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From the Private Secretary

19 November 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

President Kyprianou called on the Prime Minister at his own request this evening, on what he described as a private matter.

President Kyprianou said that his original grounds for seeking a meeting had been overtaken by an important new development. This was that the US Ambassador in Nicosia had asked to see him urgently on 16 November to hand over a message from President Reagan. The Ambassador had said that the message was very confidential and should not be shown to anyone else. President Kyprianou said that he had nonetheless insisted that he must brief the Prime Minister.

President Kyprianou continued that he regarded the letter as highly significant. It was the first time for ages that the Americans had taken an initiative over Cyprus. However, he was at a bit of a loss to understand exactly what the initiative was. The letter simply promised that the Americans would discuss with him further detailed ideas on what might be done to assure the success of the proximity talks. So far, no more had been forthcoming, though he was due to meet the American Ambassador again on 21 November. The letter appeared to suggest some sort of talks in parallel with the proximity talks.

President Kyprianou continued that he was in the dark both about the procedures envisaged by the Americans, the content of their eventual proposals and the motives for their initiative. On the last point, he wondered whether the Americans wanted something special from Cyprus in terms of the western alliance. There had been some strange rumours on this and a curious article in the Sunday Telegraph. More generally he was anxious lest the US should try to lean more heavily on the Cyprus Government than on the Turkish Cypriots or Turkey, given their close relations with the latter. He would hand over a copy of the letter

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(enclosed) to the Prime Minister in the strictest confidence. Did the Prime Minister know what the Americans were up to? Had Britain received any similar message? Did we know which other countries had? How should he reply? Would the UK agree to become involved in his discussions with the Americans, given our much greater knowledge and experience of the Cyprus problem?

The Prime Minister said that so far as she knew we had received no letter from the Americans. Clearly much would depend on the detail of the American proposals. But her reaction was that the American involvement was to be welcomed. It was very helpful that President Reagan was interesting himself personally. It was unlikely that the Americans would have any very new ideas: most of the options were well known. They would probably stress the need for the Cyprus Government to make concessions on the constitution in return for territorial concessions by the Turkish Cypriots. But she was certain that they would not exert one-sided pressure. And they might be able to offer inducements for a settlement, though she had no information to sustain this.

The Prime Minister continued that it would be important to ensure that the American proposals supported rather than cut across the Secretary-General's efforts. As regards possible British involvement, she thought it was premature to consider this. The first step was for President Kyprianou to find out the details of the US proposals. President Kyprianou said that he would do so and telephone the Prime Minister or me on Wednesday. Meanwhile he urged her to keep the information secret. The Prime Minister agreed and repeated that she thought the American intervention was to be welcomed.

President Kyprianou said that his original reason for seeking a meeting had been to discuss guarantees. He had been casting round for ideas for what to do if the proximity talks reached deadlock. All he could think of was that the 1960 situation should be restored and Cyprus invited to become a member of NATO. He wondered what the response to this would be. He also wondered whether to revive the idea of consultations under the Treaty of Guarantee. He thought that it might be possible to bring the Greek Government round to this. Would the idea find favour?

The Prime Minister said that this was not the time to consider these matters. The priority must be to make progress in the proximity talks and explore the American initiative. She would not wish to do anything which cut across these or made them more difficult, although she would of course reflect on what President Kyprianou had said. Meanwhile she hoped that he would approach the next round of

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proximity talks realistically and be ready to make concessions on the constitution in order to unlock progress on land. Otherwise there was a real risk that the Turkish Cypriot entity would establish itself and become an accepted fact.

It was left that President Kyprianou would contact the Prime Minister once he had further details of the American proposals. In the meantime, at President Kyprianou's request, the Prime Minister agreed not to feed this information into normal diplomatic channels, though she urged him to use Sir John Thomson as a channel of communication once he went to New York.

It would be helpful to have advice on President Kyprianou's ideas and what the Prime Minister might most usefully say when he contacts her again on Wednesday.

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