month after month we proved we can cooperate effectively in the absence of formal consultative mechanisms in difficult, fast-changing circumstances. This fact should not be forgotten amidst the travails of Lebanon. It will be important to continue to stay in close touch, whether as regards Lebanon, the Middle East more generally, or other key regions outside the formal treaty area of the alliance. The Persian Gulf in particular comes to mind in this regard. Again, I suggest this not because we will agree on everything, which we will not, but because it is important that we try to pursue our common aims and narrow any differences.

We have also learned the necessity of cooperation against terrorism. This phenomenon, especially when state-supported, poses problems for us all. It is also sure to remain. It is a scourge that must be resisted. And we are likely to be more successful in doing so working together than separately.

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

In short, I believe that one of the lasting accomplishments of our experience in Lebanon is the demonstration of our ability to cooperate with one another. As we face challenges in the future, it is certain that the safety and well-being of our societies and the security of our interests will demand similar efforts.

Let me just close by saying how much I value your counsel. Please continue to provide it whenever you see fit.

Sincerely yours,

George

SECRET

Defence Department
233 4768 E306

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VISIT OF MRS JEANE KIRKPATRICK, US AMBASSADOR TO THE UN: 8-9 APRIL
IRAN/IRAQ

POINTS TO MAKE

The War

1. Our consistent wish to see an early negotiated end to the conflict acceptable to both sides. UK will support any realistic attempt to bring this about.
2. But a difficult period ahead. If conflict spreads, first recourse must be to diplomatic action. Must keep in closest touch about contingency planning.

5

Mediation

3. We are encouraging UN Secretary-General to maintain his mediation efforts. But our present assumption is that Iran is determined to pursue a military solution.

UN

4. In the wake of the UN team of experts' report on the use of chemical weapons, what is US assessment of the chances of re-engaging Iran in the UN search for a peaceful solution?

Chemical Weapons

5. Grave concern that report of specialists appointed by the UN Secretary-General concludes that chemical weapons have been used. The UK whole-heartedly endorses the Security Council's statement on 30 March condemning the use of chemical weapons. Glad to note that the report does nothing to substantiate the wholly unfounded claim that the UK has supplied chemical weapons to Iraq.

VISIT TO THE UK OF MRS JEANE KIRKPATRICK, US AMBASSADOR TO THE UN:
8-9 APRIL

IRAN/IRAQ

BACKGROUND

The War

1. Fighting has intensified in recent weeks, though it is comparatively quiet at present. Iranian preparations are underway for a further large-scale attack in the South. Iraqi army's performance in defence so far has been good. They should be able to contain the expected offensive.

The Gulf

2. No evidence that the air attack south of Kharg Island claimed by Iraq on 24 March was effective. On 27 March, the Iraqis damaged a Greek tanker and sank a South Korean supply boat working for Saudi Arabia. These attacks were outside the Iraqi MEZ. On 28 March, Iraq attacked an Iranian convoy near Bandar Khomeini, hitting a Greek and an Iranian vessel.

Mediation

3. The UK continues to encourage any realistic mediation efforts. Welcomed the Algerian Government's appeal to both sides on 28 February; encouraged by King Hassan of Morocco's later appeal. In contact with the Swedes and would be happy to see any further activity by Mr Palme, the UN Secretary-General's special representative. Main problem remains Iranian intransigence. Four Security Council Resolutions have achieved nothing, but we are encouraging the UN Secretary-General to pursue any possible opening.

Consultations with US

4. Consultations with the Americans on contingency planning in the event of an escalation in the Gulf have been close and frequent, but have revealed possible differences between US and UK in the event of escalation. We believe it important first to explore all

/diplomatic

diplomatic avenues, particularly through the UN, in the event of escalation. There may be strong domestic pressures on US administration to act more robustly. A further round of talks with the Americans is due on 9 April.

Soviet Union

5. US is not keen to discuss the Gulf with the Russians. Soviet statements condemning Western activity in the area have recently considerably sharpened in tone. Kornienko told UK officials on 29 March that the USSR supported the principle of freedom of navigation, but military intervention in support of such freedom would cause dangerous complications.

