

SUBJECT.
cc Maiter.



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cc Sir P Cawood

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 December 1984

Dear Colin,

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE LEADER OF THE GREEK
OPPOSITION AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THURSDAY 6 DECEMBER
AT 1545 HOURS

The Prime Minister received Mr. Constantine Mitsotakis, Leader of the Opposition in Greece, this afternoon.

Mr. Mitsotakis made clear his sharp disapproval of Mr. Papandreou and his policies. The situation in Greece had deteriorated and the economy would get worse still. Mr. Papandreou scarcely bothered with Parliament and pursued an erratic foreign policy. It was quite possible that he would bring forward elections so that they could be held before the worst effects of his economic policies became apparent. An early election would present problems for the Opposition, not least because they had no access to television and depended entirely upon meetings to get their views across.

The Prime Minister described the discussion which had taken place at the European Council on Integrated Mediterranean Programmes. Mr. Mitsotakis said that he did not believe that Mr. Papandreou would in practice block the enlargement negotiations. He had heard from Athens that Mr. Papandreou had already written to explain his behaviour to the Spanish and Portuguese Prime Ministers. In his own view, Mr. Papandreou had indulged in a bit of theatre to impress opinion in Greece.

Mr. Mitsotakis said he saw a good chance to move forward on Cyprus. He would do all he could to help. The Prime Minister welcomed this. She was very worried about Cyprus. Unless there were movement soon, the partition of Cyprus and the existence of an independent "State" in the North would become an established fact. Mr. Mitsotakis agreed that time was working against the Greek Cypriots. He understood that the Turks had made some important concessions which ought to enable progress to be made. The Prime Minister said that the basis for a settlement had to be concessions on the constitution in return for territory. Mr. Mitsotakis said that he thought that the idea of a solution on these lines had "matured" in the Cypriot people. But there would be difficulties in reaching a full settlement while Mr. Papandreou remained in power.

/Apart from

Apart from this, the conversation dealt with party matters.

Yours sincerely
Charles Powell

(C.D. Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

[Handwritten initials]

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 December 1984

CD

Dear Charles,

Visit by Leader of the Greek Opposition: 5-7 December

I enclose a background brief (together with three copies for your use) for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Mitsotakis after Question Time on Thursday 6 December.

Since the meeting has been arranged on Party channels we have not offered any specific points to make. A brief on Papandreou's performance yesterday at the Dublin Summit will be sent across separately in case Mr Mitsotakis raises the matter.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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CDP
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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH LEADER OF THE GREEK OPPOSITION:
6 DECEMBER

INTRODUCTION

1. Mr Constantine Mitsotakis was elected leader of the New Democracy Party on 1 September, following the resignation of Mr Averoff. This visit is at his own request and has been arranged on Party channels. He will have been given dinner by the Conservative Party Group for Europe on 5 December, is meeting the Foreign Affairs Committee on the morning of 6 December and sees Sir G Howe at 5 pm. Mr Gummer is giving him dinner.
2. He visited the UK as an official guest of the Secretary of State for Trade in 1979.
3. Mitsotakis will probably concentrate on the situation in Greece and may look for Party to Party assistance in improving his party's organisation. General elections are due in Greece by October 1985 and will be preceded by Presidential elections in May. Mitsotakis will wish to make political capital out of the visit. He may be deliberately indiscreet with the Press. Whilst Mitsotakis' views are likely to be more attractive to HMG, Papandreou currently seems better placed to win the general elections.

INTERNAL SITUATION

4. PASOK's assumption of office in October 1981, ended seven years of New Democracy rule. As founder and ex-leader of New Democracy, President Karamanlis acts as a sort of 'constitutional balance' to Papandreou. Karamanlis has not yet announced whether he will stand again in the Presidential elections.
5. Papandreou remains conspicuously Greece's key figure. But his headline-catching international forays mask domestic problems, primarily economic (18% inflation; 10% and rising unemployment; low growth) and also internal security (a spate of bomb attacks including two bombs found near Mitsotakis on 1 December). This has



led to some public and internal dissatisfaction, although Papandreou's chances of winning the next election so far seem unaffected.

