

OUT TELEGRAM

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Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE 251330 Z

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL
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5 251330 Z
6 FM FCO 250945 Z SEPTEMBER 84
7 TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA
10 INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CBFC, MODUK (DS11)
11 INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL STRASBOURG
12 CYPRUS: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU
13 For the Secretary of State's Party
14 1 Discussion between the Prime Minister and President
15 Kyprianou on 24 September lasted some two hours. The main points
16 are in my second IFT.
17 2 During the discussion the Prime Minister was able to clarify
18 the Greek Cypriot position on a number of questions at this stage
19 in the proximity talks. Kyprianou professed to be uncertain as
20 to whether either Turkey or Denktash wanted any settlement at
21 all. The Prime Minister said that in all logic they should do so.
22 Turkey would not wish to sustain the economic and political
23 burden of supporting ~~it~~ definitely an isolated Turkish Cypriot
24 state. Moreover, Denktash's prestige and influence would surely
25 be greatly increased if he were Vice-President of a united and

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File number		Dept SED		Distribution CYPRUS LIMITED (ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION)	
Drafted by (Block capitals) DR RACHEL BARKER					
Telephone number 233 4189					
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CONFIDENTIAL

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 2 internationally recognised Cyprus.
 3 3 As regards the three constitutional issues on which the
 4 Turks have given their own account of the Greek Cypriot position
 5 (your telno 877), Kyprianou explained that:
 6 a he accepted that a list should be drawn up to specify the
 7 powers and functions of the federal government. Equally,
 8 however, the powers of the provincial administrations should
 9 be similarly defined. It was not enough to list only the
 10 federal powers, with all residual powers automatically lying
 11 with the provinces.
 12 b he could accept that there should be no retreat from the
 13 roles of the President and Vice-President as set out in the
 14 1980 Constitution. But Denktash was asking for considerably
 15 more. Kyprianou thought it unacceptable that the Presidency
 16 should alternate between Greek and Turkish Cypriots given
 17 the population balance in Cyprus. He argued that the
 18 election of the President by the population as a whole,
 19 could give the Turkish Cypriot community significant
 20 opportunities in a multi-party state, in the ~~main~~ choice
 21 of President.
 22 c he could accept a bi-cameral legislature while maintaining a
 23 preference for a unicameral system. He was also ready to
 24 discuss the proportionate representation of the communities
 25 in each chamber taking account of what the Secretary-General
 26 had proposed.
 27 4 On the confidence building measures, Kyprianou was sceptical
 28 as to whether a deal could be done on the basis of opening
 29 Nicosia airport in exchange for a territorial offer. It was in
 30 any case far from clear what territorial offer Denktash could be
 31 induced to make on this basis. Nicosia airport covered wider
 32 issues, eg the ending of the embargo, which were more appropriate
 33 to the overall settlement.
 34 5 The Prime Minister told Kyprianou that we would be seeking

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2 to clarify the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions in the same
 3 way as she had sought to clarify his. She emphasised the
 4 importance of avoiding a breakdown of the talks and expressed
 5 strong support for the efforts which the Secretary-General was
 6 making.

7 6 In the light of the above the Secretary of State may wish to
 8 ensure that he has an adequate opportunity to speak to Halefoglu.
 9 In doing so, he may wish to emphasise the following points:

10 a The Secretary-General has made clear to us that he is
 11 concerned about the lack of progress in the proximity talks
 12 so far. He has put in a tremendous personal effort. The
 13 maximum flexibility will be required at the next round.

14 b We assume that Turkey is in favour of a unitary federal
 15 state of Cyprus. But the Greek Cypriots profess to believe
 16 that Denktash is simply playing for time. It would be a
 17 great help if Denktash could find ways of making his support
 18 for the overall objective of a settlement on the basis of a
 19 unitary federal state explicitly clear, both publicly and
 20 privately.