Arms Sales to Iran

6. The Americans have asked UK and others not to supply military items to Iran. We do not intend to abandon our policy of refusing to supply lethal items to either Iran or Iraq, but we have to fulfil certain obligations to Iran under contracts concluded before the revolution. (The Americans know that we shall in due course release the support ship, Kharg, and two other Yarrow support ships, all unarmed.) Other defence related items supplied are subject to rigorous scrutiny to ensure that they are not lethal.

Chemical Weapons

7. The experts sent by UN Secretary-General to Iran to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons concluded that mustard gas and nerve agents had been used there, but did not apportion blame. On 30 March the Security Council strongly condemned the use of chemical weapons in the conflict and called on both sides to adhere to 1925 Geneva Protocol. Prior to this, on 6 March, the US directly accused Iraq of using CW in the Gulf War. Our own statements have blamed Iraq only by inference.

VISIT OF US AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS: 8-9 APRIL

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

POINTS TO MAKE

Visit by Mr Kornienko (28/29 March)

1. Useful visit. Russians clearly taking our interest in improving relations seriously.
2. Kornienko senior figure, close adviser of Gromyko. Intelligent and thorough grasp; expert on arms control. 6
3. Tone reasonably friendly, but no sign of flexibility on substance of certain East/West issues: nuclear arms control and relations with US.
4. On former insistent on return to status quo ante before any nuclear negotiations; on latter critical of US, claim to be sceptical of Reagan wish for dialogue. Less rigid approach to regional issues.
5. We gave strong support to Reagan line in 16 January speech. Did not shy off difficult points: spoke plainly on Afghanistan and human rights.
6. Generally no surprises, but indications of some common ground (eg on chemical weapons) on which may be possible to build when Sir G Howe goes to Moscow in July.

General East/West Relations

7. Soviet tone recently harsher. Onus put on US to make first move: Chernenko 2 March speech "Now it is up to Washington". (Echoed strongly by Kornienko.)
8. Unlikely to move on nuclear arms control this year. By staying still will hope to make Western public opinion nervous, and thereby put pressure on governments.
9. But in longer term, Soviet leadership needs and wants more substantial superpower relationship and negotiations on arms control, particularly strategic and in space. Would not exclude possibility of progress in 1985.
10. Western approach must be long term, consistent, and co-ordinated, unflappable. No compromise on principles; but willingness to reduce tension. Show that there is mutual interest in security at lower level of weapons. Broader dialogue needed so full weight of relationship not on arms control.
11. Impression of recent confidential US/Soviet contacts?

Poland

12. In spite of political detainees and recent tightening of grip on opposition, Poland still one of most liberal countries in Eastern Europe. NATO 1982 measures hurting Polish people rather than Government. Time to consider re-engaging Western influence through "critical" dialogue and fewer sanctions.



Technology Transfer (If raised)

13. Welcome close UK/US collaboration. Must continue to work nationally and in COCOM to maintain effectiveness of strategic embargo. Important to work on basis of consensus.

14. Agree that COCOM's assessment capacity should be improved so that we can agree on what we most need to protect.

BACKGROUND

Visit by Kornienko

1. Kornienko's intention was clearly to indicate readiness for more substantial relationship with the UK, while drawing a clear comparison with the US/Soviet relationship. Took consistently hard line on INF/START and gave disparaging assessment of US intentions.
2. Visit nevertheless served useful purpose in terms of providing an opportunity to put over our concerns (for instance over freedom of navigation in the Gulf) at senior level. Kornienko was prepared to talk in some detail and join in debate rather than stick to dogged exchange of prepared positions. Gave an interesting feel for some of nuances of Soviet policy.

Other Recent East/West Contacts

3. At series of recent meetings in Moscow (Vogel of the German SPD on 11-14 March, US Dartmouth arms control sub-committee, Swedish and Japanese political consultations), Russians have taken significantly harder position on nuclear arms control and relations with US. Campaign to call into question Reagan's sincerity in seeking better and more substantial relationship.
4. (Not for use): Gromyko condemned US policy in harsh terms at meeting with US Ambassador in Moscow on 11 March. But exchange of confidential messages between Reagan and Chernenko continues. Appears to be some room for progress over peripheral issues (eg hot line, consulates, and demarcation of the Bering Straits). Contrast between hard Soviet line in public, and evident underlying desire to rebuild contacts.

