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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1352 OF 15 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON,
ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO.

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YOUR TELNO 664 : CYPRUS : UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. ON THE BASIS OF A CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL SOME SUGGESTIONS ARE MADE ABOUT THE HANDLING OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU ON 19 NOVEMBER.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAW ME THIS EVENING, 15 NOVEMBER, DESPITE HIS MANY OTHER PREOCCUPATIONS ON HIS RETURN FROM ADDIS ABABA. I EXPLAINED THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD BE SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER ON 19 NOVEMBER AT HIS OWN REQUEST. I STRESSED THAT IT WAS NOT HER INTENTION TO GET INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT KYPRIANOU WAS PRESENTING HIMSELF AS A TARGET AT A CRUCIAL MOMENT AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S ADVICE ON HOW SHE MIGHT MAKE USE OF THIS UNEXPECTED OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED.

3. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET TO GRIPS WITH THE DETAILS OF THE CYPRUS DOSSIER SINCE HIS RETURN. BUT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF HOME TRUTHS THAT NEEDED TO BE BORNE IN ON KYPRIANOU:

(A) THE GREEK CYPRIOTS' SINGLE IDEA WAS THAT ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED WAS PRESSURE ON TURKEY BECAUSE ONLY THEY HAD MADE CONCESSIONS: THIS WAS SIMPLY NOT TRUE AND IT WOULD HELP IF THE PRIME MINISTER COULD CONVEY TO HIM THAT HE HAD TO DO SOMETHING ON THIS SIDE:

(B) AT THE BACK OF GREEK CYPRIOT MINDS WAS THE THOUGHT THAT A BIZONAL SOLUTION NEED ONLY BE THEORETICAL: IN FACT THEY HAD TO REALISE THAT THEY WERE COMPLETELY WRONG IF THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE THE TURKISH INVASION:

(C) TO DATE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD NOT DEPARTED FROM NEGOTIATING POSITIONS: AT THIS RATE DISCUSSIONS WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL THE 21ST CENTURY: IT WAS TIME TO SHOW SOME REAL CARDS, PREFERABLY IN PRIVATE TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL (OF COURSE THIS CONSIDERATION ALSO APPLIED TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS):

(D) THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE TURKISH SIDE: THE GREEK CYPRIOTS COULD FIND THEMSELVES IN TROUBLE IF THEY TURNED OUT TO BE THE MORE INTRANSIGENT PARTY AT THE NEXT ROUND (I MENTIONED THAT MR WILBERFORCE HAD WARNED TACOVOU THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MIGHT BE LEFT HIGH AND DRY).

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4. BEYOND THAT, THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT THE KEY WOULD LIE IN IMPROVING THE 1960 CONSTITUTION THROUGH ENLARGING THE RANGE OF ISSUES ON WHICH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD HAVE A VETO WITHOUT MAKING GOVERNMENT UNWORKABLE. THIS IMPLIED FINDING A FORMULA THAT ALLOWED FOR 'POLITICAL EQUALITY' WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE NUMBERS OF GREEK CYPRIOTS AND THE NUMBERS OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS. ALTHOUGH THE SECRETARIAT HAD ADVISED A 3:1 FORMULA FOR A ROTATING PRESIDENCY HE WAS PRIVATELY CONVINCED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS.

5. I SAID THAT THE CHIEF IMPRESSION I HAD DISTILLED FROM THIS CONVERSATION AND THE TELEGRAPHIC TRAFFIC I HAD SEEN WAS THAT BOTH SIDES THOUGHT THEY WERE IN A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION AND IT WAS JUST POSSIBLE THAT THERE WERE PEICES NOT YET ON THE TABLE WHICH COULD BE BROUGHT TOGETHER TO FORM A PACKAGE THE ESSENCE OF WHICH WAS TERRITORY AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE GREEKS OUGHT TO WANT THE SYMBOLISM OF A UNITARY STATE TOGETHER WITH A VERY STRONG PROVINCIAL REALITY. THIS INCLINED ME TO ADVISE MRS THATCHER TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING TWO OR THREE POINTS TO KYPRIANOU, IN ADDITION TO THOSE SUGGESTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL:

- I) IF HE WAS EVER GOING TO REGAIN ANY REAL AMOUNT OF TERRITORY HE WOULD HAVE TO DO A DEAL AND SIGN SINCE OTHERWISE THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD MOVE FAST IN 1985 TO CONSOLIDATE UDI:
- II) WITH OUR LONG EXPERIENCE OF ADMINISTRATION WE RECOGNISED THAT IT WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY INTOLERABLE TO HAVE (TURKISH CYPRIOT) INTERFERENCE IN THE DAY TO DAY RUNNING OF THE (GREEK CYPRIOT) PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION: THIS IMPLIED A STRONG PROVINCIAL AUTHORITY WITH A CORRESPONDINGLY LIMITED FEDERAL ARRANGEMENT: THE LATTER MIGHT BE REPRESENTED AS PAYMENT FOR TERRITORY REGAINED:
- III) (THOUGH I WAS LESS CERTAIN ABOUT THIS) SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE FOR DENKTASH WHICH MIGHT ONLY BE COSMETIC BUT COULD BE REPRESENTED AS A SYMBOL OF 'POLITICAL EQUALITY'.

6. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT THESE POINTS STRUCK HIM AS IMPORTANT AND INTERESTING AND HE WOULD APPRECIATE THEIR BEING MADE TO KYPRIANOU. HE WONDERED WHY IN FACT KYPRIANOU WAS GOING TO LONDON. I SAID THAT HE HAD EXPLAINED THAT HE WISHED TO RAISE A PRIVATE MATTER BUT (IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM URQUHART, WHO WAS PRESENT) I AGREED THAT IT WAS CONCEIVABLE THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO RAISE SOMETHING IN CONNECTION WITH OUR STATUS AS A GUARANTOR POWER.

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7. IN CONCLUSION I MENTIONED THAT DENKTASH HAD COMMENTED TO MR WILBERFORCE THAT HE DID NOT QUITE UNDERSTAND THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TACTICS (IE WHAT DENKTASH CLAIMED WAS THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SUGGEST THAT IF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS POSITION WAS A AND THE GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION B COULD NOT DENKTASH MOVE TOWARDS C). THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT DENKTSH WAS ''AN ACTOR''. IN FACT THESE WERE EXACTLY THE TACTICS THAT THE HAD ADOPTED IN THE SECOND ROUND AND THAT HE WOULD ADOPT FOR THE THIRD ROUND.

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PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR LUCE

PS/MR. RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR GOODALL

MR BRAITHWAITE

MR O'NEILL

MR WESTON

MR EGERTON

MR RENWICK

MR J THOMAS

MR JENKINS

MR BARRINGTON

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APPENDIX B

DRAFT TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

- I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,
- II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.

ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.