



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 September 1984

Dear Charles,

Call by President Mobutu on the Prime Minister

Since I wrote to you on 24 September, we have heard that President Mobutu will be arriving in the late morning of Thursday 27 September and leaving early the following day. A Special Representative of the Foreign Secretary will meet him and see him off.

I now enclose three copies of the briefing, and of Personality Notes on the President, the State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and the new Zairean Ambassador. President Mobutu has asked that Umba and Mukamba should both be present too. Umba will have called on Mr Renton in the FCO immediately beforehand. John Johnson (AUSS for Africa) will represent the FCO. The interpreter will be Mrs Taylor.

President Mobutu last called on the Prime Minister during his official visit in December 1981, although there have been a number of messages between them since then, the most recent of which was the Prime Minister's message on the visit of Mr P W Botha to London. The present call on the Prime Minister will follow calls on President Mitterrand in Paris on 20 September and on President Reagan in New York on 23 September. We believe President Mobutu also hopes to visit Paris (again), Bonn and Rome after London before returning to Zaire. His purpose is likely to be to seek additional financial support, in the form of further debt rescheduling and increased bilateral aid, for his economic policies in 1985, the first year of his new term as President. This would enable him to maintain his structural adjustment efforts under IMF guidance.

The Prime Minister will be able to respond sympathetically to these concerns, within the limits of our resources, and inform him that we hope to have a further flm in aid for next year. She will also be able to urge the Zaireans to abstain on the Falklands' Resolution in the General Assembly as

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they did in 1982 and 1983. If time permits, the Prime Minister may wish to discuss briefly current Southern African issues.

*Yours ever,
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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POINTS FOR PRESIDENT MOBUTU

1. Congratulations on re-election. Recall 1981 visit.
2. Impressed by re-adjustment measures.
3. Glad to have reached agreement on debt rescheduling. Will consider sympathetically request for re-scheduling in 1985.
4. Increased our aid by £½ million. Hope to have further £1 million next year.
5. Please abstain again on Falklands resolution.
6. Prospects in Angola/Namibia.
7. Withdraw Zairean forces from Chad?
8. Describe problem in Durban.
9. Still intend to invite Botha to Zaire?

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT MOBUTU OF ZAIRE

18.15 HOURS ON 27 SEPTEMBER 1984

POINTS TO MAKE

BILATERAL

1. Congratulations on President Mobutu's re-election (in July).
2. Recall visits of President Mobutu in December 1981 and State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in February 1984. (Regret unable to see the State Commissioner at that time). Relations good; very few problems.

IMF/Zaire

3. Sympathy for difficulties Zairean economy has suffered in recent years. Most impressed by courageous adjustment remedies taken. Hope Zaire will press ahead with these efforts - necessary for keeping IMF programme on track.

4. UK/Zaire Debt Rescheduling Agreement

Initialled in London very recently; to be signed very shortly. Provides exceptionally generous terms for debt repayment. Working well so far. [If necessary]. Prepared to consider sympathetically any application for further debt rescheduling in 1985.

5. Aid

Increased our pledge in 1984 by £½m. Hope to have a further £1m for next year. Of course this is in addition to contributions we are making for Zaire via the IDA (US\$ 6.6m in 1984) and the EDF (£20m 1981-1985).

6. Falklands

Much appreciated Zaire's abstention on the Falklands resolution in 1982 and 1983. The 1984 draft much more prejudicial - complete disregard for islanders' rights to self-determination. Hope you can at least again abstain.

7. Military Training [if raised]

Glad to be able to allot a place at Sandhurst under our Military Technical Assistance Scheme. Places very limited, and our forces fully committed [but will look into possibility of meeting further requests].

INTERNATIONAL

8. Southern Africa

(a) Namibia/Angola. Zairean assessment of prospects for progress on:

- (i) Namibian independence? US diplomacy active.
- (ii) UNITA/MFLA reconciliation in Angola? Neither side can win militarily.

(b) Mozambique/South Africa. Greatly welcomed Nkomati Accord (10 March). Important for both sides to honour it as stressed to Mr Botha in June (Prime Minister's message to Mobutu). Mr Rifkind in Mozambique 20-22 September.

(c) Durban Consulate. [If raised].

- (i) The six opposition leaders remain at the Consulate. In the present circumstances we will not require them to leave against their will, but clearly cannot go on indefinitely.
- (ii) We cannot act as an intermediary. It is for the six to negotiate with the South African Government through their legal representatives. They have access at all times to their lawyers. We continue to hope conditions will be created which will enable

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the six to leave voluntarily.