Poland

5. Situation in Poland generally stable. Internal situation still difficult but not as repressive as in Romania, Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European countries.

6. US policy towards Poland remains hard-line and generally out of step with Ten who have agreed on desirability of re-engaging Western influence and gradual resumption of official and technical contacts. Americans see Polish problem as essentially political one. Despite some recent US give over official debt rescheduling negotiations with Poles, Americans are wedded to step by step policy whereby any US relaxation must be linked to prior Polish improvements in human rights, political liberalisation and progress in economic reform. Such policy seems increasingly impracticable in present circumstances in Poland. It would involve Polish loss of face and unlikely to be effective.

7. UK objective to engage in a tough, critical dialogue with Polish leadership and restore contact with Polish people.

COCOM

8. Not in complete agreement with US on widening scope of COCOM controls. But progress made in recent discussions. Mrs Kirkpatrick unlikely to raise.

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VISIT OF US AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS: 8/9 APRIL

NATO: EUROPE/US RELATIONS

Points to Make

1. Cohesion of Alliance reaffirmed at end of last year with successful initial deployments of INF. Important that we continue to consult closely. Must expect the Russians to continue divisive tactics, particularly if INF/START negotiations remain stalled.
2. Although some opposition to specific policies, especially nuclear, overwhelming support for Alliance in the main European countries.
3. Should pursue, for both the defence and public opinion reasons, improvements in conventional defence which will raise nuclear threshold. But must guard against impression that new technologies offer easy solutions or can replace role of nuclear weapons.
4. Important to demonstrate that transatlantic relations are in good repair and counter speculation about rifts in the Alliance (eg Kissinger in Time Magazine). Recent statements by British Ministers have underlined fundamental importance of US role in the Alliance. Welcome firm position of the US Administration on this. Notion of continental drift exaggerated. Danger of self-fulfilling prophesy.
5. The European contribution to NATO should not be underestimated. British effort particularly significant.
6. Endorse idea of strengthening European defence cooperation. Objective would be strengthening contribution to the common defence in the Alliance. No question of European substitute for NATO or US nuclear guarantee.



7. Looking at French ideas on WEU in this spirit. Open-minded about most appropriate forum but an official working group in WEU framework has been set up to explore ways in which WEU could be vitalised. Most important not to undermine transatlantic relationship. Intend to keep in touch with US at every step. Must not devalue work of the Eurogroup and IEPG.

VISIT OF US AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS: 8/9 APRIL

NATO: EUROPE/US RELATIONS

Essential Facts

1. Successful initial deployments of INF have been a major achievement. The East/West Appraisal commissioned at the December Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, and due to be submitted to Ministers in Washington at the end of May, should act as a framework for a common allied approach in the months ahead. Consultation within the Alliance is good and the Administration has carefully avoided any speculation about the state of transatlantic relations.

European Contribution to NATO

2. There is a strong feeling in the US, especially sections of Congress, that Europe is not bearing its full share of the NATO defence burden. However, in successive reports to Congress, the US Administration has been helpful in correcting this view by pointing out that the European Allies contribute their fair share of the overall NATO/Japan defence effort. Apart from providing a high proportion of the Alliance's ready forces in Europe (90% of ground forces, 80% of combat aircraft, 80% of tanks, 90% of armoured divisions, 70% of fighting ships) the European Allies also provide a number of support facilities, such as airfields and harbours, whose value is not normally reflected in tables of defence expenditure.

3. The UK spends more on defence in absolute terms and per capita than any ally except the United States (eg 1982 USA: \$198,500 million; UK: \$24,200 million followed by the FRG \$22,500 million. Per capita 1983 USA \$862; UK \$480; European average \$308).

4. American attitudes to ideas for revitalising the WEU are not entirely clear. There have been no signs of particular anxiety on the part of Mr Shultz or Mr Weinberger. It is clear /that

that, if ideas for revitalising the WEU are to be pursued, care will have to be taken to keep the Americans fully in the picture. Meanwhile at a meeting of WEU Permanent Representatives and Political Directors on 30 March, it was decided to set up a Working Group to explore ways in which WEU could be vitalised and to report in early May. We still have an open mind on revitalising it. We need to keep the Americans fully informed.