New Democracy (115 seats out of 300)

6. Mitsotakis is an old and bitter rival of Papandreou and is widely considered to be the only opponent capable of taking him on (they were members of the same party in the mid sixties). The long-delayed departure of Averoff came as a relief to many in the Party. But New Democracy still lacks unity and organisation and improvement of this will be a high priority for Mitsotakis.

7. New Democracy support the EC and NATO and wish Greece to play a more constructive role internationally. On Cyprus and relations with Turkey, Mitsotakis has said he wishes to promote a dialogue: but he is likely to share the generally held views in Greece that national interests over the range of Aegean disputes must be protected, vigorously if necessary.

PASOK (168 seats out of 300)

8. PASOK is Papandreou's own creation, a follow-on from a socialist-orientated resistance movement which Papandreou formed in exile during the rule of the Junta. He keeps the party on a tight rein and is ruthless with those who step out of line. He takes all important decisions himself.

9. Papandreou sees Greece as having an active international role and as a bridge between Europe and the Arab world (eg mediation between Mitterand and Qadhafi over Chad). He has visited Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Poland this year (he described Jaruzelski as a 'Patriot' and Solidarity as irrelevant to the development of Poland). His views on arms control and East/West relations generally abound with heresies from NATO doctrine. He strikes a popular chord in Greece by being publicly critical of the US: but he has not fulfilled his electoral promise to shut US military bases.

10. Relations with Turkey are bad and are apparently used for electoral purposes. Turkish tentative conciliatory noises have been /brushed



brushed aside and diplomatic point-scoring has occurred in the Council of Europe, the European Community, European Parliament and NATO (most recently over Lemnos).

Communist Party (13 seats out of 300)

11. The Moscow-orientated Communist Party, KKE, is unlikely to capture more than 15% of the vote but has a disproportionate effect on PASOK who feel it necessary to protect their left flank: this probably accounts for much of Papandreou's anti-American posture.

European Community

12. Greece has done well out of Community membership. The Commission's response to the Greek Memorandum of 1982 was sympathetic, proposing to meet Greek demands for increased economic assistance under three headings; Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, existing channels (Social and Regional Funds etc) and special supplementary programmes. Estimated Greek benefits in 1983 were 924 mecu (\$650m) putting them in second place behind Italy in the table of net beneficiaires. In the ad hoc committee on institutions (Dooge committee) the Greeks have opposed strengthening of political cooperation or reform of institutions and have used the committee to press for more funds for Greece.

Bilateral relations

13. Bilateral relations are generally as good as Papandreou's idiosyncratic behaviour allows. Trade, at about £400m in toto remains stable (£100m in our favour). Greece is 36th in the UK's export league. About one million British tourists visit Greece each year. The Elgin marbles controversy has not so far affected the general run of bilateral relations.

Cyprus

14. The third round of the UN Secretary General's proximity talks are currently in recess in order to allow Kyprianou to consult in Nicosia. The Turkish Cypriots claim to be ready to make substantial concessions and have thus regained the high ground. The Secretary General is likely to arrange a High Level Meeting. Since these talks are Confidential, we should not go into details with Mitsotakis.

Personality Note

15. Born on Crete in 1918, Mitsotakis qualified as a lawyer. He entered politics in 1946 and has had wide Ministerial experience in several governments. Mitsotakis and Papandreou are bitter rivals of long standing having been members, and Ministers, of the same party in the mid sixties: since the party split up Papandreou has accused Mitsotakis of treachery. Mitsotakis went into exile after the 1967 coup and was a strong critic of the Junta. He joined New Democracy in 1978 and was Foreign Minister from 1980-81. He leans more to the centre than the right-wing of his party.

