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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 June 1984

*CDP 15/6*

*Jon Austin*

Visit of President Kyprianou

I enclose briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting with President Kyprianou at 1500 on 18 June.

We have agreed with the Cyprus High Commission that the following will accompany the President:

- Mr George Iakovou, Foreign Minister
- Mr Tasos Panayides, Cyprus High Commissioner
- Mr Haris Vovides, Private Secretary.

As agreed, Sir J Bullard will attend from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The briefing refers to the renewal of the UNFICYP mandate and new proposals which we expect the Turkish Cypriots to make in New York later today. New York will report them by telegram over the weekend. I will write again on Monday morning with an analysis of the new proposals and, if necessary, a suggested line to take for the Prime Minister.

*[Handwritten signature]*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU OF  
CYPRUS: 18 JUNE

STEERING BRIEF

Introduction

1. The meeting is at Kyprianou's request. Without being specific he has said that he wants to discuss the Cyprus problem following the passage by the UN Security Council of resolution 550. He will be in London from 16-21 June. He will also attend a meeting of the Commonwealth Action Group on Cyprus (India, Australia, Guyana, Nigeria, Zambia) on 20 June. Australia was opposed to the group's meeting with one of the parties to the dispute present. But they have given way to the other members of the group. Kyprianou will no doubt be seeing representatives of the Greek Cypriot community in London but we know of no other official engagements.

2. Kyprianou saw the Prime Minister in London in November 1983, immediately after the purported Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence. They met again in New Delhi at CHOGM and in London in January.

British Objectives

3. (a) To help protect our interests in Cyprus (principally the Sovereign Base Areas) by listening sympathetically to Kyprianou;
- (b) to prevent a deterioration of the situation in Cyprus which would be detrimental to the interests of Britain, the West and Cyprus;
- (c) to re-emphasise our support for the UN Secretary-General and remind Kyprianou of the efforts we have made to help Sr Perez de Cuellar in his mission of good offices reaffirmed by SCR 550.

(d)/





- (d) to resist attempts to cast us as mediator;
- (e) to satisfy Kyprianou that we are doing all we can to help implement relevant Security Council Resolutions particularly SCR 541 (which we drafted);
- (f) to remind Kyprianou of our major contribution to UNFICYP;
- (g) to encourage Kyprianou to show the courage, flexibility and imagination necessary to make progress.

#### Cypriot Objectives

4. (a) To press the UK to act with other permanent members of the Security Council for action to help implement SCR 550 - ie. to put pressure on Turkey;
- (b) to urge the UK to deny EC preferential access for goods from northern Cyprus;
- (c) possibly to ask the UK to hold double bilateral talks with Greece and Turkey under the Treaty of Guarantee;
- (d) to present Kyprianou's own ideas for a solution to the Cyprus problem;
- (e) to demonstrate to public opinion in Cyprus that Kyprianou is being active in his efforts to solve the Cyprus problem (without making the concessions necessary to get one).

#### Background

5. President Kyprianou is an effective operator locally, and despite his lack of charisma and success on the "national issue" there remains no serious contender to him for the presidency. He was re-elected in February 1983 with an absolute majority of the popular vote over his two opponents. But since then he has seen the  
Cyprus/





Cyprus problem develop in a way which has been entirely unhelpful to the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence represented the culmination, for the Greek Cypriots, of a disastrous policy of internationalisation which has yielded big majorities in the UN General Assembly and elsewhere for one-sided motions in favour of the Greek Cypriots but no tangible advantage to them.

6. Meanwhile Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot Leader, has outmanoeuvred Kyprianou at every stage by a series of provocative steps which we and our allies have challenged or sought to contain. Since Kyprianou last saw the Prime Minister in January he has effectively rejected the Secretary General's five-point plan, exchanged 'Ambassadors' with Turkey, pressed ahead with the development of his 'state' and made some tentative moves into Varosha (the formerly Greek Cypriot suburb of Famagusta which has been under Turkish Cypriot control but deserted since 1974) although the latest information is that these moves may have been at least temporarily suspended.

7. Against this background there are signs that Kyprianou is becoming increasingly worried and casting around for virtually any ideas which might help his community. Some of his proposals are likely to be borne of this frustration and for lack of any coherent ideas as to how matters may be advanced. There is no real sign yet that his political future is under threat, but he must be aware that continued lack of results could harm his long-term prospects.