- (iii) We deplore the decision of the South African Government to go back on a clear undertaking given to a British court to return the four defendants in the Armscor case. We cannot accept any link between this and the situation at the Consulate in Durban.
- (iv) UK/SA Relations: a difficult period. But we wish to contain this problem. No change in our general policy.

9. CHAD

Hope Franco-Libyan agreement will bring about a Libyan withdrawal. Have welcomed Zairean contribution to stemming Libyan aggression. Your troops to be withdrawn too?

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT MOBUTU OF ZAIRE

18.15 HOURS ON 27 SEPTEMBER 1984

ESSENTIAL FACTS


INTERNAL

1. President Mobutu has been in power for 19 years and faces no significant challenge to his authority. In elections held on 28-29 July 1984, Mobutu was re-elected for a third 7-year term. Voting was obligatory and tightly controlled. There were no other candidates.
2. Mobutu governs through the sole legal party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR). Careful control of the armed forces and security services as well as frequent government reshuffles help to preserve the Mobutu regime.
3. Zaire is a country richly endowed with natural resources including substantial mineral reserves and a sizeable hydroelectric and agricultural potential. It is a leading producer of cobalt and industrial diamonds and the world's sixth largest copper producer. But despite this large and diverse resource base, the years since 1975 have been characterised by prolonged economic crisis and there are few grounds for optimism about the immediate future.

BILATERAL

4. Trade. Our main exports to Zaire are transport equipment, textile yarns and chemicals. Main imports are minerals, coffee, cocoa and timber. UK exports are increasing considerably despite Zaire's serious economic problems and cut-backs in imports.


/In 1983



In 1983 they were £21m, and imports were £11.2m. The January-June figures for 1984 were £17.2m against imports of £4.9m.

5. Political. Our bilateral relations although not substantial are friendly and we have very few problems. Despite Mobutu's profession of non-aligned views, he has in general been anti-communist. American influence, which did so much to raise him to power, is now less exclusive and he looks to France, Portugal and the UK as well as to Belgium. The Shaba invasions of 1977 and 1978 and the Cuban presence in Angola confirmed his distrust of Soviet intentions.

6. IMF/Zaire Zaire has been facing serious economic difficulties for several years due to deteriorating copper prices (Zaire's major export) compounded by expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. In December 1983 the IMF Executive Board approved Zaire's Special Borrowing Agreement and Compensatory Finance Facility request for SDR 342.5 million. The SBA was reviewed on 8th August. Executive Directors commended Zaire for progress achieved in some sectors (eg reform of foreign exchange policy, tightening fiscal policy, controlling inflation, control of Bank of Zaire). But some problems remain, particularly the financial position of public enterprises. The Fund's view is that Zaire's prospects remain uncertain, depending on commodity prices. The programme leaves little room for slippage, and rectifying the deep seated problems will take many years. An IMF 'Permanent Representative' will arrive in Kinshasa at the end of October.



UK/Zaire Debt Rescheduling Agreement

7. The fifth Agreement was initialled in London on 21 June 1984. Formal signing is to take place in Kinshasa on a date still to be agreed. Under the four previous Agreements the debt relief provided covered all long-term maturities falling due between 1976 and 1981, as well as arrears of same at end 1975 and short-term arrears as at 30 June 1979. The debt involved totalled approximately £37m.

8. During the period 1982/3 the payment experience of all creditor countries was generally poor and by end 1983 all were reporting significant arrears under their bilateral Agreements. Given that there was little prospect of the payments being brought up-to-date, the Paris Club agreed in December 1983 to a further major restructuring exercise. The package of debt relief agreed covered not only new long term maturities falling due during the period 1981-4 but also the repayments of all previously rescheduled debt due and unpaid at end 1984 as well as all unpaid moratorium interest due and unpaid at end 1983. For most categories of debt the repayment terms were set at 12 years including a grace period of 6 years.

9. The latest UK/Zaire Agreement reflects these exceptionally generous terms and to date our payment experience has been good with over £3.25m having so far been received. Zaire has indicated recently that a further generous debt rescheduling was essential for 1985. Our response was that we would be prepared to consider sympathetically any application they may make.