FACT SHEETTHE HELLENIC REPUBLIC (GREECE)DEMOGRAPHY

Population: 9.7 million (1981)

Distribution: Capital Area 31.1%
Northern Greece 35.6%
Central Greece and Evia 11.3%
Peloponnese 10.4%
Ionian and Aegean Islands 6.4%
Crete 5.2%

Religion: 97% Greek Orthodox, 0.5% other Christians,
2% Muslim

Language: Greek

Principal Political Parties: (from Right to Left)
Progressive Party, New Democracy (ND),
Social Democratic (KODESO), Panhellenic
Socialist Movement (PASOK), Communist
(Interior) (KKE (Int)), Communist (Exterior)
(KKE)

Parliamentary Composition (December 1984): PASOK 168, ND 115, KKE 13, others 4

MEPs: PASOK 10, ND 9, KKE 3, KKE (Int) 1,
EPEN 1

GEOGRAPHY

Land area: 131,944 sq kilometres

Neighbours: Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Turkey

Capital: ATHENS

Principal towns: Salonica, Piraeus, Patras, Larissa, Heraklion
(Crete)

Principal ports: Piraeus, Salonica, Volos, Patras

ECONOMY

Basis Mixed

GDP 1983 \$ 34.5bn (UK US\$ 449.2bn)

GDP per capita 1983 US\$ 3520 (UKUS\$ 8007)

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Balance of Trade 1983 - (minus) US\$ 4.3bn (UK US\$ - 1.1bn)

Balance of Payments on current account 1983 - (minus) US\$ 1.9
(UK US\$ + 4.4bn)

Gross official (minus gold) reserves 1983 US\$ 0.90bn
(UK US\$ 11.34bn)

Real growth of GDP 1983 0.3% (UK 3.4%)

Budget deficit 1983 259.66bn DR; 8.5% of GDP

TRADE

Principal Exports: Hand-manufactured goods, food and live animals, miscellaneous manufactures, fuels and lubricants, raw materials

Principal Imports: Fuels and lubricants, machinery and transport equipment, semi-manufactured goods, food, beverages and tobacco, chemicals

TRADE WITH UK

Exports to UK 1981: £163 million
1982: £151.7 million
1983: £165 million

Imports from UK: 1981: £254 million
1982: £255.3 million
1983: £280.2 million

DEFENCE

Defence expenditure of 196 billion drachmas in 1982/3 represented 6.9% of GNP by NATO criteria. Major suppliers of military aid are the USA and FRG.

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CONTINGENCY PRESS LINE

GREECE: CALL BY GREEK OPPOSITION LEADER ON PM AND SECRETARY OF STATE: 6 DECEMBER

1. Mr Constantine Mitsotakis, Leader of the Greek Opposition Party New Democracy, will meet the Prime Minister after Question Time and have private talks with the Secretary of State at 5pm today.

2. Mr Mitsotakis is on a private visit to the UK, from 5-7 December, arranged at his own request through Conservative Party Central Office.



CDP
6/xii
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 December, 1984

Dear Charles,

Visit by the Leader of the Greek Opposition: Integrated
Mediterranean Programmes

I enclose a supplementary brief (4 copies) on IMPs for the Prime Minister's meeting tomorrow with Mr Mitsotakis.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



edp 6/26

VISIT BY THE LEADER OF THE GREEK OPPOSITION:

5-7 DECEMBER

INTEGRATED MEDITERRANEAN PROGRAMMES

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Important for functioning of Community that Greece is able to play a full and positive part. UK Recognise that the Community needs to respond to the issues raised by the Greek Memorandum and to ensure that no serious difficulties are caused by enlargement. In this regard, we recognise the significance of IMPs to Greece.

2. This was why UK was willing to agree to provisions for IMPs recorded in Brussels European Council Conclusions. These provide the basis for IMPs. We are ready to meet our commitment and to get IMPs underway in 1985.

3. Agreed at Brussels European Council that IMPs should be of limited duration and financed through the existing structural funds. Moreover, the Community simply cannot find money which does not exist. Hence the European Council's decision that the structural funds would grow, having regard to IMPs, "within the limits of financing possibilities".