#### UK Tactics

8. We should give Kyprianou as much encouragement as we can without promising anything which

- (a) we cannot deliver;
- (b) would lead us into difficulties, eg. by enabling the parties to shift to us the blame for lack of progress;
- (c) would damage other UK or Western interests;
- (d)/





- (d) Kyprianou could represent as a "concession" wrested from us.

9. In sum we can make clear to him that in our view the best course is to continue to pursue active diplomatic efforts in support of the UN Secretary General. We can take a conciliatory line on EC/Cyprus without making any concessions at this stage. We cannot agree to act as mediator or to unspecified 'action' by the permanent members of the Security Council. If Kyprianou presents a specific new idea for UK action we can listen politely and agree to consider it.

Likely Cypriot tactics and course of meeting

10. The Prime Minister may wish to begin by reiterating our concern at recent events in Cyprus and pointing out what we have done over recent months to help the Secretary General. She could then invite Kyprianou to say how he sees the future (thus trying to discourage him from his usual discursive account of the history of the problem.)

11. Kyprianou will probably then make specific requests for UK assistance. He is likely to press for UK action to follow up SCR 550. The Cyprus Foreign Minister approached the Chargé d'Affaires in Nicosia in this sense as part of a series of approaches to permanent members of the Security Council. We also believe he was planning to suggest that the UK should hold parallel bilateral consultations under the Treaty: although our latest information is that the Greeks may have successfully opposed this for their own reasons. He is almost certain to press us on EC preferences for northern Cyprus.

12. Because of our interests in Cyprus (including the SBAS) we want to appear sympathetic within the limits of para 8 above. If we can satisfy Kyprianou with our response, this should enable us to get across some advice on his future handling of the Cyprus problem. We should urge him to show restraint and to avoid being provoked into actions - eg. a move of Greek troops into Cyprus or arms purchases - which/





- which would not be in the long term interests of anyone - least of all the Greek Cypriots. We should stress that the Secretary-General needs to be given the maximum opportunity successfully to launch a new approach which he has said he will do once the UNFICYP mandate is renewed.

13. Detailed Points to Make, Background and supporting documents - including a personality note - are attached.





## POINTS TO MAKE

1. We continue to be most concerned about the situation in Cyprus and to be anxious to do all we can to prevent it getting worse.
2. We have been very active recently in helping the UN Secretary General who we believe to be best placed to help make progress towards a settlement. We have put our views across to the Turkish Government and to Mr Denktash. For example, Sir G Howe has twice seen the Turkish Foreign Minister Mr Halefoglu in the last month. Cyprus dominated both conversations. You will have seen our recent statement on Varosha. We voted for SCR 550. Our Ambassador intervened strongly in Ankara immediately prior to Denktash's arrival there last week to seek Turkish understanding of the need to restrain him. We continue to be the major contributor to UNFICYP. In short, we are doing all we can to work for a peaceful, just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.
3. The last six months have been an extraordinarily difficult time for the people of Cyprus. You have borne a heavy burden as President. You have shown statesmanship and restraint in the face of overwhelming provocation. I hope that you will continue to do so despite the difficulties and frustrations that lie ahead since this policy will eventually offer the best chance of success.
4. The Secretary-General said in his report to the Security Council that he intends to make another effort now that the UNFICYP mandate has been renewed. He should be given the maximum opportunity to do this successfully.

Action by Permanent Members of Security Council

5. The UK have been very active in supporting the UN Secretary General. We are always ready to study further specific suggestions.
6. We agreed to the Secretary General's idea for a 5-power démarche by the Permanent Members during the recent Security Council debate/





debate in New York, but this foundered for lack of Soviet and Chinese support.

7. We are anxious to avoid cutting across the UN Secretary General's efforts.

8. {If specific action is proposed} We will consider this proposal carefully.

#### EC/Cyprus

9. As you will be aware, this question has been and continues to be under discussion in the Community. Our substantial interests in this question, including our trade with northern Cyprus, have naturally meant that we have given the problem very serious thought.

10. We think there may come a time when events make it appropriate to withdraw Community preference from Turkish Cypriot exports. But we believe that this time has not yet come, because Community preference is one of the very few pieces of real leverage that the Ten have over the "TRNC". Its withdrawal would tend further to deepen the divisions between the two halves of Cyprus, which we both want to avoid. Nor do we wish to make a move which in the present context could give Mr Denktash a pretext for a further unwelcome move.

#### Guarantor Power Consultations

11. We remain ready to hold the consultations with Greece and Turkey that are envisaged in the Treaty of Guarantee.

12. Turkey has agreed to such consultations but Greece has declined. The Cyprus Government should therefore first suggest to the Greek Government that they reconsider their position.

