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bc :- Sir P. Craddock

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 October 1984

CSCE: BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM

Thank you for your letter of 18 October about UK participation in the CSCE Cultural Forum.

The Prime Minister agrees that Sir Charles Troughton should lead the delegation, with Mr. Gerard Mansell as his deputy.

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

18 October, 1984

Agree re appointment of
 Sir Charles Troughton and
 Mr. Mansell as leader and
 Deputy Leader of our delegation?
 Dear Charles,

C.D.P.

18/10.

Yes Mr

CSCE: Budapest Cultural Forum

The concluding document of the CSCE Madrid Review Meeting provided for a 'Cultural Forum' to take place in Budapest at the invitation of the Hungarian Government beginning on 15 October 1985. A preparatory meeting of experts will be held also in Budapest on 21 November 1984. The Forum will be attended by leading personalities in the field of culture from the participating states; and it will discuss 'inter-related problems concerned creation, dissemination and cooperation, including the promotion and expansion of contacts and exchanges in the different fields of culture'.

We have already started preparatory work on the Forum and have had preliminary discussions with the Ten and the Americans among others. I enclose a copy of the Steering Brief, the line of which has been endorsed by the Foreign Secretary, which gives the flavour of what is involved.

We must now consider the question of UK participation in the Forum. The Hungarians have said that they envisage delegations of 8 or 9 per country to be led by cultural personalities supported by officials. We would hope to be able to field a smaller team although to some extent this will depend on what others decide to do. It already seems probable that the meetings will sub-divide into three working groups requiring attendance by at least three cultural personalities in addition to the leader. The actual composition of the team and its strength can be left till later on, but we need now to appoint a leader and deputy of the delegation so that they can be associated with the preparatory work. The Foreign Secretary considers that Sir Charles Troughton would be a good choice as leader of our delegation and that Mr Gerard Mansell would make a good tough No 2.

Provided the Prime Minister has no objection we would propose to approach them accordingly. Once we have an agreed leader of the delegation we shall discuss with him the selection of the rest of the team, with the aim of providing the right backbone and political balance.

Yours ever,
 Colin Budd

C D Powell Esq
 10 Downing Street

(C R Budd)
 Private Secretary

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ANNEX 1

STEERING BRIEF FOR THE UK DELEGATION

CSCE CULTURAL FORUM; BUDAPEST 15 OCTOBER 1985
AND PREPARATORY TALKS BEFOREHAND

General

1. It would be unrealistic to expect the Budapest meeting, and the earlier Experts' Meeting in 1984 also in Budapest, to lead directly or in the short term to any significant improvement in East/West cultural relations. Cultural policy in the Soviet Union and many Eastern European countries appears to be becoming more hard-line. Nevertheless, we should not miss any opportunity to improve relations and should see the meeting in this sense and not just as a propaganda exercise. Moreover, the meeting will provide a useful occasion to project Western values through the mouths of leading personalities in the cultural field; and to question the impediments to the freer exchange of cultural activity which the East imposes. The West should therefore approach the meeting in a constructive manner and be ready for wide ranging discussion across the whole field of culture in the confident knowledge that we hold the stronger position. In principle this should be an occasion for putting into practice the original Helsinki rule that participation takes place outside military alliances, making the most of western cultural diversity and of the attraction which this has for the populations in the East. In practice, however, the cultural functionaries in the Warsaw Pact states are likely to have their own delegations under tight control, and even those Eastern regimes most interested in independence from Moscow will be cautious under the Soviet eye. The UK approach must therefore be set in the classical CSCE framework, although due account should be taken of the special circumstances of the Forum.

UK Objectives

2. The UK's objective should be to play and be seen to play, in concert with the Ten and NATO member countries, an active and

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positive role evidencing our support for the meeting as a part of a balanced approach to the CSCE process and for the view that there exists a need to expand and improve cultural interchange generally and to remove all barriers to the freer exchange of 'cultural creation, dissemination and cooperation, including the promotion and expansion of contacts and exchanges in the different fields of culture'. Accordingly, it will be important to ensure that any failure to resolve existing problems (or even to engage in meaningful debate) should be seen to be attributable to the Soviet Union (and its allies) and not to the West.