5. The Eurogroup was created in 1968 to help strengthen the Alliance by ensuring that the European contribution to the common defence is as strong, cohesive and effective as possible. The focus of its work is provided by the twice yearly meetings of Eurogroup Defence Ministers. The French have chosen not to participate. But they do take part in the work of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), which the Eurogroup itself regards as the principal means of extending equipment cooperation among the European members of NATO.

Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

4 April 1984

MRS JEANE KIRKPATRICK

Most of the American public sees Mrs Kirkpatrick as tough, strident and abrasive. Her television interviews give colour to this image but it is misleading. She is indeed firm-minded and sometimes vehement but she has a warm personality, a good sense of humour and is prepared to listen to argument.

As befits an academic, Mrs Kirkpatrick likes argument. She is at home with ideas and enjoys analysis. She knows a lot about Latin America but would herself probably say that her specialities are modern France and American Presidential politics.

She is not a political person in the sense that she has probably never thought seriously about running for elective office. Although by background a Democrat, if President Reagan were to offer her, as is not inconceivable, the Secretaryship of State she would probably accept.

Mrs Kirkpatrick has four Ambassadors supporting her at the UN (though at the moment there are two vacancies). She does not follow all subjects personally but she is very much captain of the team. She usually spends two or three days a week in Washington and regularly attends meetings of the Cabinet and NSC. She travels and lectures a lot. She is not a natural administrator and these absences add to the disjointed way in which the US Mission functions. Sometimes nobody in the Mission apart from Mrs Kirkpatrick knows what the US position is. She deals directly with Shultz, Eagleburger and McFarlane, and on most matters they allow her a free hand. As part of the policy-making process in Washington particularly on Latin America, she can often write her own instructions.

Mrs Kirkpatrick started off with a good deal of contempt and hostility towards the UN. She retains some of this but

-2-

has come to see that the US cannot ignore the UN especially in its guise as the political forum for the Third World. She also appears to have come to realise that a great deal can be done through persistent persuasion, explanation and the cultivation of political friendships. She may be planning to write a couple of books on her UN experience.

Mrs Kirkpatrick's husband is fifteen years older than she is. They have very similar interests and it is a successful partnership. She has three sons and regrets not having a daughter. They have a house in the South of France and Mrs Kirkpatrick who had two years at the Sorbonne, has a particularly soft spot for the French.

VISIT OF US AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS: 8-9 APRIL

FALKLANDS/ARGENTINA

Points to Make

ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS

1. It is Britain rather than Argentina who have consistently taken the initiative in seeking the normalisation of relations. On 26 January we followed up the Prime Minister's message to President Alfonsin with some specific ideas to establish terms of reference for official talks on normalisation of bilateral relations. We received the Argentine reply on 17 February. We have studied it, and will respond shortly.
2. Will keep our Allies informed of developments. But we do not intend to make our exchanges with the Argentines public. Priority must be to build confidence by a step-by-step approach to the re-establishment of normal bilateral relations. Progress on commercial and economic fronts is the most realistic first step. No possibility of discussing sovereignty.
3. Very much regret US support for UN Resolutions which are known to be unacceptable to us.

[DEFENSIVE]

UN ROLE/PEACEKEEPING FORCE

4. The administration and protection of the Falkland Islands are a clear British responsibility. We are keeping the UN Secretary-General generally informed about developments. But we regard the Protecting Powers as the correct channels for any communication between ourselves and the Argentines.

ARGENTINE OFFER OF "GUARANTEES" TO THE ISLANDERS

5. It is not realistic to expect the Islanders, so shortly after the conflict of 1982, to have any confidence in Argentine "guarantees", especially when these appeal to their "interests" rather than their "wishes". This is not a new idea; the Argentines were talking about guarantees in February 1982, shortly before they invaded.

FORMAL ARGENTINE DECLARATION OF CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

6. We have noted several statements by the Argentine Government that they will use peaceful means of pursuing their claim. These are welcome but it would be helpful if President Alfonsin could now formally declare a definitive cessation of hostilities and renounce the future use of force. This would give a useful impetus to the process of normalisation. President Alfonsin after all himself criticised the invasion.