/Aid

AID

10. A grant for £2m was agreed in 1976 and increased in 1979. A further £3m pledged in 1981 was increased to £3.5m in 1984. The Aid Framework for 1976 grant was used to supply Bailey Bridging to Office des Routes, for use mainly in Western Zaire and also for use in Kivu province on the Uvira-Fizi Road which runs down the west shore of Lake Tanganyika, at cost of £2.4m. Since 1981 £0.9m was spent on the provision of river ferries, pontoons and spare parts for Office des Routes; about £0.3m of equipment was provided for ONATRA, a transport parastatal for railway rehabilitation; equipment and spares were also provided for INZAL (Industrie Nationale Zairoise des Automobiles Leyland) to a value of £0.7m.

11. The UK contributes indirectly to support for Zaire through the International Development Association and the European Development Fund. It is hoped that Zaire's external transport problems may be partially solved through participation in the European Community's proposed East African Northern and Central Corridor projects.

12. Under the technical cooperation programme the UK contributes to the cost of an OXFAM rural development team who provide medical and agricultural advice at village level. Our contribution to this project is £50,000 in 1983/84 with a similar amount envisaged for 1984/85. We also support the English Language Centre at Kinshasa (£25,000 pa) but intend from 1985/86 to restrict its finance to students who are sponsored by the UK Government. Training in the UK is the largest element in the programme (£165,000 out of a total allocation of £250,000) and we provided 25 new awards in 1983/84. However this has been reduced to £150,000 in 1984/85 and we shall probably finance 15 awards.

13. HMG has financed the cost of a Zairean at Sandhurst in 1983 and again in 1984. Competition for places is fierce and the Zairean candidates for 1985/86 have been unsuccessful (but are on a waiting list). Bids for 1986/87 should be submitted by January 1985, via HM Ambassador.

INTERNATIONAL

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Prime Minister's Message

14. The Prime Minister sent a message (copy attached) to President Mobutu following the visit of P W Botha. It was handed over by HM Ambassador on 3 July. Mobutu commented that the Prime Minister had spoken very firmly with Mr Botha. He said that Mr Botha had asked to visit Zaire also. But Mobutu had seen problems at this juncture and had sent a temporising answer. But he had not said no.


Zaire/Namibia/Angola

15. In 1978 Zaire signed a Tripartite agreement with Angola and Zambia agreeing to respect national frontiers and not to support rebel movements operating from each other's territories. Despite this, Mobutu retains considerable sympathy for Savimbi and allows an active UNITA office to operate in Kinshasa.

16. Mobutu told HM Ambassador on 3 July that Zaire's position on Cuban withdrawal from Angola was exactly the same as ours. There was a nuance in that he could not take this position publicly, because the Cubans had been freely invited by a legally recognised government. But he considered it in Zaire's interest that the Cubans should go.

17. Mobutu considered that Cuban withdrawal depended on MPLA/UNITA reconciliation. If the Cubans left, the Luanda Government would collapse under pressure from UNITA. He thought that reconciliation would come eventually but it would take time.

/He



He gave no indication that he contemplated trying to bring the MPLA and UNITA together at this stage or that he was in close touch with Savimbi.

18. Mobutu is careful not to reveal publicly his realistic attitude to Angola and South Africa, but could in the future play a useful role in the search for MPLA/UNITA reconciliation. The amount of assistance he decided to give UNITA could be significant in determining UNITA's fate, above all after Namibian independence.

Namibia: US Diplomacy

19. Remains active. Currently aimed at:

- (a) Completion of South African disengagement from Angola. (SA forces now 60km from border). Neither side anxious to see process completed until arrangements worked out over post-withdrawal monitoring. Angola also wants evidence of further moves towards SCR 435.
- (b) Ceasefire between SWAPO and SAG. Last ceasefire talks broke down over SWAPO insistence that SAG should also fix a date for implementation of SCR 435. More recently SWAPO seem to have softened their line.
- (c) Agreement with Angola on Cuban withdrawal. Americans described recent contacts as encouraging. [Not for use. Americans have told us that the Angolans have now produced a timetable for Cuban withdrawal linked to implementation of SCR 435. The US suggested some amendments to ensure proposal would be acceptable to SAG. Angolans have now considered these and invited the Americans to further talks in Angola].

CHAD

20. On 17 September, France and Libya announced their agreement for the mutual withdrawal of French and Libyan forces from Chad beginning on 25 September. The withdrawal is to be completed in 45 days, ending on 15 November.