21 c If the talks break down the Turks will have to contend with
 22 the continuing economic and political dependence of the
 23 Turkish Cypriots on Turkey. We shall ^{au} be faced with the
 24 prospect of rising tension in Cyprus. This situation can be
 25 in the interests of neither the West, nor of Turkey:

26 d The Greek Cypriot position over the Secretary General's
 27 working points does not appear to be as negative as the
 28 Turkish Permanent Representative has indicated to Sir J
 29 Thomson. For example, they have told us that they can
 30 accept powers for a Turkish Vice-President similar to those
 31 set out in the 1960 Constitution. They can also accept a
 32 bi-cameral legislature and are open to discussion about
 33 representation of the communities within the chambers. On
 34 the other hand, we are concerned about the lack of precision

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in Denktash's position. There needs to be more clarity and flexibility in particular on his territorial proposals if the Secretary-General is to have a chance in the next round.

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Precedence/Deskby
IMMEDIATE

ZCZC 1 ZCZC
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 CLASS 3 **CONFIDENTIAL**
 CAVEATS 4
 DESKBY 5
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO 250900Z SEP 84
 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 AND FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY
 10 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA
 11 INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CBFC, MODUK(DS11)
 12 ~~INFO SAYING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL STRASBOURG~~
 13 ~~REF: 2~~ **CYPRUS: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU**
 14 1. ~~President~~ Kyprianou said that he thought the interval
 15 between the two rounds of proximity talks could most profitably be
 16 used for private diplomacy. Indeed, this was a condition of
 17 progress. So far exchanges through the UN Secretary-General had
 18 been limited to generalities. The Turkish Cypriots had been
 19 dilatory and unready to move on substance. It had only been at
 20 his (Kyprianou's) insistence that the talks had run into a second
 21 week, and Denktash had wanted to delay the second round until the
 22 end of October. The Secretary-General had tried to play down
 23 Turkish Cypriot intransigence as tactical. He had held out the
 24 prospect of some movement in the next round and promised in the
 25 meantime to talk to the Turkish, United States and other
 governments. There was no doubt, however, that Perez de Cuellar

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File number	Dept SED	Distribution Cyprus Limited (Additional Distribution)
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Telephone number 233-6034		
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2 was disappointed with the lack of progress.

3 2. On constitutional issues, the Turkish Cypriot position was
 4 unchanged. They were demanding full equality. On the
 5 territorial matters, the Secretary-General had proposed that the
 6 Turkish Cypriots hand back the territories offered in 1981 as a
 7 first step but it seemed that they were not prepared to do even
 8 this. The Secretary-General had tried an alternative tack, that
 9 of agreeing the number of refugees to be resettled rather than the
 10 area of land. But Denktash would not accept this either. It was
 11 quite clear that his goal was two entirely separate territories
 12 divided on ethnic criteria. So, in summary, the Turkish Cypriots
 13 would not move on constitutional issues and had actually gone
 14 backwards on territorial questions and the return of refugees.
 15 Moreover, they were now saying that the withdrawal of Turkish
 16 forces would commence only after the implementation of a settle-
 17 ment had begun. His firm impression was that Denktash was not
 18 interested in a settlement.

19 3. The Prime Minister asked whether the powers and functions of
 20 the proposed federal government had been discussed. Kyprianou
 21 said that they had. He accepted that a list should be drawn up to
 22 specify the powers and functions of the federal government.
 23 Equally, however, the powers of the provincial administrations
 24 should be similarly defined. It was not enough, as Denktash
 25 seemed to wish, to list only the federal powers with all residual
 26 powers lying automatically with the provinces.

27 4. ~~When it came to~~ ^{As regards} the executive, the Turkish Cypriots insisted
 28 that the Presidency should be held by each community in rotation.
 29 This was unacceptable given the population balance in Cyprus. The
 30 Greek Cypriot view was that the roles of the President and the
 31 Vice-President should be maintained as set out in the 1960
 32 constitution. If the President was elected by the population as a
 33 whole, this could give the Turkish Cypriots significant
 34 opportunities in a multiparty state to influence the actual choice

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2 of President.

3 5. As regards the legislature, he had said to Perez de Cuellar
4 that he preferred a unicameral system but would not reject a bi-
5 cameral one. In reply to a question whether he could accept a
6 50:50 representation in the Upper Chamber, President Kyprianou
7 said that he had spoken only of "increased" Turkish Cypriot
8 representation. He could not show his hand on all points at this
9 stage. Otherwise the Turkish Cypriots just swallowed his
10 concessions without giving anything in return.