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LIFTING OF FALKLAND ISLANDS PROTECTION ZONE

7. An Argentine declaration of a definitive cessation of hostilities would not necessarily commit Britain to any particular step in return. We do not envisage keeping the Protection Zone indefinitely, but we cannot be rushed into lifting it prematurely. We need to be fully satisfied that Argentina renounces the future use of force.

MILITARY DISPOSITIONS

8. We regret that President Alfonsin should have condemned as a serious threat to the security of the whole region our military dispositions on the Islands. We have made these to ensure that the tragic events of 1982 do not recur. Absurd to suggest they have any wider purpose.

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BACKGROUND

1. Mrs Kirkpatrick, who is a main pillar of the Latin American lobby in the US Administration, was strongly opposed to US support for Britain during the Falklands crisis which she feared would prejudice US relations with Latin America. She announced publicly that she did not see a need for the US to choose between Britain and Argentina and at one stage denied that the Argentine invasion constituted aggression. US support at New York vacillated between passivity and active unhelpfulness. Since the conflict the US has twice voted for UN resolutions unacceptable to us (Nos 37/9 and 38/12). But it is important to continue to emphasize that it is we, rather than the Argentines, who are making the running in seeking to restore bilateral relations. This is especially so since Argentine Foreign Minister Caputo is due to visit Washington and New York in the week beginning 9 April.

A 2. An extract from Alexander Haig's forthcoming memoirs (due to be published on 30 April) which appeared in the Sunday Telegraph on 25 March, included the comment that Mrs Kirkpatrick "vehemently opposed an approach that condemned Argentina and supported Britain on the basis of international law" and that even after US policy had been approved, she continued, "in the eyes of the British, at least, . . . to attack and undermine it, notably through a series of misleading signals to the Argentines". Haig went on to comment about her "public statements and her private conversations with the Argentines". The Sunday Times on 8 April is to publish an interview with her which is likely to contain an account of the story as she saw it, in response to what she describes as considerable misrepresentations about her views on the Falklands crisis.

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B 3. Our proposed terms of reference for official talks on the normalisation of bilateral relations were conveyed to the Argentine authorities by the Swiss Protecting Power on 26 January. As agreed in OD we told our Allies and Partners in confidence of our approach. Mr Morley, Director for the Southern Cone in the State Department, welcomed our initiative, and expressed appreciation of our belief that any progress made in the normalisation of bilateral relations with Argentina has to be on a gradual, step-by-step basis. The Prime Minister has since seen Vice-President Bush on 11-12 February.

C 4. We received Argentina's formal reply on 17 February. We are continuing to confirm that we have received this, but are refusing to respond to press speculation about the content of the exchanges.

5. The Argentine Government have made a number of unhelpful statements about the nature of our military dispositions on the Falkland Islands and the maintenance of the FIPZ. President Alfonsin described them on 1 February as a "danger not just to Argentina, but also the whole of South America". There have also been allegations about the setting up of a NATO base and the creation of a nuclear fortress on the Islands. At a press conference on 12 January, however, President Alfonsin described as "very important" press reports that the Secretary of State for Defence had said that Britain's military commitment to the Falkland Islands was inconvenient and posed a problem for our NATO obligations. The President said: "this certainly changes considerably previous statements from which one had been led to suppose that the Malvinas Islands could be important for NATO and for the Atlantic Alliance."

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said, but the British had refused for 150 years to relinquish sovereignty and time had run out. "Do you intend to use force?" Reagan asked. Galtieri replied that Argentina felt free to use whatever resources it possessed unless Her Majesty's Government, that very night, recognised Argentine sovereignty over all the islands and turned over control within the next few months. Reagan warned that the British would certainly fight in case of an Argentine landing on the Falklands. "I must have your assurance that there will be no landing tomorrow," Reagan said. Galtieri responded with a portentous silence.

Even as Galtieri spoke to Reagan, the invasion was being launched. During the night of April 1-2, an assault force of about 300 Argentine marines went ashore near Port Stanley and in a short time secured the airfield and the port.

Britain broke diplomatic relations with Argentina, froze Argentine assets in London, and asked its partners in the European Economic Community and the United States to impose financial sanctions and a trade embargo. The very accomplished Lord Carrington, who was subjected to the charge that he had not read the signs of trouble aright or brought them soon enough to the notice of the Prime Minister (and who may have taken a slacker line after the invasion than Mrs Thatcher), resigned as Foreign Secretary and was replaced by Francis Pym.

