



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 December 1984

Dear Peter,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN:  
NORTHERN IRELAND

I have seen a copy of Washington telegram no. 3725 about the handling and public presentation of discussion on Northern Ireland by the Prime Minister and President Reagan.

I have discussed this with Bernard Ingham. We both think that it is dangerous and unrealistic to try to dodge the issue in the way suggested by the State Department. There is no doubt that the fact of a discussion would leak in Washington and suspicions would be created if we seemed to have connived at hushing it up.

It would surely be much better for us to be able to say that the Prime Minister, at her initiative, briefed President Reagan on the Anglo-Irish Summit and thanked him for what the United States was doing to clamp down on support for terrorists. She also expressed the hope that he could help even more in counteracting NORAID. This would, of course, be said only after the meeting. I agree with the Embassy in Washington that we should decline to comment on individual subjects to be discussed at Camp David in advance of the meeting.

Yours sincerely  
C.D. Powell

(C.D. Powell)

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 December 1984

Spoken to Mr.  
 Appleyard - Garsed  
 with in letter  
 CD.

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Visit to Washington: Public Reference  
to possible discussion of Northern Ireland

Washington telno 3725 seeks guidance on how to react to the news that Congressman Biaggi will petition the President to raise Northern Ireland with the Prime Minister.

It would clearly be unfortunate if it subsequently looked as though Northern Ireland was discussed primarily at the instigation of Congressman Biaggi. The Embassy suggest that the best way to avoid this outcome would be for both sides to confirm that the subject was discussed and to say that the Prime Minister had wished to brief the President on her meeting in November with Dr Fitzgerald. The Prime Minister is of course being briefed to speak to the President on Northern Ireland. This seems to us better than the alternative State Department suggestion that they should try to fudge the issue.

There is a subsidiary question relating to whether anything should be said in advance. In our view we should follow normal practice and say nothing. If we advertise the the Prime Minister is going to raise Northern Ireland with the President it will put a quite different and undesirable complexion on the matter.

I enclose a draft telegram of reply to Washington which if you agree with the above, we shall despatch as soon as possible.

*Yours ever,*

*Lee Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
 10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Precedence/Deskby

**IMMEDIATE**

ZCZC  
GRS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
DESKBY  
FM FCO  
PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
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6 FM FCO 131300Z DEC 84  
7 TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 INFO BIS NEW YORK, DUBLIN  
10 YOUR TELNO 3725: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT,  
11 22 DECEMBER: NORTHERN IRELAND  
12 1. We agree that the line you propose in your para 7 seems  
13 much more likely to achieve our objectives than the State  
14 Department suggestion in para 4. Please seek their agreement  
15 to your proposal.  
16 2. As implied by your para 8 we should certainly not wish you  
17 to say in advance what individual subjects will be discussed at  
18 Camp David. The hypothetical advantages of pre-empting Biaggi  
19 seem to us to be minimal.  
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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept RID	Distribution NI LIMITED NAD, MAED, SCU, RID PROTOCOL PS PS/LADY YOUNG PS/MR RENTON PS/PUS SIR W HARDING MR DAVID THOMAS CC: PS/No 10 Downing St Mr Cartledge, Cabinet Office
Drafted by (Block capitals) G E CLARK		
Telephone number 233 3994		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



10 DOWNING STREET

To Power

I think it is quite - and dangerous - unrealistic to dodge the issue. In any case it will leak in Washington and suspicions will be created if we have remained at hush up the fact of a discussion of Northern Ireland. I think the State Department on this evidence is either mad or Machiavellian.

I would like to be able to say that the PM, at the initiative, briefed President Reagan on the Irish bilateral (in the course of which I would draw attention to the positive points about the Jews in the community) and the thanked President for what USA was doing to clamp down on terrorism and hoped for more help in countering Nordair. 14  
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