11 6. In reply to a question, President Kyprianou said that he was
12 willing to offer Turkish Cypriots a role in Cyprus's overseas
13 representation.

14 7. The Prime Minister suggested that President Kyprianou's
15 bottom line was that a unitary state, even with very limited
16 powers for the federal government, was better than total
17 separation. There was a risk that Denktash would calculate that
18 time was on his side and if he just sat tight he would achieve his
19 goal of a separate state. A great deal therefore depended on
20 finding a solution to the constitutional issues and particularly
21 the Presidency. ~~President~~ Kyprianou said that the Turkish
22 Cypriots could not ask for too much. The 1960 constitution
23 already gave the Vice-President substantial powers. Now, in
24 addition, the Turkish Cypriots were being offered full autonomy
25 and a bi-cameral legislature. He was prepared to agree that the
26 Vice-President rather than the President of the House of
27 Representatives should deputise for the President. It was hard to
28 see what more he could offer. The Prime Minister asked whether
29 President Kyprianou could envisage minor changes to the 1960
30 constitution. President Kyprianou said that he was ready to show
31 flexibility but so far had met with no matching response. One had
32 to remember that federation used to be unthinkable. The Greek
33 Cypriots had moved a long way. The Turkish Cypriots were now
34 being offered a very privileged position.

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2 8. The Prime Minister asked about the prospects of re-opening
 3 Nicosia airport as a confidence-building measure. President
 4 Kyprianou doubted whether a deal could be done on the basis of
 5 opening Nicosia airport in return for a territorial offer. It was
 6 first necessary to remove the obstacles to re-opening. Wider
 7 issues were involved which were more appropriate to an overall
 8 settlement.

9 9. President Kyprianou repeated his conviction that basically
 10 Denktash was not interested in a settlement and that at the end of
 11 October matters would be where they were now. But he was ready to
 12 keep on trying. He hoped very much that the United Kingdom and
 13 others would take action with the Turkish Government before the
 14 resumption of talks in mid-October. The Prime Minister said that
 15 she doubted whether Turkey wanted the burden, economic and
 16 political, of supporting an isolated Turkish Cypriot state.
 17 Denktash's prestige would be greatly increased if he were Vice-
 18 President of a united and internationally recognised Cyprus.
 19 Sir G Howe would be seeing his Turkish colleague in New York.
 20 We would seek to clarify Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions.

21 10. The Prime Minister continued that she wanted to be sure
 22 that she had understood President Kyprianou's position properly.
 23 He was ready to have a bizonal country with a federal government
 24 and a bi-cameral legislature, and to negotiate on the distribution
 25 of powers in the executive. Was this a fair summary? President
 26 Kyprianou confirmed that it was. But he doubted even so whether
 27 there would be an adequate response from Denktash. The situation
 28 would be very difficult if the talks failed.

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30 ~~HOWE~~ **Young Howe**

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GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	251330
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 251025 Z SEPTEMBER 84
PRE/ADD	7	IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA
	10	INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CBFC MODUK (DS11)
	11	INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL STRASBOURG
	12	MIPT: CYPRUS: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU MIPT
	13	1 1 You should give the Secretary-General an account in
	14	confidence of the discussion between Kyprianou and the Prime
	15	Minister and explain, subject to the agreement of the Secretary
	16	of State, the line we propose to take with the Turks. It would
	17	also be helpful if, in the light of Kyprianou's remarks, the
	18	Secretary-General could indicate more precisely the points on
	19	which he would like to see constitutional concessions from the
	20	Greek Cypriots.
	21	2 Please pass copy to Secretary of State's party for
///	22	information.
//	23	3 For Washington: Please also inform the State Department at
/	24	a senior level while emphasising the need for discretion over the
	25	discussion between the Prime Minister and Kyprianou. It would be

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword /helpful
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2 ~~helpful~~ *useful* to know what action the Americans are proposing to take
3 between now and 15 October with the parties concerned.
4 4 We may wish subsequently to take further action in Athens,
5 Ankara and Nicosia. It would be helpful to have Nicosia's views
6 on the timing of an approach to Denktash and the line to take
7 with him.
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9 **YOUNG HOWE**
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