In a reawakening of the spirit of the Blitz that exhilarated Britain, warships were withdrawn from Nato, civilian ships were requisitioned and refitted, troops were embarked, and in an astonishingly short time a task force of over 100 ships and 26,000 men were steaming under the British flag toward the Falklands. On April 5 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 502, calling for cessation of hostilities, Argentine withdrawal from the Falklands, and a negotiated settlement of the dispute. On April 4 Argentina invaded and took South Georgia.

AT THE State Department, in the early hours of the crisis, most of the staff shared the amusement of the Press and public over what was perceived as a Gilbert and Sullivan battle over a sheep pasture between a choleric old John Bull and a comic dictator in a gaudy uniform. Among the White House staff, there was little sense of urgency. Though I was virtually alone in this, I viewed the situation from the very beginning with the utmost seriousness.

Margaret Thatcher never saw the problem as a narrow issue exclusively between Britain and Argentina. Almost messianically, she viewed it as a test of Western fibre and determination. In this she was correct. The Argentine Junta, in the first of many miscalculations, invaded the Falklands because it

believed the European democracies were so decadent that Britain would never fight and the United States would decide that its vital interests and its political and economic future lay not in an exhausted Europe but in a nascent Latin America. (The Ambassador Silaudeman, in fact, Galtieri had suggested that Washington should acquiesce in the invasion as a quid pro quo for Argentine support for the United States in the Southern Hemisphere.)

Had Britain collapsed in the face of this petty aggression, it would, in Mrs Thatcher's words to me, have sent a signal round the world with devastating consequences. Had the United States, for reasons of selfish advantage, retreated from the principle that the status quo must not be changed by the use of force, and, however subtly, connived at rewarding aggression, it would have

confirmed the corruption of the West.

Knowing the technological capabilities and the state of training of the two sides, there was never the slightest doubt in my mind that if it came to a fight — as I feared it must — Britain would win. This was not an opinion that was universally held among the White House staff, the American military, or our Intelligence analysts.

In the National Security Council I argued that the United States must do whatever it could to avoid further bloodshed and bring the crisis to a negotiated solution, but if this was not possible, it must support Britain and the rule of law. In this view I enjoyed the enthusiastic, if uncharacteristic, support of Caspar Weinberger, the Defence Secretary. Mrs Kirkpatrick, a specialist in Latin American questions, vehemently opposed an approach that condemned Argentina and supported Britain on the basis of international law. Such a policy, she told the President, would buy the United States a hundred years of animosity in Latin America.

Even after the policy was approved, Mrs Kirkpatrick, in the eyes of the British, at least, continued to attack and undermine it, notably through a series of misleading signals to the Argentines, a course of action that risked influencing the Argen-

of the crisis, the British were telling us they believed that Mrs Kirkpatrick had told the Argentine Ambassador to the UN that if his country continued to support the United States on Nicaragua, there would be no American criticism of the UN on the landing in the Falklands. I assured an agitated Ambassador Henderson that, no matter what his evidence, this statement bore no resemblance to official US policy. Mrs Kirkpatrick continued to assure me that she was not engaged in such activity.

Nevertheless, the British went on complaining till the end about Mrs Kirkpatrick's public statements and her private conversations with the Argentine.

In the Falklands crisis, while I was shuttling back and forth from Washington to London to Buenos Aires carrying the details of the negotiations in my own mind while reporting the broad outlines to the President for his eyes only, Mrs Kirkpatrick was describing the progress and the meaning of the talks, about which she knew little, in a variety of public forums — and, if the British are to be believed, in a very active pattern of private contacts.

Because she held Cabinet rank and was known to have access to the White House through channels that excluded the Secretary of State, her words were given considerable weight. How were the Argentines to know that hers was not the authentic text on Presidential policy? Mrs Kirkpatrick was in no way to be blamed for this unfortunate state of affairs. She was merely acting according to the rules of the system which had at its heart an evidently irresistible desire to save the President's popularity even if this meant undermining the President's policies. Mrs Kirkpatrick herself acted out of a deep loyalty to her own principles and very intelligent opinions. The populist instincts of the White House staff, quick to adjust appearances to shifts in public mood and opinion, were the real cause of the problem.