21. It is not clear why Qadhafi decided that it was now time to withdraw; the military stalemate, the unpopularity and cost of the occupation, Libyan internal political difficulties, and Qadhafi's feeling of international isolation were all probable factors. It is not clear what role Morocco, newly "united" with Libya, played in the search for a settlement.

22. President Mobutu has already welcomed the French-Libyan agreement. After a meeting with Mitterand on 20 September, Mobutu stated that his troops (which were sent in to support the regime of Hissene Habre) could not stay in Chad forever. But he has also promised to send an envoy to Ndjamena to discuss with Habre the fate of the Zairean contingent.

SOUTH AFRICA: DURBAN CONSULATE INCIDENT

21. The six leaders of the United Democratic Front and Natal Congress entered the British Consulate in Durban on 13 September. Detention orders re-issued by the South African Government on 10 September have yet to be served on them.

22. A lawyer representing the six met the FCO Assistant Under-Secretary for Africa on 17 September. A request for a Ministerial meeting was refused.

23. On 24 September the South African Government announced that they felt absolved from their commitment to ensure the return to the UK of four South Africans charged with offences relating to the illegal export of arms to South Africa (the Armscor case) and due to appear in court in the UK on 22 October.



The South African Government made it clear that this was in retaliation for the continued presence of the six in the Durban Consulate which the South African Government sees as a violation of the Vienna Convention.

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FM FCO 211300Z JUNE 1984
TO IMMEDIATE KINSHASA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 133 OF 21 JUNE
YOUR TELNO 71: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MOBUTU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BEGINS :
'YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER VISITED THE UK ON 2 JUNE.

I AM NOW WRITING PERSONALLY TO GIVE YOU MY IMPRESSIONS OF THIS MEETING. I MADE CLEAR AT THE OUTSET THAT I WANTED A FRANK AND WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION. INDEED, THE MEETING LASTED FOR OVER FIVE HOURS AND COVERED THE FULL RANGE OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS. WE FOCUSED PARTICULARLY ON NAMIBIA AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. MR BOTHA GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION OF BEING PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT HE ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE TO SOUTH AFRICA OF AN ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA, SINCE HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT FAIR AND FREE ELECTIONS COULD TAKE PLACE IN NAMIBIA WHILE THEY WERE STILL THERE. I EXPLAINED THAT, WHILE I BELIEVED FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (INCLUDING SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA, AND CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA) WE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY FORMAL LINK BETWEEN THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES AND A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT, FOR WHICH SCR 435 PROVIDES THE INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS. FOR HIS PART MR BOTHA SAID HE COULD SEE NO PROSPECT OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL UNTIL THERE WAS RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA. I SHOULD BE INTERESTED TO KNOW HOW YOU SEE THIS. WE HAD A LONG DISCUSSION ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. I MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT I CONDEMNED APARTHEID AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. I LAID PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE NEED TO FIND WAYS OF SATISFYING THE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE BLACK

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27537 - 1

POPULATION. I REFERRED TO NELSON MANDELA'S CONTINUED DETENTION AND SAID THAT I HOPED THERE WOULD BE PROGRESS ON THIS SOON. I SPOKE TOO, ABOUT THE APPALLING PRACTICE OF FORCED REMOVALS OF BLACK PEOPLES IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE ALSO DISCUSSED SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. MR BOTHA SHOULD NOW BE WELL AWARE OF OUR VIEW THAT THE ONLY AGREEMENTS THAT ARE LIKELY TO HAVE LASTING VALUE ARE THOSE WHICH ARE ENTERED INTO FREELY AND WITHOUT A SENSE OF DURESS.

AS YOU KNOW I AM ANXIOUS TO PUSH BACK COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, BUT BELIEVE SOME SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES RUN COUNTER TO THIS. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO TRY TO INFLUENCE MR BOTHA'S PERCEPTIONS AT FIRST HAND. I DO NOT EXPECT QUICK RESULTS, BUT I SEE THIS MEETING AS PART OF A PROCESS THROUGH WHICH WE MUST ALL CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR THE SORT OF CHANGES WE ALL WANT TO SEE IN SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES.' ENDS.

2. IN DELIVERING THIS MESSAGE YOU SHOULD STRESS ORALLY THAT THIS MEETING WITH MR BOTHA SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE REGARDED, LEAST OF ALL BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS, AS CONDONING APARTHEID: NOR AS REPRESENTING ANY CHANGE IN BRITISH POLICY.

HOWE

SOUTHERN AFRICA

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