4. Unfortunately the Commission's proposals for IMPs aroused unrealistic expectations among IMPs beneficiaries. Their proposals bear no relation to reality and suggest absurdly high expenditure levels with no indication where the money is to come from.

5. At Dublin, UK was ready to agree to set aside money for IMPs to get underway in 1985 with finance for future years being agreed in the normal budgetary process. Much regret that Mr Papandreou was unable to accept what was on offer.

6. Question of IMPs will no doubt figure at the next European Council in March after further discussions at lower level. UK will continue to seek to implement the European Council decisions on IMPs. But very large additional sums will simply not be possible.

[As necessary]

7. Blocking enlargement would be very damaging to Greek interests, since it would entail blocking also the increase in own resources. The result would almost certainly be a reduction in the benefits Greece receives from the Community.

/BACKGROUND



BACKGROUND

1. Greece is a significant net beneficiary from its membership of the Community as befits its status as the poorest Member. In 1982 Greece's net receipts were 685 mecu. In 1983 they grew to 940 mecu. Greece is now the second largest net recipient of EC funds (after Italy) and the third largest recipient on a per capita basis (after Ireland and Luxembourg). Its receipts will probably continue to grow and will include a total of about 2,500 mecu over the next five years from the Regional and Social Funds.

2. The Greek Memorandum argued for special measures to enable Greece to benefit fully from the operations of the Community. The Community has already agreed:

- (a) postponement of introduction of VAT (£140 m);
- (b) special measures for vocational training (£70 m);
- (c) extension of Greek agricultural development programme (£26 m).

3. The Brussels European Council agreed that IMPs would be launched in 1985; that they would be of limited duration; and that their aim would be to enable the southern regions to adjust to enlargement and to cover the problems raised by the Greek Memorandum. On financing

/IMPs




IMPs, the European Council agreed that "the financial resources allocated to aid from the funds, having regard to the IMPs, will be significantly increased in real terms within the limits of financing possibilities".

4. The Commission's proposals, providing for expenditure of 6,600 mecu over 6 years, have always been seen by ourselves and most other Member States as wildly unrealistic. The protection being offered to Mediterranean producers in the enlargement negotiations eg ten year transition period for Spanish fruit and vegetables with rigid surveillance arrangements makes them more so. Not surprisingly, the Greeks have latched on to the figure the Commission have put forward and adopted it as their target. The UK, supported by the Germans, French, Dutch and Danes, have sought to fulfil the commitments on IMPs while scaling down the Commission's proposals and avoiding agreeing to any measures which would lead to other expenditure eg by generating further agricultural surpluses. We have gone along with the decision in Budget Council to set aside 50 mecu for IMPs in 1985 pending a decision by the Council on IMPs.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

5 DECEMBER 1984



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

PHBW/B

30th November 1984

R4

Dear Prime Minister

I understand that the Leader of the Opposition in Greece, Mr. Constantine Mitsotakis, is coming to see you in the near future. As President of the North Atlantic Assembly I have recently met with the Governments of Turkey and Greece and I enclose reports of these meetings which you might be interested to read prior to your meeting with Mr. Mitsotakis.

I shall be sending you in the near future a full report on the activities of the British Delegation of the North Atlantic Assembly during 1984.

The recent Brussels meeting was a great success and I am glad to say I was re-elected President until October 1985, when we meet in San Francisco.

Yours sincerely
Patrick Wall

The Prime Minister,
The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP
10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1

REPORT ON THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT

30 OCTOBER - 1 NOVEMBER 1984

The Secretary-General was not able to accompany me so I met Job Dittberner, the Senior Director of Studies, in Frankfurt for the night of the 28th October.

We flew to Ankara on the 30th, arriving in the late afternoon. Were met by the Leader of the Turkish Delegation to the NAA, Mr. Ilter and taken to the Government Guest House where we had a quiet dinner.

Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly
Mr. Karaduman

On Wednesday, 31st October, we had our first meeting. He gave the impression of being a strong and able personality. I told him that we much valued the Turkish Delegation and that we hoped that they would appoint Turks to each of our Sub-Committees and each of the Military Tours, as this was where the real work of the Assembly was done. He agreed to this.

We then spoke about the Greek/Turkish problem. He said this was the creation of the Greek Government as the Greek and Turkish people were friendly with each other. It was only the Government that was hostile. The Turks had no aggressive intentions whatsoever against Greece as they realised that the real danger came from the USSR. He said that business contacts between Greece and Turkey were starting and he hoped that they might achieve a breakthrough on this level. However, the Greek Prime Minister was particularly difficult.

Chairman of the National Assembly Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Celikbas

He had been a member of the Turkish Parliament for a very long time and was at present also a member of the

Council of Europe. He pointed out that the main danger from Greece was any increase of the territorial waters in the Aegean from 6 - 12 miles. A 12 mile increase would close off the Aegean completely to Turkish vessels and turn it into a Greek lake.

We asked him how their accession to the Common Market was proceeding but he said there were difficulties but they hoped to be full members in the not too distant future.

We then discussed the problems of the Middle East and the Iran/Iraq war. He said Turkey had Ambassadors in both countries (as she had in Israel) and were waiting for a chance to mediate between the two.

Head of the Turkish Delegation to the NAA and Chairman of the National Assembly Committee on Defence, Mr. Ilter.

He told us that conscription in Turkey was to be reduced from 20 months to 18 months. This he said would save money for better hardware and for modernisation of their weapon systems. He told us that two Turkish Armies were kept on the Soviet Frontier and that Ismir was only used for Training Units. It was, of course, at Ismir that the Greeks claimed that the Turks had 10,000 landing craft and a complete army ready for the invasion of Greece!

All the officers and NCOs in the Turkish Army were regulars. They needed a considerable amount of assistance from their Allies to modernise their weapon systems.

We then had lunch hosted by the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Ozal

We met Mr. Ozal at his home after lunch. He spoke mainly about the dangers in the Aegean and showed us maps to show what would happen if the Greeks extended to 12

12 miles. He added, quite deliberately, that if they did this it would mean war.

We then discussed Cyprus in which he said he would be perfectly willing to agree to a Federal Government. He had offered to have a meeting with the Greek Prime Minister through business contacts but Mr. Papandreou had refused. He understood this as there would be an election in Greece next year. In order to help relations he had removed the requirement for the Greeks to have visas when they visited Turkey. As a result a very large number of Greeks had taken this opportunity. Greek visitors had now become so familiar in certain parts of Turkey that shopkeepers are prepared to give them extended credit.

He re-affirmed that Turkey had no ambitions or hostile intention whatever towards Greece and that Greek's hostility was based on a fallacy. The only exception being that if they extended their EEZ round the Greek Islands in the Aegean to 12 miles then it would turn the Aegean into a wholly Greek Sea, which would be quite unacceptable to Turkey.

Minister of Defence, Mr. Yavützur

With him we again discussed the Greek problem and he re-affirmed that the Turks had no hostile intent towards Greeks. He said they were growing increasingly worried about Syria as Turkish terrorists were being trained by the Syrians under Russian supervision and were then infiltrated back into Turkey.

As far as weapon systems are concerned, the M48 tanks were being updated with 105 mm. guns. They had also purchased Rapier and Milan. National Service was being decreased from 20 months to 18 months because of the

increase in population, which was a different reason than that given to us by the Chairman of the Defence Committee. New recruits were taken in four times a year.

The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yilmnaz

The Minister was abroad. Mr. Yilmnaz was also a very impressive character and re-affirmed that the Turks had no quarrel with Greece. The tension was being maintained by the Greek Prime Minister solely to attract Nationalist votes at the next General Election. The Turks were purchasing F16 Aircraft from America which were being assembled in Turkey. They had offered for Greece to share in the Assembly Plant but had had no reply. Unfortunately the liberals in Europe always seemed to blame Turkey for any trouble in the Aegean.