In conversations with the British and Argentines it became clear that both sides hoped that I would serve as intermediary. It was clear to me that if I undertook this mission and did not find a way to stop the hostilities, I might have to resign. By now it was clear enough that there were men and women around the President who would urge my departure. "If the situation cannot be saved, and this is very possible," I told my wife, "then whatever I do will be seen as a failure, even if it is a success in larger terms than the conflict itself. I'm going to take this on because I have to, but it may turn out to be my Waterloo."

By April 6 the State Department had produced the bones of a solution. This involved diverting the British fleet, withdrawing Argentine military forces from the Falklands, and interposing on the islands a peacekeeping force consisting of personnel from

6 We wouldn't mind
sinking the Argentine
fleet — something
that can be done
relatively easily 9

times into thinking that American policy differed from the one I was describing to them, and thereby affecting the outcome of negotiations.

Before the end of the first week

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TO FLASH BERNE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 22 OF 26 JANUARY

MIPT: RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SPEAKING NOTE.

BEGINS: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE ASKED THE SWISS PROTECTING POWER TO APPROACH THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA, TO CONSIDER MEANS OF FOLLOWING UP THE EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES ON 10 DECEMBER BETWEEN MRS THATCHER AND PRESIDENT ALFONSIN. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPEAT THEIR WELCOME FOR THE RETURN OF DEMOCRACY TO ARGENTINA. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF TALKS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA AT OFFICIAL LEVEL ABOUT THE PROGRESSIVE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD NOW BE CONSIDERED. IT WILL BE NECESSARY HOWEVER FOR BOTH SIDES TO RECOGNISE THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION AND THE CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH THE OTHER IS OPERATING.

2. WITH THIS IN MIND, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PROPOSE THAT ANY DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA RESPECTIVELY ON THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, AND INDEED, THAT SOVEREIGNTY WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED.

3. IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION COULD INCLUDE:

- A. THE RECIPROCAL LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA.
- B. THE LIFTING OF ALL OUTSTANDING FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS.
- C. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RETURN OF THE ARGENTINE DEAD FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS OR, FAILING THAT, FOR A NEXT-OF-KIN VISIT.

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- D. THE RESTORATION OF THE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.
- E. THE RESUMPTION OF CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC AND FULL SPORTING CONTACTS.
- F. THE UP-GRADING OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS.
4. THERE HAVE BEEN SUGGESTIONS FOR SECRET TALKS. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT WELCOME SUCH A PROCEDURE, SEEING NO NEED TO CLOAK IN SECRECY MEETINGS ABOUT THE NORMALISATION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. MOREOVER, THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS DANGERS OF MISUNDERSTANDING IF THERE WERE TO BE CLANDESTINE DISCUSSIONS, AND WORD OF THESE WERE TO LEAK.
5. REGARDING PRESENTATION, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE HAS SAID PUBLICLY THAT BOTH SIDES ARE DEVELOPING A WILL TO BEGIN TAKING STEPS TOWARDS RESTORING A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP. IF BRITISH SPOKESMEN ARE ASKED ABOUT THE PRESENT SWISS APPROACH TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA, THEY PROPOSE TO CONFIRM IN GENERAL TERMS THAT MEANS OF CARRYING THIS PROCESS FORWARD ARE BEING EXPLORED. BUT THE SWISS AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS HAVE NO INTENTION OF STIMULATING PUBLICITY AT THIS EARLY STAGE. THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF TALKS BETWEEN BRITISH AND ARGENTINE OFFICIALS CAN BE DISCUSSED ONCE TERMS OF REFERENCE HAVE BEEN AGREED.
6. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT LOOK FORWARD TO KNOWING THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA ON THESE SUGGESTIONS. THEY CONSIDER IT MOST IMPORTANT TO FOLLOW UP THE EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES THROUGH EXCHANGES IN AREAS ON WHICH IT IS REALISTIC TO EXPECT EARLY PROGRESS. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HOPE THAT THIS CAN LEAD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RENEWED CLIMATE OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE IN WHICH OUR RELATIONS CAN BE MANAGED IN A PRACTICAL AND PRODUCTIVE WAY. ENDS.