13. The sort of double bilateral consultations envisaged by President Kyprianou are not provided for in the Treaty. The Turks would be within their rights should they decline to enter into them.

They/





They would be unlikely to lead to progress and would simply risk cutting across and frustrating the efforts of the UN Secretary General who has the backing of the whole international community.

14. It would therefore be better for both the British and Cyprus governments to maintain their support for Sr Perez de Cuellar's efforts. As part of our support for those efforts we will of course maintain diplomatic contacts with both the Greek and Turkish governments.

15. {If pressed} The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is ready to consult the UN Secretary General to establish whether it would be helpful for him, in present circumstance, to issue a further invitation to tripartite consultations.

#### Denktash's Visit

16. Denktash's planned private visit was postponed. We made sure no ministers or officials attended Savoy dinner on 13 June.

{If necessary} For MPs to make up own minds. We advised them of government policy.

#### Defensive: Bilateral issues

##### "Money for the Bases"

17. Ready to continue discussions if you want. Worth looking again at our £7.5m loan offer made in 1978.

##### Students Fees

18. Glad we were able to provide flm for three years 1983-6. No decision yet on continuance of scheme. But those already studying will not suffer.





## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The situation in Cyprus is delicate and dangerous. Since the purported Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence in November 1983 the UN Secretary General's efforts to promote a political dialogue have been unsuccessful. Following proposals earlier this year from both Kyprianou and Denktash, Perez de Cuellar put forward a "five-point plan", of which the elements were:-

(i) The Greek Cypriots would abandon internationalisation of the Cyprus problem.

(ii) The Turkish Cypriots would freeze development of the "TRNC";

(iii) Inter-communal contact would be resumed;

(iv) Varosha, a deserted suburb of Famagusta, would be handed over to the United Nations for Greek Cypriot re-settlement;

(v) There would be a freeze of military enhancements by both sides.

Kyprianou broadly accepted these ideas, although on the understanding that 'Varosha' was taken to mean the whole of 'Greek Famagusta' (a much wider area). Denktash, however, rejected the proposals. Instead, he put forward some new ideas of his own, including that Varosha would be handed over for Greek Cypriot re-settlement only after a year in which the Greek Cypriots had forgone 'internationalisation'.

2. On 17 April Turkey and the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" exchanged "Ambassadors". This move, made when the UN Special Representative Dr Gobbi was visiting Cyprus, was a slap in the face for the Secretary General and greatly angered the Greek Cypriots. The following day they announced their intention to protest to the UN Security Council at Turkey's "flagrant violation"

of/





of Security Council resolutions. After a long debate the UN Security Council passed a resolution (SCR 550) on 11 May by 13-1(Pakistan)-1(US) condemning the exchange of "Ambassadors" and re-affirming SCR 541, which had condemned UDI and which we had drafted. The resolution also reaffirmed the UN Secretary-General's mission of good offices. We voted for the resolution despite some reservations explained in our Explanation of Vote.

3. During the debate the UN Secretary General tried to persuade the five permanent members of the Security Council to make a joint appeal to the parties. We responded positively to this idea, in line with our general policy of support for the Secretary General. France, and with less enthusiasm the US, also agreed. But the Soviet Union and China declined to become involved and the idea therefore lapsed. Kyprianou appears to be reverting to action by the permanent members but without any clear ideas as to what this should be or whether it should be joint or individual action.

4. Following the Security Council resolution, which was predictably rejected by both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, Denktash is continuing to consolidate the "TRNC". A draft constitution was published on 8 June. It is modelled on the 1975 "TFSC" constitution but omits any reference to federation with the Greek Cypriots. It also allows the "President" to serve for an unlimited number of terms, provides for a "Republican Security Council" on which a Turkish General would sit and for simultaneous legislative assembly and presidential elections. Denktash appears to be pressing ahead with plans for a referendum in August and elections in the Autumn.

5. There have also been moves by the Turkish Cypriots into Varosha. Both we and the Americans have issued statements regretting such moves. Latest reports from Nicosia indicate that the Turkish Cypriots have now taken steps to prevent access to the recently occupied part of Varosha. But we are continuing to watch the situation there closely. The Turkish Cypriots say that the part of Varosha into which moves have been made has never been offered back to the Greek Cypriots. But it remains an emotional and sensitive issue.