3. As part of the CSCE process and generally, the aim in the meeting should be to facilitate a realistic examination of existing problems of both sides including barriers to cooperation established by Eastern practices. It is also legitimate and right for the UK (and its allies) to use the opportunity to point out the need for the development of greater freedom of contact and exchange of information on the lines set out in the relevant provisions of the Helsinki Final Act; and with a view to securing more consistent implementation of CSCE goals. We must also be prepared to defend ourselves against possible Eastern attacks on UK policy of curtailing or restricting cultural exchanges post Afghanistan and Poland.

4. We should resist efforts by Eastern countries to trivialise the Forum and deflect it into inconsequential themes such as 'Folklorique'. The East will naturally hope to emerge from the meeting with as much prestige for their arts and as much acceptance for their propaganda as possible. They will make much of the so-called 'cultural imbalance'. They may also seek to obtain liberalisation of regulations etc governing the transfer of science and technology. We must be ready (with our allies) to resist such attempts; and to refute any assertion by the East that they must protect themselves from Western cultural pollution - pornography, propaganda for racialism and violence. However, the overall UK line on the substance should not be advanced in a manner likely to provoke difficulties within the Ten (cf football hooliganism).

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5. In terms of consultation and coordination the UK should give high priority (in descending order of merit) to:

- (a) The unity of the Ten. The French give more attention (and money) to culture than the UK and they have been consistently keen on the Cultural Forum. Further, whereas they (and the Germans) have been less keen to impose retaliatory measures in the cultural field as a consequence of events in Afghanistan and Poland, it has been the UK's policy to curtail and restrict cultural programmes which could be seen to imply that our relations with the Soviet Union (and Poland) were continuing normally or where the main effect was likely to be to enhance the prestige of the Soviet (and Polish) regimes (rather than being of direct benefit to their peoples). We must work with our EC partners to present a broad front at the meeting and not unduly press British views. Although the recent NATO East/West study has helped to build consensus, the issue of cultural sanctions is still a potentially sensitive one in NATO and the Ten.
- (b) Effective consultation in the NATO caucus. This will be difficult as the United States may wish to raise wider CSCE considerations such as Human Rights at the Meeting; and urge that we should go beyond considering exchanges to discuss issues such as the decimation of cultural life in the Soviet Union. They may also expect us to support private groups which promote human rights. We may need to insist within the Ten that each country's position should not be finalised before other members of NATO have been able to contribute.
- (c) Close contact with the neutral and non-aligned countries insofar as their view point on this issue is close to our own. The position of Yugoslavia as a proposer of the

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meeting is likely to be important in this connection.

Substance of the meeting

6. This will be governed by the Agenda agreed at the preparatory meeting in 1984 and by the Mandate of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Review meeting which stated:

'At the invitation of the Government of Hungary a 'Cultural Forum' will take place in Budapest, commencing on 15 October 1985. It will be attended by leading personalities in the field of culture from the participating states. The 'Forum' will discuss interrelated problems concerning creation, dissemination and cooperation, including the promotion and expansion of contacts and exchanges in the different fields of culture. A representative of UNESCO will be invited to present to the 'Forum' the views of the organisation. The 'Forum' will be prepared by a meeting of experts the duration of which will not exceed two weeks and which will be held upon the invitation of the Government of Hungary in Budapest, commencing 21 November 1984'.

7. In the light of the latter, there is probably no need to seek the inclusion in the Agenda of a specific item such as 'constraints to cultural interchange': matters such as 'access to archives' and 'freedom of invitation' will arise during general discussion at the meeting. The absence of such an item would also deny the East an excuse to introduce items of their own choosing such as 'peace and disarmament'. There is advantage therefore in the discussion following three main sectoral groups which the Ten have agreed they should aim for at Budapest, viz: artistic exchanges (performing and plastic arts); audio-visual culture (cinema, radio and television); literature (printed material), which could be considered under the terms of the Concluding Document ie creation, dissemination and cooperation.