HOWE

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL
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UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF ARGENTINE NOTE HANDED TO THE SWISS
AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES ON 17 FEBRUARY 1984

Mr Ambassador,

I have the honour to ask Your Excellency to bring the following reply to the attention of the British Government:

'The Argentine Government, inspired by its dedication to peace, favours contacts which might mean a first exchange of ideas leading to the opening of substantive negotiations at the appropriate time. It follows from a realistic appraisal of the totality of relations between Argentina and the United Kingdom that those substantive negotiations cannot overlook the vital subject of sovereignty if a complete solution to the dispute is to be achieved. Such negotiations about sovereignty over the Falkland Islands [Malvinas], South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands must be held within the framework of the relevant United Nations resolutions, with participation ['intervencion'] of the Secretary General as envisaged in those resolutions. A global negotiation such as that proposed by the Argentine Government would also give due consideration to the interests of the inhabitants of the Islands and likewise to the subject of economic and scientific-technological co-operation in the area. It must be made clear that the Argentine Government wishes to remove the obstacles which impede the normalisation of relations between the two countries, and understands that the aim of that normalisation is a return to the pre-conflict situation in all its dimensions. In this connexion the proposed plan does not add anything substantially new to those issues which were expressly endorsed in the joint Argentine-British communiqué of 26 April 1977.

'As will be known, that communiqué was brought to the attention of the international community through parallel notes presented by the Permanent Representatives of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom at the United Nations in June 1977.

"The Argentine Government has analysed with great interest the British Government's proposal of 26 January 1984 in which they suggest an agenda to include the following points:

- (A) The reciprocal lifting of restrictions on trade between the United Kingdom and Argentina.
- (B) The lifting of existing financial restrictions.
- (C) Arrangements for the transfer of the Argentine dead from the Islands, or, in the absence of this, for a visit by next-of-kin.
- (D) The reactivation of the air services agreement between the two countries.
- (E) The resumption of cultural, scientific and sporting contacts.
- (F) The raising of the level of official relations.

"The Argentine Government considers that this British initiative constitutes a positive step insofar as it suggests the possibility of an exchange of ideas at official level which could lead towards the progressive normalisation of relations between the two countries.

"Recognising the desirability of examining these questions in depth, the Argentine Government is persuaded that other unavoidably important questions which exist between the two countries, and which require immediate attention, must also be included.

"It therefore believes that it is essential to add the following subjects:

- (A) The lifting of the Protection Zone [sic] which the United Kingdom purports to have established in the South Atlantic.
- (B) A halt to the fortification of the Islands, to the construction of the strategic airfield and to the warlike concentration in the area.
- (C) Guarantees that nuclear weapons or artifacts will be withdrawn from the region.

"An agenda comprising the subjects proposed by Argentina and the United Kingdom could then permit contacts to begin.

/'Similarly,

"Similarly, the Argentine Government wishes to convey to the United Kingdom the spirit in which it is approaching the problem of bilateral relations. In this connection, the Argentine Government:

- (1) Attaches very great importance to the definitive normalisation of relations between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom.
- (2) Considers that to achieve this, it is essential - and this is its wish - to put an end, through peaceful means, to the dispute over the Falkland Islands [Malvinas], South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.
- (3) Also agrees about the undesirability of secret meetings, negotiations or talks, it being a fundamental point of its foreign policy to keep public opinion informed in accordance with the democratic style which has been restored in the Argentine Republic.
- (4) Considers that at the present time it would be highly desirable to explore the matter sincerely and in good faith, taking into account all the elements involved and thus enabling each side to assess the future prospects for a formal negotiation:
- (5) Considers, as has been previously indicated, that the presence of United Nations peace-keeping forces in the Islands, in place of other military forces, would serve to re-establish a better atmosphere in the area and safeguard the security of the inhabitants.
- (6) Considers that in order to fulfil a determined wish to put a final end to the division existing between the two countries the most advisable course would be to hold a preliminary and open exchange of ideas, at an appropriate time informing the Secretary General of the United Nations of the content thereof. These informal exchanges would pave the way towards subsequent negotiations which would be held in the presence of the Secretary General of the United Nations by virtue of the mandate of good offices received from the General Assembly."

With my warm respects to Your Excellency,

(signed Caputo).