6. Denktash has also threatened to interfere with the operation of UNFICYP if the mandate, which expires on 15 June, is not renewed on his terms. He would like a reference to the government of the "TRNC" in the resolution. At present the UK Permanent Representative in New York, as President of the Security Council, is broking a text which is similar to the last mandate renewal, ie. with no reference to Denktash's government. This text has been agreed by all members of the Security Council and welcomed by Greece and Cyprus.

7. Denktash visited Ankara from 12-14 June for talks with the Turkish Government. There are some signs that they will restrain him from some of the moves described in paras 4-6, at least to the extent of keeping the Secretary-General's mission alive and allowing UNFICYP to continue its operations.

8. Denktash said in Ankara that his "Foreign Minister", who is attending the UNFICYP mandate renewal debate in New York, will put forward some "new views" designed to help the Secretary-General's mission. They are likely to be a development of earlier Turkish Cypriot proposals.

9. The UN Secretary-General has told us that, after the mandate renewal, he intends to take a fresh initiative on Cyprus. We have suggested that he might consider a limited package. But the indications are that he will make some comprehensive proposals, possibly including for the establishment of a provisional government. (Kyprianou is aware only that the Secretary-General intends to make a fresh move and we should not reveal to him what we know of the Secretary-General's plans).

#### Guarantor Power Consultations

10. Following the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence Sir G Howe proposed to his Turkish and Greek colleagues consultations together under the Treaty of Guarantee. The Turks accepted, but the Greeks declined and have maintained this position ever since. We now think it less likely that Kyprianou will raise the possibility of the UK holding double bi-lateral consultations with the Greeks  
and/





and Turks.

EC/Cyprus

11. Shortly after the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence the Greeks proposed that the EC should cease giving preferential access to goods from northern Cyprus. After protracted discussion the EC commission on 22 February circulated new customs stamps for Cyprus but did not instruct member states to refuse to accept Turkish Cypriot stamps.

12. The Greeks and French have interpreted this Commission action as an instruction not to give preferential access to goods from northern Cyprus unless accompanied by Greek Cypriot customs stamps (in practice this amounts to a denial of preferential access). Other member states, of whom only ourselves and the FRG have substantial trade with northern Cyprus, have taken the view that the Commission action does not alter the status quo. The Commission is unlikely to take further early action to clarify the situation.

13. We have never thought it wise (or in our commercial interest as northern Cyprus' major trading partner) for the EC to take precipitate action to cut off Turkish Cypriot preferences. But given our other interests in Cyprus (above all the SBAs) we have not wanted to be any more prominent than we have to in opposing Greek Cypriot wishes. In the initial round of discussion in the Community we were obliged to stick our necks out more than we liked, because other member states looked to us for a lead, and we came under pressure from the Greek Cypriots as a result. In subsequent discussion we have let others make the running, but the Greek Cypriots still see us (not unjustifiably) as the key to a change in the Community position. President Kyprianou is likely to raise the subject as he did on his last visit. But there is no good reason to take action against the Turkish Cypriots at the moment. Such a move would be unlikely to restrain Denktash from further provocative action. Indeed, the contrary could be the case. It would be better for the EC to retain its only effective leverage with him until it could be shown that some positive good would result, or some specific harmful development be averted, by our using it.





### Denktash's Visit

14. Denktash was to have visited the UK in the week beginning 11 June to attend a dinner on 13 June at the Savoy Hotel. It was organised by the "TRNC" chamber of commerce to promote trade between the UK and northern Cyprus. The Rt Hon Julian Amery MP was a guest speaker. The FCO advised government ministers and officials to decline invitations and advised MPs of HMG's policy. In the event Denktash went to Ankara (the dinner went ahead as planned). We heard that Denktash might visit the UK on 16 June but Nicosia have no information about this visit.

### Money for the Bases

15. Since 1965 Cypriots have pressed us for aid (£250m) they allege to be due under the 1960 Treaties setting up the Republic of Cyprus and Sovereign Base Areas. They have also maintained that HMG should pay for the facilities we enjoy there. Appendix R of the Treaties provide for aid to be paid until 1965 and consultations thereafter, with the final decision left to the UK.

16. We maintain that there is no legal obligation to pay after 1965. We help in other ways: our contribution to UNFICYP is the largest (£22m per year and 800 men). In 1978 we offered a £7.5m loan: the Cypriots have not taken this up, partly because we said we would see it as fulfilling any obligations to date.

### Students Fees

17. In 1983 the British Government decided to make £1m available for each of the three financial years 1983/86 to help students from Cyprus continue to come to the UK to study. It is not yet known whether there will be sufficient funds for this scheme to continue after 1986, but it will certainly be possible to allow students already in the scheme to benefit during a "winding down" period. A final decision on allocation of funds after 1986 is unlikely for some time.