Turkey was taking increased interest in the Middle East and her trade there was expanding. The Iran/Iraq war was most regrettable and they hoped eventually to be able to mediate.

He asked whether the new idea of re-activating the WEU had much significance and we said we thought it was merely a gesture at the present time, as what really mattered was that the IEPG should get together and present sensible proposals to the USA.

He emphasised the importance of Turkey to NATO being on the flank of the Alliance and he said that they needed considerably more financial help from their Allies so they could modernise their weapon systems.

That evening the Counsellor of the British Embassy, Mr. Jeremy Varcoe, had a cocktail party for us at which we met a number of prominent Turks, politicians, businessmen and journalists. It was then we heard the news of Mrs. Ghandi's assassination.

The Ambassador was away meeting HMS Fearless in Istanbul.

We then returned to the Government Guest House and left for England early on the morning of the 1st November.

PHBW

November 1984

PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO TURKEY

Monday, 29 October

- 18:00 Depart London (Sir Patrick will arrange for his own ticket)
- 20:25 Arrive Frankfurt
- Stay at City Hotel, Rüsselsheim, Marktstrasse 2-4, tel. (6142) 65051/2/3/4, telex : 4182187
- Job Dittberner arrives at 19:30 (or 15:40 if no seats available on later flight).

Tuesday, 30 October

- 10:00 Depart Frankfurt with Job, flight LH 322. (NAA will arrange for tickets)
- 16:35 Arrive Ankara.
- Accommodation during visit will be in State Visitors' Residence.
- Evening reception at the British Embassy in Ankara (details to be confirmed).

Wednesday, 31 October

- 10:00 meeting with Mr. Karaduman, Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
- 10:45 meeting with Mr. Celikbas, Chairman of the National Assembly Committee on Foreign Affairs
- 11:30 meeting with Mr. Ilter, head of the Turkish delegation to the NAA and Chairman of the National Assembly Committee on Defence.
- 13:00 lunch hosted by the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly.
- 15:00 meeting with Mr. Yavüztur, Minister of Defence.
- 15:50 meeting with Mr. Yilmaz, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs (the Minister will be abroad at this time).
- A meeting will also be held with Mr. Ozal, the Prime Minister, but the exact time will be confirmed upon arrival in Ankara.

Thursday, 1 November

- 08:30 depart Ankara for London (via Istanbul). (NAA is arranging this ticket)

REPORT ON THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO THE GREEK GOVERNMENT

25 - 28 NOVEMBER 1984

Accompanied by David Hobbs (Director, Scientific and Technical Committee) in the place of the Secretary-General who is about to enter hospital, I spent three days in Athens staying at the Grande Bretagne Hotel.

Admiral Zervos (Leader of the Greek Delegation) accompanied us throughout our visit, except during our meeting with the Leader of the National Democratic Party.

The Greek delegation, together with their wives, dined us on the 26th November and could not have been more friendly.

Meetings took place as follows -

Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on National Defence,
Mr. John Koutsoyannis

Rather fiery, anti-American, emotional.

NATO supported the Colonels and their coup was a CIA plot; the US (and NATO) also helped the Turks over Cyprus by providing landing aircraft. NATO thinks Turkey is more important than Greece and gives her more arms (the 7:10 ratio).

The Greeks know the Turkish intentions are to take the Greek Islands on the eastern half of the Aegean and to divide that sea into two.

As far as NATO was concerned Greece was more important than Turkey for if Greece fell to the USSR Turkey would be isolated.

The Greeks were right to re-militarise Lemnos under the Treaty of Montreaux (1936) and had done so and this must be recognised in NATO exercises.

President of the Greek Chamber of Deputies
The Hon. John Alevas

A member of PASOK, over 80 and a much respected statesman. Greeted us kindly but critically.

A family should stay together - why then did not NATO stop the Turks in Cyprus? NATO should protect the Greeks against Turkey, both are allies but the Greeks fear that the main threat comes from the East and not from the North. There is no ill will between the people of Greece and Turkey but the Turkish Generals are aggressive.