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8. If the West is to avoid polemical discussion, it is desirable that as much as possible should be prepared in advance of the meeting. We would also hope to avoid philosophical discourses on the role of culture in society and the evils of cultural imperialism such as tend to occur in UNESCO fora. Conversely, we should encourage discussion on such issues as cultural identity, since each of the East European countries could be expected to be keen on preserving its own cultural identity and indeed emphasising certain national factors and to be reluctant to be lumped in with the Soviet Union. In this, they would be strongly supported by the neutral and non-aligned countries. However in encouraging such development and speaking for example of minority ethnic/linguistic matters, the UK must be careful only to assert the right of those who wish to study their mother tongue to be allowed to do so. To go further and claim that the authorities are bound to provide the necessary educational facilities would lay us open to criticism.

Procedure/Tactics

9. The Madrid Concluding Document provides that unless otherwise agreed the duration of the Cultural Forum should not exceed six weeks. This timescale is likely to be convenient for both East and West. The question is unlikely to be decided before the Preparatory Meeting. The Western countries should be prepared to stay the course in order not to jeopardise Western interests at later CSCE meetings and in the light of our stronger position in cultural matters generally. We should also insist on a thorough general discussion on the issues involved so that the view point of participants should be fully expressed and understood.

10. The UK should be prepared to keep an open mind and to be ready to accept an Agenda which follows standard lines ie;

- (i) Formal opening of the meeting
- (ii) Adoption of the Agenda
- (iii) General Exchange of Views
- (iv) Examination and Elaboration of methods of resolving

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problems concerning creation, dissemination and cooperation in the different fields of culture, such as:

- (a) Performing Arts;
 - (b) Plastic Arts;
 - (c) Cinema, radio and television;
 - (d) Printed material.
- (v) Drawing up of Conclusions and Recommendations and adoption of the Report to Governments.

We also consider that academic and student exchanges as a means by which cultural exchanges in the various fields take place is worth discussing as a specific Agenda item. The UK should aim to make the opening debate last long enough to concert substantive positions among the West, and to influence the neutral and non-aligned countries.

11. In its opening statement the UK should set out its criteria for judging proposals at the Conference. The UK might concentrate on the following main themes:

- (i) Any procedure agreed should add to, and not detract from, existing procedures;
- (ii) Any proposals for institutional arrangements should conform to and if possible strengthen existing institutions and structures;
- (iii) Any resolutions on culture must be capable of implementation in practical terms.

In the discussion itself, the UK should seek improvements in areas such as:

- (i) regulations governing access;
- (ii) regulations governing copyright.

12. It will be for consideration by Western delegations, perhaps beforehand in discussion within the Ten and NATO, whether these criteria can be promoted by the tabling of an appropriate paper

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by the West, in particular if the East makes proposals.

13. Subject to the views of Political Directors and, as necessary, Ministers, the Ten and, as appropriate, Western delegations outside the Ten should not go to Budapest intending to initiate largely political exchanges and should aim to keep the cultural discussion at a technical/practical level. We would not want to make a precedent for the politicisation of other follow-up meetings of greater interest to us. They will, however, need defensive briefing material for use if the Soviet Union tries to exploit the support of its propaganda themes on peace and disarmament. They should be ready to respond in kind should the Soviet Union decide, possibly because of events in other fora, to adopt a basically political stance at Budapest. The UK and its partners and allies should in any event ensure that outside observers, including the media, to the extent that they show interest, are appropriately briefed on the purpose of the Conference, UK and Western objectives, etc. The Hungarians will wish to make the Forum, the first CSCE meeting to be held in the East, a success. They will be sure to stimulate interest from the media; and we may not need to act in the matter ourselves.

Cultural Relations Department
July 1984

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