Supporting/






Supporting Documents

- A Treaty of Guarantee
- B SCR 541 (November 1983: drafted by UK)
- C SCR 544 (Renewal of UNFICYP mandate in December 1983) C/
- D SCR 550 (May 1984: non-aligned draft)
- E UK Explanation of Vote on SCR 550
- F Record of PM's conversation in January
- G Kyprianou's "framework proposals".
- H Draft resolution renewing UNFICYP mandate.





KYPRIANOU, Spyros

President of the Republic of Cyprus since 1977.

Born 1932. Educated locally and then in London. Barrister (Grays Inn). Represented Makarios in London 1952-54. Attended the UN General Assembly in 1956 as Representative of the Ethnarchy Council. Returned to Cyprus in 1959 and, on Independence, was briefly Minister of Justice, then Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1972. In 1976 launched new pro-Makarios party of the centre-right DEKO. Following elections that year became President of the House of Representatives and thus Acting President on the death of Makarios in 1977. Subsequently elected President by acclaim and re-elected unopposed in February 1978.. Re-elected for a second term in February this year gaining a clear majority on the first ballot over his two opponents.

Has had health problems. Serious heart attack in March 1969 and subsequent troubles. But his health appears to have improved more recently. Speaks English well.



## TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

- I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,
- II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:

### ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

### ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

### ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus<sup>(1)</sup> signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.

### ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

### ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.





Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/541 (1983)  
18 November 1983

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RESOLUTION 541 (1983)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2500th meeting,  
on 18 November 1983

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

Concerned at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983 which purports to create an independent State in northern Cyprus,

Considering that this declaration is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee,

Considering, therefore, that the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus,

Reaffirming its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975),

Aware of the need for a solution of the Cyprus problem based on the mission of good offices undertaken by the Secretary-General,

Affirming its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus,

Taking note of the Secretary-General's statement of 17 November 1983,

1. Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus;

2. Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal;



3. Calls for the urgent and effective implementation of its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975);
  4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices, in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus;
  5. Calls upon the parties to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices;
  6. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;
  7. Calls upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus;
  8. Calls upon all States and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation;
  9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed.
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SED

UNITED  
NATIONS

Mr Perks.  
for appropriate action.

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Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/544 (1983)  
15 December 1983

RESOLUTION 544 (1983)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2503rd meeting  
on 15 December 1983

The Security Council,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus of 1 December 1983 (S/16192 and Add.1),

Noting also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

Noting further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1983,

Reaffirming the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending 15 June 1984;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 31 May 1984;
3. Calls upon all the parties concerned to continue to co-operate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.





Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/550 (1984)  
11 May 1984

RESOLUTION 550 (1984)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2539th meeting  
on 11 May 1984

The Security Council,

Having considered the situation in Cyprus at the request of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

Having heard the statement made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/16519),

Recalling its resolutions 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 541 (1983) and 544 (1983),

Deeply regretting the non-implementation of its resolutions, in particular resolution 541 (1983),

Gravely concerned by the further secessionist acts in the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus which are in violation of resolution 541 (1983), namely, the purported "exchange of ambassadors" between Turkey and the legally invalid "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" and the contemplated holding of a "constitutional referendum" and "elections", as well as by other actions or threats of actions aimed at further consolidating the purported independent State and the division of Cyprus,

Deeply concerned by recent threats for settlement of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants,

Reaffirming its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus,

1. Reaffirms its resolution 541 (1983) and calls for its urgent and effective implementation;

2. Condemns all secessionist actions, including the purported exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, declares them illegal and invalid and calls for their immediate withdrawal;



3. Reiterates the call upon all States not to recognize the purported State of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" set up by secessionist acts and calls upon them not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity;

4. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;

5. Considers attempts to settle any part of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible and calls for the transfer of this area to the administration of the United Nations;

6. Considers any attempts to interfere with the status or the deployment of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus as contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to promote the urgent implementation of Security Council resolution 541 (1983);

8. Reaffirms its mandate of good offices given to the Secretary-General and requests him to undertake new efforts to attain an overall solution to the Cyprus problem in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions for such a settlement laid down in the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolution 541 (1983) and the present resolution;

9. Calls upon all parties to co-operate with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices;

10. Decides to remain seized of the situation with a view to taking, in the event of non-implementation of its resolution 541 (1983) and the present resolution, urgent and appropriate measures;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to promote the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council as developments require.

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