Later Mr. Alevas sent me a magnificent book on the Greek Museums.

Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs
Lady Amelia Fleming (wife of the discoverer of Penicillin)

Lady Fleming originally came from Asia Minor and proved to be the bitterest of all those we talked to. Most were anti-American, but Lady Fleming was anti-British. She claimed that the British Constitution for Independent Cyprus was a trick, (but did not explain this). The Turks want to expand to the West encouraged by the USA and NATO does nothing to stop this, nor does Britain who has some responsibility for Cyprus. She claimed (wrongly) that it was Dr. Kutchuk who failed to make the Cyprus Constitution work.

The Turks were not democratic and human rights were being abused, but in spite of this the Greek and Turkish people were not hostile one to the other.

NATO needed defence in depth - the Dardenelles - Lemnos - Crete. I asked about the 12 mile limit and she said that though the Greeks had this right in international law they would not use it.

PASOK had brought about a much needed social revolution in Greece and would win the next General Election, which would probably take place in October 1985.

Leader of the Greek delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly
Admiral Zervos

The Admiral accompanied us everywhere, except on our visit to the NDP. He met us at the Airport and arranged a dinner with the members of the delegation and their wives. His view was that though there was no immediate danger of aggression from Turkey, the Turks would move step by step to take over the Islands in the eastern Aegean following the example of their action in Cyprus. The Greeks must therefore stick to their rights, especially in Lemnos.

Alternate Minister for National Defence (General)
Antonios Drosyannis

Very friendly and said that the situation was now improving. He thought that the Lemnos dispute could be solved and got on well with Lord Carrington the new Secretary-General of NATO. Greece was a small country and could not afford to lose any territory. Turkey wanted to divide the Aegean into two on a north-south line which is why they objected to Lemnos being re-militarised. Under the Treaty of Montreaux the Turks could refortify Tenedos and Imvros and the Greeks Lemnos and Samothaki. This should in fact strengthen NATO.

The Turks wanted the Greek Islands in the eastern Aegean but they would not get them without a war in which the Greeks, though outnumbered, would fight to the last man.

The Turks were inciting the Moslem minority in Greece (only 3% of the population). The Turks were also holding amphibious warfare exercises near the Greek Islands instead of in the Black Sea.

He had recently discussed these matters with the Turkish Ambassador, whom he admired, but did not know if this had had any effect in Ankara.

The Turks had withdrawn visa requirements for the Greeks but the Greeks could not reciprocate because of the Moslem minority. In spite of this the Turks had just arrested 10 women - he didn't know why.

Turkey was still ruled by the Generals, the Prime Minister had no power. Phase I of their plan would be to help the Islands and the Turks had already offered electricity and water. Phase II was to obtain the de-militarisation when the Greek population would withdraw through fear, and Phase III would represent the takeover. The US never could understand Mediterranean politics. I suggested a non-aggression pact - he agreed and said how would it be guaranteed? NATO could do this but the Turks would not allow this to happen.

He then got rather heated over Cyprus - an example of Turkish aggression and no help from Greece's allies. NATO's bullets were used to shoot Greek soldiers. (There were both Greek and Turkish soldiers on the Island at the time). I suggested the Colonels were mainly responsible and he partly agreed.

Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. John Capsis

An ex-journalist, not an MP, very pro-British (his son was educated at the LSE and he fled to London when the Colonels took over). Impressively open to us.

Had just received a cable from Ankara that Lord Carrington's No. 2 had been very rudely received! Thought relations could improve over Lemnos with Carrington's diplomacy.

He explained the Treaty of Lausanne 1923 and Montreaux 1936 had authorised the de-militarisation and the re-militarisation of Lemnos and Samothaki (Greek) and Imvros and Tenedos (Turkish).

Prime Minister Papandreou was a genuine Greek Nationalist and did not bang the drum for party purposes (?). PASOK, in opposition, prevented the NDP signing the US bases agreement so there would be no change of policy even if the NDP should win the next election. Businessmen were getting together which might help relieve tension (the Turkish PM also told me that this was happening).

F16s were being purchased by both sides (co-production was not possible), and owing to different claims over air space in the Aegean a clash was always possible. The Greek Air Force was good and intercepted all planes entering their air space without their permission.

He also expressed the view that the US supported the Colonels. I suggested a non-aggression pact and he said this had been suggested to Turkey in February 1984 but there had been no reply.

He agreed that a Turkish attack would be pointless but said that they intended to expand to the West and that Greece could take no chances (cf. Cyprus). What Greece needed was a NATO guarantee.

We argued about the "Army of the Aegean" and he showed me a situation map showing that this was Turkey's largest army, 24,000 men and 149 landing craft. (The Turks had told me that this was a training unit based on Ismir). Our North Atlantic Assembly Sub-Committee flew over this area in a helicopter and could see no landing craft.

He claimed that Prime Minister Ozal was powerless and would not last long. The Generals were in charge and planned aggression. Oil is not now an issue as it was too deep. However, the Turkish threat which started in 1973 had continued ever since (Cyprus was invaded in July 1974). He then gave us a list of threats spoken by prominent Turks.

He agreed that the Turks could not gain by starting a war, but said that Greece had to be prepared. He said that the Turkish economy was in a mess and the Turkish Prime Minister had failed to cure this.

Leader of the Opposition National Democratic Party
Mr. Constantine Mitsotakis (an ex Foreign Minister)

Very friendly and optimistic. Would be seeing Mrs. Thatcher in London in a few days and also Lord Carrington in Brussels.

He agreed that the Turkish Prime Minister had little power and he himself kept in touch with the President and the Generals. He thought that there could be a breakthrough if only the Turks would make the first move on Lemnos, and possibly some adjustment in Cyprus followed by a non-aggression pact.

He was optimistic about the chances of the National Democratic Party in the General Election in October 1985, or perhaps earlier (perhaps too optimistic as PASOK had re-distributed much wealth).

NATO must move over Lemnos, the Turks would take this and it could become part of the package deal.

There was no chance of an extension of sea limits to 12 miles by Greece (they knew the consequences!) However, the Greek obsession over Turkey was not justified.

He considered Mr. Drosoyannis good but had no use for Mr. Capsis, who was a journalist rather than a minister!

His party HQ was very busy at 0900!!

CONCLUSIONS ON VISITS TO TURKEY AND GREECE

1. Both Governments re-affirm that they have no hostile intention towards each other, and both said that businessmen are in contact with each other to try and resolve economic problems.
2. The Greek fears are genuine and strongly held, even if they are grossly exaggerated.
3. There must be a stage by stage approach to lessen the present hostility.
4. The issue which could cause hostilities would be the extension round the Greek Islands from the present six mile to a twelve mile limit. This the Greeks say they have no intention of doing.
5. The Greek case over re-militarising Lemnos is a strong one and should be the starting point of reducing hostility if the Turks (whom I understand have re-militarised both Tenedos and Imvros) would agree - this I believe is a distinct possibility.
6. Talks over Cyprus in New York seem to be getting nowhere, but a slight rectification of the Turkish line, which I understand might be possible, would be interpreted in Athens as a gesture.
7. Both Governments say they want a Federal Constitution for Cyprus in the future.
8. The next stage might be some agreement over air space over the Aegean. This would be difficult to achieve but as the Greek airforce intercept all unidentified aircraft flying in their airspace and as Turkey and later Greece are acquiring F16s, an incident is more than possible and this could have very serious consequences.

9.

Finally, as both governments say privately that they have no territorial ambitions against each other they should be persuaded to say so publicly in a non-aggression pact registered by the United Nations.

10.

This programme would be difficult to achieve but I believe, given a reasonable amount of goodwill on both sides, that it is achievable as any alternative could have consequences that would be very serious to both countries and to NATO as a whole.

PHBW

November 1984